Renee Ramirez vs Petvet Care Centers (California) Inc et al

Case Number

24CV06537

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 08/22/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

CMC; Motion to Compel

Tentative Ruling

For all reasons discussed herein, the motion of defendant to compel arbitration and stay proceedings is denied.

Background:

On November 21, 2024, plaintiff Renee Ramirez filed a complaint titled as a representative action against defendants PetVet Care Centers (California), Inc., and PetVet Care Centers, LLC (collectively, defendants), asserting one cause of action for violation of the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 or “PAGA”, codified as Labor Code section 2698 et seq. As alleged in the complaint:

Plaintiff has been employed by defendants since July 2022, and has been classified as a non-exempt employee who is paid on an hourly basis. (Compl., ¶ 9.) The complaint arises from purportedly unlawful conduct by defendants which includes requiring plaintiff to work “off the clock” including during meal breaks, rounding actual time worked and recorded by plaintiff, failing to pay overtime and break premiums at one and one half times plaintiff’s regular rate of pay, failing to include plaintiff’s incentive compensation as part of plaintiff’s regular rate of pay, failing to provide rest periods, failing to accurately record and pay plaintiff for the actual amount of time worked, failing to provide complete and accurate wage statements showing the correct gross and net wages earned by plaintiff, failing to timely pay plaintiff at the close of each payroll period, failing to pay or underpaying sick wages, and failing to reimburse plaintiff for required business expenses, among other things. (Compl., ¶¶ 14-33.)

Plaintiff further alleges that she is not suing defendants in an individual capacity, that plaintiff brings this action solely on behalf of all current and former aggrieved employees who worked for defendants starting on September 10, 2023, and that plaintiff does not seek to recover anything other than penalties permitted under Labor Code section 2699. (Compl., ¶¶ 1-4 & 9.)

On April 28, 2025, defendants filed a motion for an order compelling arbitration of the cause of action alleged in the complaint and staying this proceeding.

The motion is supported by a declaration of Letty Jeric (Jeric) who is employed by defendants as a Regional Human Resource Manager. (Jeric Decl., ¶ 1.) Jeric states that defendants provide services to customers via more than 450 hospitals across 40 states, and utilize mail, internet, cell phones, and a Web site to conduct their business operations, which include communicating with, issuing invoices to, and receiving payments from customers who are located outside of California. (Jeric Decl., ¶ 2.)

Jeric states that on July 27, 2022, plaintiff submitted an “Employment Application” to work as a Veterinary Assistant for Santa Barbara Veterinary Group, which is a subsidiary of defendants, and a copy of plaintiff’s resume. (Jeric Decl., ¶¶ 3-4.) In the Employment Application and resume, plaintiff indicated that her personal electronic mail or “email” address was reneer805@gmail.com. (Ibid.) Copies of the Employment Application and the resume submitted by plaintiff are attached to an index of exhibits (the Index) filed by defendants in support of the motion. (Ibid. & Index, Exhs. 1-2.)

Jeric further states that plaintiff commenced her employment with defendants on September 6, 2022. (Jeric Decl., ¶ 5.) Plaintiff’s “New Employee Information” form and “Emergency and Permanent Contact Information” also indicate that plaintiff’s personal email address is reneer805@gmail.com. (Ibid.) Copies of the New Employee Information form and Emergency and Permanent Contact Information are also attached to the Index. (Ibid. & Index, Exhs. 3-4.)

Jeric asserts that on April 20, 2023, defendants sent to plaintiff’s personal email address described above, a “Dispute Resolution Procedure and Arbitration Agreement” (the Agreement) using “SignNow”, which is a third-party electronic signature software program. (Jeric Decl., ¶ 6.) Jeric explains the procedure employed by defendants to provide employees with a link and login credentials to access and electronically sign the Agreement using SignNow. (Jeric Decl., ¶¶ 7-8.)

Jeric states that plaintiff electronically signed the Agreement via SignNow on April 20, 2023. (Jeric Decl., ¶ 9.) A copy of the Agreement and its related SignNow document history are attached to the Index. (Ibid. & Index, Exh. 5.)

The motion is also supported by a declaration of defendants’ counsel, Ronnie Arenas (Arenas), who states that on September 11, 2024, plaintiff filed as Santa Barbara Superior Court case number 24CV05042, a class action entitled Renee Ramirez v. PetVet Care Centers (California), Inc., et al. (the Class Action). (Arenas Decl., ¶ 2.) After accepting service of the Class Action, Arenas transmitted a copy of the Agreement to and met and conferred telephonically with plaintiff’s counsel regarding the Agreement, during which plaintiff’s counsel agreed to dismiss the Class Action and pursue arbitration. (Arenas Decl., ¶¶ 3-4.) According to Arenas, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the Class Action on November 14, 2024. (Arenas Decl., ¶ 5; Index, Exh. 6 [request for dismissal].)

Arenas further states that on January 10, 2025, plaintiff initiated an arbitration which is ongoing, and which, according to Arenas, covers the same violations at issue in this action. (Arenas Decl., ¶ 7; Index, Exh. 7 [plaintiff’s complaint in arbitration].) On various dates in January, March, and April 2025, Arenas communicated to plaintiff’s counsel that the present action is, according to Arenas, also subject to the Agreement and that defendants intended to move to compel arbitration. (Arenas Decl., ¶¶ 8-9.) Arenas states that plaintiff was unwilling to stipulate to arbitrate this matter. (Arenas Decl., ¶ 9.)

The above summary of information appearing in the Jeric and Arenas declarations is not intended to be exhaustive.

The motion is opposed by plaintiff.

Analysis:

Assuming, without deciding, that the present record is sufficient to show that plaintiff signed the Agreement, and that the Agreement is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (the FAA), codified as 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., the cause of action for civil penalties under PAGA as alleged by plaintiff in the complaint is not subject to arbitration for all reasons discussed below.

“A PAGA claim for civil penalties ‘ “ ‘is fundamentally a law enforcement action.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘The “government entity on whose behalf the plaintiff files suit is ... the real party in interest.: ’ [Citation.] PAGA’s default civil penalties are thus calculated ‘ “to punish the employer” for wrongdoing’ [citation] and ‘ “to deter violations” ’ [citation] rather than ‘compensate employees for actual losses incurred’ [citation].” (Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1117 (Adolph).)

“[A] a predispute categorical waiver of the right to bring a PAGA action is unenforceable....” (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1117.) This rule is not preempted by the FAA. (Ibid.; see also Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639, 656-657 [142 S.Ct. 1906, 213 L.Ed.2d 179].) In addition, interpreting PAGA in a manner “that impedes an employee’s ability to prosecute his or her employer’s violations committed against other employees would undermine PAGA’s purpose of augmenting enforcement of the Labor Code.” (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 1122-1123.)

Further, standing under PAGA “is not inextricably linked to the plaintiff’s own injury.” (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 85.) Instead, the provisions of PAGA authorize “suits brought ‘separately’ from individual claims for relief.” (Id. at p. 88.)

In the motion, defendants contend that, pursuant to the opinion in Leeper v. Shipt, Inc. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1001 (Leeper), this action necessarily includes an individual component notwithstanding the manner in which plaintiff has pleaded her PAGA claim. Defendants argue that plaintiff cannot proceed without alleging an individual claim under PAGA, which, according to defendants, may be compelled to arbitration under the Agreement.

On April 16, 2025, the California Supreme Court ordered review of Leeper on the court’s own motion. Accordingly, “[a]ny citation to [Leeper] must ... note the grant of review and any subsequent action by the Supreme Court.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(e)(1).) The court questions why defendants do not include in their moving papers any note of the California Supreme Court’s grant of review of the opinion Leeper, as required by court rules.

Pending the California Supreme Court’s review, the opinion in Leeper “may be cited, not only for its persuasive value, but also for the limited purpose of establishing the existence of a conflict in authority that would in turn allow trial courts to exercise discretion under [Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 456], to choose between sides of any such conflict.” (See Standing Order Exercising Authority Under California Rules of Court, Rule 8.1115(e)(3), Upon Grant of Review or Transfer of a Matter with an Underlying Published Court of Appeal Opinion, Administrative Order 2021-04-21; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(e)(3) and corresponding Comment, par. 2.) Considering the purposes for which Leeper may be cited, the court also questions defendants’ contention that the opinion in Leeper “is binding in this district.” (See Motion at p. 3, ll. 14-15.)

In their reply to plaintiff’s opposition to the motion, defendants also rely on the opinion in Williams v. Alacrity Solutions Group, LLC (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 932, of which the California Supreme Court granted review on July 9, 2025. Defendants also fail to note this fact in their reply papers. The same reasoning and analysis apply.

Though the court in Leeper held that “any PAGA action necessarily includes both an individual PAGA claim and a representative PAGA claim...” (Leeper, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 1009), the court in Rodriguez v. Packers Sanitation Services LTD., LLC (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 69 (Rodriguez) found the Leeper decision unpersuasive, stating that “[w]e do not believe this logic withstands scrutiny.” (Rodriguez, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 79.) The Rodriguez court also stated that “just because a PAGA action must include an individual PAGA claim does not mean any particular complaint brought under the auspices of PAGA does contain one.” (Id. at pp. 79-80, original italics [also stating that “the Leeper court appeared to insert into the plaintiff's complaint a missing claim”].)

“[I]n our legal system it is the plaintiff, not the court, who is responsible for prosecuting a civil action. [Citation.] And the complaint in a civil action ‘serves to frame and limit the issues.’ [Citation.]” (Rodriguez, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 80.) “[W]here, as here, the defendant brings a motion to compel arbitration and the parties dispute whether the complaint includes arbitrable individual PAGA claims, the court should resolve the dispute by examining the complaint. A motion to compel arbitration ‘is simply a suit in equity seeking specific performance of a contract.’ [Citation.] On a motion to compel arbitration, the court is required to determine whether the plaintiff has asserted claims that fall within the parties’ arbitration agreement. [Citations.] And ‘no dispute may be ordered to arbitration unless it is within the scope of the arbitration agreement.’ [Citation.] If the plaintiff's complaint asserts no individual PAGA claim, there is no existing dispute over his or her right to obtain an individual PAGA remedy, and he or she cannot properly be ordered to arbitrate such a claim. Therefore, if on a motion to compel arbitration the court examines the complaint and determines it does not allege an individual PAGA claim, the court should decline to compel any such claim to arbitration.” (Ibid.)

The court has examined the allegations of plaintiff’s complaint, which are detailed above. The complaint does not allege an individual claim under PAGA. Though defendants contend that the cause of action for civil penalties under PAGA alleged in the complaint necessarily includes an individual component pursuant to the decision in Leeper, defendants do not dispute, and appear to concede, that plaintiff's complaint does not expressly assert, and expressly does not allege, any individual PAGA claim. (See, e.g., Motion at p. 3, ll. 10-12 [noting that plaintiff “consciously sought to avoid referencing any individual claims...”].)

There exists a conflict in authority as to the issue of whether every PAGA action necessarily includes individual and non-individual PAGA claims notwithstanding whether the complaint at issue alleges an individual claim, and whether a plaintiff may bring only a non-individual PAGA action. The court finds that Rodriguez is the more persuasive authority.

For all reasons discussed above, the court finds that plaintiff may bring the present action in a representative capacity without asserting an individual claim under PAGA. Because the present record demonstrates, without dispute, that plaintiff does not allege an individual PAGA claim in the complaint, the representative PAGA claim at issue in this action is not subject to arbitration. (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 1117-1118.)

Defendants argue that 2024 reforms to PAGA, specifically to subdivision (c) of Labor Code section 2699, “codify” the requirement that a plaintiff may not assert a “purely representative” PAGA claim without alleging individual harm. (Motion at p. 8, ll. 14-20.) Subdivision (c) of Labor Code section 2699 provides that an “ ‘aggrieved employee’ means any person who was employed by the alleged violator and personally suffered each of the violations alleged during the period prescribed under Section 340 of the Code of Civil Procedure....” (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (c).) Giving the complaint a reasonable interpretation, its allegations are sufficient to show that plaintiff personally suffered each of the violations described in that pleading. Defendants offer no reasoned argument to show why plaintiff has failed to allege this fact in the complaint.

Furthermore, the comments to Assembly Bill No. 2288, which codified the reforms to PAGA relied on by defendants, note that “[t]he bill preserves PAGA as a vehicle for an employee to bring a representative action for civil penalties to enforce the Labor Code even where the employee has signed an arbitration agreement that would otherwise prevent the employee from pursuing such claims in any forum. In Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348 (2014), the California Supreme Court held PAGA claims are unwaivable and that an arbitration agreement requiring an employee as a condition of employment to forfeit the right to pursue a representative PAGA action in any forum is contrary to public policy and unenforceable. AB 2288 does not impact this holding. It will remain the case, after AB 2288 is signed into law, that contractual waivers of the right to pursue representative PAGA actions are void. It will also remain the case, as the Supreme Court held in [Adolph], that an aggrieved employee does not lose standing to pursue the individual and non-individual components of that employee’s representative PAGA claim on behalf of the Agency and other employees even if an arbitration agreement or other contract requires the employee to pursue those otherwise integrated components of the employee’s PAGA claim in separate forums.” (Assem. Floor Analysis, analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2288 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 21, 2024, pp. 3-4.)

The comments set forth above demonstrate that the reforms to PAGA relied on by defendants did not change the rules discussed herein, as set forth in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 383, overruled on another ground in Quach v. California Commerce Club, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 562, 582, fn. 4 (Iskanian), and Adolph. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the PAGA reforms referenced in the motion do not change the court’s analysis. The court also questions the basis for defendants’ ostensible argument that these reforms codify any requirement that a plaintiff must allege individual harm.

Defendants further contend that the provisions of the Agreement require that the question at issue in the present motion regarding whether plaintiff must arbitrate her PAGA claim must be delegated to the arbitrator. This argument is not persuasive.

For example, defendants’ argument presumes the existence of a valid arbitration agreement encompassing the present dispute. (See, e.g., Sandquist v. Lebo Automotive, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 233, 243-244 [general discussion].) Under the circumstances present here, the PAGA claim alleged by plaintiff in this action is not subject to arbitration for all reasons discussed above. Moreover, to the extent any delegation clause in the Agreement effectively operates as a waiver of plaintiff’s right to bring a representative PAGA action in court by requiring plaintiff to submit that claim to an arbitral forum, that clause is unenforceable. (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 383; Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1117; Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 101.)

For all reasons further discussed above, the court will deny the motion to compel plaintiff to arbitrate the non-individual PAGA claim alleged in the complaint.