Dulce Fuentes vs California Psychcare Inc

Case Number

24CV06834

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 07/25/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion: Judgment

Tentative Ruling

For all reasons discussed herein, the motion of defendant for judgment on the pleadings is denied.

Background:

On December 6, 2024, plaintiff Dulce Fuentes filed a complaint against defendant California Psychcare, Inc., (CPI), alleging one cause of action for civil penalties under Labor Code section 2698 et seq. (the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 or PAGA). The cause of action arises from alleged violations by CPI of Labor Code sections 201, 202, 203, 204, 210, 218.5, 221, 226, subdivision (a), 226.3, 226.7, 246, 432.5, 510, 512, subdivision (a), 551, 552, 558, 1174, subdivision (d), 1194, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 2800 and 2802, and IWC Wage Orders. (Compl., ¶ 1.)

In the complaint, plaintiff states that this action is brought “as an exclusively representative action on behalf of other current and former aggrieved employees of [CPI] for penalties...” and that plaintiff “seeks only to prosecute her non-individual PAGA claims and does not seek to prosecute any individual PAGA claims against [CPI].” (Compl. at p. 2, ll. 1-4 & ¶ 1.) As further alleged in the complaint:

Plaintiff and other current and former hourly-paid, non-exempt “aggrieved employees”, as that term is defined under subdivision (c) of Labor Code section 2699, were employed by CPI from September 16, 2023, to the present. (Compl., ¶ 17.) During their employment with CPI, CPI had a policy and practice of failing to compensate aggrieved employees for all hours worked; failing to provide aggrieved employees with meal and rest periods’ failing to pay all wages due including upon termination; failing to keep accurate records regarding gross and net wages earned by, total hours worked by, and hourly rates of the aggrieved employees; and failing to pay to the aggrieved employees all business expenses incurred within the required time period. (Compl., ¶¶ 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, & 29.)

On January 7, 2025, CPI filed an answer to plaintiff’s complaint, generally denying its allegations and asserting twenty-three affirmative defenses.

On June 9, 2025, CPI filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Court records reflect that CPI did not separately file or include a notice of the present motion.

In the “Introduction” section of the opening memorandum, CPI asserts as ostensible grounds for the motion: “In her effort to circumvent her contractual agreement to arbitrate all claims against [CPI], on an individual basis, [plaintiff] has taken the extraordinary step of expressly disclaiming her ‘individual PAGA claim’ – a maneuver that not only undermines the terms of the agreement but also runs counter to the very principles underlying arbitration and the [PAGA] jurisprudence. Recent Court of Appeal authority makes clear that she cannot do so. Plaintiff may state a claim for relief under PAGA if, and only if, she pleads that she is seeking recovery on behalf of others and on behalf of herself. Thus, by expressly disclaiming her individual PAGA claim, Plaintiff has rendered her complaint improper and inadequate.” (Motion at p. 1, l. 24 – p. 2, l. 4.)

CPI further states that “[i]n the alternative, [CPI] requests that this matter be stayed pending the California Supreme Court’s review of the issues set forth below, which the Court has agreed to consider on its own motion....”

The motion is opposed by plaintiff.

Analysis:

A defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made on the grounds set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 438, subdivision (c)(1)(B), which include that “[t]he complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B).) (Note: Undesignated code references herein shall be to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise stated.) “The issue is whether the complaint raises an issue that can be resolved as a matter of law.” (Westly v. California Public Employees’ Retirement System Bd. of Administration (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1115.)

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed.” (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999 (Cloud); Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (d).) In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court “must accept as true all material facts properly pleaded, but does not consider conclusions of law or fact, opinions, speculation, or allegations contrary to law or facts that are judicially noticed.” (Stevenson Real Estate Services, Inc. v. CB Richard Ellis Real Estate Services, Inc. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1219-1220 (Stevenson).)

As further noted above, the court’s records reflect that CPI has not filed written notice of the present motion, and has instead included only a supporting memorandum.

“An application for an order is a motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1003.) Section 1005 requires written notice for any motion “in which notice is required, and no other time or method is prescribed by law or by court or judge.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (a)(13).) Section 438 states that “[a]ll motions made pursuant to this subdivision shall be made pursuant to Section 1010.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (i)(2). Section 1010 states: “Notices must be in writing, and the notice of a motion, other than for a new trial, must state when, and the grounds upon which it will be made, and the papers, if any, upon which it is to be based.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.) For these reasons, the present motion requires written notice.

“A basic tenet of motion practice is that the notice of motion must state the grounds for the order being sought [citations], and courts generally may consider only the grounds stated in the notice of motion.” (Kinda v. Carpenter (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1277 (Kinda).) Further, “[t]he purpose of the notice requirements ‘is to cause the moving party to “sufficiently define the issues for the information and attention of the adverse party and the court.” ’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.)

Because CPI has failed to serve written notice of the present motion stating the grounds for the relief sought in the motion, the court may decline to consider the grounds stated in the memorandum. To the extent the grounds stated in the memorandum may not be considered, the motion is effectively not supported by a memorandum. “The court may construe the absence of a memorandum as an admission that the motion ... is not meritorious and cause for its denial ....” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1113(a).)

In addition, section 439 requires CPI to file and serve with the present motion a declaration stating either “[t]he means by which [CPI] met and conferred with [plaintiff] and that the parties did not reach an agreement resolving the claims raised by the motion for judgment on the pleadings...” or that plaintiff “failed to respond to the meet and confer request of [CPI] or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a)(3)(A)-(B).) The court’s records reflect that CPI also did not file the declaration required under section 439, subdivision (a)(3) with the present motion.

Notwithstanding the procedural issues described which justify an order denying the motion or taking the motion off-calendar, plaintiff has not asserted any objections based on the absence of written notice and instead filed a substantive opposition to the motion responding to the arguments presented by CPI. (Kinda, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1277 [“It also may be sufficient if the omitted issue, or ground for relief, was raised without objection before the trial court...”].) In addition, the proof of service filed by CPI with the motion, and information appearing in the memorandum, shows that a declaration of CPI’s counsel was served on plaintiff with a copy of the motion, which indicates to the court that the meet and confer process described under section 439 occurred. For these reasons, the court will consider the motion. CPI’s counsel is reminded of their obligation to comply with procedural requirements and court rules.

As grounds for the motion, CPI asserts that in the complaint, plaintiff has expressly disclaimed any individual PAGA claim in an effort to avoid arbitration of that claim. “Presentation of extrinsic evidence is ... not proper on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Cloud, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 999.) CPI fails to explain why the complaint alleges the existence of an agreement to arbitrate the present dispute. A reasonable interpretation of the complaint also shows that plaintiff does not expressly allege the existence of an agreement to arbitrate any claims alleged in the complaint. For these reasons, any information, evidence, or arguments offered by CPI to show the existence of an agreement to arbitrate the claims alleged in the complaint is, for present purposes, disregarded.

Relying on the decision in Leeper v. Shipt, Inc. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1001, review ordered April 16, 2025, S289305 (Leeper), CPI contends that, under the plain language of PAGA, plaintiff cannot pursue claims only in a nonindividual or representative capacity but must include both an individual and nonindividual or representative PAGA claim. Because plaintiff alleges a cause of action for penalties under PAGA in a representative capacity only, and disclaims any individual claim for penalties, CPI argues, plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action under PAGA.

“A PAGA representative action is ... a type of qui tam action. ‘Traditionally, the requirements for enforcement by a citizen in a qui tam action have been (1) that the statute exacts a penalty; (2) that part of the penalty be paid to the informer; and (3) that, in some way, the informer be authorized to bring suit to recover the penalty.’ [Citation.] The PAGA conforms to these traditional criteria, except that a portion of the penalty goes not only to the citizen bringing the suit but to all employees affected by the Labor Code violation. The government entity on whose behalf the plaintiff files suit is always the real party in interest in the suit.” (Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 382, overruled on another ground in Quach v. California Commerce Club, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 562, 582, fn. 4.)

CPI does not appear to contend that plaintiff has failed to allege in the complaint that PAGA exacts a penalty. Instead, CPI’s arguments appear to be effectively directed to whether or not plaintiff has alleged that she is authorized to bring the present suit to recover penalties under PAGA, based on allegations that plaintiff dose not seek to pursue an individual claim for penalties under PAGA.

“By definition, Qui tam rights have never existed without statutory authorization. As a result, courts have been required to develop criteria to determine whether a given statute in fact authorizes Qui tam enforcement.” (Sanders v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 661, 671.) In addition, “[t]he prerequisites for standing to assert statutorily-based causes of action are determined from the statutory language, as well as the underlying legislative intent and the purpose of the statute.” (Boorstein v. CBS Interactive, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 456, 466.) “Where, as here, a cause of action is based on a state statute, standing is a matter of statutory interpretation.” (Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1120 (Adolph).)

“ ‘In construing a statute, our task is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the enactment.’ [Citation.] We look first to ‘the words of the statute, which are the most reliable indications of the Legislature’s intent.’ [Citation.] As noted, [Labor Code] section 2699, subdivision (c) defines ‘aggrieved employee,’ and we have explained that ‘[t]he plain language of section 2699(c) has only two requirements for PAGA standing.’ [Citation.] The plaintiff must allege that he or she is (1) ‘someone “who was employed by the alleged violator” ’ and (2) someone ‘ “against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed.” ’ [Citations.]” (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1120.)

Giving the complaint a reasonable interpretation and accepting the truth of its material factual allegations, the court finds that plaintiff has alleged these elements in the complaint. CPI also does not explain why plaintiff has failed to allege that she was employed by CPI and is someone against whom one or more of the violations alleged in the complaint was committed. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to show that plaintiff is authorized, or has standing, to bring suit to recover penalties under PAGA. Furthermore, though CPI contends that the complaint fails to state a cause of action for civil penalties under PAGA because plaintiff has disclaimed any individual claim under PAGA, “an employee who does not bring an individual claim against her employer may nevertheless bring a PAGA action for herself and other employees of the company.” (Balderas v. Fresh Start Harvesting, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 533, 536.)

In addition, the court in Leeper was “concerned with what a PAGA action entails as defined by section 2699, subdivision (a), and not standing.” (Leeper, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 1007.) To the extent CPI relies on the Leeper court’s interpretation of subdivision (a) of Labor Code section 2699, or the court’s determination that “based on the unambiguous language in section 2699, subdivision (a), any PAGA action necessarily includes both an individual PAGA claim and a representative PAGA claim...” (Leeper, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 1009), the Leeper court’s interpretation of PAGA was questioned in Rodriguez v. Packers Sanitation Services LTD., LLC, in which the court stated that this interpretation “reads far too much into the word ‘and’ while ignoring other terms of significance, such as the statutory phrases ‘civil action’ and ‘on behalf of.’ [Citations.]” (Rodriguez v. Packers Sanitation Services LTD., LLC (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 69, 81, fn. 5.)

CPI concedes that on April 16, 2025, the Supreme Court of California, on its own motion, ordered a review of Leeper. “Pending review and filing of the Supreme Court’s opinion, unless otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court under (3), a published opinion of a Court of Appeal in the matter has no binding or precedential effect, and may be cited for potentially persuasive value only.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(e)(1).) Moreover, where appellate court decisions are in conflict, “the court exercising inferior jurisdiction can and must make a choice between the conflicting decisions.” (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 456.) Based on the authorities further discussed above, the court does not find the opinion in Leeper to be persuasive.

The court is also not persuaded by the remaining arguments asserted by CPI.

For all reasons discussed above, CPI has failed to show why the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against CPI for civil penalties under PAGA. Therefore, the court will deny the motion.

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice:

Plaintiff requests that the court take judicial notice of the complaint filed in this action, and 12 trial court orders or rulings entered in unrelated actions. (Pl. RJN ¶¶ 1-13 & Exhs. 1-13.)

Though not necessary, as the complaint is a proper subject of judicial notice, the court will grant plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of this court record. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)(1).)

The isolated written trial court rulings for which plaintiff requests judicial notice have “no precedential value” and “cannot properly be cited in support of a legal argument, absent exceptions not applicable here.” (Santa Ana Hospital Medical Center v. Belshe (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 819, 831; San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. v. County of San Diego (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1184.) Furthermore, orders entered in matters which are not related to the present action have no relevance to the question of whether the complaint filed by plaintiff in this action states a cause of action against CPI. (Evid. Code, § 350; Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063, overruled on other grounds in In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1276.) For these reasons, the court will deny plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of the 12 trial court orders.

Plaintiff’s objection to CPI’s “new” evidence:

Plaintiff asserts objections to the declaration of Laura Szitar submitted in support of CPI’s reply, and exhibit A to that declaration which includes a copy of an arbitration agreement purportedly signed by plaintiff on March 16, 2022, on the grounds that CPI may not present new evidence with its reply papers and that the court may not consider extrinsic evidence to determine the present motion. (See Declaration of Laura Szitar, ¶ 5 & Exh. A.) As further discussed above, the court, for present purposes, considers and accepts as true only those material facts which appear on the face of the complaint and are properly pleaded, and matters which are subject to judicial notice. (Stevenson, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1219-1220.)