Christianne Taylor v. FCA US, LLC, et al.

Case Number

24CV06491

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 04/23/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Demurrer of Defendant FCA US LLC to Complaint

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiff Christianne Taylor: Tionna Carvalho, Sanam Vaziri, Strategic Legal Practices, APC

                                   

For Defendants FCA US, LLC, and Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram Fiat of Santa Barbara: Matthew C. Wolf, Lauren K. VanDenburg, Arya Shirani, Turner Henningsen Wolf & Vandenburg, LLP

                 

RULING

For the reasons set forth herein, the demurrer of defendant FCA US, LLC, to the sixth cause of action of plaintiff Christianne Taylor’s complaint is sustained with leave to amend. Plaintiff shall file and serve her first amended complaint on or before May 8, 2025.

Background

As alleged in plaintiff’s complaint:

On October 14, 2015, plaintiff Christianne Taylor entered into a warranty contract with defendant FCA US, LLC (FCA) regarding a 2015 Jeep Grand Cherokee (the Vehicle), which was manufactured and/or distributed by FCA. (Complaint, ¶ 10.) Taylor purchased the Vehicle with a defective engine. (Complaint, ¶ 19.)

Defects and nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves within the applicable express warranty period, including engine and electrical defects. (Complaint, ¶ 15.) The engine has one or more defects that can cause loss of power, stalling, engine running rough, and engine misfires. (Complaint, ¶ 19.) The engine defect is a safety concern because it can suddenly affect the driver’s ability to control the Vehicle, cause a non-collision fire, or cause the Vehicle to fail without warning while moving at highway speeds. (Complaint, ¶ 20.) FCA actively concealed the existence and nature of the defect from Taylor at the time of purchase, repair, and thereafter. (Complaint, ¶ 28.)

Prior to Taylor’s acquiring the Vehicle, FAC knew that the Vehicle was defective but failed to disclose this fact to Taylor at the time of sale or thereafter. (Complaint, ¶¶ 21-23.) Taylor interacted with sales representatives, considered FCA’s advertisement or other marketing materials concerning the FCA Vehicles prior to purchasing the Vehicle. (Complaint, ¶¶ 24, 70.) Had Taylor been aware of the engine defect, Taylor would not have purchased the Vehicle. (Complaint, ¶¶ 24, 27.)

On November 19, 2024, Taylor filed the original complaint in this action asserting six causes of action: (1) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (d); (2) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (b); (3) Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (a)(3); (4) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability; (5) negligent repair; and (6) fraudulent inducement—concealment. The first, second, third, fourth, and sixth causes of action are brought against FCA. The fifth cause of action is brought against defendant Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram Fiat of Santa Barbara (CDJRF SB).

On December 20, 2024, FCA filed this demurrer to the sixth cause of action (fraudulent concealment) of the complaint.

On January 22, 2025, CDJRF SB filed its answer to the complaint, generally denying the allegations thereof and asserting 48 affirmative defenses.

No opposition has been filed to the demurrer.

Trial is now set for February 18, 2026.

Analysis

“ ‘The rules by which the sufficiency of a complaint is tested against a general demurrer are well settled. We not only treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but also ‘give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.’ ” (Zhang v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364, 370, internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)

FCA demurs only to the fraudulent concealment cause of action. FCA argues that the cause of action is not alleged with the specificity required of fraud causes of action.

“The required elements for fraudulent concealment are (1) concealment or suppression of a material fact; (2) by a defendant with a duty to disclose the fact; (3) the defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff by intentionally concealing or suppressing the fact; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would have acted differently if the concealed or suppressed fact was known; and (5) plaintiff sustained damage as a result of the concealment or suppression of the material fact.” (Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 17 Cal.5th 1, 40 (Rattagan).)

“California’s pleading requirement [is] that fraud must be alleged with specificity. The requirement provides an important safeguard against the risk of tort recovery for fraud in every case involving conduct occurring during a contractual relationship. [Citation.] When affirmative misrepresentation fraud is alleged, ‘This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which “show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” ’ [Citations.]” (Rattagan, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 43.) “California courts apply the same specificity standard to evaluate the factual underpinnings of a fraudulent concealment claim at the pleading stage, even though the focus of inquiry shifts to the unique elements of the claim.” (Ibid.)

Here, the principal issue with the particularity requirement exists with the first element of concealment or suppression of a material fact. In order to comply with the specificity requirement identified in Rattagan, a plaintiff alleging fraudulent concealment in the inducement must at least allege circumstances under which the fraudulently-induced contract was formed. These circumstances give the necessary context to the alleged concealed fact. Unlike even the general allegations approved in Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 833, 844 where a specific dealership involved in the transaction was identified as an agent of the manufacturer, Taylor’s complaint provides no allegations of the purchase transaction or its circumstances. It is not necessary in a concealment case such as this to recount every detail, but truly generic allegations of “sales representatives” and “materials disseminated by FCA” are insufficient to meet the specificity required of a fraud claim.

Accordingly, the demurrer to the sixth cause of action will be sustained with leave to amend.