Jane Doe vs Manchester Capital Management LLC et al
Jane Doe vs Manchester Capital Management LLC et al
Case Number
25CV00245
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Fri, 07/25/2025 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
Motion to Seal; Demurrer and Motion to Strike
Tentative Ruling
(1) The motion of defendants to strike portions of plaintiff’s complaint is granted, with leave to amend, to strike the words “Jane Doe” from page 2 at lines 1 and 5.
(2) The demurrer of defendants to plaintiff’s complaint is sustained in part and overruled in part. The demurrer is sustained, with leave to amend, as to the first (sexual harassment) and fifth (aiding and abetting FEHA violation) causes of action as against defendants E. Cronin and S. Cronin, and is sustained, with leave to amend as to the seventh (negligence) cause of action as against all defendants. In all other respects, the demurrer is overruled.
(3) As explained herein, plaintiff shall file and serve her first amended complaint on or before August 11, 2025.
(4) Defendants’ motion to seal documents lodged provisionally under seal in support of the demurrer and motion to strike is continued to October 3, 2025, at 10:00 a.m.
Background:
As alleged in plaintiff’s complaint:
Plaintiff Jane Doe (plaintiff or Doe) sues under a pseudonym and does not allege her true name in the complaint. (Complaint, p. 1, fn. 1, & ¶ 1.)
At the times relevant to the complaint, Doe worked for defendant Manchester Capital Management, LLC (MCM) at its office in Montecito. (Complaint, ¶¶ 2, 3, 8.) Plaintiff is an attorney and worked as E. Cronin’s Executive Assistant and as Head of Human Resources. (Complaint, ¶¶ 13, 35, 63.)
Defendant Edward Wright Cronin (E. Cronin) is MCM’s founder, majority owner, and until recently, the Chief Executive Officer. (Complaint, ¶ 4.) Defendant Jeffrey Hall was MCM’s Head of Real Estate, and in 2023, was promoted to Chief Executive Officer. (Complaint, ¶ 5.) Defendant Susan Read Cronin (S. Cronin) acted as an advisor and agent for MCM. (Complaint, ¶ 6.) Defendants E. Cronin, Hall, and S. Cronin, all held supervisory authority over Doe.
Doe alleges various conduct by the defendants in support of her causes of action that Doe alleges constitutes harassment and discrimination. (E.g., Complaint, ¶¶ 45, 46.)
Doe generally alleges that she has “exhausted all administrative remedies necessary and has timely brought this action.” (Complaint, ¶ 11.)
On January 13, 2025, Doe filed her original complaint asserting 12 causes of action: (1) sexual harassment in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (j)); (2) discrimination based on sex, gender, and
disability in violation of FEHA (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (a)); (3) retaliation in violation of FEHA (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (h)); (4) failure to prevent harassment and discrimination from occurring in violation of FEHA (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (k)); (5) aiding and abetting in violation of FEHA (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (i)); (6) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (7) negligence; (8) negligent failure to warn, train, or educate; (9) failure to engage in the interactive process in violation of FEHA (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (n)); (10) failure to accommodate in violation of FEHA (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (m)); (11) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (12) unlawful retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5.
On March 6, 2025, defendants filed this combined demurrer and motion to strike, originally noticed for hearing on June 6. Defendants demur to the first, fifth, seventh, and eleventh causes of action asserting that Doe has failed to allege facts sufficient to state these causes of action. Defendants also move to strike the “Jane Doe” pseudonym and to require Doe to proceed using her legal name. In support of their demurrer and motion to strike, defendants concurrently filed a request for judicial notice and a public-redacted version of the declaration of attorney Ian A. Michalak.
On March 7, 2025, defendants filed their cross-complaint asserting 15 causes of action against Doe.
On March 10, 2025, defendants filed their motion to seal the redacted portions of the March 6 Michalak declaration, the unredacted version of which was concurrently lodged provisionally under seal. This motion was also set for hearing on June 6.
On April 4, 2025, Doe filed her answer to the cross-complaint, generally denying the allegations thereof and asserting 33 affirmative defenses.
On May 21, 2025, Doe filed her opposition to the demurrer and motion to strike, attaching to the opposition the declaration of Jane Doe of the same date with that declaration’s exhibits.
On May 30, 2025, defendants filed their reply to Doe’s opposition to the demurrer and motion to strike. Defendants also filed objections to Doe’s evidence submitted in opposition to the demurrer.
On June 2, 2025, Doe filed opposition to defendants’ objections to Doe’s evidence.
On June 3, 2025, defendants filed an objection and motion to strike Doe’s June 2 opposition.
On June 6, 2025, the court continued the hearing on the demurrer and motions to this hearing date.
No opposition has been filed to defendants’ motion to seal certain documents.
Analysis:
Defendants have filed a combined motion to strike and demurrer. A motion to strike and a demurrer are to be noticed for hearing together. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322(b). The court permits combined memoranda in support of, or in opposition to, multiple motions, such as demurrers and motions to strike, where there are overlapping issues; the court encourages combined declarations in support of speaking motions where the underlying testimony would otherwise be repetitive, such as with discovery motions. However, the court requires separate documents, with appropriate captions, for the notice of each motion. (See Edmon & Karnow, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2025) ¶¶ 9:24.3-9:24.5.) The notice would appropriately cite each document (e.g., memorandum or declaration) in support of that particular motion. Among other things, the separate notices are important for the court’s calendar to identify multiple motions.
The combined motion filed here does not comply with these requirements. Nonetheless, because of the circumstances here, the court will address each of the motions. The court expects counsel to file a separate notice of motion for each motion in the future.
(1) Motion to Strike
“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. [¶] (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.”(Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) “The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).)
Defendants move to strike “Jane Doe” from the second page of the complaint because they assert that there is no basis for the plaintiff to proceed solely under a pseudonym.
The names of all parties to a civil action must be included in the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 422.40.) “Because of the inherently sensitive nature of some proceedings, statutes specifically allow for keeping certain parties’ identities confidential. [Citations.] Even in the absence of a statute, anonymity for parties may be granted when necessary to preserve an important privacy interest.” (Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 105, 110 (Department).)
In Department, a case not cited by either party, the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (now the Civil Rights Department [CRD]), the state administrative agency responsible for enforcing employment discrimination laws, brought an action against an employer for employment discrimination on behalf of an employee. (Department, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 108.) The employee was concerned about further mistreatment, even violence against him and his family, if the nature of the discrimination were publicly revealed. (Ibid.) At the employee’s request, the plaintiff department moved for an order allowing the plaintiff to proceed under a fictitious name. (Id. at p. 109.) The trial court denied the order on the grounds that there was no legal authority to allow the plaintiff to proceed anonymously and found the plaintiff’s evidence speculative. (Ibid.)
The Department court issued a writ of mandate requiring the trial court to reconsider its ruling and to apply the appropriate legal standard. (Department, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 113.) The court stated:
“In determining the appropriate standard, we first note that here the identity of the employee seeking to proceed under a pseudonym is known to the defendant. Significant constitutional concerns would be implicated were it otherwise. [Citation.] Since the employee’s identity is known to the defendant, proceeding anonymously would not similarly intrude on the defendant’s rights.” (Department, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 110.)
“But another important constitutional right is implicated when a party is allowed to proceed anonymously: the right of public access to court proceedings. Among the guarantees of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution is that court proceedings are open and public. [Citation.] Public access to court proceedings is essential to a functioning democracy. It promotes trust in the integrity of the court system, and it exposes abuses of judicial power to public scrutiny. [Citation.] The right of public access applies not only to criminal cases, but also to civil proceedings like this one. [Citation.] And the right to access court proceedings necessarily includes the right to know the identity of the parties.” (Department, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at pp. 110-111.)
“Much like closing the courtroom or sealing a court record, allowing a party to litigate anonymously impacts the First Amendment public access right. Before a party to a civil action can be permitted to use a pseudonym, the trial court must conduct a hearing and apply the overriding interest test: A party’s request for anonymity should be granted only if the court finds that an overriding interest will likely be prejudiced without use of a pseudonym, and that it is not feasible to protect the interest with less impact on the constitutional right of access. In deciding the issue the court must bear in mind the critical importance of the public’s right to access judicial proceedings. Outside of cases where anonymity is expressly permitted by statute, litigating by pseudonym should occur ‘only in the rarest of circumstances.’ [Citation.]” (Department, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at pp. 111-112, fn. omitted.)
“Procedurally, because a hearing is required, a party who wants to proceed anonymously will file the initial complaint or petition conditionally under a pseudonym and then move for an order granting permission to proceed that way. If the request is granted, the initial pleading can remain. If pseudonym use is denied, the pleading must be amended to state the party’s true name.” (Department, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 112, fn. 1.)
Plaintiff Doe has not complied with the procedural requirement set forth in Department because Doe has not made a motion for permission to proceed under a pseudonym. Here, in addition, there is a concern not discussed in Department in that the court itself needs to maintain a record of the plaintiff’s identity for reasons including ensuring plaintiff’s own access to sealed records in this case.
In opposing this motion to strike, plaintiff attempts to address this issue factually. A motion to strike, which is not a speaking motion (see Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a)), is not the appropriate procedure to address this issue.
The court will therefore make the following orders on this issue: (i) the motion to strike the words “Jane Doe” will be granted with leave to amend; (ii) plaintiff shall file an amended complaint which either (a) includes plaintiff’s true name in the publicly filed amended complaint, or (b) includes plaintiff’s true name together with “Jane Doe” in a version of the amended complaint lodged provisionally under seal and plaintiff concurrently files a public-redacted version of the same amended complaint redacting plaintiff’s true name (leaving only “Jane Doe”); and (iii) plaintiff shall file a motion under California Rules of Court, rules 2.550 and 2.551 to seal the version of the amended complaint lodged provisionally under seal (if such a version is lodged).
By this procedure, the court will hold the evidentiary hearing required by Department as the hearing on the motion to seal. If the court grants the motion to seal, plaintiff will be permitted to proceed under the pseudonym and plaintiff’s true name will be part of the court’s sealed records. If the court denies the motion, the provisionally lodged version may be filed in the public record. In any case, the plaintiff and the defendants will be able to present all appropriate evidence for the court to make the Department determination under the appropriate legal standard.
Because the court will strike plaintiff’s pseudonym as it is now pleaded based on the face of the complaint, the court does not consider the declaration of Ian A. Michalak, and its exhibits, filed in support of the demurrer and motion to strike, the declaration of Jane Doe, and its exhibits, attached to Doe’s opposition, defendants’ objections to the declaration of Jane Doe and its exhibits, Doe’s opposition to defendants’ objections, or defendants’ objection and motion to strike Doe’s surreply (i.e., Doe’s opposition to defendants’ objections). Defendants’ request for judicial notice is discussed below.
(2) Demurrer
“ ‘The rules by which the sufficiency of a complaint is tested against a general demurrer are well settled. We not only treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but also ‘give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.’ ” (Zhang v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364, 370, internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)
Defendants E. Cronin and S. Cronin demur to the first (sexual harassment) and fifth (aiding and abetting FEHA violation) causes of action on the grounds that Doe failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to these individual defendants. All defendants demur to the seventh (negligence) and eleventh (intentional infliction of emotional distress on the grounds that these causes of action are derivative of the FEHA claims.
(a) Requests for Judicial Notice
In support of the demurrer and motion to strike, defendants request judicial notice of exhibits attached to the declaration of Ian A. Michalak: (exhibit A) a February 12, 2024, complaint submitted to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the CRD; (exhibit D) a State Bar of California Attorney License profile from the State Bar website; and (exhibit E) the complaint filed in this action.
As discussed above in ruling on defendants’ motion to strike, Doe’s complaint does not provide any allegations identifying plaintiff’s real name. Because the complaint does not identify the plaintiff, neither the allegations of the complaint nor any judicially noticeable materials connect exhibits A and D to the complaint. The only connection between exhibits A and D to the unidentified plaintiff in the complaint is the evidence of defendants’ counsel. “Because a demurrer challenges defects on the face of the complaint, it can only refer to matters outside the pleading that are subject to judicial notice.” (Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 482.) Exhibits A and D are not relevant to the disposition of the demurrer to the complaint as it now exists.
“Although a court may judicially notice a variety of matters [citation], only relevant material may be noticed. ‘But judicial notice, since it is a substitute for proof [citation], is always confined to those matters which are relevant to the issue at hand.’ [Citation.]” (Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063.) The requests for judicial notice will be denied as to exhibits A and D.
The court will grant the request for judicial notice of the complaint. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)(1).) However, because a demurrer is also a pleading (Code Civ. Proc., § 422.10), judicial notice of the complaint subject to the demurrer is unnecessary.
(b) Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Defendants E. Cronin and S. Cronin demur to the first (sexual harassment) and fifth (aiding and abetting FEHA violation) causes of action on the grounds that Doe failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to these individual defendants by failing to include these defendants in the complaint filed with the CRD.
“[I]t is ‘plaintiff’s burden to plead and prove timely exhaustion of administrative remedies, such as filing a sufficient complaint with [DFEH [now, CRD]] and obtaining a right-to-sue letter.’ [Citations.]” (Kim v. Konad USA Distribution, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1345–1346.)
In opposition to the demurrer, Doe argues that this requirement has been met as to all defendants, referring to matters not alleged in the complaint. As noted above, Doe’s sole allegation is the conclusion that Doe has met all such requirements. The bare conclusion is insufficient to meet Doe’s pleading requirement. The court need not, and does not, consider the exhibits proffered by defendants or plaintiff in order to determine that Doe must provide sufficient factual allegations in the complaint to meet the plaintiff’s pleading burden. Accordingly, the demurrer will be sustained as to defendants E. Cronin and S. Cronin on the first and fifth causes of action.
(c) “Derivative” Claims
Defendants also demur to the seventh (negligence) and eleventh (intentional infliction of emotional distress) causes of action on the grounds that these causes of action are derivative of plaintiff’s FEHA claims.
“There is no common law cause of action for sexual harassment, but conduct constituting sexual harassment may be alleged in common law claims such as battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress.” (Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1426.) Consequently, a claim for negligence may not be solely based upon sexual harassment. (Thomas v. Regents of University of California (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 587, 622.)
In opposition, Doe argues that “Plaintiff’s tort claims are based on duties that exist independently of FEHA. One of the duties Defendant MCM owed was a general duty to provide a safe workplace free from discrimination and harassment.” (Opposition, at p. 5.) The difficulty with this argument is that employees generally may not bring negligence claims against their employer based upon workplace safety that constitute a normal part of the employment relationship. (Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 148, 160.) Because sexual harassment falls outside of the normal part of the employment relationship it is actionable under FEHA. Doe has not alleged facts to support a negligence claim that is not essentially as sexual harassment claim under FEHA. The demurrer to the seventh cause of action will be sustained.
With respect to the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), conduct arising from sexual harassment may be independently actionable. (Medix Ambulance Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 109, 119; accord, Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1051 (Hughes) [“If properly pled, a claim of sexual harassment can establish ‘the outrageous behavior element of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.’].)
“A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is ‘ “ ‘ “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.” ’ ” ’ [Citations.] A defendant’s conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so ‘ “ ‘ “extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’ ” ’ [Citation.] And the defendant’s conduct must be ‘ “ ‘intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Hughes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 1050–1051.)
Doe has alleged numerous instances of harassing behavior that is sufficient to establish outrageous conduct within the meaning of the IIED tort. (Complaint, ¶ 45.) The demurrer to the eleventh cause of action will be overruled.
(d) Leave to Amend
Because this is the first complaint where the court has ruled on a demurrer, the court will grant leave to amend.
(3) Motion to Seal
Defendants have also filed a motion to seal the unredacted version of the declaration of Ian A. Michalak, now lodged provisionally under seal pending disposition of the court’s ruling on their motion to strike. The motion is based upon plaintiff’s present use of a pseudonym, essentially out of an abundance of caution to protect plaintiff’s interests if the court rules in plaintiff’s favor. As discussed above, defendants dispute that plaintiff may appropriately conceal her identity from the public record. No opposition or other response has been filed to this motion.
As discussed above, the court rules on the motion to strike subject to the limitations of such a motion, but in a manner to permit the subsequent evidence-based hearing on the propriety of the use of a pseudonym. Because this motion to seal is dependent upon the disposition of that evidence-based hearing, the court will continue the hearing on this motion to allow such a motion to be filed (or for such filing to become moot).