Hope Alexandra Starchild et al vs ZP 125 Mason Inc et al

Case Number

24CV06633

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 09/12/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Minor's Compromise

Tentative Ruling

For the reasons set forth herein, the petition of Jocelyn Johnston-Slason for expedited approval of compromise of claim or action or disposition of proceeds of judgment for minor is continued to October 10, 2025. On or before September 25, 2025, petitioner shall file and serve a memorandum or supplemental brief fully addressing each of the matters further discussed herein.

Background:

On November 26, 2024, plaintiff Hope Alexandra Starchild (Starchild) filed a complaint against defendants ZP 125 Mason, Inc., (ZP Mason) and Mike Richardson Realtors (MRR), alleging six causes of action: (1) negligence; (2) breach of the warranty of habitability; (3) nuisance; (4) constructive eviction; (5) retaliatory eviction; and (6) negligent infliction of emotional distress.

On March 10, 2025, without any response to the complaint having been filed, Starchild filed a first amended complaint (the FAC) against ZP Mason, and defendants Richardson Real Estate Services, Inc., (Richardson Real Estate), Dina Richardson (Richardson), and Aspen Insurance, alleging the same six causes of action described above and adding causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment, violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200, failure to disclose known defects, and bad faith and unfair insurance practices. The FAC does not name MRR as a defendant.

Court records reflect that on July 24, 2025, attorney Geoffrey D. Plourde (Plourde) of the Ibis Law Group APC, filed a notice that Plourde is provide representation to Starchild in this action, limited in scope to an application for the appointment of a guardian ad litem, a joint stipulation re second amended complaint, a petition for a minor’s compromise, and a request for dismissal. (July 24, 2025, Notice, ¶¶ 1 & 2(c).)

On August 4, 2025, Starchild filed a joint stipulation which is executed by Starchild, Jocelyn Johnston-Slason (Slason), who is identified in the stipulation as the proposed guardian ad litem for minor Astya K. S. (Astya), ZP Mason, and Richardson Real Estate. In that stipulation, the parties request that the court grant Starchild leave to file a second amended complaint for the sole purpose of adding Astya, who is the child of Starchild, as a plaintiff. (Aug. 4, 2024, Stip., ¶¶ 7-8.) On the same date, the court entered an order granting Starchild leave to file a second amended complaint limited to adding Astya by and through guardian ad litem Slason.

On August 7, 2025, Plourde filed a second notice that Plourde will provide representation to Slason as the proposed guardian ad litem for Astya, limited in scope to an application for the appointment of a guardian ad litem, a joint stipulation re second amended complaint, a petition for a minor’s compromise, and a request for dismissal. (Aug. 7, 2025, Notice, ¶¶ 1 & 2(c).)

Also on August 7, 2025, Starchild filed an application (the application) for the appointment of Slason as guardian ad litem for Astya. Information appearing in the application shows that Slason is Astya’s grandparent. (See Aug. 7, 2025, Application, ¶ 8(b).) On that same date, Starchild and Slason, as the guardian ad litem for Astya (collectively, plaintiffs) separately filed a second amended complaint (the SAC) against ZP Mason, Richardson Real Estate, Richardson, and Aspen Insurance (collectively, defendants), alleging the same causes of action asserted in the FAC. As alleged in the SAC, which is the operative pleading:

In November 2020, Starchild entered into a lease agreement with Richardson Real Estate for a rental home located at 125 W. Mason Street (the unit) in Santa Barbara, California. (SAC, ¶ 15.) ZP Mason owns and operates the unit, which is managed by Richardson Real Estate. (SAC, ¶¶ 9-10.) Richardson is the Director of Property Management for Richardson Real Estate. (SAC, ¶ 11.) Aspen Insurance provided insurance coverage related to the unit. (SAC, ¶ 12.)

In reliance on defendants’ representations that the unit was safe, Starchild moved into the unit in November 2020. (SAC, ¶¶ 3-4 & 15.) Shortly after moving into the unit, Starchild experienced persistent water and plumbing issues, repeated flooding, ceiling and wall leaks, deteriorating drywall, unrepaired structural damage including to cabinets and floors, and an improperly sealed toilet, among other things. (SAC, ¶ 17.) Persistent mold contamination also plagued the unit, with defendants refusing to disclose the results of environmental testing despite Starchild’s repeated requests. (SAC, ¶ 18.) Starchild’s own environmental testing confirmed the existence of mold on Starchild’s mattress and belongings which exposed Starchild to rashes, respiratory issues, and allergic reactions which are documented in medical records. (Ibid.)

Defendants also failed to maintain adequate exterior lighting and to secure the laundry room, allowing trespassing incidents, garage tampering and break-ins, and repeated mailbox theft. (SAC, ¶ 21.) Defendants removed Starchild’s self-installed security lock and refused to install security cameras or decoy cameras despite repeated safety concerns. (SAC, ¶ 22.)

As a result of the conditions present at the unit and described above, Starchild suffered “pregnancy complications” including “early labor and low birth weight” for Astya, an overnight hospitalization for a near-miscarriage precipitated by overwhelming stress and which required monitored vital care, and an emergency ultrasound due to heavy vaginal bleeding. (SAC, ¶¶ 30-31.) The “near miscarriage and the excruciating stress from [d]efendants’ actions directly endangered [Astya] in utero, contributing to severe, life-threatening pregnancy complications....” (SAC, ¶ 31.)

Defendants directed Starchild to file a renter’s insurance claim which defendants knew would be denied, and assured Starchild that the unit was habitable despite extensive damage, and concealed pre-existing defects, including prior tenant complaints. (SAC, ¶ 23.) On October 25, 2022, defendants retaliated against Starchild for habitability complaints by issuing a rent increase despite unresolved hazards, fabricating false accusations that Starchild entered a containment area during remediation, and withholding maintenance services. (SAC, ¶¶ 24-25.) Defendants’ conduct forced Starchild to vacate the unit in November 2022. (SAC, ¶ 26.)

On August 8, 2025, the court entered an order granting the application and appointing Slason as the guardian ad litem of Astya.

On August 20, 2025, Slason filed an unopposed verified petition for expedited approval of a compromise or settlement of Astya’s disputed claim, and separately filed a declaration of Starchild in support of that petition, in which Starchild asserts that defendants’ refusal to finalize or pay the settlement of Starchild’s claims until the petition is approved by the court has severely affected Starchild’s ability to provide for herself and Astya, and Starchild’s ability to work due to a repossession of Starchild’s vehicle and Starchild’s inability to pay for registration. (Starchild Decl., ¶¶ 3-5.) For these reasons, Starchild requests that the court consider the petition on an expedited basis. (Starchild Decl., ¶ 6.)

The petition:

In the verified petition, Slason, who may at times be referred to herein as petitioner, asserts that Astya is currently two years of age. (Pet. ¶ 2(b).) Slason states that the incident or accident occurred at the unit from August through November 2022, and involved Starchild, Astya, and defendants Richardson, Richardson Real Estate, and ZP Mason (collectively, the settling defendants). (Pet. ¶ 5(a)-(c).)

Slason asserts that Astya was in utero at the time of the incident or accident. (Pet. ¶ 6.) Slason further asserts that the unit was in a state of disrepair in violation of multiple provisions of the Civil, Health, and Safety Code provisions as well as local ordinances, and that the settling defendants failed to provide safe, sanitary, and habitable housing. (Ibid.) The proposed settlement reflects a compromise of these disputed claims in light of Astya’s age and the contested nature of liability and damages. (Ibid.)

According to Slason, Astya has no known manifestations of post birth injuries, and has not received any treatment that has been medically evaluated or prescribed in connection with the incident or accident post birth. (Pet. ¶¶ 7-8.)

Slason has made a careful and diligent inquiry and investigation into the facts and circumstances of the incident or accident in which Astya was injured, the responsibility for the incident or accident, and the nature, extent, and seriousness of Astya’s injuries. (Pet. ¶ 10.) Slason understands that if the compromise proposed in the petition is approved by the court and consummated, Astya will be forever barred from seeking any further recovery of compensation from the settling defendants even if Astya’s injuries turn out to be more serious than they now appear. (Ibid.)

To settle Astya’s claim, the settling defendants have offered to pay to Astya, on a global basis, the amount of $4,000. (Pet. ¶ 11(a)-(b).) A copy of a “draft” settlement agreement between Astya, by and through her guardian Slason, and the settling defendants is attached to the petition. (Pet. ¶ 11(c) & Attachment 11c.)

One or more of the settling defendants have also offered to pay the amount of $196,000 to Starchild to settle claims arising out of the same incident or accident that resulted in Astya’s injury. (Pet. ¶ 12(b)(1)-(3).)

There are no medical expenses or statutory or contractual liens to be paid or reimbursed from the settlement proceeds. (Pet. ¶ 13.) There are no attorney’s fees for which court approval is requested. (Pet. ¶ 14(a)-(b).) Slason states costs of suit attributable to more than one settling plaintiff are not apportioned between them, and that these costs of suit and attorney’s fees will be paid by Starchild out of Starchild’s settlement with the settling defendants. (Pet., ¶ 14(c) & Attachment 14c.) Plourde has received or expects to receive attorney’s fees in the amount of $1,000 from Starchild on September 15, 2025. (Pet. ¶ 18(b).)

Plourde, the attorney purporting to represent Slason, also represents Starchild. (Pet. ¶ 18(a).) Slason explains that Plourde has been retained by both plaintiffs in this matter to provide limited scope representation necessary to amend the operative complaint to add Astya as a plaintiff, to appoint Slason as Astya’s guardian ad litem, to prepare and file the present petition, and to prepare and file notice of settlement and request for dismissal. (Pet., Attachment 18a.)

Plourde did not become involved with this matter, directly or indirectly, at the request of a party against whom the claim is asserted or a party’s insurance carrier, and is not representing, employed by, or associated with a defendant in this matter or an insurance carrier. (Pet., ¶ 3(d)-(e).)

The net balance of the proceeds remaining for Astya is $4,000. (Pet. ¶ 16.) Slason declares that there is no guardianship or conservator of the estate of Astya, and requests that the court order disposition of the proceeds of the settlement, in the amount of $4,000, be transferred to Slason at P.O. Box 2003 in Paso Robles, California, as the proposed custodian and for the benefit of Astya under the California Uniform Transfer to Minors Act. (Pet. ¶ 19(b)(5) & Attachment 19b(5).)

Analysis:

Code of Civil Procedure section 372 provides that “[t]he ... guardian ad litem so appearing for any minor ... shall have power, with the approval of the court in which the action or proceeding is pending, to compromise the same, ... or release or discharge any claim of the ward ... pursuant to that compromise.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 372,  subd. (a)(3).) “The purpose of section 372 is to protect the minor involved in litigation by adding an extra layer of scrutiny to the settlement of the minor’s claims. This statute is a ‘shield’ to protect the interests of a minor.” (Pearson v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1339.)

“A petition for court approval of a compromise ... under Code of Civil Procedure section 372 must comply with [California Rules of Court], rules 7.950 or 7.950.5, 7.951, and 7.952.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1384(a).) The petition must be submitted on a completed and approved Judicial Council form, must be verified by the petitioner, and “. . . must contain a full disclosure of all information that has any bearing on the reasonableness of the compromise, covenant, settlement, or disposition.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.950; Barnes v. Western Heritage Ins. Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 249, 256, fn. 4.) If the petitioner has been represented by an attorney in preparing the petition, the petition must also disclose the information described in rule 7.951(1) through (6), and the petitioner and the minor must attend the hearing unless the court for good cause dispenses with their appearance. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 7.951 & 7.952(a).)

Relevant here, “a petitioner for court approval of a compromise of .. a minor’s disputed claim ... may satisfy the disclosure requirements of rule 7.950 by submitting the petition on a completed Petition for Expedited Approval of Compromise of Claim or Action or Disposition of Proceeds of Judgment for Minor or Person With a Disability (form MC-350EX).” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.950.5(a).) A petition for expedited approval of a compromise of a minor’s claim may be used under circumstances where:

“(1) The petitioner is represented by an attorney authorized to practice in the courts of this state;

“(2) The claim is not for damages for the wrongful death of a person;

“(3) No portion of the net proceeds of the compromise, settlement, or judgment in favor of the minor or disabled claimant is to be placed in a trust;

“(4) There are no unresolved disputes concerning liens to be satisfied from the proceeds of the compromise, settlement, or judgment;

“(5) The petitioner’s attorney did not become involved in the matter at the direct or indirect request of a person against whom the claim is asserted or an insurance carrier for that person;

“(6) The petitioner’s attorney is neither employed by nor associated with a defendant or insurance carrier in connection with the petition;

“(7) If an action has been filed on the claim:

“(A) All defendants that have appeared in the action are participating in the compromise; or

“(B) The court has finally determined that the settling parties entered into the settlement in good faith;

“(8) The judgment for the minor or claimant with a disability (exclusive of interest and costs) or the total amount payable to the minor or claimant with a disability and all other parties under the proposed compromise or settlement is $50,000 or less ...

“(9) The court does not otherwise order.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.950.5(a)(1)-(9).)

Though the petition is verified and appears to be procedurally appropriate under the California Rules of Court, rule 7.950.5, there exists some question as to the reasonableness of the settlement as to Astya’s claim, among other things.

A guardian ad litem such as Slason “is not a party to the action. [Citation.] The court is, in effect, the guardian of the minor and the guardian ad litem is but an officer and representative of the court. [Citation.] In such a case it will be presumed that the court will look to the best interests of the child and will render a decree that will establish and preserve her rights.” (Serway v. Galentine (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 86, 89.)

Noted above, the SAC alleges that Starchild suffered pregnancy complications which resulted in premature labor and a low birth weight for Astya, and that these conditions are documented in medical records. (SAC, ¶ 30.) The settling defendants have agreed to compromise Astya’s disputed claim, which ostensibly includes the purported injury or condition described in the SAC and above, for the amount of $4,000.

Though Slason asserts in the petition that Astya did not receive any treatment or medical evaluation “post birth”, there is no information addressing any medical evaluations or treatments in connection with Starchild’s alleged premature labor or Astya’s resulting low birth weight.

For example, and subject to exceptions which do not appear to apply here, item 9 of the petition requires Slason to attach to the petition a doctor’s report containing a diagnosis of Astya’s injuries or a prognosis for Astya’s recovery, and a report of Astya’s current condition. Wholly absent from the petition is any report addressing Astya’s purported low birth weight, or showing Astya’s current condition in light of the pregnancy complications and resulting low birth weight alleged by Starchild, among other things. Considering that the settling defendants have agreed to pay money to Astya in settlement of the disputed claims alleged in the SAC, the court requires the reports described in item 9 to determine whether the settlement is reasonable under the circumstances present here.

Slason provides no information or argument showing why she is not required to attach the reports described in item 9 of the petition. Further, the absence of any information or reports regarding any ostensible injuries or conditions suffered by Astya as a result of Starchild’s alleged pregnancy complications, such as Astya’s purported low birth weight, or Astya’s current condition deprives the court of full and complete information sufficient to permit it to discharge its duty in determining whether the settlement is reasonable and in Astya’s best interests.

The court also has concerns regarding the manner in which the money in settlement of Astya’s claim will be paid or delivered.

“Money or other property to be paid or delivered pursuant to the order or judgment for the benefit of a minor ... shall be paid and delivered as provided in Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 3600) of Part 8 of Division 4 of the Probate Code.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 372, subd. (a)(3).) Probate Code section 3600 et seq. applies “whenever both of the following conditions exist:

“(a) A court ... approves a compromise of a pending action or proceeding to which a minor ... is a party....

“(b) The compromise ... provides for the payment or delivery of money or other property for the benefit of the minor or person with a disability.” (Prob. Code, § 3600, subds. (a)-(b).)

In the petition, petitioner does not request that any medical or other expenses or attorney’s fees be paid from the money to be paid or delivered for the benefit of Astya. (See Prob. Code, § 3601.) Where, as here, there is no guardianship of the estate of the minor, “the remaining balance of the money and other property, after payment of all expenses, costs, and fees as approved and allowed by the court under Section 3601, shall be paid, delivered, deposited, or invested as provided in Article 2 (commencing with Section 3610).” (Prob. Code, § 3602, subd. (a).)

The petition requests that the money to be paid to Astya as further described above be transferred to Slason. Wholly absent from the petition is any information sufficient to show that this proposed transfer complies with Probate Code section 3610.

For example, though the draft settlement agreement states that the settling defendants may fund the payment to Astya through the purchase of an annuity policy, the agreement does not identify the annuity issuer or provide any information regarding the proposed annuity. (Pet., Attachment 11c, ¶ 7.0.) The petition also provides no information showing that the remaining balance to be paid for Astya’s benefit will be deposited in an insured account in a financial institution, the conditions on which the proceeds will otherwise be held by Slason, or why these conditions are in the best interest of Astya. (See, e.g., Prob. Code, § 3611, subd. (b)-(d).) Moreover, the absence of any information regarding the proposed transfer to Slason prevents the court from making the order required under Probate Code section 3611.

The deficiencies noted above also raise concerns regarding Plourde’s simultaneous representation of Starchild and Astya in this matter, and whether the simultaneous representation has enabled Plourde to preserve Astya’s rights. Slason is responsible for assisting Plourde “in protecting the rights of [Astya]. [Citation.] But [Plourde] does not represent [Slason], who is not a party to the action [citations]; thus, [Plourde] represents [Astya].” (A.F. v. Jeffrey F. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 737, 747 (A.F.).)

“Conflicts of interest commonly arise ... in cases of simultaneous representation, where an attorney seeks to represent in a single action multiple parties with potentially adverse interests....In simultaneous representation cases, ‘[t]he primary value at stake ... is the attorney’s duty—and the client’s legitimate expectation—of loyalty, rather than confidentiality.’ [Citation.] Because a conflict involving an attorneys duty of loyalty is ‘[t]he most egregious’ kind of conflict, the disqualification standards we have developed for simultaneous representation cases are ‘more stringent’ than those that apply in successive representation cases; ‘[w]ith few exceptions, disqualification [in a case of simultaneous representation] follows automatically, regardless of whether the simultaneous representations have anything in common or present any risk that confidences obtained in one matter would be used in the other. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Charlisse C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 145, 159-160, original italics.)

The automatic disqualification rule described above “ ‘is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct,’ but also to keep honest attorneys from having to choose between conflicting duties, or being tempted to reconcile conflicting interests, rather than fully pursuing their clients’ rights. [Citation.] The loyalty the attorney owes one client cannot be allowed to compromise the duty owed another.” (People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1135, 1147.)

Considering the absence of any information showing Astya’s current condition in light of the allegations of the SAC, that Starchild’s claims arising out of the same incident or accident that resulted in Astya’s purported condition or injury, that the settling defendants have also agreed to pay money to Starchild, and that the petition includes a blanket request for an order permitting the transfer of the money to be paid for Astya’s benefit to Slason without describing the conditions under which that money will be held for Astya’s benefit, it is unclear from the present record whether or to what extent Plourde’s simultaneous representation of Starchild and Astya has prevented Plourde from discharging his duties to Astya or from fully pursuing Astya’s rights.

Moreover, “[i]n a civil matter, attorneys representing minors—or any other party who has a GAL—are bound by Business and Professions Code section 6068 and the State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct, and have an obligation to zealously represent their clients’ interests within the bounds of the law.” (A.F., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 752.) For these additional reasons, and under the totality of the circumstances present here, there exists concerns regarding whether or to what extent the simultaneous representation described above has impacted the representation of Astya’s interests and rights, and whether those interests and rights have been fully pursued and preserved in connection with the settlement at issue. 

Though the deficiencies and issues discussed herein justify a denial of the petition for all reasons discussed above, the court will instead continue the hearing on the petition and require Slason to submit a memorandum or supplemental briefing addressing these deficiencies and issues. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1114(d) [“if it would further the interests of justice, ... the court may order the submission of, a memorandum in support of” a petition to approve compromise of claim of a minor].) The court expects that Slason will fully address in the memorandum or supplemental brief, with supporting reasoned factual and legal argument and any necessary documentation, the purported injuries alleged in this action and Astya’s current condition (or why Slason is not required to provide this information), the manner in which the remaining balance of the money paid to Astya will be deposited or held by Slason, and why Plourde, under the circumstances present here, is not automatically disqualified from simultaneously representing Starchild and Astya in this proceeding.