Matter of Sharon M Trotter Family Trust

Case Number

24PR00596

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Thu, 01/16/2025 - 09:00

Nature of Proceedings

Petition re Internal Affairs of Trust; Demurrer

Tentative Ruling

TENTATIVE RULING:

For the reasons set forth herein, the demurrer to the petition to invalidate trust, is overruled. Respondent Steve Martin shall file and serve his response to the petition no later than January 31, 2025.

Background:

This action commenced on October 15, 2024, by the filing of petitioner Nancy Anne Clarkson’s (“petitioner”) petition to invalidate trust based on undue influence, and for damages for financial elder abuse against respondent Stephen Scott Martin (“respondent”). Respondent also goes by “Steve”.

To briefly summarize the petition:

Sharon Trotter (“Sharon”) was first married to Jerry Martin (“Jerry”) and had two children: respondent and Jennifer Suzanne Martin (“Suzanne”). (Pet., ¶ 1.) (Note: Due to common surnames amongst several individuals, they will be referred to by their given names for clarity. No disrespect is intended.) That marriage ended in divorce. (Ibid.)

In 1982, Sharon married Donald “Bruce” Trotter (“Bruce”), who brought into the marriage three biological children: Richard Bruce Trotter (“Richard”), petitioner, and Donna Beth Trotter (“Donna”). (Pet., ¶ 2.) Bruce also brought into the marriage adopted son Walter Roy Trotter (“Walter”) and Jeannie Hebert Dobbins (“Jeannie”), whom Bruce raised and recognized as his child. (Ibid.)

Walter, who died on November 3, 2021, has three adult children: Amelia Trotter (“Amelia”), Thomas Trotter (“Thomas”), and Gavin Trotter (“Gavin”). (Ibid.)

Bruce, along with Sharon, told petitioner that he wanted Sharon to be to be taken care of so he was leaving his estate to Sharon with the understanding that she would leave her estate, half to her two children (respondent and Suzanne) and the other half to Bruce’s five children (collectively “stepchildren”). (Pet., ¶ 3.) After Bruce died, Sharon told petitioner that she wanted to honor Bruce’s wishes. (Ibid.)

On January 12, 2007, Sharon created the Sharon M. Trotter Family Trust (“2007 Trust”). (Pet., ¶ 4.) Pursuant to the 2007 Trust, Sharon fulfilled her promise to Bruce by recognizing all the stepchildren and provided for each of them in the Trust. (Pet., ¶ 5.) The only asset included in the 2007 Trust that was left solely to Sharon’s two biological children were shares of common stock, which was Sharon’s separate property that she had inherited from her mother. (Ibid.) The 2007 Trust provided that in the event that neither of Sharon’s two children survived her, and had no issue, the stock shares were to be distributed equally to the stepchildren. (Ibid.) Sharon left the remainder of the estate in two equal shares: one share to her biological children and one share to be divided equally among the stepchildren. (Ibid.) The primary asset of the 2007 Trust was real property located in Santa Barbara. (Ibid.)

In 2017, Sharon got married to Thaddeous Ross, who was also known as Ted Ross (“Ted”). (Pet., ¶ 7.) Sharon did not comingle the 2007 Trust or her other personal assets with Ted. (Ibid.)

Sharon maintained a close relationship with the stepchildren. (Pet., ¶ 8.)

In March 2024, Sharon was diagnosed with advanced lung cancer and told she likely had eight to twelve months to live. (Pet., ¶ 9.) Soon thereafter, Sharon was moved into a care facility. (Ibid.) Petitioner believes that respondent put Sharon in the care facility in contradiction of the 2007 Trust, which states that Sharon wished to continue living at home and to avoid relocation to a care facility. (Pet., ¶ 10.)

Respondent engaged in efforts to isolate Sharon and would make excuses to avoid allowing Sharon to speak with the stepchildren, and withheld important information from them. (Pet., ¶¶ 11 - 14.)

On May 8, 2024, Sharon executed a Restatement of her Trust entitled ‘First Complete Restatement to the Declaration of Trust for the Sharon M. Trotter Family Trust (‘2024 Restatement”). (Pet., ¶ 15.) By way of the 2024 Restatement, Sharon did not acknowledge any of the stepchildren, nor any of her grandchildren. (Ibid.) The 2024 Restatement does make a bequest to Donna but does not identify her as one of Sharon’s stepchildren. (Pet., ¶ 16.)

Also on May 8, 2024, Sharon executed a new Will, wherein she did not acknowledge any of the stepchildren. (Pet., ¶ 19.) Despite language in the 2007 Trust to the contrary, the new Will stated that all of Sharon’s property is her separate property. (Ibid.) The Will names respondent as her executor and Jennifer as the next alternate executor. (Ibid.)

Sharon died on May 13, 2024. The cause of death listed on the death certificate is hypoxia and pneumonia, presumed bacterial. (Pet., ¶ 21.) Under the physician’s certification, the physician stated that he had attended to Sharon since April 29, 2024, which is only nine days prior to the purported executions of the 2024 Restatement and Will. (Ibid.)

“Stephen Martin controlled access to his mother and isolated her from the rest of her family, specifically her step-children and grandchildren, the issue of the stepchildren. Additionally, both the 2024 Restatement and 2024 Will purport to be executed by Sharon M. Trotter on the same day, May 8, 2024, yet neither signature resembles the other. Further, on this same date, there was a report by a Mission Park employee that the Settlor was unable to speak and was in and out of consciousness. The Settlor had seventeen years to modify her estate plan and she failed to do so. Upon receiving a diagnosis of advanced lung cancer, Sharon Trotter did not immediately amend nor did she take steps to restate her Trust prior to being placed in the facility, Mission Park. Five (5) short days prior to her passing, abruptly the Settlor allegedly restated her Trust and made a new Will despite suffering from hypoxia, bacterial pneumonia and terminal lung cancer. Sharon Trotter was reportedly experiencing delirium.” (Pet., ¶ 23.)

Sharon was 84 years old, weakened by illness, and suffering from delirium at the time of the purported execution of the 2024 Restatement and Will. (Pet., ¶ 36 (a).)

Respondent now demurs to the petition on the grounds that the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

Petitioner opposes the motion.

Analysis:

Meet and Confer

“(a) Before filing a demurrer pursuant to this chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. If an amended complaint, cross-complaint, or answer is filed, the responding party shall meet and confer again with the party who filed the amended pleading before filing a demurrer to the amended pleading.

“(1) As part of the meet and confer process, the demurring party shall identify all of the specific causes of action that it believes are subject to demurrer and identify with legal support the basis of the deficiencies. The party who filed the complaint, cross-complaint, or answer shall provide legal support for its position that the pleading is legally sufficient or, in the alternative, how the complaint, cross-complaint, or answer could be amended to cure any legal insufficiency.

“(2) The parties shall meet and confer at least 5 days before the date the responsive pleading is due. If the parties are not able to meet and confer at least 5 days before the date the responsive pleading is due, the demurring party shall be granted an automatic 30-day extension of time within which to file a responsive pleading, by filing and serving, on or before the date on which a demurrer would be due, a declaration stating under penalty of perjury that a good faith attempt to meet and confer was made and explaining the reasons why the parties could not meet and confer. The 30-day extension shall commence from the date the responsive pleading was previously due, and the demurring party shall not be subject to default during the period of the extension. Any further extensions shall be obtained by court order upon a showing of good cause.

“(3) The demurring party shall file and serve with the demurrer a declaration stating either of the following:

“(A) The means by which the demurring party met and conferred with the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer, and that the parties did not reach an agreement resolving the objections raised in the demurrer.

“(B) That the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer failed to respond to the meet and confer request of the demurring party or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith.

“(4) A determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).)

Here, respondent’s counsel submitted a declaration stating that on December 3, 2024, he sent a meet and confer letter to petitioner’s counsel via email. The declaration states that it is attached as Exhibit A. There is no Exhibit A attached to the declaration as stated. Based on this fact, it is unclear whether respondent properly complied with the meet and confer requirement.

Standard on Demurrer

“When any ground for objection to a complaint, cross-complaint, or answer appears on the face thereof, or from any matter of which the court is required to or may take judicial notice, the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer to the pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) “Our consideration of the facts alleged includes ‘those evidentiary facts found in recitals of exhibits attached to [the] complaint.’ [Citation.]” (Alexander v. Exxon Mobil (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1250.)

“[A] court must treat a demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, it does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.” (Travelers Indem. Co. of Connecticut v. Navigators Specialty Ins. Co. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 341, 358, citing Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)

“If the complaint states a cause of action under any theory, regardless of the title under which the factual basis for relief is stated, that aspect of the complaint is good against a demurrer. “ ‘[W]e are not limited to plaintiffs’ theory of recovery in testing the sufficiency of their complaint against a demurrer but instead must determine if the factual allegations of the complaint are adequate to state a cause of action under any legal theory. The courts of this state have . . . long since departed from holding a plaintiff strictly to the ‘form of action’ he has pleaded and instead have adopted the more flexible approach of examining the facts alleged to determine if a demurrer should be sustained.’ ” [Citations.]” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38-39.)

“To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)

While, for some reason, respondent addresses the two causes of action in the reverse order that they appear in the petition, the court will address them in the order that they are set forth in the petition.

Undue Influence

“Undue influence may be present:

“1. In the use, by one in whom a confidence is reposed by another, or who holds a real or apparent authority over him, of such confidence or authority for the purpose of obtaining an unfair advantage over him;

“2. In taking an unfair advantage of another’s weakness of mind; or,

“3. In taking a grossly oppressive and unfair advantage of another’s necessities or distress.” (Civ. Code, § 1575.)

“(a) ‘Undue influence’ means excessive persuasion that causes another person to act or refrain from acting by overcoming that person’s free will and results in inequity. In determining whether a result was produced by undue influence, all of the following shall be considered:

“(1) The vulnerability of the victim. Evidence of vulnerability may include, but is not limited to, incapacity, illness, disability, injury, age, education, impaired cognitive function, emotional distress, isolation, or dependency, and whether the influencer knew or should have known of the alleged victim’s vulnerability.

“(2) The influencer’s apparent authority. Evidence of apparent authority may include, but is not limited to, status as a fiduciary, family member, care provider, health care professional, legal professional, spiritual adviser, expert, or other qualification.

“(3) The actions or tactics used by the influencer. Evidence of actions or tactics used may include, but is not limited to, all of the following:

“(A) Controlling necessaries of life, medication, the victim’s interactions with others, access to information, or sleep.

“(B) Use of affection, intimidation, or coercion.

“(C) Initiation of changes in personal or property rights, use of haste or secrecy in effecting those changes, effecting changes at inappropriate times and places, and claims of expertise in effecting changes.

“(4) The equity of the result. Evidence of the equity of the result may include, but is not limited to, the economic consequences to the victim, any divergence from the victim’s prior intent or course of conduct or dealing, the relationship of the value conveyed to the value of any services or consideration received, or the appropriateness of the change in light of the length and nature of the relationship.

“(b) Evidence of an inequitable result, without more, is not sufficient to prove undue influence.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.70.)

Respondent argues that this is not a case of undue influence. In doing so, respondent relies on the merits of the case. As noted above, a demurrer is not the proper means to argue the merits of the case. The only things that respondent states relating to the allegations of the complaint (as opposed to the merits of the action) are conclusory statements that petitioner need to allege more. Respondent does not specify what “more” needs to be pled.

A review of the petition, as summarized above, clearly demonstrates that petitioner has alleged all the necessary elements to support a cause of action for undue influence. The demurrer to the first cause of action for undue influence will be overruled.

Financial Elder Abuse

“(a) ‘Financial abuse’ of an elder or dependent adult occurs when a person or entity does any of the following:

“(1) Takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains real or personal property of an elder or dependent adult for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, or both.

“(2) Assists in taking, secreting, appropriating, obtaining, or retaining real or personal property of an elder or dependent adult for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, or both.

“(3) Takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains, or assists in taking, secreting, appropriating, obtaining, or retaining, real or personal property of an elder or dependent adult by undue influence, as defined in Section 15610.70. “(b) A person or entity shall be deemed to have taken, secreted, appropriated, obtained, or retained property for a wrongful use if, among other things, the person or entity takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains the property and the person or entity knew or should have known that this conduct is likely to be harmful to the elder or dependent adult.

“(c) For purposes of this section, a person or entity takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains real or personal property when an elder or dependent adult is deprived of any property right, including by means of an agreement, donative transfer, or testamentary bequest, regardless of whether the property is held directly or by a representative of an elder or dependent adult.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30, subds. (a)-(c).)

Here, respondent misstates the law regarding a cause of action for financial elder abuse. For example, in arguing that a taking is required to support the cause of action, and that an estate is not a property right, respondent cites Mahon v. Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 862 (Mahon), as holding: “[r]espondents argue that an ‘estate plan’ cannot be a property right, and strictly speaking, they are correct”. (Demurrer, p. 4, ll. 11- 12.) The full quote is actually contrary to respondent’s position, stating: “Respondents argue that an ‘estate plan’ cannot be a property right, and strictly speaking, they are correct, but what they overlook is that the estate plan alleged here was simply the vehicle by which the Mahans sought to convey assets by gift to their children. (Mahon, supra, at p. 862.) The part that respondent left out of the demurrer changes the entire meaning of the citation. Here, the allegations of the petition are that the 2024 Restatement and Will were the vehicles by which respondent seeks to convey Sharon’s assets to himself. The language of Welfare & Institutions Code section 15610.10.30, subdivision (a)(3), quoted directly above, specifically identifies “testamentary bequest” as a vehicle for committing financial elder abuse by taking, secreting, appropriating, obtaining, or retaining real or personal property. It is an established principle of law that, in certain circumstances, undue influence with respect to a testamentary instrument, such as a Trust or Will, can amount to financial elder abuse. (See, e.g. Levin v. Winston-Levin (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1025.)

A review of the petition, as summarized above, shows that petitioner has adequately pled all of the elements of financial elder abuse. The demurrer to the second cause of action will be overruled.