Gretchen Daniels vs Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital

Case Number

24CV06224

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 06/06/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

CMC; Demurrer and Motion to Strike

Tentative Ruling

For the reasons set forth below:

1. The Demurrer of defendant Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital to plaintiff’s complaint is sustained, as to each of the eight causes of action, with leave to amend.

2. Defendant Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital’s motion to strike plaintiff’s punitive damages claims is granted with leave to amend.

2. Plaintiff shall file and serve any first amended complaint no later than June 27, 2025.   

Background:

This action commenced on November 5, 2024, by the filing of the complaint by plaintiff Gretchen Daniels (“plaintiff”) against defendant Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital (“Cottage”), for: (1) Disability discrimination; (2) Failure to accommodate disability; (3) Failure to engage in the interactive process; (4) Violation of California Family Rights Act; (5) Retaliation – requesting accommodation; (6) Retaliation; (7) Failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation; and (8) Wrongful termination in violation of public policy.

As alleged in the complaint:

Cottage employed plaintiff as a Chaplain from approximately November 2021, until Cottage terminated plaintiff’s employment on September 27, 2023. (Compl., ¶ 8.)

During the hiring process, plaintiff disclosed to Cottage that she suffered from chronic Lymes disease. (Compl., ¶ 9.) During her employment with Cottage, plaintiff developed the disabilities of cardia arrythmia, which was related to plaintiff’s disability of PTSD, and disabilities related to her knees. (Id. at ¶ 10.)

On July 21, 2023, during her shift, plaintiff experienced medical symptoms including rapid heart rate, and subsequently sought medical treatment at Cottage’s emergency department, where a physician diagnosed plaintiff with an irregular heartbeat. (Compl., ¶ 11.) Following the diagnosis, plaintiff’s physician advised plaintiff to take a medical leave of absence. (Id. at ¶ 12.) Plaintiff filled out and provided Cottage with a copy of Cottage’s “Medical Certification” form indicating that plaintiff would be taking leave of absence from July 21, 2023, until September 12, 2023, and Cottage approved the leave for the requested period. (Ibid.)

In August 2023, plaintiff underwent an MRI and was diagnosed with disabilities related to her knees. (Compl., ¶ 13.) Plaintiff notified Cottage of the knee related disabilities. (Ibid.)

On August 6, 2023, plaintiff’s neurologist issued a note stating: “[Plaintiff] is experiencing stress-related illness due to uncongenial work environment. Please offer [plaintiff] accommodations which resolve the uncongenial work environment.” (Compl., ¶ 14.) On August 7, 2023, plaintiff emailed the note to Cottage’s supervisor of leave management, and wrote, “Here is a letter requesting accommodation. I will most likely provide a second letter today or tomorrow after my next Dr. visit.” (Id. at ¶ 15.) Later the same day, plaintiff notified the supervisor of leave management that her doctor’s appointment was rescheduled to September. (Ibid.)

On August 9, 2023, the supervisor of leave management sent plaintiff a responsive email, stating: “Thanks for submitting the note from your provider. The purpose of this notice it to follow up with you regarding your work status. You indicated you have medical restrictions, which initiates our process for reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities and Amendments Act (ADAAA) and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). Our obligation under the ADAAA/FEHA is to consider accommodations that allow an employee to perform the essential functions of their position. Please review the attached Reasonable Accommodation FAQ’s. The medical documentation received indicates you are in need of ‘accommodations which resolve the uncongenial work environment’, but does not specify the medical restrictions in need of accommodation. Please have your healthcare provider indicate the specific medical restrictions in need of accommodation.” (Compl., ¶ 16.)

On August 15, 2023, plaintiff sent an email to the supervisor of leave management stating that she would not have another doctor appointment until September, and that, at that time, she would get back to her to discuss accommodations. (Compl., ¶ 17. Plaintiff forwarded the email to Cottage’s senior employee relations consultant (“SERC”). (Ibid.)

On August 16, 2023, the SERC sent a responsive email to plaintiff stating: “I am in receipt of your request for accommodation and will loop [the supervisor of leave management] in when she is back next week. (Compl., ¶ 18.)

On August 16, 2023, Cottage’s leave of absence coordinator (“LAC”) sent an email to plaintiff stating: “Please see the attached letter, it confirms that your FMLA will exhaust as of 9/9/23 but that your leave has been approved through 9/11/23 with an anticipated return of 9/12/23. Should you need to extend past 9/11/23 we will need a doctor’s note confirming that extension.” (Compl., ¶ 19.)

On August 28, 2023, plaintiff sent an email to the LAC and the supervisor of leave management stating: “Here is the update. I was able to secure an appointment for the week of September 18 to further clarify need for accommodations and what those accommodations look like. Would you like to have me plan to return to work on September 26 so that I can get the specified accommodations and get them processed by PhD before that week closes? That will give them time to plan to come back on the 26. Let me know.” (Compl., ¶ 20.) The same day, plaintiff sent another letter to the LAC and the supervisor of leave management stating: “I have been trying to get an appointment with a PhD to supplement my accommodations request. I just got word that there is an appointment available between the 18th and the 25th.” (Id. at ¶ 21.) Plaintiff also requested that Cottage moved plaintiff’s return to work date until after her appointment so that she could have her doctor review the accommodations request prior to plaintiff’s return to work. (Ibid.)

On August 29, 2023, plaintiff sent an email to the LAC reminding her of the interactive process emails that plaintiff had sent to Cottage the prior day, stating: “One of my accommodations appointment isn’t until after that date of September 11. I concerned about coming back to work before the accommodations are in order. I know if I come back on September 26 I will not be in the window of [FMLA].” (Compl., ¶ 22.) Plaintiff also wrote: “I am concerned about the legality and the protection of my job since I will be past the limit. Is there something I can do to protect my job for those two weeks.?” (Ibid.) Plaintiff also wrote: “It’s a bit of a dilemma to not return without the accommodations. But the professionals on the insurance list are booked until that time.” (Ibid.)

On September 1, 2023, plaintiff sent an email to the supervisor of leave management stating: “I have two issues requiring accommodations that I am working with. Uncongenial work environment. I am a prior victim of violent crime. Aggression and uncongenial interactions in the workplace do not work for me. An issue with my knees that is in process of diagnoses and may require further treatment, surgery and/or accommodations.” (Compl., ¶ 23.) Plaintiff also wrote: “As stated, both medical issues require accommodations. I have two appointments next week to further discuss the knee situation” and “My main concern is that My FEMLA expires on September 11. However if I return on that date, my issue with my knees and the potential need for accommodations will not be properly defined or resolved by that time.” (Ibid.) Plaintiff also explained that she would not see her doctor regarding her disability of cardia arrythmia and would not have clarification regarding that accommodation request until September 25, 2023. (Ibid.)

On September 5, 2023, plaintiff’s physician issued an off-work order that stated: “[Plaintiff] should remain off work until further evaluation due to a knee injury.” (Compl., ¶ 24.) Plaintiff emailed a copy of the note to Cottage and stated that her leave needed to be extended and that she wanted to continue her employment with Cottage. (Ibid.)

On September 6, 2023, plaintiff’s neurologist issued an off-work order along with work restrictions, which stated: “Please note that [plaintiff] is not to return to work until the uncongenial work environment has been resolved.” (Compl., ¶ 25.) The same day, plaintiff emailed a copy of the document to the LAC and the supervisor of leave management. (Ibid.)

On September 6, 2023, plaintiff sent an email to the LAC and the supervisor of leave management, stating: “I expect to have a request from my primary care doctor for an added six weeks within the next day or so, related to my knees, as I just saw the orthopedist. I can certainly get that request to you when I receive it from my primary doctor. A discussion with management would be premature at this point, because I am still having appointments with professionals and the data is not all in. Let’s plan on nailing down specific accommodations later in the process when all the data is clear. For now, please plan on me not returning to work for another six weeks with necessary paperwork pending. Please note that from my earlier email today, my supervisor has been duly notified of this extension.” (Compl., ¶ 26.) On the same day, plaintiff sent another email to the LAC and the supervisor of leave management, stating: “This email is to confirm receipt of your email, which threatens me with loss of employment when I am amidst active requests for accommodations due to my knees. As I said, in my prior detailed email which you have copied here, I have delineated what I need regarding the information that I have so far on my two medical issues so that the accommodations needed are clearly known. As I said, this detailed email is my update of expressed needs for accommodations interactively and in writing. I will go ahead and make a report to the proper agency, EEOC, to safeguard my job related to my current request for accommodations due to my knees. You already have in your possession a brief note from my physician requesting more time in terms of LOA related to my knees. A more detailed request should be forthcoming hopefully tomorrow, or at the latest Friday, as I am at the mercy of the doctor’s availability.” (Id. at ¶ 27.)

On September 6, 2023, the supervisor of leave management sent an email to plaintiff, stating: “I want to make sure the information I am sharing with you is clear. As I mentioned in my previous email, you will have exhausted your leave entitlement under FMLA/CFRA on 9/9/23. Consequently, an extension would be considered a request for accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Amendments (ADAAA) and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). Requesting leave as a Reasonable Accommodation, or any accommodation for that matter, requires the employee to engage in the Interactive Process. We cannot grant you an extension automatically. [. . .] If we are not able to engage in an IAP, you will be considered to be on an unapproved leave as of Sunday 9/10/23.” (Compl., ¶ 28.)

On September 7, 2023, plaintiff’s physician issued a note placing plaintiff off-work until October 20, 2023, “due to knee injury.” (Compl., ¶ 29.)

On September 8, 2023, plaintiff sent an email to the LAC and the supervisor of leave management, stating: “I have made inquiry with the EEOC and am awaiting further participation in that process. [. . .] As I have asserted numerous times, I have a doctors note, prohibiting me further participation in a hostile work exchange, and I am awaiting further documentation to speak to that topic later this month. As of right now, I am not able to carry out my essential job functions related to my knees and have provided a doctors note for 100% disability for six weeks. Can you please tell me what is unclear and what further questions you have, as well as who wants to speak with me about these issues? I can be available as a formality at 1 PM today with you alone by phone, but cannot engage in further hostile conversations. Please refer to the doctor’s note that I have reattached here.” (Compl., ¶ 30.) On the same day, plaintiff spoke to the supervisor of leave management, as well as her supervisor, about the interactive process. (Id. at ¶ 31.)

On September 14, 2023, the supervisor of leave management sent plaintiff a letter that stated: “You[r] leave of absence was approved through 9/11/2023” and “In order to evaluate your request for an extension of your leave of absence as a Reasonable accommodation, you are required to engage in the Interactive Process with me and your management team no later than 12:00 PM on Wednesday, 9/27/2023.” (Compl., ¶ 32.)

On September 23, 2023, plaintiff’s neurologist issued a letter, stating the following regarding plaintiff’s work status: “1) For now, [plaintiff] may participate in an interactive process regarding work accommodations in written exchanges only. Please continue leave of absence; 2) Interactive negotiations with Management are to occur via email until further accommodations can be delineated; and 3) Further delineation of accommodations will be forthcoming in the next 1-2 weeks after receipt of recommendations from PhD.” (Compl., ¶ 33.) The letter was emailed to the supervisor of leave management the same day. (Ibid.)

On September 25, 2023, plaintiff’s psychologist issued a note, that stated: “Ms. Daniels has a clear history and symptoms associated with posttraumatic stress disorder (F43.10). Her condition leads to a vulnerability to stress, results in anxiety and mood changes, and is currently at a level which may lead to somatic symptoms and impact on her physical health. She describes that a particularly conflictual situation with her supervisor, in combination with physical symptoms, has led to taking a leave from her position as Chaplain at Cottage Hospital. Based on Ms. Daniel’s report, she continues to thrive in direct work with patients and would like to return to her position. However, as a result of high conflict dynamics with her supervisor, she remains at risk for adverse impact on her prior condition, wellbeing, and ability to perform her job. Based on this information, it is recommended that she should not return to work if exposed to previous adverse conditions, especially without a plan of appropriate accommodations. In particular, efforts should be made to adjust her job conditions, especially around providing a separate space/office to ensure reduced exposure to conflict; having an alternate supervising situation, and/or mediation; and receiving supervisory feedback and coaching via email. Such steps would avoid further exposure to stressful and activating exchanges and to give Ms. Daniels time to reflect and process information without conflict.” (Compl., ¶ 34.) Plaintiff emailed the letter to Cottage. (Ibid.)

On September 26, 2023, plaintiff’s physician issued a note placing plaintiff off-work until October 20, 2023, which plaintiff emailed to the supervisor of leave management and wrote: “Please find documented disability and request for accommodations. Please note that my last knee treatment is October 17, 2023 with a requirement of a two day recovery before activity, placing my return to work date on October 20.” (Compl., ¶ 35.)

Cottage terminated plaintiff’s employment on September 27, 2023. (Compl., ¶ 37.)

Cottage now demurs to each of the eight causes of action and moves to strike plaintiff’s allegations and prayer for relief seeking punitive damages.

Plaintiff opposes the demurrer as well as the motion to strike.

Analysis:

              Standard on Demurrer

“The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds:

            “(a) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading.

            “(b) The person who filed the pleading does not have the legal capacity to sue.

            “(c) There is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action.

            “(d) There is a defect or misjoinder of parties.

            “(e) The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

            “(f) The pleading is uncertain. As used in this subdivision, “uncertain” includes ambiguous and unintelligible.

            “(g) In an action founded upon a contract, it cannot be ascertained from the pleading whether the contract is written, is oral, or is implied by conduct.

            “(h) No certificate was filed as required by Section 411.35.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.)

“When any ground for objection to a complaint, cross-complaint, or answer appears on the face thereof, or from any matter of which the court is required to or may take judicial notice, the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer to the pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) “Our consideration of the facts alleged includes ‘those evidentiary facts found in recitals of exhibits attached to [the] complaint.’ [Citation.]” (Alexander v. Exxon Mobil (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1250.)

“[A] court must treat a demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, it does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.” (Travelers Indem. Co. of Connecticut v. Navigators Specialty Ins. Co. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 341, 358, citing Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)

The majority of plaintiff’s causes of action are premised upon violations of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) and the Labor Code. “[F]acts in support of each of the requirements of a statute upon which a cause of action is based must be specifically pled.” (Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 604.) 

 

The FEHA prohibits various forms of workplace discrimination and identifies the classes protected from that discrimination, including disability and age. (Gov. Code, §§ 12940, 12941.) “Because of the similarity between state and federal employment discrimination laws, California courts look to pertinent federal precedent when applying our own statutes.” (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354.) 

              First through Third Causes of Action

Cottage demurs to the first three causes of action, which are (1) disability discrimination, (2) failure to accommodate disability, and (3) failure to engage in the interactive process, on the grounds that plaintiff fails to plead specific facts that would establish she has a “disability” as defined by the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), and that plaintiff does not state facts that establish that she was qualified to perform the essential duties of her position. Cottage also argues that the first cause of action also fails because plaintiff does not allege facts that she suffered an adverse employment action because of a disability. Cottage also argues that the second and third causes of action fail because plaintiff does not plead facts to show that she requested reasonable accommodation.

              First Cause of Action for Disability Discrimination

In order to state a claim for disability discrimination claim under FEHA, a plaintiff must allege the following elements of a prima facie case: (1) she suffered from a disability of which her employer was aware; (2) she was capable of performing the essential functions of her position; and (3) she was subjected to an adverse employment action because of her disability. (Prue v. Brady Co./San Diego, Inc. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1378.) 

“The law of this state contains broad definitions of physical disability, mental disability, and medical condition. It is the intent of the Legislature that the definitions of physical disability and mental disability be construed so that applicants and employees are protected from discrimination due to an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment that is disabling, potentially disabling, or perceived as disabling or potentially disabling.” (Gov. Code, § 12926.1, subd. (b), italics added.) 

 

“Physical and mental disabilities include, but are not limited to, chronic or episodic conditions such as HIV/AIDS, hepatitis, epilepsy, seizure disorder, diabetes, clinical depression, bipolar disorder, multiple sclerosis, and heart disease. In addition, the Legislature has determined that the definitions of ‘physical disability’ and ‘mental disability’ under the law of this state require a ‘limitation’ upon a major life activity, but do not require, as does the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, a ‘substantial limitation.’ This distinction is intended to result in broader coverage under the law of this state than under that federal act. Under the law of this state, whether a condition limits a major life activity shall be determined without respect to any mitigating measures, unless the mitigating measure itself limits a major life activity, regardless of federal law under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Further, under the law of this state, ‘working’ is a major life activity, regardless of whether the actual or perceived working limitation implicates a particular employment or a class or broad range of employments.” (Gov. Code, § 12926.1, subd. (c), italics added.) 

Cottage argues: “Plaintiff alleges that she is disabled by a ‘conflictual’ relationship with her supervisor and, as a ‘result of high conflict dynamics with her supervisor, she remains at risk for adverse impact on her prior condition, wellbeing, and ability to perform her job.’ ” (Demurrer, p. 8, ll. 25-27.) Cottage then goes on to acknowledge that plaintiff has alleged other conditions, including Lyme disease, PTSD, cardiac arrhythmia, and knee injuries, but argues that plaintiff has failed to plead that any of these conditions or symptoms constitute a disability within the meaning of FEHA. (Id. at p. 9, ll. 12-19.)

The court finds that plaintiff has pled more than sufficient facts to show she suffered from at least one disability as contemplated by FEHA. In the context of the complaint as a whole, it is clear that plaintiff is claiming that she has disabilities, separate from her supervisory issues, that were documented by doctors and that she made Cottage aware of those disabilities.

However, plaintiff fails to plead facts sufficient to support the second two elements of disability discrimination. She does not plead that she was capable of performing the essential functions of her position, nor does she plead that she was subjected to an adverse employment action (termination) because of her disability. By way of her opposition to the demurrer, plaintiff’s arguments center around vague and conclusory allegations of the complaint. As noted above, FEHA claims must be pled with specificity.

As plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to support the second and third elements of disability discrimination, the demurrer to the first cause of action will be sustained. Because there is a reasonable probability that plaintiff can amend the complaint to state a cause of action, she will be given leave to amend.

              Second Cause of Action for Failure to Provide a Reasonable Accommodation

“An employer must provide a reasonable accommodation for an applicant or employee with a known mental or physical disability unless the accommodation would cause undue hardship. Failure to do so is an unlawful employment practice. (Brown v. Los Angeles Unified School District (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1107.) “To establish a failure to accommodate claim, [a plaintiff] must show (1) she has a disability covered by FEHA; (2) she can perform the essential functions of the position; and (3) [the defendant] failed reasonably to accommodate her disability.” (Ibid.)

As noted above, plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts that she is capable of performing the essential functions of her position. She further fails to plead sufficient facts that Cottage failed to reasonably accommodate her alleged disabilities. Reading the complaint as a whole, the complaint alleges that the parties were in discussions regarding reasonable accommodations at the time that plaintiff was terminated from employment. There is no indication from the complaint that, had plaintiff returned to work, she would have been denied reasonable accommodations.

The demurrer to the second cause of action will be sustained. While the court has doubts as to whether plaintiff will be able to amend the second cause of action to state sufficient facts that Cottage failed to provide a reasonable accommodation, she will be given leave to amend.

              Third Cause of Action for Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process

“In addition to the obligation to make reasonable accommodation for a known physical or mental disability, the FEHA makes it unlawful for an employer “ ‘to fail to engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process with the employee . . . to determine effective reasonable accommodations, if any, in response to a request for reasonable accommodation by an employee . . . with a known physical or mental disability or known medical condition.’ ” (§ 12940, subd. (n).) Section 12940 “ ’imposes separate, independent duties on an employer to engage in the ‘ “ ‘interactive process’ ” ’ and to make ‘ “ ‘reasonable accommodations.’ ” ’ ” [Citations.]” (Zamora v. Security Industry Specialists, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1, 30 .)

Here, the complaint lacks any allegations that even tend to imply that Cottage failed to engage in the interactive process. The allegations set forth above indicate the opposite. Cottage not only attempted to engage in the interactive process on more than one occasion, Cottage demanded that plaintiff also engage in the interactive process.

The demurrer to the third cause of action will be sustained. While the court again has doubts as to whether plaintiff will be able to amend the cause of action to state sufficient facts, plaintiff will be given leave to amend.

              Fourth Cause of Action for Violation of the California Family Rights Act (“CFRA”).

“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, as defined in paragraph (4) of subdivision (b), to refuse to grant a request by any employee with more than 12 months of service with the employer, and who has at least 1,250 hours of service with the employer during the previous 12-month period or who meets the requirements of subdivision (r), to take up to a total of 12 workweeks in any 12-month period for family care and medical leave. Family care and medical leave requested pursuant to this subdivision shall not be deemed to have been granted unless the employer provides the employee, upon granting the leave request, a guarantee of employment in the same or a comparable position upon the termination of the leave. (Gov. Code, § 12945.2, subd. (a).)

Cottage argues: (1) plaintiff does not allege that she was an eligible employee, as having worked more than 1,250 hours in the previous 12-month period, (2) plaintiff alleges no specific facts to establish the statutory elements of an interference claim, and (3) plaintiff alleges no specific facts to establish the statutory elements of a retaliation claim.

             

Regarding Cottage’s first argument, plaintiff does allege that she was an eligible employee. “Plaintiff was eligible for CFRA protected leave in July 2023 in both hours worked and time employed by Defendants. Defendants were covered by the CFRA because they employ at least five employees.” (Compl., ¶ 66.)

As to the plaintiff’s second argument regarding the statutory elements of an interference claim:

“A CFRA interference claim “ ‘ “consists of the following elements: (1) the employee’s entitlement to CFRA leave rights; and (2) the employer’s interference with or denial of those rights.” ’ ” [Citation.]” (Soria v. Univision Radio Los Angeles, Inc. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 570, 601.)

The complaint fails to allege facts that would tend to show that Cottage interfered with the CFRA leave. It shows the opposite: namely that Cottage granted, and even extended, the leave. There is no allegation that Cottage terminated plaintiff for her taking leave. For the same reason, Cottage’s third argument is also valid because the statutory elements of a CFRA retaliation claim also include a requirement that plaintiff suffer an adverse employment action because of her exercise of her right to CFRA leave. No such allegations or inferences exist in the complaint.

The demurrer to the fourth cause of action will be sustained. Again, plaintiff will be given leave to amend.

              Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action for Retaliation

Plaintiff’s fifth and sixth causes of action are based on alleged retaliation in violation of FEHA.

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under FEHA, a plaintiff must show (1) he or she engaged in a “protected activity,” (2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the employer’s action. (Iwekaogwu v. City of Los Angeles (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 803, 814–815.)

Cottage argues that plaintiff has failed to allege the necessary element of a causal connection between the termination of plaintiff’s employment and any protected activity. The court agrees.

While the complaint itself is vague as to what protected activity plaintiff is claiming resulted in an adverse employment action (which is grounds in itself for sustaining the demurrer), by way of her opposition, plaintiff argues that her termination was the result of her exercising her right to request reasonable accommodations. The argument is unpersuasive. There is no allegation, or implication, that plaintiff was terminated because of her requests, or that reasonable accommodation would not have been granted had plaintiff returned to work.

As the allegations are insufficient to support either the fifth or sixth cause of action, the demurrer will be sustained with leave to amend.

              Seventh Cause of Action for Failure to Prevent Discrimination and Retaliation and Eighth Cause of Action for Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy

It is an unlawful employment practice in California for an employer “to fail to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and harassment from occurring.” (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (k).) “This section creates a tort that is made actionable by statute.” (Trujillo v. North County Transit Dist. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 280, 286.) 

“To state a claim for failure to prevent harassment, a plaintiff must show: (1) ‘plaintiff was subjected to discrimination, harassment or retaliation;’ (2) ‘defendant failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination, harassment or retaliation;’ and (3) ‘this failure caused plaintiff to suffer injury, damage, loss or harm.’(Citation.)”  (Andrade v. Arby’s Restaurant Group, Inc. (2016) 225 F.Supp.3d 1115, 1131.)

Because plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to constitute causes of action one through six and has set forth no further allegations supporting FEHA or CFRA violations, the demurrer must be sustained as to the seventh and eighth causes of action. Plaintiff will be given leave to amend.

              Motion to Strike 

 

“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) As with demurrers, “[t]he grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).) 

 

“An immaterial allegation in a pleading is any of the following: 

“(1) An allegation that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense. 

“(2) An allegation that is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense. 

“(3) A demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint or cross-complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subd. (b).) 

 

“An ‘immaterial allegation’ means ‘irrelevant matter’ as that term is used in Section 436.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subd. (c).) 

 

“[J]udges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” [Clauson v. Sup.Ct. (Pedus Services, Inc.) (1998) 67 CA4th 1253, 1255.) 

“In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) 

“An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).)

“Malice is defined as ‘conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.’ (§ 3294, subd. (c)(1).) Oppression is defined as ‘despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.’ (§ 3294, subd. (c)(2).) Fraud is defined as ‘an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.’ (§ 3294, subd. (c)(3).).” (Today’s IV, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1193.) “In addition to the requirement that the operative complaint set forth the elements as stated in section 3294, it must include specific factual allegations showing that defendant’s conduct was oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious to support a claim for punitive damages. (Citation.) Punitive damages may not be pleaded generally.” (Ibid.)

Here, as the demurrer is being sustained as to all eight causes of action, with leave to amend, the motion to strike the punitive damages claim will also be granted with leave to amend. Without making specific rulings, at this time, the court does note that, even at the pleading stage, the current allegations are far from sufficient to support a request for punitive damages.