Sandra Castro vs City of Santa Barbara et al

Case Number

24CV06183

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 08/01/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

CMC; OSC Sanctions; Demurrer; Motion to Compel

Tentative Ruling

1. For all reasons discussed herein, defendant City of Santa Barbara’s demurrer to plaintiff’s complaint is taken off-calendar as moot.

           

2. Defendant City of Santa Barbara’s motion to compel plaintiff to respond to form interrogatories, special interrogatories, and requests for production of documents is taken off-calendar as moot. However, monetary sanctions in favor of City of Santa Barbara, and against plaintiff Sandra Castro and her attorneys of record, jointly and severally, are awarded in the amount of $800.00 payable to City of Santa Barbara’s counsel no later than August 22, 2025.

Background:

This action commenced on November 5, 2024, by the filing of the complaint by plaintiff Sandra Castro (“Castro”) against defendants the City of Santa Barbara (“City”), County of Santa Barbara (“County”), and State of California (“State”) (collectively “defendants”) for negligence and premises liability.

The complaint alleges that on December 19, 2023, Castro was injured on the southeast southern sidewalk of De La Vina Street at or near Santa Barbara Rehabilitation Center located at 2415 De La Vina Street, Santa Barbara. Castro alleges that defendants “leased, operated, maintained, designed, installed, built, managed, supervised, inspected and//or otherwise controlled” the premises, which was in an unsafe condition causing Castro to fall.

City now demurs to both causes of action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e), arguing that Castro fails to state facts sufficient to constitute causes of action.

Castro has filed no opposition or other response to the demurrer. However, on July 28, 2025, Castro filed a first amended complaint.

City also moves to compel responses to interrogatories and requests for production of documents.

Castro filed a “declaration” of counsel regarding the motion to compel stating that she is “surprised” that the motion to compel is still on calendar because Castro provided written responses to the discovery on June 16, 2025, and supplemented the written responses with the production of two additional videos on June 23, 2025.

Analysis:

            Demurrer

“The rules by which the sufficiency of a complaint is tested against a general demurrer are well settled. We not only treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but also give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. (Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters (1946) 29 Cal.2d 34, 42.)’ (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38.)

“To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)

A demurrer searches for defects in the allegations of the pleading. “A demurrer is simply not the appropriate procedure for determining the truth of disputed facts.” (Ramsden v. Western Union (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 873, 879.) As such, the court will disregard the factual arguments contained in the demurrer.

With respect to a public entity, and their employees, there are specific pleading requirements. A public entity has no liability for any injury to any person except as provided by statute. (Gov. Code, § 815; Tuthill v. City of San Buenaventura (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1089.) Claims based upon statutory liability cannot be generally alleged, but must be particularly pled to allege facts demonstrating the right to recover under the statute. (Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 771, 790.)

“[I]n California all government tort liability is dependent on the existence of an authorizing statute or “ ‘enactment’ ” [citations], and to state a cause of action every fact essential to the existence of statutory liability must be pleaded with particularity, including the existence of a statutory duty. [Citation.] Duty cannot be alleged simply by stating “ ‘defendant had a duty under the law’ ”; that is a conclusion of law, not an allegation of fact. The facts showing the existence of the claimed duty must be alleged. [Citations.] Since the duty of a governmental agency can only be created by statute or “ ‘enactment,’ ” the statute or “ ‘enactment’ ” claimed to establish the duty must at the very least be identified.” (Searcy v. Hemet Unified School Dist. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 792, 802.)

Castro failed to identify any statute that would establish a duty of the City, as to the first and second causes of action. As such, the demurrer would have been sustained with leave to amend.

However, as noted above, Castro filed a first amended complaint on July 28, 2025, making the demurrer moot.

            Motion to Compel

On March 28, 2025, City served its first set of written discovery on Castro. The discovery consisted of form interrogatories set one, special interrogatories set one, special interrogatories set two, and requests for production of documents set one. (Shapiro Decl., ¶ 4.) The discovery responses were due no later than May 2, 2025. (Id. at ¶ 5.)

On May 12, 2025, not having been served responses or a request for extension, City’s attorney sent a letter to Castro’s attorneys requesting responses by May 20, 2025. (Shapiro Decl., ¶ 6 & Exh. 1.)

City filed the present motion on May 23, 2025. As of the date of filing the motion, City had received no responses to the discovery. (Shapiro Decl., ¶ 8.)

“A trial court must be mindful of the Legislature’s preference for discovery over trial by surprise, must construe the facts before it liberally in favor of discovery, may not use its discretion to extend the limits on discovery beyond those authorized by the Legislature, and should prefer partial to outright denials of discovery.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 540.)

“Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with this title, any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action. Discovery may be obtained of the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter, as well as of the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any document, electronically stored information, tangible thing, or land or other property.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.)

Code of Civil Procedure, section 2030.010 provides:

“(a) Any party may obtain discovery within the scope delimited by Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 2017.010), and subject to the restrictions set forth in Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 2019.010), by propounding to any other party to the action written interrogatories to be answered under oath.

“(b) An interrogatory may relate to whether another party is making a certain contention, or to the facts, witnesses, and writings on which a contention is based. An interrogatory is not objectionable because an answer to it involves an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the application of law to fact, or would be based on information obtained or legal theories developed in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial.”

“If a party to whom interrogatories are directed fails to serve a timely response, the following rules apply:

“(a) The party to whom the interrogatories are directed waives any right to exercise the option to produce writings under Section 2030.230, as well as any objection to the interrogatories, including one based on privilege or on the protection for work product under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 2018.010). The court, on motion, may relieve that party from this waiver on its determination that both of the following conditions are satisfied:

“(1) The party has subsequently served a response that is in substantial compliance with Sections 2030.210, 2030.220, 2030.230, and 2030.240.

“(2) The party’s failure to serve a timely response was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.

“(b) The party propounding the interrogatories may move for an order compelling response to the interrogatories.

“(c) The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. If a party then fails to obey an order compelling answers, the court may make those orders that are just, including the imposition of an issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a terminating sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010). In lieu of or in addition to that sanction, the court may impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010).” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290.)

Code of Civil Procedure, section 2031.010 provides, in pertinent part:

“(a) Any party may obtain discovery . . . by inspecting, copying, testing, or sampling documents, tangible things, land or other property, and electronically stored information in the possession, custody, or control of the party on whom the demand is made.

“(b) A party may demand that any other party produce and permit the party making the demand, or someone acting on the demanding party’s behalf, to inspect and to copy a document that is in the possession, custody, or control of the party on whom the demand is made.”

“If a party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is directed fails to serve a timely response to it, the following rules shall apply:

“(a) The party to whom the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is directed waives any objection to the demand, including one based on privilege or on the protection for work product under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 2018.010). The court, on motion, may relieve that party from this waiver on its determination that both of the following conditions are satisfied:

“(1) The party has subsequently served a response that is in substantial compliance with Sections 2031.210, 2031.220, 2031.230, 2031.240, and 2031.280.

“(2) The party’s failure to serve a timely response was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.

“(b) The party making the demand may move for an order compelling response to the demand.

“(c) Except as provided in subdivision (d), the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. If a party then fails to obey the order compelling a response, the court may make those orders that are just, including the imposition of an issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a terminating sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010). In lieu of or in addition to this sanction, the court may impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010).” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.300, subds. (a)-(c).)

As noted above, Castro’s attorney has filed a declaration that responses to the discovery were served following the filing of the present motion. There is no explanation regarding why the discovery responses were late served or why Castro’s attorney ignored attempts to meet and confer.

By way of a “notice of no opposition,” City acknowledges that Castro served late responses to the discovery, but City requests that the court impose sanctions as requested in the motion.

“The court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1348(a).)

City’s counsel seeks attorney fees of $800.00 for having to bring the motion to compel. City’s counsel spent two hours preparing the motion at a rate of $400.00 per hour. Both the number of hours spent and the hourly rate are reasonable. As there is no justification given for Castro’s failure to timely respond to discovery or to respond to meet and confer efforts, the attorney fees will be awarded in favor of City and against Castro as requested.