Denis Lomov vs Geoffrey Winston Hough

Case Number

24CV07135

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 06/06/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

CMC; Motion to Strike

Tentative Ruling

For the reasons set forth below:

1. Defendant’s motion to strike portions of plaintiff’s complaint is granted as to the portion of the caption, on page one of the complaint that reads “2. PUNITIVE DAMAGES.” In all other respects the motion to strike is denied.

2. Defendant Geoffrey Winston Hough shall file and serve his answer to the complaint no later than June 27, 2025.

Background:

This action commenced on December 18, 2024, by the filing of the complaint by plaintiff Denis Lomov (“plaintiff”) against defendant Geoffrey Winston Hough (“defendant”) for negligence and punitive damages.

As alleged in the complaint:

On September 30, 2024, defendant operated his vehicle in a negligent manner and caused a collision with plaintiff’s vehicle, resulting in injuries to plaintiff. (Compl., ¶ 11.)

At the time of the incident, defendant was under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152(a). (Compl., ¶ 14(a).)

Further allegations will be discussed below, where appropriate.

Defendant now seeks to strike the punitive damages portions of plaintiff’s complaint.

Plaintiff opposes the motion.

Analysis:

As an initial matter, defendant objects to the extrinsic evidence that plaintiff presents in opposition to the motion to strike. Defendant is correct that consideration of the exhibits would be improper. Defendant’s objection to plaintiff’s evidence is sustained and the court will not consider it.

Defendant seeks to strike the following:

The first page of the complaint, the cause of action entitled “2. PUNITIVE DAMAGES”; Page 4, line 11, heading that reads “PUNITIVE DAMAGES”; Page 6, line 15, which reads, “. . . and as such justifies an award of punitive damages”; and Page 7, line 1, in the Prayer for Relief, which reads, “Punitive damages.”

 

“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) As with demurrers, “[t]he grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).) 

 

“An immaterial allegation in a pleading is any of the following: 

“(1) An allegation that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense. 

“(2) An allegation that is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense. 

“(3) A demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint or cross-complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subd. (b).) 

 

“An ‘immaterial allegation’ means ‘irrelevant matter’ as that term is used in Section 436.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subd. (c).) 

 

“[J]udges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” [Clauson v. Sup.Ct. (Pedus Services, Inc.) (1998) 67 CA4th 1253, 1255.) 

The right to punitive damages is strictly statutory. “In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “ ‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Id. at subd. (c)(1).) “ ‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Id. at subd. (c)(2).) “ ‘Fraud’ means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Id. at subd. (c)(3).)

“Used in its ordinary sense, the adjective ‘despicable’ is a powerful term that refers to circumstances that are ‘base,’ ‘vile,’ or ‘contemptible.’ (4 Oxford English Dict. (2d ed. 1989) p. 529.) As amended to include this word, the statute plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs’ interests. The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.” (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.) 

“Inasmuch as Civil Code section 3294 requires as a prerequisite to the recovery of punitive damages that the defendant ‘has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice,’ the cases have uniformly recognized that proof of negligence, even gross negligence, or recklessness is insufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.” (Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 87.)

By way of the demurrer, defendant largely relies on the case of Gombos v. Ashe (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 517 (Gombos). Gombos has, since it was decided in 1958, been disapproved of by numerous cases. Defendant also relies on other unpersuasive, and nonbinding, cases and argument, including a dissenting opinion and cases that analyze substantive evidence rather than the sufficiency of allegations. Further, defendant’s argument that the legislature repudiated Taylor v. Superior Court, and restored Gombos to controlling law, is simply untrue. The legislature did no such thing.

The current seminal case on the recoverability of punitive damages in an intoxicated driver case is Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890 (Taylor). In Taylor “the complaint alleged that the car driven by [defendant] collided with plaintiff’s car, causing plaintiff serious injuries; that [defendant] is, and for a substantial period of time had been, an alcoholic ‘well aware of the serious nature of his alcoholism’ and of his ‘tendency, habit, history, practice, proclivity, or inclination to drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol’; and that [defendant] was also aware of the dangerousness of his driving while intoxicated. The complaint further alleged that [defendant] had previously caused a serious automobile accident while driving under the influence of alcohol; that he had been arrested and convicted for drunken driving on numerous prior occasions; that at the time of the accident herein, [defendant] had recently completed a period of probation which followed a drunk driving conviction; that one of his probation conditions was that he refrain from driving for at least six hours after consuming any alcoholic beverage; and that at the time of the accident in question he was presently facing an additional pending criminal drunk driving charge. In addition, the complaint averred that notwithstanding his alcoholism, [defendant] accepted employment which required him both to call on various commercial establishments where alcoholic beverages were sold, and to deliver or transport such beverages in his car. Finally, it is alleged that at the time the accident occurred, [defendant] was transporting alcoholic beverages, ‘was simultaneously driving . . . while consuming an alcoholic beverage,’ and was ‘under the influence of intoxicants.’ ” (Id. at p. 893.) 

The court in Taylor held:  “One who wilfully consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical and mental faculties with a vehicle capable of great force and speed, reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious disregard of the safety of others. The effect may be lethal whether or not the driver had a prior history of drunk driving incidents.” (Id. at p. 897.)

As relevant to the present case, plaintiff pleads the following:

“20. That at all times herein mentioned Defendants’ vehicle was driven by defendants, while under the influence of drugs, or the combined influence of alcohol and drugs.

“21. Defendants, for a substantial period of time, had known that they had serious problems with alcohol intake or drug use, and were well aware of the serious nature of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs and had a tendency, habit, history, practice, proclivity and inclination to drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Defendants were also aware of the danger of driving while intoxicated.

“22. Upon information and belief, on or about Defendant GEOFFREY WINSTON HOUGH consumed alcohol and/or drugs to the point of legal intoxication, and knew they would drive a motor vehicle, knowing full well that the drinking of alcoholic beverages or use of drugs would occur prior to any attempt to drive their motor vehicle.

“23. Defendants rapidly consumed large quantities of drugs or alcohol before driving. Defendants knew that this quantity of drugs or alcohol would substantially impair their ability to drive, and chose to willfully, wantonly, and knowingly consume said excessive amounts of alcoholic beverages or drugs, knowing that they would be required to drive themselves without the assistance of any other persons. While consuming said drugs or alcohol, Defendants knew that they would then immediately go to their automobile, and operate said vehicle on said highway.

“24. Upon information and belief, Defendants knew that the consumption of drugs and alcoholic beverages can and does cause an increased risk of accidents, as opposed to not ingesting drugs and alcoholic beverages prior to driving. Defendants knew the amount of alcohol that they consumed and despite knowing of the dangers to the driving public, decided to drive their automobile after the rapid consumption of drugs or alcohol. Defendants were charged with the violation of driving under the influence. Defendants had no drugs or alcohol from the time of the accident till the time that they were tested.

“25. Defendants having rapidly ingested a large amount of drugs and/or alcohol knew, or should have known, of the probable seriousness of injury to others, which would result from their driving, and thus demonstrated a conscious disregard for the rights and safeties of others, thus constituting despicable conduct and malice.

“26. Upon information and belief, Defendants decided to consume alcoholic beverages within a period of six hours of driving their motor vehicle, and knew at the establishment or place where they did in fact consume the alcoholic beverages that they did intend to drive their automobile on the highway, knowing the dangerousness of driving while intoxicated. While they were in fact driving, Defendants were under the influence of alcohol and had done so on prior occasions, and were fully aware of the probable dangerous consequence of their conduct. Defendants willfully and deliberately engaged in despicable conduct to drive their automobile knowing the danger to the public which in fact was a cause of the accident heretofore mentioned.

“27. Defendants consumed the alcohol and/or drugs before the subject incident, said consumption was willful and voluntary and with full knowledge that after consumption, their driving abilities would be substantially impaired. Knowing these facts, Defendants did, willfully and voluntarily, consume sufficient quantities of alcohol and/or drugs with knowledge that they would thereafter be operating a motor vehicle. That due to their state of intoxication, Defendants could not properly operate a motor vehicle, and as a result, slammed into the vehicle in which Plaintiff sat, causing substantial injury and damages to Plaintiff. . . .

“29. Defendant with wanton disregard for the safety of the public chose to drive their vehicle dangerously fast and recklessly while swerving and with excessive speeds and inattentiveness on a very narrow roadway on Mesa Road which is located in a very dense area of the college campus, University of California, Santa Barbara (“UCSB”) on a two lane roadway at a time of day when there would be many other cars, pedestrians, college students on foot and on bicycle on the roadway. Driving while intoxicated in and around a highly populated college campus like UCSB is a reckless disregard for human life.

“30. The above-described conduct of the Defendants, voluntarily and intentionally operating their motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating alcohol and/or drugs, was willful, wanton and malicious, and in conscious disregard for the rights and safety of Plaintiff, and others, and as such justifies an award of punitive damages.”

While not alleging as many facts as was alleged in Taylor, for pleading purposes, plaintiff’s complaint is sufficient to overcome defendant’s motion to strike.

However, defendant is correct that punitive damages is not a proper, stand-alone, cause of action. The portion of the caption, on page one of the complaint that reads “2. PUNITIVE DAMAGES,” will be stricken.

The motion to strike will be denied in all other respects and defendant will be ordered to answer the complaint.