Salatiel Abrajan, et al. v. Michael Dal Bello, et al

Case Number

24CV06257

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 05/21/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

1. Defendants’ Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ Complaint; 2. Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ Complaint

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiffs Salatiel Abrajan, Alitza Chavez, Eleazar Abrajan Chavez, Esperanza Abrajan Chavez, and Jeovany Abrajan: Daniel Azizi, Michael Juarez-Munoz, Downtown L.A. Law Group

For Defendants Michael Dal Bello and Anthony Dal Bello: Megan C. Winter, Kristine A. Winter, Procter Shyer & Winter, LLP

                       

RULING

For the reasons set forth below:

1. Defendants’ demurrer to plaintiffs’ complaint is overruled
2. Defendants motion to strike portions of plaintiffs’ complaint is granted in part and denied in part as follows:
   1. The motion to strike is granted, without leave to amend, as to Paragraph No. 110: “in an amount of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than two thousand dollars ($2,000)”, Prayer For Relief, paragraph 19: “in the amount of $2,000”, and Prayer For Relief, paragraph 20: “”in the amount of not less than $100 nor more than $1,000”.
   2. The motion to strike is denied in in all other respects

Background

This action commenced on November 7, 2024, by the filing of the complaint by plaintiffs Salatiel Abrajan, Alitza Chavez, Eleazar Abrajan Chavez, Esperanza Abrajan Chavez, and Jeovany Abrajan (collectively “plaintiffs”) against defendants Michael Dal Bello and Anthony Dal Bello (collectively “defendants) for: (1) Negligence, (2) Tortious Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability, (3) Breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, (4) Private Nuisance, (5) Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment, (6) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, (7) Violation of the California Unfair Competition Act, and (8) Unlawful Retaliatory Eviction. (Note: Due to common surnames, sometimes individual parties will be referred to by their given names for clarity. No disrespect is intended.)

As alleged in the complaint:

In February 2019, plaintiffs entered into a written lease agreement with defendants for the occupancy of 135 N. Milpas Street, Santa Barbara (the “property”). (Compl., ¶ 19 & Exh. A.) Plaintiffs were “unlawfully evicted” in approximately October 2023. (Id. at ¶ 20.) Defendants owned and managed the property. (Id. at ¶ 29.)

Defendants engaged in wrongful conduct including intentionally and negligently failing to make repairs to the property, the common areas, and maintain the habitability of the property throughout plaintiffs’ tenancy. (Compl., ¶ 32.) Defendants’ wrongful conduct harmed plaintiffs, threatened the health and safety of plaintiffs, and the community at large. (Ibid.) The substandard conditions at the property included: (1) dampness, moisture, and mold, (2) cockroach infestation, (3) rodent infestation, (4) bubbling and peeling paint, and (5) the presence of high levels of lead, mercury, and other metals. (Id. at ¶ 33.) Defendants had actual or constructive notice of the defects but failed to take timely or reasonable steps to abate or remedy the defects. (Id. at ¶ 34.) “Any repairs that were undertaken by Defendants were inadequate and/or exacerbated the subject problem (i.e., Painting over mold), Defendants failed to repair and abate the defects at the property to save money and increase Defendants’ cash flow and net income.” (Ibid.)

The property has a persistent cockroach infestation which has caused plaintiffs to inhale cockroach allergens, bacteria, and contamination. (Compl., ¶ 35.) The vermin at the property have defecated and contaminated plaintiffs’ food and personal property, caused plaintiffs significant bodily injury, emotional distress, and property damages. (Ibid.) One or more of the plaintiffs are allergic to cockroach allergens and suffered “allergy-like” symptoms. (Ibid.) Defendants intentionally and negligently failed to properly abate and eradicate  the cockroach infestation. (Ibid.)

The property has been subject to persistent water leaks, which has led to the formation of mold and mildew conditions which damaged the property, interfering with plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of the property, reducing the habitability of the property, and causing plaintiffs significant bodily injury and emotional distress. (Compl., ¶ 36.) Defendants intentionally and negligently failed to properly repair, eliminate, and abate the mold growth and the water leaks at the property. (Ibid.)

The property contains deteriorating lead paint, and due to the presence of high levels of lead and mercury, Salatiel required medical treatment when pregnant and when tested the results showed high levels of metal in her system. (Compl., ¶¶ 37, 38.) Other plaintiffs also tested positive for high levels of metal. (Ibid.)

Plaintiffs complained to defendants about the various defects, but defendants intentionally ignored plaintiffs and refused to make repairs to the property, causing plaintiffs emotional distress. (Compl., ¶ 40.)

“Defendants’ negligence and tortious conduct in failing to properly remedy the substandard living conditions has caused Plaintiffs lead poisoning, high levels of mercury, left side of body numb, tingling, muscle spasm, depression, constipation, allergic reactions, mental and/or emotional distress, lack of sleep, stress, general discomfort and fatigue, annoyance, and inability to quietly enjoy their home.” (Compl., ¶ 42.)

“The acts and omissions of Defendants, directly or through their agents, in inducing Plaintiffs to rent a dwelling that contains the defects mentioned herein, which Defendants had intentionally failed to identify, abate, and repair in an effective manner was outrageous and beyond all boundaries of decency and reasonable in a civilized society. Defendants knew that intentionally failing to identify, abate, and repair the housing defects would expose Plaintiffs to deplorable conditions including exposure to cockroach infestations and lead exposure. This was intentionally done to cause harm to Plaintiffs as Defendants knew that a reasonable tenant, including Plaintiffs, would suffer severe emotional distress and Plaintiff did suffer such distress in having to live with such defects and uninhabitable conditions. Despite this knowledge, Defendants took no steps to change their actions.” (Compl., ¶ 92.)

“Defendants’ conduct would cause a reasonable person severe emotional distress and caused Plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress.” (Compl., ¶ 93.)

“Defendants at all times acted with reckless disregard of the probability of causing Plaintiffs severe emotional distress. Defendants intentionally failed to repair and maintain the Property in an attempt to save money and increase their cash flow.” (Compl., ¶ 94.)

As the direct and proximate result of defendants’ outrageous conduct, Plaintiffs have suffered severe emotional distress in an amount in excess of the jurisdictional limits of this Court. Plaintiffs have suffered lead poisoning, high levels of mercury, left side of body numb, tingling, muscle spasm, depression, constipation, allergic reactions, emotional distress, chronic toxic stress, and related physical symptoms or bodily injury due to the cockroach infestation and the lead exposure in the Property. Defendants’ conduct was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiffs’ emotional distress and related physical symptoms.” (Compl., ¶ 95.)

“Defendants’ conduct described above was willful, wanton, intentional, despicable, malicious and initiated with malice and with the intent to knowingly take advantage of, oppress, and injure Plaintiffs. Defendants at all times acted with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights of safety of Plaintiffs. Defendants were at all times aware that there was a high probability that their intentional and/or negligent failure to repair and maintain the Property would injure Plaintiffs and cause them personal injury, emotional distress and property damage. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an award of punitive and exemplary damages . . ..” (Compl., ¶ 96.)

Defendants now demur to the sixth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) on the grounds that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

Defendants also move to strike several portions of the complaint.

Plaintiffs oppose the demurrer as well as the motion to strike.

Analysis

            Demurrer

“When any ground for objection to a complaint, cross-complaint, or answer appears on the face thereof, or from any matter of which the court is required to or may take judicial notice, the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer to the pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) “Our consideration of the facts alleged includes ‘those evidentiary facts found in recitals of exhibits attached to [the] complaint.’ [Citation.]” (Alexander v. Exxon Mobil (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1250.)

“The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds:

“(a) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading.

“(b) The person who filed the pleading does not have the legal capacity to sue.

“(c) There is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action.

“(d) There is a defect or misjoinder of parties.

“(e) The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

“(f) The pleading is uncertain. As used in this subdivision, “uncertain” includes ambiguous and unintelligible.

“(g) In an action founded upon a contract, it cannot be ascertained from the pleading whether the contract is written, is oral, or is implied by conduct.

“(h) No certificate was filed as required by Section 411.35.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.)

“[A] court must treat a demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, it does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.” (Travelers Indem. Co. of Connecticut v. Navigators Specialty Ins. Co. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 341, 358, citing Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)

“To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)

As noted above, defendants demur solely to plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action for IIED.

“A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is ‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.’ [Citations.] A defendant’s conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so ‘extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’ [Citation.] And the defendant’s conduct must be ‘intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.’ [Citation.]” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051, internal quotation marks omitted (Hughes).)

“In order to avoid a demurrer, the plaintiff must allege with “ ‘great[ ] specificity’ ” the acts which he or she believes are so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. [Citation.]” (Vasquez v. Franklin Management Real Estate Fund, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 819, 832.)

“[I]t is clear that the availability of a remedy for breach of implied warranty of habitability does not preclude a tenant from suing his landlord for intentional infliction of mental distress if the landlord’s acts are extreme and outrageous and result in severe mental distress. Whether this is so under the present allegations, presents a factual question - it cannot be said as a matter of law that appellant has not stated a cause of action.” (Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 922.)

Here, plaintiffs’ allegations satisfy all of the elements of a claim for IIED and are specific enough to overcome demurrer. The allegations are not, as defendants argue, conclusory. The facts alleged, as set forth above, are more than sufficient at the pleading stage. As noted above, plaintiffs allegations include numerous acts and omissions that plaintiffs claim were extreme and outrageous, intentional or with reckless disregard, and the sustaining of severe emotional distress. The facts, as alleged, could lead a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the conduct, if proven true, exceeds “all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” For pleading purposes, this is sufficient.

The demurrer will be overruled.

            Motion to Strike

“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) “Irrelevant matter” includes a “demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subds. (b)(3), (c).) “The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).)

“In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.)

“[J]udges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)

Defendants move to strike several paragraphs of plaintiffs’ complaint.

The portions that defendants seek to have stricken are:

Paragraph 49, under the negligence cause of action: “Defendants’ conduct described above was willful, wanton, intentional, despicable, malicious, and initiated with malice and with the intent to knowingly take advantage of, oppress, and injure Plaintiffs. Defendants at all times acted with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights of safety of Plaintiffs. Defendants were at all times aware that there was a high probability that their intentional and/or negligent failure to repair and maintain the Property would injure Plaintiffs and cause them personal injury, emotional distress and property damage. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an award of punitive and exemplary damages under and pursuant to Civil Code, Section 3294 and Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890.”

Paragraph 63, under the tortious breach of implied warranty of habitability cause of action: “Defendants’ conduct described above was willful, wanton, intentional, despicable, malicious, and initiated with malice and with the intent to knowingly take advantage of, oppress, and injure Plaintiffs. Defendants at all times acted with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights of safety of Plaintiffs. Defendants were at all times aware that there was a high probability that their intentional and/or negligent failure to repair and maintain the Property would injure Plaintiffs and cause them personal injury, emotional distress and property damage. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an award of punitive and exemplary damages under and pursuant to Civil Code, Section 3294 and Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890.”

Paragraph 80, under the private nuisance cause of action: ““Plaintiffs are further entitled to an award of exemplary damages, because the acts of Defendants were intentional, despicable, in that they were in knowing violation of law.”

Paragraph 81, under the private nuisance cause of action: “Defendants’ conduct described above was willful, wanton, intentional, despicable, malicious, and initiated with malice and with the intent to knowingly take advantage of, oppress, and injure Plaintiffs. Defendants at all times acted with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights of safety of Plaintiffs. Defendants were at all times aware that there was a high probability that their intentional and/or negligent failure to repair and maintain the Property would injure Plaintiffs and cause them personal injury, emotional distress and property damage. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an award of punitive and exemplary damages under and pursuant to Civil Code, Section 3294 and Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890.”

Paragraph 89, under the breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment cause of action: “Defendants’ conduct described above was willful, wanton, intentional, despicable, malicious, and initiated with malice and with the intent to knowingly take advantage of, oppress, and injure Plaintiffs. Defendants at all times acted with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights of safety of Plaintiffs. Defendants were at all times aware that there was a high probability that their intentional and/or negligent failure to repair and maintain the Property would injure Plaintiffs and cause them personal injury, emotional distress and property damage. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an award of punitive and exemplary damages under and pursuant to Civil Code, Section 3294 and Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890.”

Paragraph 96, under the IIED cause of action: “Defendants’ conduct described above was willful, wanton, intentional, despicable, malicious, and initiated with malice and with the intent to knowingly take advantage of, oppress, and injure Plaintiffs. Defendants at all times acted with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights of safety of Plaintiffs. Defendants were at all times aware that there was a high probability that their intentional and/or negligent failure to repair and maintain the Property would injure Plaintiffs and cause them personal injury, emotional distress and property damage. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an award of punitive and exemplary damages under and pursuant to Civil Code, Section 3294 and Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890.”

Paragraph 110, under the unlawful retaliatory eviction cause of action: “punitive damages in an amount of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than two thousand dollars ($2,000) for each retaliatory act”.

Paragraph 113, under the unlawful retaliatory eviction cause of action: “punitive damages”.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Paragraph 2, as to negligence: “For punitive damages and exemplary damages according to proof.”

Paragraph 5, as to tortious breach of implied warranty of habitability: “For punitive damages and exemplary damages according to proof.”

Paragraph 10, as to private nuisance: “For punitive damages and exemplary damages according to proof.”

Paragraph 13, as to breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment: ““For punitive damages and exemplary damages according to proof.”

Paragraph 16, as to IIED: “For punitive damages and exemplary damages according to proof.”

Paragraph 19, as to unlawful eviction: “For punitive damages in the amount of $2,000 for each retaliatory act per Civil Code § 1942.5(h).”

Paragraph 20, as to unlawful eviction: “For statutory punitive damage in the amount of not less than $100 nor more than $1,000 for each retaliatory act, per Civil Code § 1942.5(l)

“In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)

“As used in this section, the following definitions shall apply:

“(1) ‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

“(2) ‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.

“(3) ‘Fraud’ means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c).)

“[P]unitive damages are recoverable for intentional infliction of emotional distress and breach of fiduciary duty.” (Heller v. Pillsbury Madison & Sutro (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1390.)

Defendants rely on, essentially, the same arguments for the motion to strike as they do for the demurrer. The arguments fail for the same reasons that the demurrer will be overruled. Importantly, defendants do not apply their arguments to any of the causes of action individually. Rather, defendants’ argument is general as to the entire complaint. It is defendants’ burden to show that each portion of the complaint, that they seek to have stricken, should be stricken from the complaint. They have failed to meet that burden.

It will be for the trier of fact to determine whether defendants committed the acts and omissions, alleged in the complaint, and whether those acts and omissions constitute malice, oppression, or fraud. The motion to strike will be denied except as to the three portions discussed below.

 “No claim for exemplary damages shall state an amount or amounts.” (Civ. Code, § 3295, subd. (e).”

Plaintiffs’ argue that pleading a range, as provided by statute, does not violate Civil Code section 3295 because they do not state a specific amount. The argument is without merit. The statute specifically states: “amount or amounts.” This would include a range.

The following portions of the complaint will be stricken:

Paragraph No. 110: “in an amount of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than two thousand dollars ($2,000)”.

Prayer For Relief, paragraph 19: “in the amount of $2,000”.

Prayer For Relief, paragraph 20: “”in the amount of not less than $100 nor more than $1,000”.