Sable Offshore Corp. and Pacific Pipeline Company v. California Coastal Commission

Case Number

25CV00974

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 07/09/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Sable’s Motion to Stay the Commission’s Cease and Desist Order

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiffs and Petitioners Sable Offshore Corp. and Pacific Pipeline Company [“Sable”]: Jeffrey D. Dintzer, Matthew C. Wickersham, Garrett B. Stanton, Trevor D. Large, Victoria Diffenderfer

                                   

For Defendant and Respondent California Coastal Commission [“Commission”]: Rob Bonta, Norman N. Franklin, Wyatt E. Sloan-Tribe

                                   

HEARING

Sable’s Motion to Stay the Commission’s Cease and Desist Order.

RULING

For the reasons set forth herein, Sable’s Motion for stay of the cease and desist orders of the Commission is DENIED.

Background

In its May 28, 2025, ruling on the application of the Commission, discussed below, the Court set out the following background (quotation marks omitted):

On February 18, 2025, Sable filed their original complaint for damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief against the Commission. On April 16, Sable filed an amended complaint, which includes a petition for writ of mandate.

Also on April 16, 2025, the Commission filed a cross-complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against Sable. (Note: The Commission filed a first amended cross-complaint on May 15, 2025.) The cross-complaint alleges that Sable is the owner of the Las Flores Pipelines, which include pipeline segments designated as CA-324 and CA-325 (collectively, the Pipeline). (First Amended Complaint [FAC], ¶ 1; Cross-complaint, ¶ 2; Teufel decl., ¶ 3.) The Pipeline is located within the coastal zone in unincorporated Santa Barbara County. (Cook decl., ¶ 3 & exhibit A, at pp. 4, 9.) … The Pipelines were operated until 2015, when the Pipelines were shut down as a result of the Refugio Oil Spill.

According to the Commission, in March 2025, Sable, in the Sable Statement, stated that several months ago Sable had undertaken steps to “repair certain ‘anomalies’ detected along Line CA-324 and planned to repair other identified anomalies along both Lines CA-324 and CA-325.” (Sable Statement, p. 14.) A pipeline “anomaly” was explained as “a pipeline segment with some deviation from its original configuration.” (Ibid.) Sable stated that repair of any particular detected anomaly generally requires that it: “(1) access the affected pipeline segment via existing roadways and rights-of-way, which in some locations requires placing metal plates over water courses; (2) excavate the anomaly site, including the dirt beneath the affected pipeline segment, which in some locations may require dewatering and associated discharge; (3) expose the pipeline segment by removing insulation and sandblasting; (4) evaluate whether a ‘Composite Repair’ or ‘Cut-Out Repair’ is required, (5) conduct the Composite or Cut-Out Repair as appropriate, sandblast the repaired pipeline segment, and apply an epoxy coating, pipe tape, and rockguard wrap; (6) backfill the anomaly site, and (7) conduct final site cleanup including erosion control and revegetation work[.]” (Id. at p. 15, fn. omitted.) This work requires the use of heavy equipment and may involve the removal of vegetation. (Ibid.)

According to Sable, Sable began conducting repair and maintenance activities to the Las Flores Pipelines in 2024. (Rusch decl., ¶ 4.) Sable conducted repair and maintenance until receiving Notice of Violation File No. V-9-24-0152 and subsequent communications from Coastal Commission staff dated October 4, 2024. (Ibid.) Sable thereafter suspended repair and maintenance activities. (Ibid.) Sable resumed repair and maintenance activities on February 14, 2025, following confirmation from the County of Santa Barbara (County) that the repair and maintenance activities were authorized pursuant to existing permits. (Ibid.)

Sable has completed the safety valve installation work on the Las Flores Pipelines and all span remediation work on the Santa Ynez Pipelines. (Rusch decl., ¶ 5.) Sable has also completed in the Coastal Zone approximately 100 anomaly repairs, and the only work remaining includes approximately twenty-two (22) additional anomaly repairs to the Las Flores Pipelines, which will occur onshore in pre-disturbed areas along small sections of the Las Flores Pipelines. (Ibid.) Of the

approximately twenty-two remaining repairs, 18 repairs will be conducted within Sable’s right of way provided by the California Department of Parks and Recreation within the Gaviota State Park. (Ibid.) Additionally, approximately four repairs will be conducted within Sable’s right of entry obtained from the Land Trust for the County of Santa Barbara. (Ibid.) Sable’s remaining repair and maintenance work will be completed in approximately six weeks. (Ibid.)

Sable currently has a right of entry to perform the repair and maintenance activities from the California Department of Parks and Recreation, and Plaintiffs are negotiating a slightly revised right of entry that is anticipated to be agreed upon following the hearing on the Commission’s application for a temporary restraining order (TRO). (Rusch decl., ¶ 6.) Sable currently has a right of entry to property of the Land Trust for the County of Santa Barbara. (Ibid.) Sable is completing repair and maintenance activities pursuant to existing Coastal Development Permits (CDPs) for the Las Flores Pipelines, which were permitted by the County, not the Coastal Commission, under the County’s Local Coastal Program pursuant to its delegated authority from the Coastal Commission. (Id. at ¶ 7.)

All work is being conducted in the disturbed pipeline corridor where all impacts were determined to be permanent for the lifetime of the Las Flores Pipelines. (Rusch decl., ¶ 8.) In addition, for all ongoing work, Sable is implementing robust construction best management practices, including conducting pre-construction biological resources surveys, including nesting bird surveys, ensuring that a biologist is available onsite to monitor work, and conducting environmental awareness training with all onsite personnel, to ensure that impacts to coastal resources would fall within the scope of impacts previously analyzed during the Las Flores Pipelines’ environmental review, authorized under the CDPs, and approved by the County. (Ibid.)

According to the Commission, on April 9, 2025, Commission Energy and Ocean Resources staff conducted a site visit to a portion of pipeline segment CA-324. (Teufel decl., ¶¶ 4-5.) Commission staff observed the presence of various construction equipment, including several excavators excavating soil, a bulldozer grading an inland slope, and a mechanical crane lowering equipment or a pipeline section into a trench. (Id. at ¶ 4 & exhibit AA.) Personal and construction vehicles were parked at several locations within fields adjacent to the work area, and at least seven white construction trucks were also present, several bearing the emblem of Pacific Petroleum. (Ibid.) Staff also visited a site near Refugio Beach and observed heavy equipment, including an excavator. (Id. at ¶ 5) Staff further visited a third nearby site and observed a truck with a “Fence Factory” decal on the driver’s side door parked adjacent to an above-ground valve, and personnel actively installing a fence post in the adjacent field. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Staff also observed construction equipment, vehicles, and portable restrooms along a section of pipeline segment CA-324 near the Gaviota Pump Station. (Id. at ¶ 7.) All of this activity took place within the coastal zone. (Id. at ¶ 10.) To the Commission’s knowledge, Sable had never applied to the County for a CDP to perform this work, nor had Sable provided Commission staff with a detailed description of the nature of the anomaly work it was conducting on the onshore pipelines or the precise locations of the anomaly work. (Ibid.)

After a public hearing on April 10, 2025, the Commission issued a cease and desist order (CDO). (Commission Request for Judicial Notice [RJN], exhibit 1.) The CDO includes findings adopted by the Commission as set forth in the Commission’s staff report. (RJN, exhibit 1, at pp. 27-28; RJN, exhibit 3.) The CDO includes the following orders that Sable:

“Cease and desist from engaging in or undertaking any development, as that term is defined in the Coastal Act (PRC Section 30106) and the Santa Barbara County Local Coastal Program (at Section 35-58), on any of the property and/or locations defined in Section 4.3, below, as the Santa Ynez Unit, including but not limited to the following development undertaken or planned at A) locations onshore: excavation; removal of major vegetation; fill of wetlands; grading and widening of roads; installation of metal plates over water courses; dewatering and discharge of water; removal, replacement, and reinforcement of pipeline and pipeline infrastructure; and other development associated with the return to service of Las Flores Pipelines CA-324 and CA-325; and[ ]B) at locations offshore: placement of sand and cement bags on the seafloor below and adjacent to Sable’s out-of-service offshore oil and water pipelines; as part of an effort to restart the Santa Ynez Unit oil production operations and bring the pipelines back into use; unless and until either: (a) Sable secures a new, final, operative CDP specifically covering the work to be performed; (b) Sables secures another final, operative, valid form of Coastal Act authorization for the work to be performed; or (c) Sable secures a final, formal determination that the work it will perform is exempt from the Coastal Act’s permitting requirement. The word ‘final’ as used in the prior sentence shall mean that it is no longer subject to an administrative appeal, including to the Commission.” (CDO, ¶¶ 1.0, 1.1.)

On April 16, 2025, the Commission filed its application for a TRO to restrain further violation of the CDO and for issuance of an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue (OSC). The application was opposed by Sable. The Court heard the application on April 17 and granted the application in part. The Court granted the application for issuance of the OSC to be heard on May 14, 2025, with further opposition papers to be filed and served no later than 20 days before the hearing (i.e., April 24) and reply papers to be filed and served no later than 10 days before the hearing (i.e., May 2). The Court denied the application for issuance of a TRO.

On April 21, 2025, the Commission filed a notice of appeal as to the denial of the issuance of the TRO. In the Court of Appeal, on April 22, 2025, the Commission filed a petition for stay, writ of supersedeas, or other appropriate order. (Sable Offshore Corp. v. Cal. Coastal Commission (B345604, app. pending).)

No further opposition was filed by Sable in response to the OSC. The Commission filed a reply on May 2, 2025.

On May 6, the Court issued a case management order (CMO) requesting further briefing on the issue of this Court’s jurisdiction to rule on the OSC pending the appeal of the denial of the TRO while the petition for stay was pending. The Court noted the lack of further opposition filed by Sable and continued the hearing on the OSC to this hearing date of May 28.

As discussed below, both parties filed briefs in response to the Court’s request in the CMO. On May 15, 2025, the Court of Appeal issued its order denying the Commission’s petition for writ of supersedeas “without prejudice to appellant’s right to seek preliminary injunctive relief in the superior Court during the pendency of this appeal.” (Order, filed May 15, 2025.)

On May 23, 2025, Sable filed evidentiary objections to the evidence of the Commission.

(This ends the quotation from the May 28 ruling.)

On May 28, 2025, the Court granted the Commission’s application for issuance of a preliminary injunction. In ruling on the preliminary injunction, the Court specifically noted that Sable had the opportunity to file a motion to seek a stay of the CDO but had failed to do so.

On June 9, 2025, the Court entered its written order granting the preliminary injunction. The preliminary injunction enjoins Sable from, among other things, “conducting any further development in violation the duly-ordered cease and desist order issued by the Commission on April 10, 2025.” (Order, filed June 9, 2025, at p. 2.)

On June 13, 2025, Sable filed this motion to stay enforcement of the cease-and-desist order. Sable’s motion seeks to stay the CDO and to discharge the Court’s previously issued preliminary injunction. (Motion, at p. 2.) Sable argues that it is entitled to the stay because it will not upset the public interest.

The Commission opposes the motion, arguing that there are no changed circumstances warranting modification or dissolution of the preliminary injunction, and that the motion is procedurally improper.

Analysis

This motion is brought by Sable pursuant to California Public Resources Code section 30803, subdivision (b).

“A Court may stay the operation of the cease and desist order after it provides notice to the commission and holds a hearing. Any such stay may be imposed or continued only if it is not against the public interest.” (Pub. Resources Code, § 30803, subd. (b).)

The existing preliminary injunction was entered on the Commission’s application pursuant to subdivision (a):

“Any person may maintain an action for declaratory and equitable relief to restrain any violation of this division, of a cease and desist order issued pursuant to Section 30809 or 30810, or of a restoration order issued pursuant to Section 30811. On a prima facie showing of a violation of this division, preliminary equitable relief shall be issued to restrain any further violation of this division. No bond shall be required for an action under this section.” (Pub. Resources Code, § 30803, subd. (a).)

In granting the Commission’s application for a preliminary injunction under subdivision (a), the Court noted that Sable had not then brought a motion under subdivision (b). The Court further noted that the text of subdivision (a) is different from than subdivision (b) in that subdivision (a) states that a Court shall issue a preliminary injunction on a prima facie showing of a violation of the Coastal Act. Subdivision (b) states that the Court may stay the operation of a cease and desist order as long as it is not against the public interest. In ruling on the Commission’s application, the Court found that the Commission had met its burden under subdivision (a). Because Sable had not also brought a motion under subdivision (b), the Court considered Sable’s arguments and evidence in the context of the Commission’s application and not in the context of a motion under subdivision (b).

Sable now brings this motion under subdivision (b), arguing:

“Under well-established principles of statutory interpretation, words in statutes must be construed to promote the purpose of the statute, and each part should be given its plain meaning and read so as not to nullify other provisions. The Court’s authority to issue a preliminary injunction under subdivision (a) cannot prevent it from also issuing a stay under subdivision (b). If that were so, as the Commission apparently intends to argue, then that would nullify the Legislature’s addition of subdivision (b). The Legislature expressly decided that Courts may issue a stay under subdivision (b), regardless of the existence of a preliminary injunction, if doing so is not against the public interest. Moreover, where the issuance of a stay under subdivision (b) is appropriate, as is the case here, an injunction previously issued under subdivision (a) must necessarily be discharged so as to give effect to the stay.” (Motion, at p. 8.)

The Commission argues that this motion is nothing more than an effort to dissolve the preliminary injunction without any new facts or law.

“In any action, the Court may on notice modify or dissolve an injunction or temporary restraining order upon a showing that there has been a material change in the facts upon which the injunction or temporary restraining order was granted, that the law upon which the injunction or temporary restraining order was granted has changed, or that the ends of justice would be served by the modification or dissolution of the injunction or temporary restraining order.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 533.)

“In discerning the scope and meaning of [a statute], ‘ “[w]e begin with the plain language of the statute, affording the words of the provision their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing them in their statutory context, because the language employed in the Legislature’s enactment generally is the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.” [Citations.] The plain meaning controls if there is no ambiguity in the statutory language.’ [Citation.] In interpreting a statutory provision, ‘our task is to select the construction that comports most closely with the Legislature’s apparent intent, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the statutes’ general purpose, and to avoid a construction that would lead to unreasonable, impractical, or arbitrary results.’ [Citation.]” (Poole v. Orange County Fire Authority (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1378, 1384–1385.)

There is some tension between subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 30803. Each subdivision authorizes a complementary motion to the other, but each applies somewhat different standards. In the context of this motion, the granting of a motion to enjoin violation of a cease and desist order is directly contrary to a motion to stay enforcement of the same cease and desist order.

Sable argues that this tension is resolved by considering its motion here, under subdivision (b), separately from the Commission’s motion under subdivision (a). Resolving the tension in that way, however, leads to a resolution that depends on whose motion is heard first: Here, Sable argues that finding in its favor on its motion under subdivision (b) would properly lead to the dissolution of the preliminary injunction issued under subdivision (a). However, by the same reasoning, if the Court had first issued a stay of the cease and desist order, the Commission would be entitled to bring a motion under subdivision (a), applying the standards only of subdivision (a), and have a preliminary injunction issued that would properly lead to the dissolution of the stay issued under subdivision (b). Because the clear purpose of the Coastal Act is the protection of the coastal environment while allowing permitted coastal development, the issuance of a preliminary injunction or of a stay of a cease and desist order should not depend upon which party brought which motion first.

The principle set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 533 resolves this tension as it applies in the current context. Section 533 codifies the inherent powers of Courts to modify or to dissolve preliminary injunctions “when the circumstances and situation of the parties have so changed as to render such action just and equitable. This inherent power … may be exercised either where there has been a change in the controlling facts upon which the injunction rested, or the law has been changed, modified or extended, or where there the ends of justice would be served by modification.” (Sontag Chain Stores Co. v. Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County (1941) 18 Cal.2d 92, 95; accord, Union Interchange, Inc. v. Savage (1959) 52 Cal.2d 601, 604.) Section 533 neither permits nor encourages successive motions where the facts, law, and circumstances are unchanged from the Court’s granting of the preliminary injunction.

As the Court noted in ruling on the Commission’s motion, Sable could have, but did not, bring its motion for a stay at that time. Sable instead strategically waited until after the Court ruled on the Commission’s motion to bring this motion and to present its evidence in full. (Motion, at p. 8, fn. 1 [“Plaintiffs did not file any opposition to the application for preliminary injunction or a previous motion to stay because it was our mistaken belief that the Court had enough evidence and argument to deny the preliminary injunction and did not wish for Plaintiffs to file additional papers.”].)

This strategic choice is notable since Sable was the first to file this action, expressly seeking relief under Public Resources Code section 30803, but not applying to the Court for any interlocutory order. After Sable’s action was filed, the Commission then filed its cross-complaint and sought its provisional remedies. Had Sable’s current motion been made concurrently with its opposition to the Commission’s application, the Court would have had the opportunity to harmonize the potentially conflicting standards of subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 30803. Under the present circumstances, the Court addresses this motion under the standards of Code of Civil Procedure section 533 harmonized with subdivisions (a) and (b).

As the party seeking relief, the burden is on Sable to show that the circumstances of section 533 justify relief. (See Loeffler v. Medina (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1504.) With respect to new facts or new law, the Court finds that Sable has failed in its burden to show any such new material facts or new law that could not have been presented at the time the Court considered the Commission’s application for preliminary injunction and consistent with the Court’s scheduling orders for filing opposition to such motion.

With respect to circumstances where the ends of justice would be served by modification, the Court also finds that Sable has failed in its burden. As a general proposition, the Court does not find that the ends of justice are served by giving Sable a second opportunity to avoid the preliminary injunction when it intentionally did not present evidence and or make this motion to stay when it would have been appropriate to do so. But putting that general proposition to one side, Sable’s arguments as to the need for a stay include the argument that the anomaly repair work at the center of this litigation is complete. (Motion, at p. 19; Rusch decl., ¶ 6.)

While the Court generally agrees with Sable that it is in the public interest to maintain safe pipelines, Sable does not present circumstances now, whether such circumstances involve safety or otherwise, that were not also present and considered when the Court granted the Commission’s application for the preliminary injunction.

Based on a review of the admissible evidence and arguments of the parties, the Court will deny Sable’s motion for a stay of the Commission’s cease and desist order.