Dawn Louise Vereuck v. FCA US, LLC

Case Number

25CV00314

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 10/08/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Plaintiff’s Motion To Compel The Deposition Of Defendant FCA US LLC’s Person Most Qualified

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiff Dawn Louise Vereuck: Guy Mizrahi, Priscilla Le, JSGM Law LLP

                                   

For Defendant FCA US LLC: Brian Yasuzawa, Michael J. Gregg, RoseWaldorf LLP

RULING

For all reasons discussed herein, the motion of Plaintiff to compel the deposition of Defendant’s person most qualified is granted, in part. The person who is most qualified to testify on Defendant FCA US LLC’s behalf is ordered to appear for a deposition on November 3, 2025, at the time and place set forth in Plaintiff’s Notice of Deposition dated May 27, 2025, a copy of which is attached to the motion. The parties may agree to a different date for the deposition of Defendant’s person most qualified, provided that agreement is made in writing and that the deposition concludes on or before November 3, 2025. Except as herein granted, the motion is otherwise denied.

Background

On January 15, 2025, Plaintiff Dawn Louise Vereuck filed a complaint against Defendant FCA US, LLC (FCA), alleging three causes of action: (1) violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act – breach of express warranty; (2) the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act – breach of implied warranty; and (3) the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act – Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (b).

In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that they acquired a 2023 Jeep Wrangler (the vehicle) on March 2, 2023, and received multiple express warranties directly from FCA. (Compl., ¶ 7.) The vehicle was delivered to Plaintiff with defects and nonconformities to the warranty which include the battery and electrical system, a faulty power inverter module, the vehicle’s inability to go into electric mode and not regenerating, a faulty battery control module, and an inoperative horn, and which manifested during the warranty period. (Compl., ¶¶ 8 & 13.) Plaintiff delivered the vehicle to the manufacturer’s authorized repair facility, but FCA denied warranty coverage for certain nonconformities and was unable to conform the vehicle to the express warranties. (Compl., ¶¶ 14-16.)

FCA filed an answer to the complaint on February 26, 2025, generally denying its allegations and asserting twenty-three affirmative defenses.

On August 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for an order compelling FCA to produce its person most qualified for deposition, which is supported by a declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel, Priscilla Le (Le). Le states that on May 27, 2025, Plaintiff served a notice of deposition (the notice) of FCA’s person most knowledgeable and request for production of documents at deposition, which set the deposition for June 12, 2025, and identified 12 categories for examination. (Le Decl., ¶ 4 & Exh. A [notice].) On June 5, FCA served a response to the notice which includes what Le asserts are “boilerplate” objections, and in which FCA affirmed that its witness would not be produced on June 12. (Le Decl., ¶ 5 & Exh. B.)

Le further states that on June 6, June 23, and July 2, 2025, Plaintiff sent meet and confer correspondence to FCA requesting alternative deposition dates, and that FCA failed to respond to that correspondence. (Le Decl., ¶¶ 6-8 & Exhs. C-E.)

The motion is opposed by FCA. In support of its opposition, FCA submits a declaration of its counsel, Michael J. Gregg (Gregg), who asserts that FCA timely responded and objected to the notice, and agreed to work cooperatively with Plaintiff to reschedule the deposition. (Gregg Decl., ¶ 7 & Exh. A.) Gregg further states that Plaintiff’s counsel sent a single meet and confer letter on June 6, that FCA advised Plaintiff that its person most qualified was available on November 3, 2025, and that FCA has always been willing to work cooperatively with Plaintiff regarding a suitable date, time, and location for the deposition. (Gregg Decl., ¶¶ 8-10.)

Analysis

The parties here contend or do not appear to dispute that the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 871.26, which “only applies to a civil action seeking restitution or replacement of a motor vehicle pursuant to [Code of Civil Procedure] [s]ection 871.20[,]” governs the deposition at issue. (Code Civ. Proc., § 871.26, subd. (b); see also Code Civ. Proc., § 871.20, subd. (a) [“this chapter applies to an action, brought against a manufacturer who has elected under Section 871.29 to proceed under this chapter”].)

FCA contends that, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 871.26, Plaintiff’s deadline to conduct the deposition of the person most qualified to testify on FCA’s behalf fell on June 26, 2025, and that Plaintiff waited until the “last possible moment to timely notice [FCA’s] deposition.” (Opp. at p. 2.) Code of Civil Procedure section 871.26 provides that “[w]ithin 120 days after the filing of the answer or other responsive pleading, all parties have the right to conduct initial depositions, each not to exceed two hours....” (Code Civ. Proc., § 871.26, subd. (c).) Plaintiff does not address this contention in their reply to FCA’s opposition to the motion.

FCA does not appear to dispute that the notice was served before the deadline to conduct the deposition of FCA’s person most qualified prescribed in Code of Civil Procedure section 871.26 expired, or that the notice set the deposition prior to that deadline. (Opp. at p. 2, ll. 11-13.) The available evidence and information also shows that in its responses to each matter for examination set forth in the notice, FCA did not raise any objection based on the timeliness of the notice under section 871.26, and agreed to produce a witness. (See, e.g., Sep. Stmt. at pp. 3, 15-17, 19, 21-22, 24, & 26-27 [responses to category nos. 1 & 6-10 [stating that FCA “will produce a witness to testify ... at an agreeable time and place”] & pp. 5, 8, 11, 14, & 29-3 [asserting objections to category nos. 2-5 & 11-12].) The record also reflects that FCA advised Plaintiff that its person most qualified was available for deposition on November 3, 2025. (Gregg Decl., ¶ 9.)

“California law defines waiver as the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. [Citation.] Under this definition, waiver is based on intent. [Citation.] The intent to waive may be expressed in words, either oral or written, or implied by a party’s conduct.” (Smith v. Ogbuehi (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 453, 475.) Under the circumstances present here as further detailed above, there exists some question as to whether FCA has waived any right under Code of Civil Procedure section 871.26 in regard to the deposition of its person most qualified for deposition. The Court’s records also do not reflect that FCA has filed an appropriate noticed motion for an order that the deposition of its person most qualified not be taken. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420, subd. (b)(1) [describing directives that may be included in a protective order which is sought prior to a deposition].) Furthermore, available information shows that FCA has agreed to produce its person most qualified for a deposition on November 3, 2025.

FCA also appears to contend that Plaintiff failed to meet and confer in good faith before filing the present motion. In circumstances where a deponent fails to attend a deposition, a motion seeking to compel that deponent’s attendance must be accompanied by “a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (b)(2); see also Leko v. Cornerstone Building Inspection Service (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1124.)

The response of FCA to the notice includes a statement by FCA that it “will not produce its person(s) most knowledgeable for deposition at the date, time, and the location set forth in the [notice]...” (Le Decl., Exh. B at p. 2.) The correspondence attached to the Le declaration also shows that Plaintiff contacted FCA to inquire about FCA’s refusal to produce its person most knowledgeable. (Le Decl., Exhs. C-D.) For these reasons, the present record is sufficient to show that Plaintiff contacted FCA to inquire about the nonappearance of its person most qualified as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450.

FCA further asserts that pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (b)(1), Plaintiff must set forth “specific facts demonstrating good cause for the discovery sought.” (Opp. at p. 3, ll. 3-16.) Section 2031.310 applies where a party has filed a motion for an order compelling a further response to an inspection demand. The notice of the present motion does not request any order compelling responses to any inspection demand contained in the notice. FCA also fails to cite any statutory provision or other legal authority which would require Plaintiff to demonstrate good cause with respect to the deposition at issue.

Further, FCA advances no reasoned argument showing why the matters or categories for examination described in the notice are not relevant to the subject matter of this action or why the information sought in these categories could not reasonably lead to admissible evidence. (See Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 590-591 [the phrase “subject matter” is not limited to admissible evidence such that relevant information includes that which might assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement].)

For example, the matters for examination nos. 1 through 12 described in the notice relate to the vehicle’s service and warranty history, including FCA’s failure to repurchase the vehicle; technical service bulletins and recalls applicable to the vehicle; FCA’s policies and procedures regarding warranties, the handing of customer complaints, and compliance with the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act; communications between FCA and Plaintiff and FCA and its authorized repair facilities concerning the vehicle; documents produced by FCA in this action; and FCA’s third-party dispute resolution program. (Le Decl., Exh. A at p. 4.) FCA fails to explain why these categories for examination are not relevant or within the scope of permissible discovery considering the claims and causes of action raised in the complaint. (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 541 [“a civil litigant’s right to discovery is broad...”].)

In addition, without the benefit of a specific deposition question to which Plaintiff seeks to compel an answer, there exists insufficient information to permit the Court is conclusively determine whether the examination matters described in the notice include matters which are not properly discoverable. For this same reason, the Court cannot, at this time, determine whether any objections asserted by FCA are meritorious.

To the extent FCA contends that there exists no good cause for the deposition at issue based on any purported delay by Plaintiff in conducting the deposition under Code of Civil Procedure section 871.6, the same reasoning and analysis apply.

At this stage of the proceedings, and considering the matters further described above, the Court will grant the motion, and order the deposition of the person most qualified of FCA to proceed on November 3, 2025, which is the date agreed to by FCA. Absent any objection by FCA, the deposition shall be conducted at the time and place described in the notice. The parties may agree to a different date for the deposition of FCA’s person most qualified, provided that agreement is made in writing and that the deposition concludes no later than November 3, 2025.

Sanctions:

Plaintiff requests an award of sanctions against FCA in the amount of $2,500, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 871.26.

“A request for a sanction shall, in the notice of motion, identify every person, party, and attorney against whom the sanction is sought, and specify the type of sanction sought.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.040.) The notice of the present motion fails to identify every person or attorney against whom Plaintiff seeks sanctions, and fails to specify the monetary sanctions requested in the memorandum. Moreover, under the totality of the circumstances present here, the Court finds that an award of sanctions would be unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (a).)

For all reasons discussed above, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s request for an award of monetary sanctions.