Hope Alexandra Starchild et al vs ZP 125 Mason Inc et al

Case Number

24CV06633

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 10/10/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Minor's Compromise

Tentative Ruling

For the reasons set forth herein, the petition of Jocelyn Johnston-Slason for expedited approval of compromise of claim or action or disposition of proceeds of judgment for minor is granted in accordance with this ruling.

Background:

On November 26, 2024, plaintiff Hope Alexandra Starchild (Starchild) filed a complaint against defendants ZP 125 Mason, Inc., (ZP Mason) and Mike Richardson Realtors (MRR), alleging six causes of action: (1) negligence; (2) breach of the warranty of habitability; (3) nuisance; (4) constructive eviction; (5) retaliatory eviction; and (6) negligent infliction of emotional distress.

On March 10, 2025, without any response to the complaint having been filed, Starchild filed a first amended complaint (the FAC) against ZP Mason, and defendants Richardson Real Estate Services, Inc., (Richardson Real Estate), Dina Richardson (Richardson), and Aspen Insurance, alleging the same six causes of action and adding causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment, violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200, failure to disclose known defects, and bad faith and unfair insurance practices. The FAC does not name MRR as a defendant.

Court records reflect that on July 24, 2025, attorney Geoffrey D. Plourde (Plourde) of the Ibis Law Group APC, filed a notice stating that Plourde is providing representation to Starchild which is limited in scope to an application for the appointment of a guardian ad litem, a joint stipulation re second amended complaint, a petition for a minor’s compromise, and a request for dismissal. (July 24, 2025, Notice, ¶¶ 1 & 2(c).)

On August 4, 2025, Starchild filed a joint stipulation executed by Starchild, Jocelyn Johnston-Slason (Slason), who is identified in the stipulation as the proposed guardian ad litem for minor Astya K. S. (Astya), ZP Mason, and Richardson Real Estate. In that stipulation, the parties requested that the court grant Starchild leave to file a second amended complaint for the sole purpose of adding Astya, who is the child of Starchild, as a plaintiff. (Aug. 4, 2024, Stip., ¶¶ 7-8.) On that date, the court entered an order granting Starchild leave to file a second amended complaint limited to adding Astya by and through her guardian ad litem Slason.

On August 7, 2025, Plourde filed a notice of Plourde’s representation of Slason as the proposed guardian ad litem for Astya, which Plourde states is limited in scope to an application for the appointment of a guardian ad litem, a joint stipulation re second amended complaint, a petition for a minor’s compromise, and a request for dismissal. (Aug. 7, 2025, Notice, ¶¶ 1 & 2(c).)

Also on August 7, 2025, Starchild filed an application (the guardian application) for the appointment of Slason as guardian ad litem for Astya. Information appearing in that application that Slason is Astya’s grandparent. (See Aug. 7, 2025, Application, ¶ 8(b).) On that same date, Starchild, Astya, and Slason, as the guardian ad litem for Astya (collectively, plaintiffs) separately filed a second amended complaint (the SAC) against ZP Mason, Richardson Real Estate, Richardson, and Aspen Insurance (collectively, defendants), alleging the same causes of action asserted in the FAC. As alleged in the operative SAC:

In November 2020, Starchild entered into a lease agreement with Richardson Real Estate for a rental home located at 125 W. Mason Street (the unit) in Santa Barbara, California. (SAC, ¶ 15.) The unit is owned and operated by ZP Mason and managed by Richardson Real Estate. (SAC, ¶¶ 9-10.) Richardson is the Director of Property Management for Richardson Real Estate. (SAC, ¶ 11.) Aspen Insurance provided insurance coverage related to the unit. (SAC, ¶ 12.)

In reliance on defendants’ representations that the unit was safe, Starchild moved into the unit in November 2020. (SAC, ¶¶ 3-4 & 15.) Shortly after moving, Starchild experienced persistent water and plumbing issues including repeated flooding, ceiling and wall leaks, deteriorating drywall, unrepaired structural damage to cabinets and floors, and an improperly sealed toilet, among other issues. (SAC, ¶ 17.) Persistent mold contamination also plagued the unit, and defendants refused to disclose the results of environmental testing despite Starchild’s repeated requests. (SAC, ¶ 18.) Starchild’s environmental testing confirmed the existence of mold on Starchild’s mattress and belongings which exposed Starchild to rashes, respiratory issues, and allergic reactions. (Ibid.)

Defendants also failed to maintain adequate exterior lighting and to secure the laundry room, allowing trespassing incidents, garage tampering and break-ins, and repeated mailbox theft. (SAC, ¶ 21.)

As a result of the conditions present at the unit and described above, Starchild suffered “pregnancy complications” including early labor, low birth weight, an overnight hospitalization for a near-miscarriage which required monitored vital care, and an emergency ultrasound due to heavy vaginal bleeding. (SAC, ¶¶ 30-31.) The “near miscarriage and the excruciating stress from [d]efendants’ actions directly endangered [Astya] in utero, contributing to severe, life-threatening pregnancy complications....” (SAC, ¶ 31.)

Defendants directed Starchild to file a renter’s insurance claim which defendants knew would be denied, and assured Starchild that the unit was habitable. (SAC, ¶ 23.) On October 25, 2022, defendants retaliated against Starchild for her habitability complaints by issuing a rent increase, fabricating false accusations, and withholding maintenance services. (SAC, ¶¶ 24-25.) Defendants’ conduct forced Starchild to vacate the unit in November 2022. (SAC, ¶ 26.)

On August 8, 2025, the court granted the guardian application and appointed Slason as the guardian ad litem of Astya.

On August 20, 2025, Slason filed an unopposed verified petition for expedited approval of a settlement of Astya’s disputed claim, and separately filed a declaration of Starchild in support of that petition, in which Starchild asserts that defendants’ refusal to finalize or pay the settlement of Starchild’s claims until the petition is approved by the court has severely affected Starchild’s ability to provide for herself and Astya, among other things. (Starchild Decl., ¶¶ 3-5.)

In the verified petition, Slason, who may at times be referred to herein as petitioner, asserts that Astya is currently two years of age. (Pet. ¶ 2(b).) Slason states that the incident or accident occurred at the unit from August through November 2022, and involved Starchild, Astya, and defendants Richardson, Richardson Real Estate, and ZP Mason (collectively, the settling defendants). (Pet. ¶ 5(a)-(c).)

According to Slason, Astya was in utero at the time of the incident or accident. (Pet. ¶ 6.) The unit was in a state of disrepair in violation of multiple provisions of the Civil, Health, and Safety Code provisions and local ordinances, and the settling defendants failed to provide safe, sanitary, and habitable housing. (Ibid.) The proposed settlement reflects a compromise of these disputed claims in light of Astya’s age and the contested nature of liability and damages. (Ibid.)

Slason states that Astya has no known manifestations of post birth injuries, and has not received any treatment that has been medically evaluated or prescribed in connection with the incident or accident post birth. (Pet. ¶¶ 7-8.)

Slason has made a careful and diligent inquiry and investigation into the facts and circumstances of the incident in which Astya was injured, the responsibility for the incident, and the nature, extent, and seriousness of Astya’s injuries. (Pet. ¶ 10.) Slason understands that if the compromise proposed in the petition is approved by the court and consummated, Astya will be forever barred from seeking any further recovery of compensation from the settling defendants even if Astya’s injuries turn out to be more serious than they now appear. (Ibid.)

To settle Astya’s claim, the settling defendants have offered to pay to Astya, on a global basis, the amount stated in the petition. (Pet. ¶ 11(a)-(b).) A copy of a “draft” settlement agreement between Astya, by and through her guardian Slason, and the settling defendants is attached to the petition. (Pet. ¶ 11(c) & Attachment 11c.)

One or more of the settling defendants have also offered to pay amounts to Starchild to settle claims arising out of the same incident that resulted in Astya’s injury. (Pet. ¶ 12(b)(1)-(3).)

There are no medical expenses or statutory or contractual liens to be paid or reimbursed from the settlement proceeds. (Pet. ¶ 13.) There are no attorney’s fees for which court approval is requested. (Pet. ¶ 14(a)-(b).) Slason states that the costs of suit and attorney’s fees will be paid by Starchild out of Starchild’s settlement with the settling defendants. (Pet., ¶ 14(c) & Attachment 14c.) Slason further states that Plourde has received or expects to receive payment for attorney’s fees from Starchild on September 15, 2025. (Pet. ¶ 18(b).)

Plourde also represents Starchild. (Pet. ¶ 18(a).) Slason explains that Plourde has been retained by both plaintiffs in this matter to provide limited scope representation necessary to amend the operative complaint to add Astya as a plaintiff, to appoint Slason as Astya’s guardian ad litem, to prepare and file the present petition, and to prepare and file notice of settlement and request for dismissal. (Pet., Attachment 18a.) Plourde did not become involved with this matter, directly or indirectly, at the request of a party against whom the claim is asserted or a party’s insurance carrier, and is not representing, employed by, or associated with a defendant in this matter or an insurance carrier. (Pet., ¶ 3(d)-(e).)

Slason declares that there is no guardianship or conservator of the estate of Astya, and requests that the court order disposition of the proceeds of the settlement to be transferred to Slason at P.O. Box 2003 in Paso Robles, California, as the proposed custodian and for the benefit of Astya under the California Uniform Transfer to Minors Act. (Pet. ¶ 19(b)(5) & Attachment 19b(5).)

After a hearing held on September 12, 2025, the court entered a minute order (the Order), adopting its tentative ruling on the petition in which the court continued the hearing to October 10, 2025, and ordered Slason to, on or before September 25, file and serve a memorandum or supplemental brief fully addressing each of the matters discussed in the Order.

After the September 12 hearing on the petition, Starchild filed a substitution of attorney, substituting herself for Plourde.

On September 25, 2025, Slason filed a joint stipulation executed by the parties, requesting that the court enter an order sealing Astya’s medical and financial records, and settlement figures.

On September 29, 2025, Slason filed a supplemental brief which is supported by supplemental declarations of Plourde, Starchild, and Slason.

In the Plourde supplemental declaration, Plourde describes the limited scope of his engagement in this matter, which did not include settlement negotiations. (Supp. Plourde Decl., ¶¶ 2-3.) Plourde further explains that any references to an annuity in the draft settlement language are “boilerplate”, and that the petition seeks a lump-sum disposition to Slason under the California Uniform Transfers to Minors Act (the UTMA). (Supp. Plourde Decl., ¶ 6.)

Plourde also provides information purporting to explain why the supplemental brief was late-filed based on circumstances relating to a declaration from Astya’s pediatrician, and requests that the court exercise its discretion to consider the supplemental brief. (Supp. Plourde Decl., ¶¶ 7-8.)

In the supplemental Starchild declaration, Starchild states that Astya has not exhibited post-birth manifestations attributable to the allegations described above, and that Plourde did not represent Starchild or Slason in negotiating settlement allocations described in the petition. (Supp. Starchild Decl., ¶¶ 2-6.)

In the supplemental Slason declaration, Slason asserts that Astya has not received any post-birth medical treatment in connection with the allegations of the SAC, that Slason requests disbursements of the funds described in the petition as a custodian under the UTMA, and that Slason will hold the funds separately for Astya’s sole benefit and use them only in accordance with the UTMA or any court order. (Supp. Slason Decl., ¶¶ 2-5.) Slason will provide financial institution information as needed, and will comply with any court imposed conditions. (Supp. Slason Decl., ¶ 5.)

On October 1, 2025, Slason lodged conditionally under seal, a declaration of Ryn Kreidl, M.D., who is Astya’s pediatrician. (Kreidl Decl., ¶ 1.) Dr. Kreidl provides detailed information regarding their personal examination of Astya, Astya’s birth and prenatal summary and post-birth care, and Astya’s condition as of September 12, 2025. (Kreidl Decl., ¶¶ 2-5.)

On October 2, 2025, the court entered an order on the parties’ September 25 joint stipulation described above, directing that certain materials to be lodged conditionally under seal, among other things.

Analysis:

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 372, “[t]he ... guardian ad litem so appearing for any minor ... shall have power, with the approval of the court in which the action or proceeding is pending, to compromise the same, ... or release or discharge any claim of the ward ... pursuant to that compromise.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 372,  subd. (a)(3).) “The purpose of section 372 is to protect the minor involved in litigation by adding an extra layer of scrutiny to the settlement of the minor’s claims. This statute is a ‘shield’ to protect the interests of a minor.” (Pearson v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1339.)

“A petition for court approval of a compromise ... under Code of Civil Procedure section 372 must comply with [California Rules of Court], rules 7.950 or 7.950.5, 7.951, and 7.952.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1384(a).) The petition must be submitted on a completed and approved Judicial Council form, must be verified by the petitioner, and “. . . must contain a full disclosure of all information that has any bearing on the reasonableness of the compromise, covenant, settlement, or disposition.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.950; Barnes v. Western Heritage Ins. Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 249, 256, fn. 4.) If the petitioner has been represented by an attorney in preparing the petition, the petition must also disclose the information described in rule 7.951(1) through (6), and the petitioner and minor must attend the hearing unless the court for good cause dispenses with their appearance. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 7.951 & 7.952(a).)

Relevant here, “a petitioner for court approval of a compromise of .. a minor’s disputed claim ... may satisfy the disclosure requirements of rule 7.950 by submitting the petition on a completed Petition for Expedited Approval of Compromise of Claim or Action or Disposition of Proceeds of Judgment for Minor or Person With a Disability (form MC-350EX).” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.950.5(a).) A petition for expedited approval of a compromise of a minor’s claim may be used under circumstances where:

“(1) The petitioner is represented by an attorney authorized to practice in the courts of this state;

“(2) The claim is not for damages for the wrongful death of a person;

“(3) No portion of the net proceeds of the compromise, settlement, or judgment in favor of the minor or disabled claimant is to be placed in a trust;

“(4) There are no unresolved disputes concerning liens to be satisfied from the proceeds of the compromise, settlement, or judgment;

“(5) The petitioner’s attorney did not become involved in the matter at the direct or indirect request of a person against whom the claim is asserted or an insurance carrier for that person;

“(6) The petitioner’s attorney is neither employed by nor associated with a defendant or insurance carrier in connection with the petition;

“(7) If an action has been filed on the claim:

“(A) All defendants that have appeared in the action are participating in the compromise; or

“(B) The court has finally determined that the settling parties entered into the settlement in good faith;

“(8) The judgment for the minor or claimant with a disability (exclusive of interest and costs) or the total amount payable to the minor or claimant with a disability and all other parties under the proposed compromise or settlement is $50,000 or less ...

“(9) The court does not otherwise order.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.950.5(a)(1)-(9).)

The petition is verified and appears to be procedurally appropriate under the provisions of California Rules of Court, rule 7.950.5 set forth above.

The allegations of the SAC described above indicate or suggest that Starchild suffered pregnancy complications which resulted in premature labor and a low birth weight for Astya, and that these conditions are documented in medical records. (SAC, ¶ 30.) The settlement at issue, in the amount stated in the petition, ostensibly includes injuries described in the SAC and above.

Item 9 of the petition requires Slason to attach to the petition a doctor’s report containing a diagnosis of Astya’s injuries or a prognosis for Astya’s recovery, and a report of Astya’s current condition. The declaration of Dr. Kreidl includes information and evidence which the court finds sufficient to show that Astya did not suffer any injuries resulting from the incidents or events described in the SAC. Considering the amount that the settling defendants have agreed to pay to Astya in settlement of the disputed claims alleged in the SAC, the settlement appears reasonable and in Astya’s best interests under the circumstances present here.

Information appearing in the petition also shows that the settlement proceeds will not be reduced by any medical or other expenses, or attorney’s fees.  

“Money or other property to be paid or delivered pursuant to the order or judgment for the benefit of a minor ... shall be paid and delivered as provided in Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 3600) of Part 8 of Division 4 of the Probate Code.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 372, subd. (a)(3).) Probate Code section 3600 et seq., applies “whenever both of the following conditions exist:

“(a) A court ... approves a compromise of a pending action or proceeding to which a minor ... is a party....

“(b) The compromise ... provides for the payment or delivery of money or other property for the benefit of the minor or person with a disability.” (Prob. Code, § 3600, subds. (a)-(b).)

Where, as here, there is no guardianship of the estate of the minor, “the remaining balance of the money and other property, after payment of all expenses, costs, and fees as approved and allowed by the court under Section 3601, shall be paid, delivered, deposited, or invested as provided in Article 2 (commencing with Section 3610).” (Prob. Code, § 3602, subd. (a).)

Slason effectively states or represents that the settlement proceeds will be delivered to a financial institution for credit to an account in Slason’s name as custodian for Astya under the UTMA, codified as Probate Code section 3900 et seq. (See Prob. Code, §§ 3909-3910.) Information appearing in the present record shows that Slason will take control of, hold, and manage the settlement proceeds as Astya’s custodian under the UTMA, and has agreed to comply with any applicable standards of care in dealing with the custodial property.

Information appearing in the supplemental declarations described above is also sufficient to show that Plourde’s simultaneous representation of Starchild and Astya did not prevent Plourde from discharging his duties to Astya or from fully pursuing Astya’s rights.

The court has reviewed the petition, its attached documentation, the supplemental brief of Slason, and the supplemental declarations of Plourde, Starchild, and Dr. Kreidl described above. The petition is submitted on the mandatory Judicial Council form, is verified, complies with California Rules of Court, rule 7.950.5, and includes information bearing on the reasonableness of the settlement at issue. The petition also discloses the information required by California Rules of Court, rule 7.951, and is sufficient to show that Astya has not suffered permanent or other injuries arising from the events at issue in this litigation.  

For all reasons discussed above, the court finds that the amount described in the petition to settle Astya’s claims in this matter is both reasonable and appropriate, and in Astya’s best interests. For these reasons, the court will grant the petition. The court authorizes, and directs that, the settlement proceeds be delivered to Slason, as the custodian of Astya and for the benefit of Astya, subject to the provisions of Probate Code section 3900 et seq.