Ethan Edney v. Steve Gordon

Case Number

24CV06560

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 02/19/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Verified Petition For Writ Of Administrative Mandate

Tentative Ruling

For Petitioner Ethan Edney: William C. Makler, Law Offices of William C. Makler, P.C.

                                   

For Respondent Steve Gordon, Director, California Department of Motor Vehicles: Rob Bonta, Gary S. Balekjian, Narek Shahmoradian, Office of the Attorney General

RULING

For all reasons discussed herein, the verified petition of Ethan Edney for a writ of administrative mandate is denied.

Background

On November 22, 2024, petitioner Ethan Edney (Edney) filed a verified petition (the petition) for writ of administrative mandate directed to respondent Steve Gordon (Gordon), who is identified in the petition as the Director of the California Department of Motor Vehicles (the DMV). Briefly, as alleged in the petition, on July 8, 2024, following a traffic enforcement stop initiated by California Highway Patrol officers S. Smith (Officer Smith) and S. Lopez (Officer Lopez), Edney was arrested for violating Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a), which makes it unlawful for a person under the influence of alcohol to drive a vehicle. (Pet., ¶¶ 5-10 & Exh. A.)

Following Edney’s arrest, the DMV revoked Edney’s driving privilege. (Pet., ¶ 12 & Exh. C.) Edney requested an Administrative Per Se hearing (the APS hearing), which was held on October 18, 2024, before Hearing Officer C. Castillo-Gonzalez (Castillo-Gonzalez). (Pet., ¶¶ 13-14 & Exh. E.) The DMV issued Edney a temporary license and stayed the revocation of Edney’s driving privilege pending the outcome of the APS hearing. (Pet., ¶ 13.)

At the APS hearing, Castillo-Gonzalez allowed forensic toxicologist Ronald L. Moore (Moore) to testify as an expert on Edney’s behalf. (Pet., ¶ 15 & Exh. E.) Moore testified that he was “’very confident’” that Edney had a blood-alcohol content or “BAC” of less than 0.08 percent when he was initially detained by Officer Smith. (Pet., ¶ 18.)

On October 25, 2024, the DMV issued a “Notification of Findings and Decision,” in which Castillo-Gonzalez found that it was “more than likely” that Edney’s BAC was .08 percent at the time Edney was driving. (Pet., ¶ 19 & Exh. E.) Based on these findings, the DMV reimposed its revocation of Edney’s driving privilege. (Ibid.)

In the petition, Edney requests that the Court review the final administrative decision of the DMV and enter an order directing the DMV to rescind the suspension of Edney’s driving privileges. (Pet., ¶¶ 2 & 20-22.) Edney contends that Castillo-Gonzalez violated Edney’s constitutional right to due process by manifesting bias and prejudice towards Edney, and that the DMV failed to meet its burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Edney had been driving a motor vehicle with a BAC at or over .08 percent. (Pet., ¶¶ 20-22.)

On December 17, 2024, Gordon filed an answer to the petition, responding to each of its allegations and asserting four affirmative defenses.

Edney filed his opening brief on December 20, 2024. In the opening brief, Edney contends that the suspension of his driving privileges should be set aside because the decision of the DMV is against the weight of the evidence presented at the APS hearing, and because Castillo-Gonzalez acted with bias and prejudice towards Edney. (Pet. Brief at p. 2, ll. 10-12; p. 5, ll. 15-16 & p. 8, ll. 8-9.)

Gordon filed an opposition brief on January 17, 2025, to which Edney replied on January 21, 2025.

The administrative record:

On December 12, 2024, Edney filed a certified copy of the administrative record (the AR) regarding the APS hearing held on October 18, 2024.

The undisputed or not reasonably disputed evidence and information appearing in the AR shows that on July 8, 2024, at 11:22 p.m., Officer Smith and Officer Lopez initiated an enforcement stop after observing a vehicle swerve two times onto the broken white painted lines to its right, while traveling southbound on U.S. Highway 101 north of La Cumbre Road in Santa Barbara, California. (AR016 & AR019.) The vehicle yielded to the patrol vehicle’s overhead emergency lights, and exited the freeway at Las Positas Road. (AR019.) Officer Smith contacted the driver of the vehicle through the vehicle’s open driver side window, and identified Edney as the driver. (AR019-AR020.)

While speaking with Edney, Officer Smith “smelled the odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from within the passenger compartment of the [vehicle]” and observed Edney’s eyes to be “red and watery.” (AR020.) Edney related to Officer Smith that he was returning from a “trivia night at M Special Brewery in Old Town Goleta” where Edney stated he had consumed one alcoholic beverage. (Ibid.) Officer Smith conducted a “cursory check of [Edney’s] eyes for the presence of nystagmus” and “observed possible signs of impairment.” (Ibid.) Officer Smith asked Edney to exit the vehicle and proceed to the right front of the police vehicle where Officer Smith continued with the investigation. (Ibid.)

Officer Smith asked Edney a series of pre-Field Sobriety Test or “FST” questions, during which Edney admitted to consuming two alcoholic beverages. (AR020.) Edney rated himself one on a scale of zero to 10, with zero being completely sober and 10 being “fall down drunk”. (Ibid.) Officer Smith continued to observe Edney’s eyes to be red and watery and observed the smell of an alcoholic beverage emanating from Edney’s person. (Ibid.) Officer Smith explained and demonstrated a series of FSTs, which included a horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN), a “Walk and Turn”, and a “One Leg Stand”, each of which Edney performed. (AR018-AR020.)

As part of the HGN, Edney was instructed to follow the tip of the Officer Smith’s right finger with his eyes only. (AR018.) During the HGN, Officer Smith observed a “lack of smooth pursuit, … sustained nystagmus at 17 maximum deviation [and] … vertical gaze nystagmus in both eyes.” (Ibid.) During the “Walk and Turn” FST, Edney completed nine heel-to-toe steps. (Ibid.) Once Edney reached his ninth step, Edney stopped and asked Officer Smith how he should complete his turn. (Ibid.) In response, Officer Smith related to Edney that he “needed to complete his turn as explained and demonstrated.” (Ibid.) After completing the turn, Edney began a second set of heel-to-toe steps and, on the ninth step, Edney missed heel to toe. (Ibid.) During the One Leg Stand, Edney raised his left foot and “reached his count of 1024” after 30 seconds, at which time Officer Smith instructed Edney to stop. (AR019.)

Following the FST, Edney agreed to complete a preliminary alcohol screening test or “PAS”, during which Edney provided two breath samples into a PAS machine, one at 11:47 p.m. and the other at 11:50 p.m. (AR009 & AR019.) The results of the breath samples provided by Edney during the PAS showed that Edney’s BAC was, respectively, .082 percent and .075 percent. (Ibid.) Based on his training, experience, and observations of the signs and symptoms displayed by Edney, Officer Smith formed the opinion that Edney was under the influence of alcohol and unable to safely operate a motor vehicle. (AR009 & AR020.)

At 11:52 p.m., Officer Smith placed Edney under arrest for violating Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a), and advised Edney that, pursuant to Vehicle Code section 23612, Edney was required to submit to a blood or breath chemical test. (AR017 & AR021.) Edney stated that he preferred a blood test. (AR009 & 021.) Edney was transported to Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital where Edney provided a blood sample at 12:19 a.m. on July 9, 2024. (Ibid.) Officer Smith took possession of the blood sample and later placed it into a Department of Justice (DOJ) drop box. (AR021.)

The DMV issued an “Age 21 and Older Administrative Per Se Suspension/Revocation Order and Temporary Driver License” signed by Officer Smith on July 9, 2024, notifying Edney that his privilege to operate a motor vehicle would be suspended or revoked effective 30 days from the date that order was issued. (AR013.)

The DOJ prepared a “Physical Evidence Examination Report Forensic Alcohol Analysis” (the DOJ Report) dated July 31, 2024. (AR015.) The DOJ Report is signed under penalty of perjury by Senior Criminalist Ceirin Connolly-Ingram. (Ibid.) According to information appearing in the DOJ Report, an analysis of Edney’s blood sample was performed on July 29, 2024. (Ibid. [Summary].) Based on the analysis performed by the DOJ, Edney’s blood sample contained “0.082 ± 0.004% (W/V)”. (Ibid.) The DOJ Report further states that “[m]easurement uncertainty is expressed as an expanded uncertainty at 99.73% level of confidence.” (Ibid.)

On July 12, 2024, Edney requested the APS hearing. (AR074-AR075.) The DMV issued Edney a temporary license, and stayed its revocation of Edney’s driving privilege pending the outcome of the APS hearing. (AR076-AR079.) The APS hearing, which was held via Microsoft Teams Remote Conference, was originally scheduled for September 19, 2024, and rescheduled to October 18, 2024, because, among other things, Edney had not received a copy of the DOJ Report. (AR030-AR042, AR069-AR073, AR083-AR093.)

The APS hearing proceeded on October 18, 2024, before Castillo-Gonzalez, to determine whether Officer Smith had reasonable cause to believe that Edney was driving a motor vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code sections 23152 or 23153, whether Edney was lawfully arrested, and whether Edney was driving a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content of .08 percent or higher. (AR043-AR045.)

At the APS hearing, Castillo-Gonzalez admitted into evidence as exhibit 1, a six page document titled “Age 21 And Older Officer’s Statement” (the Form DS367), ostensibly prepared and executed by Officer Smith on July 9, 2024, under penalty of perjury. (AR009-AR014 & AR045-AR046.) Castillo-Gonzalez also admitted the DOJ Report into evidence as exhibit 2. (AR015 & AR046.) An “Arrest-Investigation Report” (the CHP arrest report) signed by Officer Smith on July 14, 2024, was admitted into evidence as exhibit 3. (AR016-AR022 & AR046-AR047.) Castillo-Gonzalez admitted Edney’s two page driving record as exhibit 4. (AR023-AR024 & AR047.)

After exhibits 1 through 4 were admitted by Castillo-Gonzalez, Edney introduced the testimony Moore. (AR048-AR049.) Moore is a standardized field sobriety test instructor and gas chromatography instructor for the American Chemical Society at Axion Laboratories. (AR050.) Moore testified that from 1989 to 2007, he served as a Forensic Scientist with the Orange County Sheriff’s Department Crime Lab. (AR049.) After retiring from that position, Moore became the Supervisor of the Forensic Alcohol section, which performed all of the blood and urine alcohol analyses for the County of Orange, trained police officers in how to perform pre and post-arrest alcohol testing, fixed all of the breath alcohol testing instruments, and testified as experts on alcohol analysis, alcohol metabolism, and alcohol impairment. (AR049-AR050.)

Moore stated that he reviewed the CHP arrest report, the Form DS367, calibration records for the PAS, and records of the blood alcohol test performed by the DOJ, including the gas chromatograms from that test. (AR051.) Based on his review of these materials, the exhibits admitted into evidence by Castillo-Gonzalez and further described above, and information provided by Edney’s counsel, Moore testified that he was “very confident” that Edney’s BAC was under .08 at the time Edney was driving his vehicle. (Ibid.)

Castillo-Gonzalez asked Moore “[w]hat makes you so confident?” (AR051.) In response, Moore stated that he “looked at the calibration check results of the PAS device and found that from the middle of June through August, when the records ended, the device had been reading … up to as much as .0062 high.” (Ibid.) Moore further stated that “[t]here is caselaw in California that allows us to subtract that high bias from the sample results, which would result in both the PAS tests being under .08.” (AR052.)

Ostensibly referring to the “chemical test results” set forth in the DOJ Report, Moore further testified that “going up then to a .082 which is just barely above .08 at the time of … the blood test”, that this was “consistent with [Edney’s] other physical symptoms and field sobriety tests” in which, according to Moore, “[t]he officer noted that [Edney] had normal speech” and “[n]o unsteady gait.” (AR052.) Moore also stated that “there were only four HTN clues, which according to the NHTSA Robusta study, and the data from the 1998 violation study having only four clues is actually more consistent with being under .08.” (Ibid.) In addition, Moore asserted that “there were no clues on the one-leg stand”, “the two clues on the walk and turn were very minimal”, that “[t]here was only one time [Edney] missed heel to toe” which was “the last step on the last sequence of feed”, and that Edney had “stopped and asked the question at the turn about how the turn should be performed.” (Ibid.)  

At the conclusion of Moore’s testimony as further detailed above, Castillo-Gonzalez stated that he had a “question for … counsel. What calibration logs? Or Mr. Moore, the calibration logs were you referencing?” (AR053.) Castillo-Gonzalez also noted that he had the “blood alcohol sequence” and a “bar summary report”, after which Moore clarified that he was referencing the PAS calibration logs provided in a packet from the CHP. (Ibid.) In response to Castillo-Gonzalez’s question, Edney’s counsel stated that the calibration logs could be provided “within a matter of moments.” (Ibid.)

After a pause in the proceedings, the PAS calibration logs were transmitted to Castillo-Gonzalez electronically and admitted into evidence as exhibit 5. (AR025-AR027 & AR054-AR055.) After receiving the PAS calibration logs, Castillo-Gonzalez permitted Edney’s counsel to make a closing argument, after which the APS hearing concluded. (AR056-AR057.)

 

On October 25, 2024, Castillo-Gonzalez issued a Notification of Findings and Decision (the Decision). (AR003-AR006.) In the Decision, Castillo-Gonzalez found that Edney was lawfully detained and arrested. (AR003-AR004.) Castillo-Gonzalez further found that Moore’s testimony “did not rebut that [Edney’s] BAC was at .08% at the time of the driving based on the blood test results”, and that “it is more than likely [Edney’s] BAC was at .08% at the time of driving.” (AR005.)

Pursuant to the Decision, the suspension or revocation of Edney’s driving privilege was reimposed effective November 3, 2024. (AR003 & AR006.)

Analysis

Vehicle Code section 13559 and Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 authorize judicial review of a DMV order of suspension or revocation of a person’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle. (Coombs v. Pierce (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 568, 575 (Coombs).)

Vehicle Code section 13559 provides:

“[W]ithin 30 days of the issuance of the notice of determination of the department sustaining an order of suspension or revocation of the person’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle after the hearing pursuant to Section 13558, the person may file a petition for review of the order in the court of competent jurisdiction in the person's county of residence.…The review shall be on the record of the hearing and the court shall not consider other evidence. If the court finds that the department exceeded its constitutional or statutory authority, made an erroneous interpretation of the law, acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, or made a determination which is not supported by the evidence in the record, the court may order the department to rescind the order of suspension or revocation and return, or reissue a new license to, the person.” (Veh. Code, § 13559, subd. (a).)

Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, which authorizes judicial review of an administrative agency decision for abuse of discretion or lack of evidentiary support, provides that “[t]he inquiry in such a case shall extend to the questions whether the respondent has proceeded without or in excess of jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is established if the respondent has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).)

Though, generally, the procedure set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 provides the “traditional” means for judicial review of a final decision of an administrative agency to the extent these provisions are not in conflict with the more specialized provisions of Vehicle Code section 13559, because “[a] driver’s license is a fundamental right” the trial court must “not only examine the administrative record for errors of law, but also must exercise its independent judgment upon the evidence.” (Coombs, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at pp. 574-575; Berlinghieri v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1983) 33 Cal.3d 392, 395, 398.)

“In ruling on an application for a writ of mandate following an order of suspension or revocation, a trial court is required to determine, based on its independent judgment, ‘ “whether the weight of the evidence supported the administrative decision.” ’ [Citations.]” (Lake v. Reed (1997) 16 Cal.4th 448, 456 (Lake); Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (c).) “Even exercising its independent judgment, the trial court still ‘must afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings, and the party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence.’ [Citation.]” (Manriquez v. Gourley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1227, 1233 (Manriquez); see also Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 812 [“considerable weight should be given to the findings of experienced administrative bodies made after a full and formal hearing, especially in cases involving technical and scientific evidence”].)

Relevant under the circumstances present here, the DMV had the burden of proving three facts by a preponderance of the evidence: “(A) [t]he peace officer had reasonable cause to believe that the person had been driving a motor vehicle in violation of [Vehicle Code] [s]ection 23136, 23140, 23152, 23153, or 23154[,] [¶] (B) [t]he person was placed under arrest or, if the alleged violation was of [Vehicle Code] [s]ection 23136, that the person was lawfully detained[,] [¶] [and] (C) [t]he person was driving a motor vehicle … [¶] [w]hen the person had 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her blood.” (Veh. Code, § 13557, subd. (b)(3)(A)-(C)(i); Lake, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 456.) In the present proceeding, Edney challenges the Decision with respect to the third fact.

The nature of an administrative DMV hearing is “informal” and “does not require the full panoply of the Evidence Code provisions used in criminal and civil trials. Such hearings are governed by the Administrative Procedure Act. [Citation.] The DMV bears the burden of proof that a driver was operating a vehicle with a blood-alcohol level of .08 percent or higher. [Citation.] But where, as here, the driver submits to a blood test, that burden is typically satisfied by two documents: the sworn statement of the arresting officer and a forensic lab report documenting the results of a chemical test of the driver’s blood. [Citation.]” (Petricka v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1348 (Petricka); see also Veh. Code, § 13353.2, subd. (a)(1) [requiring the “immediate” suspension of driving privileges under circumstances where a person driving a motor vehicle has 0.08 percent or more alcohol in his or her blood].)

“Procedurally, it is a fairly simple matter for the DMV to introduce the necessary foundational evidence. Evidence Code section 664 creates a rebuttable presumption that blood-alcohol test results recorded on official forms were obtained by following the regulations and guidelines of [California Code of Regulations,] title 17. [Citations.] Test results from authorized laboratories, performed by public employees within the scope of their duties, are admissible under the public employee records exception to the hearsay rule. [Citations.] The recorded test results are presumptively valid and the DMV is not required to present additional foundational evidence. [Citation.] At this point, ‘faced with a report of chemical test results, the burden would be on the licensee to demonstrate that the test was not properly performed.’ [Citation.]” (Shannon v. Gourley (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 60, 64-65.)

At the APS hearing, as further detailed above, the DMV submitted the Form DS367, which includes the results of the PAS, and the DOJ Report, each of which are admissible, presumed valid, and provide sufficient foundational evidence necessary to show whether Edney was operating his vehicle with a blood-alcohol level of .08 percent. For this reason, the AR shows that the DMV met its initial burden at the APS hearing, notwithstanding whether the DMV offered testimony to establish the reliability of the PAS or the blood sample analysis performed by the DOJ. (Manriquez, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1232-1233.)
 

“Once the DMV establishes its prima facie case by presenting documents contemplated in the statutory scheme, the driver must produce affirmative evidence of the nonexistence of the presumed facts sufficient to shift the burden of proof back to the DMV. [Citations.] ‘The licensee must show, “through cross-examination of the officer or by the introduction of affirmative evidence, that official standards were in any respect not observed ....” [Citation.] Once such showing has been made, the burden shifts to the DMV to prove that the test was reliable despite the violation.’ [Citations.]” (Manriquez, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1232-1233.) The licensee’s showing “cannot rest on speculation, but must demonstrate a reasonable basis for an inference that the procedures were not properly followed.” (Petricka, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 1348.)

Edney asserts that the DOJ Report, which states a percentage margin of error of .004 percent, does not indicate whether any one result is more likely than another. In addition, Edney asserts, Moore testified that the PAS calibration logs disclose a series of test results as high as .106 which, according to Moore, indicate a “high bias” of .006. Taking these matters into consideration, together with the results of one PAS which showed a BAC below .08 percent as well as Moore’s testimony regarding Officer Smith’s observation of only 4 HGN “clues”, Edney argues, Moore rebutted the presumed fact that Edney’s BAC was .08 percent at the time Edney was driving. Edney further argues that, because the DMV did not rebut Moore’s testimony, the weight of the evidence does not support the Decision.

The rebuttable presumption created under Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (b), “establishes a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence, not the burden of proof.” (Coffey v. Shiomoto (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1198, 1209 (Coffey).) It requires “the trier of fact, given a showing of the preliminary fact …, to assume the existence of the presumed fact … ‘unless and until evidence is introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence, in which case the trier of fact shall determine the existence or nonexistence of the presumed fact from the evidence and without regard to the presumption.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 1209-1210.)

Edney does not appear to dispute that the results of the PAC and blood sample analysis were sufficient to give rise to a presumption that Edney was driving with a BAC of .08 percent or more. “[E]vidence is sufficient to rebut a presumption if it ‘would support a finding of [the] nonexistence of’ the presumed fact….The most reasonable meaning of this phrase is that if the predicate facts are found, Vehicle Code section 23152’s presumption will apply unless the driver presents evidence which, if believed, ‘would support a finding of [the] nonexistence of’ the presumed fact.” (Coffey, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1210, original italics.)

The evidenced admitted by Castillo-Gonzalez at the APS hearing included the results of three tests. With respect to the PAS administered by Officer Smith, one PAS showed that Edney’s BAC was .082 percent, and the other that Edney’s BAC was .075 percent. At the APS hearing, Moore testified that upon subtracting a “high bias” of .006, which Moore testified was proper based on information appearing in the PAS calibration logs further described above and general “case law”, the results show that Edney was driving with a BAC of, respectively, .076 or .069 percent.

Even if the Court were to assume that Moore’s testimony was sufficient to rebut the presumption that Edney was operating his vehicle with a prohibited BAC based on the results of the PAS, information appearing in the Decision shows that Castillo-Gonzalez relied on the results of the blood sample analysis set forth in the DOJ Report. Edney does dispute that, according to the percentage margin of error stated in the DOJ Report, the analysis of Edney’s blood sample showed that Edney’s BAC was between .078 percent and .086 percent at the time of driving. Given the 99.73 percent confidence interval stated in the DOJ Report, this demonstrates a high probability or strong likelihood that Edney’s BAC was at, or exceeded, .08 percent. For this reason, the DOJ Report provides compelling and substantial evidence to support Castillo-Gonzalez’s conclusion that it was “more than likely” that Edney’s BAC was .08 percent at the time Edney was operating his vehicle.

The results of the PAS discussed above do not meaningfully reduce the strength of the evidence provided in the DOJ Report. Further, Edney has not shown why or in what manner the information or evidence appearing in the DOJ Report is inaccurate or unreliable.

Further, even if the Court were to assume that Moore’s testimony was also sufficient to rebut the presumption with respect to the result of the blood sample analysis, there exists sufficient additional circumstantial evidence to show, by a preponderance, that Edney was more than likely driving with a prohibited BAC. For example, the AR shows that Officers Smith and Lopez observed Edney’s vehicle swerving, and that Edney was coming from a brewery and, according to Officer Smith, had an outward appearance of alcohol intoxication. The AR further shows that Edney initially stated that he had consumed only one alcoholic beverage, and later admitted he had consumed more than one alcoholic beverage. In addition, the AR is sufficient to show that Edney failed portions of the FST administered by Officer Smith.

Considered as a whole, the circumstantial evidence described above corroborates Castillo-Gonzalez’s finding that, according to the results reflected in the DOJ Report, Edney’s BAC was more than likely at .08 percent notwithstanding whether the circumstantial evidence, alone, is sufficient to prove Edney’s BAC at the time Edney was driving. (Coffey, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1216.) For these and all reasons further discussed above, the Court finds that the weight of the evidence supports the Decision.

Edney also contends that Castillo-Gonzalez waited until after the matter had been submitted to undermine or cast doubt on Moore’s testimony rather than asking Moore to expand on his methodology or the manner in which he reached his conclusions at the time of the APS hearing. Edney also asserts that Castillo-Gonzalez mischaracterized Moore’s testimony by citing a case and making a claim not cited or advanced by Moore at the APS hearing. For these reasons, Edney argues, Castillo-Gonzalez acted with bias and prejudice towards Edney.

“ ‘Where due process requires an administrative hearing, the individual has the right to a tribunal “which meets at least the currently prevailing standards of impartiality.” ’ [Citations.] An impartial adjudicator, even in the agency setting, is an ‘irreducible minimum’ requirement of due process. [Citation.] The currently prevailing standards of impartiality recognize that the right to an impartial, nonbiased adjudicator is violated in one of two ways, through either (1) actual bias, or (2) a constitutionally intolerable probability of bias.” (Knudsen v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 186, 197-198 (Knudsen).)

The burden of establishing a due process violation based on bias or prejudice by Castillo-Gonzalez rests on Edney. (California DUI Lawyers Assn. v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 517, 530.) To meet this burden, Edney must “come forward with ‘specific evidence demonstrating actual bias or a particular combination of circumstances creating an unacceptable risk of bias’ [Citations] …. Otherwise, the presumption that agency adjudicators are people of ‘ “conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances” ’ will stand unrebutted. [Citation.]” (Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 221–222.)

Edney’s bare assertions, without more, are insufficient to demonstrate actual bias by Castillo-Gonzalez. (See, e.g., Brown v. American Bicycle Group, LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 665, 674 [“mere fact” of adverse ruling does not give an appearance of bias or show actual bias].) Moreover, even if the Court were to find that Edney met his burden to show actual prejudice or bias by Castillo-Gonzalez, Edney fails to explain why any actual prejudice or bias impaired Castillo-Gonzalez’s ability to remain impartial. (Andrews v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 781, 792 [prejudice must be sufficient to impair the decision maker’s impartiality].)

To the extent Edney contends that there exists an intolerable probability of bias notwithstanding whether or not actual bias exists, nothing in the AR shows that Castillo-Gonzalez acted as an advocate for the DMV. For example, the transcript of the APS hearing shows that Moore generally referenced nonspecific “case law”, but did not cite a specific case. (AR052.) In the Decision, Castillo-Gonzalez noted that Moore and Edney’s counsel did not specify what case law Moore was referring to, and stated that “if” Moore was referring to the decision in Brenner v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 365, disapproved in Coffey, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1217, that case was distinguishable. (AR005.) Under these circumstances, the Decision does not show that Castillo-Gonzalez mischaracterized Moore’s testimony. 

The AR also reflects that, at the APS hearing, Castillo-Gonzalez collected evidence in an impartial manner, and considered and weighed that evidence, including the testimony of Moore, to arrive at the Decision. The AR does not show that Castillo-Gonzalez asked questions that were inconsistent with Moore’s testimony, or engaged in any other conduct that would lead the Court to conclude that Castillo-Gonzalez acted as an advocate or engaged in advocacy. (Knudsen, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 207.) For these reasons, the Court does not find that Castillo-Gonzalez acted in a manner which violated Edney’s due process rights.

For all reasons further discussed above, the weight of the evidence before the Court supports the findings made by Castillo-Gonzalez, and the Decision. Further, there is nothing in the AR which shows actual bias by Castillo-Gonzalez, or reflects that Castillo-Gonzalez acted as an advocate for the DMV, or in an unbiased or impartial manner. Therefore, the Court will deny the petition.