Matter of the James Vreeland Family Trust

Case Number

24PR00371

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 08/05/2024 - 08:30

Nature of Proceedings

Petition to Determine Claim to Real Property

Tentative Ruling

Probate Notes:

Appearances required.  The following is noted for the Court at the hearing:

The merits of this petition are not governed by Estate of Heggstad as cited by petitioner, because the petition does not involve a claim to real property.

In Estate of Heggstad, the property at issue was real property “listed as item No. 5 on schedule A” and “remained in decedent's name, as an unmarried man, and there was no grant deed reconveying this property to himself as trustee of the revocable living trust.”  (Estate of Heggstad (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 943, 946.)  On those very specific facts, the Court of Appeal held “the written document declaring a trust in the property described in Schedule A was signed by the decedent at the time he made the declaration and constitutes a proper manifestation of his intent to create a trust.” (Id. at p. 948.) 

The Court of Appeal reached this conclusion after reviewing section 40 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, which is the Statute of Frauds, and reasoning:

Additionally, comment b to section 40 (statute of frauds) establishes that a written declaration of trust, by itself, is sufficient to create a trust in the property. Comment b states: “Methods of creation of trust. The Statute of Frauds is applicable whether a trust of an interest in land is created by the owner's declaring himself trustee, or by a transfer by him to another in trust.” (Second emphasis added.)

(Id. at p. 949.)  Thus, the Court of Appeal reached the holding in Heggstad by tethering the specific facts of that case to the governing law on satisfying the writing requirement of the Statute of Frauds.  Specifically, the Court of Appeal found that the entry of the subject property on schedule A of the Trust satisfied the writing requirement for real property.

In contrast, the allegations and evidence in this case do not involve real property, like the allegations and evidence in Estate of Heggstad.  Therefore, the Petition is not a “Heggstad” Petition, because it is not governed by the very specific precedent in Estate of Heggstad.

Unlike real property that requires a writing and adequate description in order to transfer it into a trust (Estate of Heggstad (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th, at p. 948), all that is required to transfer personal property (here, securities) into a trust is a general written statement evincing the settlor’s intent to transfer that property into the trust (Kucker v. Kucker (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 90, 94), or clear and convincing evidence an oral trust was created (Prob. Code,§ 15207).  A general statement is sufficient to consider all personal property a trust asset.  (Kucker v. Kucker (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 90, 95 [“There is no California authority invalidating a transfer of shares of stock to a trust because a general assignment of personal property did not identify the shares. Nor should there be.”].)

Since the trust at issue contains an adequate description of the securities (i.e. personal property) at issue, the petition should be granted unless objection is made. However, the Court should cite to Kucker v. Kucker for authority in finding the subject personal properties are trust assets held in trust.