Bryson Hall vs Andrew Madison Mackenzie-Davis

Case Number

25CV00672

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 11/03/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

CMC; Motion: Set Aside

Tentative Ruling

Bryson Hall v. Andrew Madison Mackenzie-Davis

Case No. 25CV00672

           

Hearing Date: November 3, 2025                  

HEARING:              Motion of Defendant Andrew Madison Mackenzie-Davis to Set Aside Default

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiff Bryson Hall: Robert J. Stoll, The Stoll Law Firm

                             For Defendant Andrew M. Mackenzie-Davis: Christian E. Foy Nagy, Christopher J. Fleissner, Freeman Mathis & Gary LLP

                                               

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant Andrew Madison Mackenzie-Davis’ motion to set aside default is granted. Defendant shall separately file and serve his Answer to plaintiff’s complaint no later than November 7, 2025.

Background:

This action commenced on January 29, 2025, by the filing of the judicial council form complaint by plaintiff Bryson Hall (plaintiff) against defendant Andrew Madison Mackenzie-Davis (defendant) for motor vehicle negligence. Plaintiff alleges that on July 11, 2024, on Mountain Drive in Santa Barbara, defendant negligently caused his 2017 Toyota Tacoma to collide with plaintiff, who was operating a KTM Enduro motorcycle.

According to the proof of service, filed by plaintiff on June 3, 2025, defendant was served with the summons and complaint on May 22, 2025, by substituted service on defendant’s mother Jill Mackenzie at 51 Mallard Court, Napa. The proof of service further indicates that on May 23, 2025, the summons and complaint were mailed to defendant at the same address.

On July 7, 2025, plaintiff filed a request for entry of default, which was entered on the same day. The request for entry of default was also mailed to defendant at 51 Mallard Court, Napa.

On September 19, 2025, defendant filed the present motion to set aside the default, arguing that he did not receive actual notice of the action in time to appear to defend and that any failure to timely file a responsive pleading was the result of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.

The motion to set aside the default was timely served on plaintiff, via electronic service, on September 17, 2025.

Plaintiff had not filed opposition or any other response to the motion.

Analysis:

“The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken. . . . Notwithstanding any other requirements of this section, the court shall, whenever an application for relief is made no more than six months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by an attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, vacate any (1) resulting default entered by the clerk against his or her client, and which will result in entry of a default judgment, or (2) resulting default judgment or dismissal entered against his or her client, unless the court finds that the default or dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).)

Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5, subdivision (a) provides: “When service of a summons has not resulted in actual notice to a party in time to defend the action and a default or default judgment has been entered against him or her in the action, he or she may serve and file a notice of motion to set aside the default or default judgment and for leave to defend the action. . . .”

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5, subdivision (b): “A notice of motion to set aside a default or default judgment and for leave to defend the action shall designate as the time for making the motion a date prescribed by subdivision (b) of Section 1005, and it shall be accompanied by an affidavit showing under oath that the party’s lack of actual notice in time to defend the action was not caused by his or her avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect. The party shall serve and file with the notice a copy of the answer, motion, or other pleading proposed to be filed in the action.”

The trial court has broad discretion to vacate the judgment and/or the clerk’s entry of default that preceded it.  However, “this discretion may be exercised only after the party seeking relief has shown that there is a proper ground for relief, and that the party has raised that ground in a procedurally proper manner, within any applicable time limits.” (Cruz v. Fagor America, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 488, 495.)

Unless the motion to set aside default is accompanied by an attorney affidavit of fault, which is not the case here, relief is discretionary, and the burden is on defendant to demonstrate mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. (See Lorenz v. Commercial Accept. Ins. Co. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 981, 989.) The party moving for relief on the basis of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” must show specific facts demonstrating that one of these conditions was met. (Hopkins & Carley v. Gens (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1410.)

“The law favors judgments based on the merits, not procedural missteps. Our Supreme Court has repeatedly reminded us that in this area doubts must be resolved in favor of relief, with an order denying relief scrutinized more carefully than an order granting it. As Justice Mosk put it in Rappleyea, “ ‘Because the law favors disposing of cases on their merits, ‘ “any doubts in applying section 473 must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief from default [citations]. Therefore, a trial court order denying relief is scrutinized more carefully than an order permitting trial on the merits.” ’ [Citations.]” (Lasalle v. Vogel (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 127, 134-135.)

Relevant to the present motion, by way of declaration, defendant declares:

“Several months after the accident, I was hospitalized for 16 days with end stage congestive heart failure. I have a pacemaker and a defibrillator. I was struggling to breath and was unable to sleep for weeks before doctors brought me in for monitoring and recovery, first at Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital, then at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center in Beverly Hills. Around this time, I was not receiving mail.” (Decl., ¶ 4.)

“My mailing address has been my family’s house in Napa, California, but during the months before and after the accident, I was living and working in the Santa Ynez area where I rented an apartment. Sometime after my hospitalization, a friend brought me my mail that had been sent to my family’s home. Among these documents, I found a letter from my insurance company, National General, requesting that I sign a document confirming that I had no insurance coverage other than theirs. I was still dealing with ongoing pain related to my heart condition, and I was confused about the purpose and implications of this document.” (Decl., ¶ 5.)

“Around the same time, I got a call from someone who first said he was a ‘family friend’ of the injured motorcyclist but wouldn’t say who he really was. He asked about my boss and insurance, then got angry when I said I hadn’t seen any legal papers or heard of a lawsuit. He later claimed he was a lawyer and called me ‘unresponsive.’ The whole thing felt suspicious, like it might be a scam, and I didn’t know what to do.” (Decl., ¶ 6.)

“I never tried to hide or get out of my legal responsibilities. I was never served with a summons or complaint. I first became aware of the default on August 4, 2025, when I spoke with my legal counsel from Freeman Mathis & Gary. I was shocked to learn that a $31 million default had been entered against me without my knowledge, and I started writing this declaration right away to make sure I could promptly show up and defend myself in court.” (Decl., ¶ 7.)

Defendant has demonstrated that he had no actual notice of this action in sufficient time to defend and, even if he had, he has shown facts that constitute mistake, inadvertence, surprise, and excusable neglect. The court finds the motion timely, that granting the motion will not prejudice plaintiff, and that it is brought on proper grounds. The court will grant the motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 473, subd. (b) and 473.5.

Defendant has provided a copy of his proposed answer to the complaint as required. He will be ordered to separately file and serve the answer.