Larry Lawson, et al. v. John Coggi, et al

Case Number

25CV01655

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 09/03/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Defendant Melinda Coggi’s Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiffs Larry Lawson and Nancy Duong: Tracy Ettinghoff

For Defendant Melinda Coggi: Elizabeth Opuni Afriyie

For Defendant John Coggi: No appearance

                      

RULING

For the reasons set forth herein:

Defendant Melinda Coggi’s motion to set aside entry of default is granted. Melinda Coggi shall separately file and serve her answer to Plaintiffs’ complaint no later than September 5, 2025.

The Court sets a CMC for this case on 11/5/25 at 8:30am.

Background

This action commenced on March 18, 2025, by the filing of the complaint by Plaintiffs Larry Lawson and Nancy Duong (collectively “Plaintiffs”) against Defendants John Coggi (“John”) and Melinda Coggi (“Melinda”) (collectively “Defendants”) for Breach of Contract. [Note: Due to common surnames, Defendants will be referred to by their given names to avoid confusion. No disrespect is intended.]

As alleged in the complaint:

Plaintiffs and Defendants both own real property in the Shadow Hills Single Family Lot Owners’ Association in Santa Barbara. (Compl., ¶ 7.) Defendants live at 4463 Shadow Hills Blvd., Santa Barbara. (Ibid.) Plaintiffs live in Texas but use their property in Shadow Hills for vacation purposes. (Ibid.)

On January 25, 2019, Plaintiffs and Defendants brought an action against the Shadow Hills of Santa Barbara Master Association, Shadow Hills Single Family Lots Owners’ Association, and George and Mary Ellen Guffey for alleged wrongs committed in their housing development (Case No. 19CV00454). (Compl., ¶ 8.)

In January 2019, the parties entered into an oral agreement in which Plaintiffs agreed to pay some or all of Defendants’ legal fees and costs incurred in Case No. 19CV00454, and Defendants agreed to repay the fees upon final judgment in the action. (Compl., ¶ 9.) The parties agreed that the fees were not limited to a predetermined maximum amount. (Ibid.)

In May 2020, Plaintiffs and Defendants entered into a written agreement memorializing the agreement for repayment of attorney’s fees (the “agreement”). (Compl., ¶ 10 & Exh A.) As part of the agreement, it was agreed that Plaintiffs would advance and pay the Defendants’ legal fees in connection with Case No. 19CV00454, and that Defendants would reimburse Plaintiffs at the conclusion of the litigation. (Ibid.)

Case No. 19CV00454 was tried in the Spring of 2022, and the trial Court found in favor of the Defendants in that action. (Compl., ¶ 12.) The HOA and the Guffeys were awarded $800,000 and $500,000 in attorneys’ fees, respectively. (Ibid.)

On appeal, the appellate Court issued its decision on January 29, 2024, affirming in part, reversing in part, and vacating the attorneys’ fees awards. (Compl., ¶ 13.) The Remittitur was issued on April 9, 2024. (Ibid.)

In October 2024, the parties in Case No. 19CV00454 entered into a settlement agreement and the case was fully resolved on January 7, 2025, when the settlement agreement with the Guffeys was fully executed by all parties. (Compl., ¶ 13.)

Plaintiffs paid approximately $493,847.63 of Defendants’ legal expenses but, despite numerous written demands for reimbursement, Defendants have only paid Plaintiffs $15,000.00 of the amount owed, in May 2024. (Compl., ¶ 14.)

On April 18, 2025, Melinda was personally served with the summons and complaint, in the present action, in Palm Desert, California.

Having received no answer to the complaint, on June 3, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a request for entry of default which was entered as requested.

Melinda now moves to set aside the entry of default pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b).

Plaintiffs have not filed opposition or any other response to the motion.

Analysis

“The Court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken. . . . Notwithstanding any other requirements of this section, the Court shall, whenever an application for relief is made no more than six months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by an attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, vacate any (1) resulting default entered by the clerk against his or her client, and which will result in entry of a default judgment, or (2) resulting default judgment or dismissal entered against his or her client, unless the Court finds that the default or dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).)

The motion was filed on July 25, 2025, and is timely.

The trial Court has broad discretion to vacate the judgment and/or the clerk’s entry of default that preceded it.  However, “this discretion may be exercised only after the party seeking relief has shown that there is a proper ground for relief, and that the party has raised that ground in a procedurally proper manner, within any applicable time limits.” (Cruz v. Fagor America, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 488, 495.)

Unless the motion to set aside default is accompanied by an attorney affidavit of fault, which is not the case here, relief is discretionary, and the burden is on Defendant to demonstrate mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. (See Lorenz v. Commercial Accept. Ins. Co. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 981, 989.) The party moving for relief based on “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” must show specific facts demonstrating that one of these conditions was met. (Hopkins & Carley v. Gens (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1410.)

“The law favors judgments based on the merits, not procedural missteps. Our Supreme Court has repeatedly reminded us that in this area doubts must be resolved in favor of relief, with an order denying relief scrutinized more carefully than an order granting it. As Justice Mosk put it in Rappleyea, “ ‘Because the law favors disposing of cases on their merits, ‘ “any doubts in applying section 473 must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief from default [citations]. Therefore, a trial Court order denying relief is scrutinized more carefully than an order permitting trial on the merits.” ’ [Citations.]” (Lasalle v. Vogel (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 127, 134-135.)

 

By way of sworn declaration (“MC Decl.”), Melinda declares:

“I am an 80-year-old resident of an assisted living facility in Santa Barbara. I recall receiving a copy of the current lawsuit in about the third week of April 2025. When I received the lawsuit, I was involved in a divorce proceeding, which is still ongoing. I had moved out of my primary residence and lived in a temporary rental. Additionally, I was in the process of undergoing an examination by my health care providers to determine whether I could safely live on my own or whether I needed to relocate to an assisted living facility. Ultimately, my health care providers determined that I needed to relocate to an assisted living facility, which is where I currently reside.” (MC Decl., ¶ 2.)

“Due to my age and other health-related issues, I am easily forgetful. Additionally, my life situation at the time I received this lawsuit was highly overwhelming to me.” (MC Decl., ¶ 3.)

“About two weeks after I recall receiving a copy of this lawsuit, I emailed the attorney for the Plaintiffs and requested that he grant me a 30-day extension to June 16, 2025, to find an attorney to assist me with the lawsuit. In my email, I advised the attorney that I had been dealing with serious health issues that included two hospital stays. . . . I did not hear back from the attorney.” (MC Decl., ¶ 4 & Exh. A.)

“Thereafter, I contacted multiple attorney referral services to assist me in obtaining an attorney. Coordinating with the attorney referral services was incredibly difficult. I had difficulties communicating with them and providing them with the requested information for them to assist me in finding an attorney. About four weeks after I started working with the attorney referral services, on June 17, 2025, the matched me with an attorney to assist me with the lawsuit.” (MC Decl., ¶ 5.)

“My attorney informed me that the Plaintiff filed a request for entry of default against me on June 3, 2025. I was not served with a copy of this default and was therefore not aware of it.” (MC Decl., ¶ 6.) “My attorney immediately contacted the Plaintiffs’ attorney and requested that the Plaintiff set aside the default so that I could respond to the lawsuit. My attorney made several attempts between about June 18 and now to request that the Plaintiff set aside the default, but the Plaintiff refused.” (Id. at ¶ 7.)

“My failure to file an answer on time was not intentional. I faced extremely overwhelming circumstances and had difficulties obtaining an attorney on time to help me with the lawsuit.” (MC Decl., ¶ 8.)

A copy of the proposed answer is attached as Exhibit B to Melinda’s declaration.

Given Melinda’s circumstances and the undisputed facts surrounding the filing of default, the Court finds ample justification to set aside the entry of default. Any inadvertence on the part of Melinda in failing to timely answer the complaint, after requesting an extension, was justifiable. Any neglect was excusable. It would be a miscarriage of justice to let the default stand.

The motion will be granted. Although, as noted above, the proposed answer to Plaintiffs’ complaint is attached as an exhibit, it will be ordered that the answer be separately filed and served.