Matter of Brian McAdams

Case Number

25CV01390

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 08/01/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Petition for Approval for Transfer of Payment Rights

Tentative Ruling

For the reasons set forth herein, the verified petition of J.G. Wentworth Originations, LLC, for approval of transfer of payment rights is granted in accordance with this ruling. Petitioner shall appear at the hearing on the petition and be prepared to discuss any further matters remaining for the court at this time.

Background:

On March 4, 2025, petitioner J.G. Wentworth Originations, LLC (Petitioner) filed a verified petition pursuant to Insurance Code section 10134 et seq., for approval of a transfer of certain structured settlement payment rights of Brian McAdams (McAdams). As alleged in the petition:

McAdams entered into a settlement (the settlement) in connection with a personal injury claim which provides for periodic structured settlement payments (the structured payments) of $270,000 on August 1, 2037, and $300,000.00 on August 1, 2042, with no future payments. (Pet., ¶¶ 3-4; p. 4, ll. 7-8; Section VI, ¶ 2.) Symetra Life Insurance Company (Symetra Life) issued an insurance contract which was used to fund the structured payments. (Pet., ¶ 5.) Symetra Assigned Benefits Service Company (Symetra Benefits) is the “structured settlement obligor” with respect to the structured payments. (Pet., ¶ 6.)

McAdams has agreed to sell, and Petitioner has agreed to purchase, the structured payments described above pursuant to a “California Purchase Contract” (the Purchase Contract), a copy of which is attached to the petition as exhibit A. (Pet., ¶ 7 & Exh. A.) Petitioner seeks the court’s approval to effectuate the transfer of the structured payments as set forth in the Purchase Contract. (Pet., ¶ 9.)

On March 7, 2025, Petitioner filed a notice (the Notice) of the hearing on the Petition which was set for May 30, 2025. (Notice at p. 1.)

On March 28, 2025, Petitioner separately filed errata (the errata) to section III, paragraph 10, and section VI, paragraph 10, of the petition, an amended exhibit A to the petition, and a declaration of McAdams (the McAdams Declaration) in support of the petition.

Also on March 28, 2025, Petitioner filed a proof of service (the POS) declaring, under penalty of perjury, that the petition, the Notice, the McAdams Declaration, the amended exhibit A to the petition, and the errata were each served on McAdams, Symetra Life, and Symetra Benefits on March 28, 2025, by regular and overnight mail.

On May 2, 2025, Petitioner filed an amended exhibit D to the petition which consists of an affidavit of McAdams (the Affidavit).

On June 6, 2013, the court entered an order (the Order) adopting its tentative ruling on the petition as follows:

“For all reasons discussed herein, the court will continue the hearing on the present petition to permit Petitioner to submit supplemental briefing sufficiently addressing the matters further discussed below.

“A direct or indirect transfer of structured settlement payment rights is not effective and a structured settlement obligor or annuity issuer is not required to make any payment directly or indirectly to any transferee of structured settlement payment rights unless the transfer has been approved in advance in a final court order based on express written findings by the court that:

“(1) The transfer is in the best interest of the payee, taking into account the welfare and support of the payee’s dependents.

“(2) The payee has been advised in writing by the transferee to seek independent professional advice regarding the transfer and has either received that advice or knowingly waived, in writing, the opportunity to receive the advice.

“(3) The transferee has complied with the notification requirements pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (f), the transferee has provided the payee with a disclosure form that complies with Section 10136, and the transfer agreement complies with Sections 10136 and 10138.

“(4) The transfer does not contravene any applicable statute or the order of any court or other government authority.

“(5) The payee understands the terms of the transfer agreement, including the terms set forth in the disclosure statement required by Section 10136.

“(6) The payee understands and does not wish to exercise the payee’s right to cancel the transfer agreement.” (Ins. Code, § 10139.5, subd. (a); see also 321 Henderson Receivables Origination LLC v. Sioteco (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1066 (321 Henderson).) (Note: Undesignated statutory references shall be to the Insurance Code unless otherwise stated.)

Generally, the court approval process governed by Insurance Code section 10136 et seq. (the Structured Settlement Transfer Act or Act) “requires: (1) disclosures to the transferor of the structured settlement payment rights, (2) notice to the Attorney General, and (3) court approval[,]” and requires the filing of a petition “in the county in which the transferor resides for approval of the transfer, attaching copies of the petition, the transfer agreement, the disclosure form, the annuity contract, any qualified assignment agreement and the structured settlement agreement, a list of the names and ages of the transferor’s dependents, notice of the court hearing date, and notice of a right to respond....After consideration of the petition and its attached documents, any written support or opposition by interested parties, and any evidence presented at the hearing, the court grants or denies the petition.” (321 Henderson, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1065-1066.) To grant the petition for approval, the court must make the express findings set forth above. (Id. At p. 1066.) 

The express written findings required to grant the present petition must be supported by facts and evidence appearing in the record. From the present record, it is unclear which facts or evidence support each of the factors set forth above, why any particular facts or evidence are sufficient to permit the court to make each of the findings described above, and where these matters are located in the record. Moreover, based on the manner in which Petitioner has presented the petition and the ostensibly supporting documents including the McAdams Declaration and Affidavit, the court is forced to expend scarce judicial resources to search the record for relevant facts and evidence and to determine which of these facts and evidence may support each of the factors described above.

By way of example, the court must find that the proposed transfer is in the best interest of McAdams. Petitioner fails to explain which facts or evidence support this finding, and why.

Furthermore, assuming without deciding that there exists evidence to support an express finding that the proposed transfer is in the best interest of McAdams, it is unclear where in the record this evidence appears. By way of example, the petition includes allegations regarding McAdams’ age, employment status, and conclusory allegations regarding a general “hardship situation” faced by McAdams. (Pet. at p. 4, ll. 10-18; p. 6, l. 27; p. 8, ll. 3-4 & 22 [generally stating that McAdams if facing a “hardship situation”].) The petition also includes general allegations regarding the nature of the structured settlement payments which are the subject of the Purchase Contract. (Pet. at p. 4, ll. 7-9 & p. 7, ll. 6-24.)

Additional facts are set forth in the separately filed McAdams Declaration, including with respect to McAdams’ retirement, money collected by McAdams from “SSI”, the original structured settlement agreement, and the manner in which McAdams intends to use proceeds from the proposed transaction. (McAdams Decl., ¶¶4 & 8.) These facts do not appear in the petition.

The record also includes what appears to be contradictory information. For example, though McAdam states in the McAdams Declaration that the original structured settlement is attached as exhibit D to the Petition, that settlement is not attached to the petition as exhibit D. (McAdams Decl., ¶ 4; Pet. Exh. D [single page stating “to be provided”].) In addition, McAdams asserts in the McAdams Declaration that if the proposed transaction is approved, McAdams will still collect annuity payments of $210,000 in 2027, and $240,000 in 2032. (McAdams Decl., ¶ 11.) In the petition, Petitioner asserts that there are no future payments to be made under the original settlement agreement. (Pet., ¶ 2.) Absent further information, the court is unable to resolve these contradictory assertions which, on their face, appear to be relevant to the issue of whether the proposed transfer is in McAdam’s best interest.

The Affidavit includes additional facts which also do not appear in the petition or the McAdams Declaration, including with respect to the terms of the original settlement agreement, the tort action giving rise to the structured settlement payments, whether there exists a conservator, guardian, or trust agreement, and the interested parties, among other things.

Also absent from the record is sufficient reasoned argument showing, with appropriate citations to the record, why the “California Disclosure Statement” attached to the petition as exhibit B complies with section 10136, or why the Purchase Contract complies with the requirements of sections 10136 and 10138, as required by subdivision (a)(3) of section 10139.5.

The examples provided above are intended to be illustrative but not exhaustive. For all reasons discussed above, the court is presently unable to make the express written findings required under section 10139.5 without expending significantly more judicial resources than would otherwise be required under similar circumstances. Therefore, the court will continue the hearing on the petition to permit Petitioner to file and serve a supplemental brief explaining, on a point-by-point basis with sufficient reasoned argument and specific citations to the record, why each factor set forth in subdivision (a) of section 10139.5 has been satisfied here. All references to any exhibits appearing in any supplemental brief that may be filed by Petitioner, including the petition, its exhibits, or declarations, “must reference the number or letter of the exhibit, the specific page, and, if applicable, the paragraph or line number.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1113(k).) The evidence, information, and arguments presented in Petitioner’s supplemental brief must be sufficient to permit the court to make the express written findings described above.

The court will also require Petitioner to serve its supplemental brief, if any, on all interested parties as that term is defined in subdivision (g) of section 10134, and to give appropriate notice of the court’s ruling herein.

Notice of the continuance was posted on the court’s tentative ruling website.”

Pursuant to the Order, the court directed Petitioner to, on or before July 18, 2025, file and serve a supplemental brief, if any, setting forth each of the matters further described in the Order as set forth above.

On June 26, 2025, Petitioner filed a first amended petition (the FAP), which repeats the allegations of the petition described above. The FAP includes allegations showing that McAdams became entitled to the structured payments in 1985 or 1986, that McAdams is 78 years old with no minor children, that McAdams is retired, that McAdams will receive $185,000 from the proposed transaction described in the Purchase Contract, and that McAdams entered into this transaction to obtain financial means to assist with caring for McAdams’ mother who is in an assisted living facility, and to make home improvements, among other things. (FAP, ¶¶ 3 & p. 4, ll. 12-17.)

Court records reflect that on July 18, 2025, McAdams filed an amended declaration (the July 18 McAdams declaration) in support of the FAP. Information appearing in exhibit 1 to that declaration, which consists of a statement ostensibly signed by McAdams on July 16, shows that in 1989, McAdams’ daughter sustained a severe brain injury resulting from an automobile accident. (July 18 McAdams Decl., Exh. 1.) A settlement was reached to care for McAdams’ daughter whose estate received an annuity from “Symetra” that was to be paid every 5 years through 2042. (Ibid.) McAdams asserts that he and his first wife were both the sole conservators of the annuity. (July 18 McAdams Decl., Exh. 1 & ¶ 4.) McAdams’ wife and daughter have both passed away leaving McAdams as the sole payee of the payments from Symetra. (Ibid.)

McAdams describes the original payment terms of the annuity issued by Symetra Life and described above. (See July 18 McAdams Decl., ¶ 5.) Based on this description, and the contents of a letter dated September 29, 2021, from Symetra Life attached to the FAP as exhibit C, the annuity provides for the following future payments: (1) $210,000 on August 1, 2027; (2) $240,000 on August 1, 2032; (3) $270,000 on August 1, 2037; and (4) $300,000 on August 1, 2042. (Ibid. & FAP, Exh. C.) According to McAdams, these payments were intended for his daughter’s future medical care and treatment which was necessitated by the automobile accident described above, and not for necessary living expenses. (July 18 McAdams Decl., ¶¶ 6-7.)

Pursuant to the Purchase Contract described above, McAdams is transferring to Petitioner the structured payments of $270,000 due on August 1, 2037, and $300,000 due on August 1, 2042, and will receive the amount of $185,000 from this transaction. (July 18 McAdams Decl., ¶ 5; see also FAP, Exh. A at pdf p. 15, ¶ 2(B) & pdf p. 21, ¶ 10.) McAdams will retain the payments due on August 1, 2027, and August 1, 2032. (July 18 McAdams Decl., ¶ 5.)

McAdams further states that he is 79 years old, retired, and receives monthly social security payments of $1,560 with no other income. (July 18 McAdams Decl., ¶ 8 & Exh. 1.) McAdams’ personal monthly living expenses total $5,000. (July 18 McAdams Decl., Exh. 1.)

McAdams also provides a description of the financial assistance McAdams has been providing to his mother, who is presently 99 years old and in the early stages of dementia, which McAdams has been providing since his father’s passing 16 years ago. (July 18 McAdams Decl., Exh. 1.) McAdams declares that he moved his mother to an assisted living center which costs $4,400 per month. (July 18 McAdams Decl., Exh. 1.) McAdams’ mother receives social security of $2,185, and McAdams covers the difference of this cost each month. (Ibid.)

McAdams asserts that he is presently experiencing financial hardship ostensibly resulting from a neck surgery and a shoulder replacement scheduled in August, and that he would like to perform repairs to his home which is over 50 years old. (July 18 McAdams Decl., ¶ 11 & Exh. 1.)

McAdams does not have any court-ordered child support obligations, and has not attempted or completed any previous transactions involving the structured payments. (July 18 McAdams Decl., ¶¶ 8-9.) McAdams did not receive independent legal or financial advice concerning the subject transaction. (July 18 McAdams Decl., ¶ 12.)

Petitioner also submits in support of the FAP a declaration of its counsel, James R. Felton, who provides information and an opinion purporting to demonstrate why the proposed transfer does not contravene any applicable statute, government authority, or court order.

On July 23, 2025, Petitioner filed a supplemental brief which includes the information described above.

Analysis:

As further discussed in the Order set forth above, the proposed transfer which is the subject of the Purchase Contract must be “approved in advance in a final court order based on express written findings by the court that:

“(1) The transfer is in the best interest of the payee, taking into account the welfare and support of the payee’s dependents.

“(2) The payee has been advised in writing by the transferee to seek independent professional advice regarding the transfer and has either received that advice or knowingly waived, in writing, the opportunity to receive the advice.

“(3) The transferee has complied with the notification requirements pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (f), the transferee has provided the payee with a disclosure form that complies with Section 10136, and the transfer agreement complies with Sections 10136 and 10138.

“(4) The transfer does not contravene any applicable statute or the order of any court or other government authority.

“(5) The payee understands the terms of the transfer agreement, including the terms set forth in the disclosure statement required by Section 10136.

“(6) The payee understands and does not wish to exercise the payee’s right to cancel the transfer agreement.” (Ins. Code, § 10139.5, subd. (a); see also 321 Henderson Receivables Origination LLC v. Sioteco (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1066 (321 Henderson).) (Note: Undesignated statutory references shall be to the Insurance Code unless otherwise stated.)

Generally, Insurance Code section 10136 et seq. (the Structured Settlement Transfer Act or Act) “requires: (1) disclosures to the transferor of the structured settlement payment rights, (2) notice to the Attorney General, and (3) court approval[,]” and the filing of a petition “in the county in which the transferor resides for approval of the transfer, attaching copies of the petition, the transfer agreement, the disclosure form, the annuity contract, any qualified assignment agreement and the structured settlement agreement, a list of the names and ages of the transferor’s dependents, notice of the court hearing date, and notice of a right to respond....After consideration of the petition and its attached documents, any written support or opposition by interested parties, and any evidence presented at the hearing, the court grants or denies the petition.” (321 Henderson, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1065-1066.) To grant the petition, the court must make the express findings set forth above which must be supported by facts and evidence appearing in the record. (Id. at p. 1066.) 

In addition, “[w]hen determining whether the proposed transfer should be approved, including whether the transfer is fair, reasonable, and in the payee’s best interest, taking into account the welfare and support of the payee’s dependents, the court shall consider the totality of the circumstances...” including the factors set forth in subdivision (b) of section 10139.5. (Ins. Code, § 10139.5, subd. (b)(1)-(15).)

The court’s review of the petition and the FAP show that these pleadings comply with procedural requirements set forth in section 10139.5.

Based on the present record, including the court’s findings as set forth herein and the totality of the circumstances present here including McAdam’s desire and preference to complete the transaction described in the Purchase Contract, McAdams’ age and financial situation and obligations, the stated purpose of the transfer, and other factors more fully discussed below, the court finds that the proposed transfer is fair, reasonable, and in McAdams’ best interest. For these and all reasons discussed herein, the court will approve the transfer described in the petition and the Purchase Contract. Further, the court will “retain continuing jurisdiction to interpret and monitor the implementation and closing of the transaction” that is the subject of the Purchase Contract. (Ins. Code, § 10139.5, subd. (i).)

The transfer is in the best interest of McAdams:

Information appearing in the FAP and the July 18 McAdams declaration shows that McAdams does not have any dependents. The available information and evidence also shows that McAdams is a source of financial support for his mother who suffers from dementia and requires assisted living care. Considering this information and evidence, and that McAdams’ monthly income does not appear sufficient to cover McAdams’ mother’s care and McAdams’ monthly living expenses further detailed above, McAdams appears to be experiencing financial hardship. For these and all reasons further discussed above, it appears that the transfer proposed in the FAP, pursuant to the Purchase Contract, is in the best interest of McAdams.

McAdams has been advised in writing by Petitioner to seek independent professional advice regarding the transfer:

Attached to the FAP is a document titled “California Statement Of Professional Representation” (the Waiver). (FAP, Exh. E.) McAdams does not dispute, and appears to concede, that McAdams signed the Waiver on February 26, 2025. (Ibid. & July 18 McAdams Decl., ¶ 12.)

The Waiver states that McAdams has been advised by Petitioner that he should obtain independent professional representation concerning the legal, tax, or financial implications of the proposed transaction. (FAP, Exh. E; see also July 18 McAdams Decl., ¶ 12.) Based on the terms of the Waiver, the court finds that McAdams has been advised in writing by Petitioner to seek independent professional advice regarding the proposed transfer.

The Waiver also states that McAdams does not wish to seek independent professional representation. (FAP, Exh. E.) In addition, McAdams asserts that he did not receive independent legal or financial advice regarding the proposed transaction which is the subject of the Purchase Contract. (July 18 McAdams Decl., ¶ 12.) For these and all reasons further discussed above, the court finds that McAdams has knowingly waived, in writing, the opportunity to receive independent professional advice regarding the proposed transfer.

Petitioner has complied with statutory notification requirements including by providing McAdams with a disclosure form that complies with Section 10136, and the Purchase Contract complies or substantially complies with Sections 10136 and 10138:

Section 10139.5, subdivision (f)(2), provides: “Not less than 20 days prior to the scheduled hearing on any petition for approval of a transfer of structured settlement payment rights under this article, the transferee shall file with the court and serve on all interested parties a notice of the proposed transfer and the petition for its authorization, and shall include the following with that notice:

“(A) A copy of the transferee’s current petition and any other prior petition, whether approved or withdrawn, that was filed with the court in accordance with paragraph (6) of subdivision (c).

“(B) A copy of the proposed transfer agreement and disclosure form required by paragraph (3) of subdivision (a).

“(C) A listing of each of the payee’s dependents, together with each dependent’s age.

“(D) A copy of the disclosure required in subdivision (b) of Section 10136.

“(E) A copy of the annuity contract, if available.

“(F) A copy of any qualified assignment agreement, if available.

“(G) A copy of the underlying structured settlement agreement, if available.

“(H) If a copy of a document described in subparagraph (E), (F), or (G) is unavailable or cannot be located, then the transferee is not required to attach a copy of that document to the petition or notice of the proposed transfer if the transferee satisfies the court that reasonable efforts to locate and secure a copy of the document have been made, including making inquiry with the payee. If the documents are available, but contain a confidentiality or non-disclosure provision, then the transferee shall summarize in the petition the payments due and owing to the payee, and, if requested by the court, shall provide copies of the documents to the court at a scheduled hearing.

“(I) Proof of service showing compliance with the notification requirements of this section.

“(J) Notification that any interested party is entitled to support, oppose, or otherwise respond to the transferee’s petition, either in person or by counsel, by submitting written comments to the court or by participating in the hearing.

“(K) Notification of the time and place of the hearing and notification of the manner in which and the time by which written responses to the petition must be filed, which may not be less than 15 days after service of the transferee’s notice, in order to be considered by the court.

“(L) If the payee entered into the structured settlement at issue within five years prior to the date of the transfer agreement, then the transferee shall provide the following notice to the payee’s attorney of record at the time the structured settlement was created, if the attorney is licensed to practice in California, at the attorney’s address on file with the State Bar of California. The notice shall be delivered by regular mail and shall contain the following language:

‘Your former client, (insert name, address and telephone number of payee), the ‘payee,’ has entered into a contract with (insert name of transferee) to transfer and assign certain future structured settlement payment rights. The transaction is subject to court review and approval under California law. As the payee’s former attorney, you are entitled to receive this notice. You are not required to represent, advise, or consult with the payee in connection with the proposed transaction. You are not required to take any action at all in response to this notice. You may, but are not required to, contact the payee regarding the transaction. The payee is not required to consult with you or provide you any information regarding the transaction, but the payee may do so if he or she wishes.’

“The notice to the former attorney described in this section is not required to be provided if the payee in the transaction was not a party to the original structured settlement at issue (for example, if the payee is an heir or beneficiary of the person who was a party to the original structured settlement). Also, if the payee cannot recall or identify his or her former attorney and if the identity of the former attorney cannot be ascertained from the available structured settlement documents, then the notice described in this subparagraph is not required to be provided and the transfer may proceed without the notice.” (Ins. Code, § 10139.5, subd. (f)(2)(A)-(L).)
 

To show that Petitioner has complied with the statutory requirements set forth above, Petitioner states in the supplemental brief: “Please see Notice of Hearing filed with this court on March 7, 2025. Please see the Proof of Service filed with this court on March 28, 2028. Please see the Disclosure statement attached to the Amended Petition as Exhibit B.” (Supp. Brief at p. 2, ll. 14-19.)

Information appearing in the POS described above is sufficient to show that the Notice, the petition, the McAdams Declaration, the amended exhibit A to the petition, and the errata were served on McAdams, Symetra Life, and Symetra Benefits. Noted above, the petition also includes a copy of the Purchase Contract, and a copy of a “California Disclosure Statement” (the Disclosure) ostensibly signed by McAdams on February 26, 2025. (See Pet., Exh. B.) In addition, the Notice states: “you are entitled to support, oppose, or otherwise respond to the transferee's application, either in person or by counsel, by submitting written comments to the Court or by participating in the hearing.” (Notice at p. 2, ll. 7-9.)

Court records also reflect that on June 16, 2025, Petitioner served McAdams, Symetra Life, and Symetra Benefits with a notice of the continued hearing on the petition. (See June 16, 2025, Notice Of Continuance Of Hearing.) The FAP was also ostensibly served on McAdams, Symetra Life, and Symetra Benefits on June 26, 2025. (FAP at pdf pp. 40-41 [proof of service of FAP].)

Further, information appearing in the petition and the FAP suggests or indicates that there does not exist a qualified assignment agreement, and that a copy of the annuity contract or underlying structured settlement agreement is not available. For example, the documents attached to the petition and the FAP include a “Factoring Information Request” from Symetra Life identifying McAdams as the payee under policy or account number AA0640224, and the letter from Symetra Life to McAdams described above, which sets forth the schedule of the structured payments under the policy. (Pet. & FAP, Exhs. C.) The court infers that these documents are the only documents relating to the annuity contract or the underlying structured settlement agreement that are available.

Absent conflicting information, the court also infers from information appearing in the petition, FAP, and the declarations of McAdams as further discussed above that efforts to locate and secure copies of the annuity contract, any qualified assignment agreement, or underlying structured settlement agreement were made by Petitioner, including by inquiring with McAdams to obtain copies of these documents.

Available information also shows that McAdams did not enter into the underlying structured settlement agreement within five years prior to the date of the Purchase Contract.

For all reasons further discussed above, the court finds that Petitioner has complied with the notice requirements described in section 10139.5, subdivision (f)(2).

For all reasons further discussed above, the record is also sufficient to show that Petitioner has provided McAdams with the Disclosure. (See, e.g., July 18 McAdams Decl., ¶ 13 [stating that McAdams understands the terms of the “disclosure statement”].) In addition, the court’s review of the Disclosure shows that it complies with section 10136. The Purchase Contract also complies or substantially complies with section 10136, and does not appear to include any terms which are prohibited under section 10138.

The transfer does not appear to contravene any applicable statute or the order of any court or other government authority:

In the Felton declaration submitted in support of the FAP, Felton states that that he has reviewed the petition, the Purchase Contract, the Disclosure, and “other statistical data regarding the potential transferor of their structured settlement payment rights.” (Felton Decl., ¶ 5.) Based on this review, Felton states that the statutes which apply here are section 10134 et seq., and an Internal Revenue Code provision codified as 26 U.S.C. § 5891 which, according to Felton, governs the Act and requires the court to enter a “qualified order” to avoid certain tax consequences. (Felton Decl., ¶¶ 7 & 9.) It is Felton’s opinion that the proposed transfer does not violate any provision of these statutes. (Felton Decl., ¶¶ 10.)

Felton further asserts that he is unaware of any other order or authority which would impact or contravene the proposed transfer. (Felton Decl., ¶¶ 8 & 11.)  

The tax imposed under subsection (a) of the Internal Revenue Code provision cited by Felton “shall not apply in the case of a structured settlement factoring transaction in which the transfer of structured settlement payment rights is approved in advance in a qualified order.” (26 U.S.C. § 5891(b)(1).) A “qualified order” is defined in the statute to include a final order finding that the transfer of the structured settlement payment rights “does not contravene any Federal or State statute or the order of any court or responsible administrative authority” and “ is in the best interest of the payee, taking into account the welfare and support of the payee’s dependents,” and a final order issued “under the authority of an applicable State statute by an applicable State court....” (26 U.S.C.A. § 5891(b)(2)(A)-(B).) Under the provisions of this code section, the Act qualifies as an “applicable State statute”. (See 26 U.S.C.A. § 5891(b)(3).)

For all reasons discussed above, and considering the information appearing in the Felton declaration and described above, the court finds that the transfer does not appear to contravene any applicable statute, order of any court, or other government authority.

McAdams asserts that he understands the terms of the Purchase Contract and Disclosure, and his right to cancel the Purchase Contract:

Information and evidence appearing in the petition, the FAP, the McAdams Declaration, and the June 18 McAdams declaration indicates or shows that McAdams understands the terms of the Purchase Contract and Disclosure, and does not wish to exercise McAdams’ right to cancel the Purchase Contract. (See, e.g., July 18 McAdams Decl., ¶ 13.) Based on this information and evidence, the court finds that McAdams understands the terms of the Purchase Contract and Disclosure, understands that he is entitled to cancel the Purchase Contract, and that McAdams does not wish to exercise his right to cancel the Purchase Contract.