Tracy Griffin vs Bristol Property Management et al

Case Number

24CV05613

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 07/14/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

CMC; Demurrer to FAC; Motion re Strike Portions of FAC

Tentative Ruling

Tracy Griffin v. Bristol Property Management, et al.

Case No. 24CV05613

           

Hearing Date: July 14, 2025                                                   

HEARING:              (1)       Demurrer of Defendants to First Amended Complaint

                             (2)       Motion of Defendants to Strike Portions of First Amended Complaint

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiff Tracy Griffin: David Dorenfeld, Donenfeldlaw, Inc.

                                    For Defendants Bristol Property Management and Mathilda Apartments: Rinat Klier-Erlich, Heidi M. Wycoff, Zelms Erlich Lenkov

                                   

TENTATIVE RULING:

(1)       The demurrer of defendants Bristol Property Management and Mathilda Apartments to the first amended complaint (1) is sustained, with leave to amend, as to the first, second, and third causes of action as against defendant Bristol Property Management, only, for failure to state a cause of action, (2) is sustained, with leave to amend, as to the fifth and sixth cause of action as against all defendants, for failure to state a cause of action, and (3) is in all other respects overruled.

(2)       For the reasons set forth herein, the motion of defendants Bristol Property Management and Mathilda Apartments to strike portions of the first amended complaint is granted, with leave to amend, to strike paragraphs 28 and 34 of the text and to strike paragraph 5 of the prayer. The remainder of the motion is denied as moot.

(3)       Plaintiff Tracy Griffin shall file and serve her second amended complaint on or before July 29, 2025.

Background:

As alleged in plaintiff Tracy Griffin’s first amended complaint (FAC):

Griffin was a tenant at real property located at 350 Mathilda Drive, #9, in Goleta (the Property). (FAC, ¶ 4.) The Property was owned, operated, managed, or maintained by defendants Bristol Property Management (Bristol) and Mathilda Apartments (Mathilda). (Ibid.)

Griffin first moved into the Property in 2012 pursuant to a written contract with defendants. (FAC, ¶ 11 & exhibit A.)

During Griffin’s tenancy at the Property, and within four years of the filing of this action, Griffin became aware that the Property was uninhabitable because of mold growth and water intrusion. (FAC, ¶ 13.)

After Griffin’s numerous complaints to defendants regarding the conditions of the Property, the Property was finally repaired in May 2023. (FAC, ¶ 14.)

After the repairs were completed, defendants began to engage in a course of conduct designed to improperly influence Griffin to vacate the Property, including, raising Griffin’s rent and issuing improper notices to vacate the Property. (FAC, ¶ 15.)

On October 9, 2024, Griffin filed the original complaint in this matter. On October 28, without any response having been filed, Griffin filed the FAC.

The FAC asserts six causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment; (3) breach of the warranty of habitability; (4) negligence; (5) violation of Civil Code section 1940.2; and (6) violation of Santa Barbara Municipal Code section 26.60.10 et seq.

Defendants generally and specially demur to each of the causes of action of the FAC. Defendants concurrently filed a motion to strike portions of the FAC.

The demurrer and motion to strike are opposed by Griffin.

Analysis:

In their respective captions and notices, both the demurrer and the motion to strike define the moving “defendants” as Bristol and “Karen M. Kahn, Trustee of the Karen M. Kahn Trust Dated 6/6/2004” (Kahn). Kahn is not identified as a defendant by that name in the FAC. It is not explained why Kahn is referred to as a defendant. Because there are only two named defendants, the most reasonable construction is either that it is defendants’ position that Kahn was erroneously sued as Mathilda or that Kahn is erroneously named by defendants in the papers rather than Mathilda. In either case, the court assumes that the defendant identified in the FAC as Mathilda is a moving defendant. This issue should be clarified in subsequent filings with the court.

(1)       Demurrer

“ ‘The rules by which the sufficiency of a complaint is tested against a general demurrer are well settled. We not only treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but also ‘give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.’ ” (Zhang v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364, 370, internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)

Griffin’s first cause of action is for breach of contract. “A cause of action for breach of contract requires pleading of a contract, plaintiff’s performance or excuse for failure to perform, defendant’s breach and damage to plaintiff resulting therefrom.” (McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1489.)

Defendants argue that Griffin has failed to allege a contract action against all defendants and that the allegations are insufficient to specify the uninhabitable conditions and when they occurred.

The contract alleged in the FAC is attached as exhibit A and identifies the parties as including Griffin as a tenant and Mathilda as the “Owner.” (FAC, exhibit A, at p. 12.) (Note: The FAC is not consecutively paginated as required by Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.109. Page numbers cited herein refer to the pdf page number of the electronically filed document.) This allegation sufficiently alleges a contract between Griffin and Mathilda. The contract does not identify Bristol as a party to the contract.

In opposition to the demurrer, Griffin does not point to any allegation that Bristol is a party to the contract, but rather asserts that it is sufficient to allege that “Defendants owned, operated, and managed the property” “making them liable for breaches of the lease terms.” (Opposition, at pp. 3-4.) As a general proposition, “[b]reach of contract cannot be made the basis of an action for damages against defendants who did not execute it and who did nothing to assume its obligations.” (Gold v. Gibbons (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 517, 519.) Similarly, “ ‘[a]n agent is ordinarily not liable on the contract when he acts on behalf of a disclosed principal.’ [Citations.]” (Dones v. Life Insurance Company of North America (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 665, 689.) Griffin does not adequately allege that Bristol is a party to the lease agreement attached as exhibit A, and so does not adequately allege breach of contract as to Bristol. The demurrer will be sustained as to defendant Bristol.

The allegations that the rental unit suffered from mold and habitual leaks are sufficient as a basis for breach of contract based upon uninhabitable conditions. Also, the allegations that these issues existed at times within four years until repaired in May 2023 are also sufficient allegations as to time. The general demurrer will be overruled on the asserted grounds that these elements have not be sufficiently alleged.

“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) The allegations are sufficient to put defendants on notice as to the nature of the claims against them. The special demurrer for uncertainty will be overruled.

Griffin’s second cause of action is for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. “In the absence of language to the contrary, every lease contains an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, whereby the landlord impliedly covenants that the tenant shall have quiet enjoyment and possession of the premises. [Citations, fn.] The covenant of quiet enjoyment ‘insulates the tenant against any act or omission on the part of the landlord, or anyone claiming under him, which interferes with a tenants right to use and enjoy the premises for the purposes contemplated by the tenancy. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Andrews v. Mobile Aire Estates (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 578, 588.)

Because the breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment is an implied covenant of the lease, Griffin has failed sufficiently to allege this cause of action against Bristol for the same reasons discussed above with respect to the first cause of action. The demurrer will be sustained as to defendant Bristol. Also, for the same reasons discussed above, the allegations are sufficient as against defendant Mathilda and are not uncertain. The demurrer will be otherwise overruled as to Mathilda.

Griffin’s third cause of action is for breach of the warranty of habitability. “In addition to asserting a breach of the habitability warranty as a defense to an unlawful detainer action, a tenant may bring suit against the landlord for damages resulting from such breach. [Citations.] The elements of such an affirmative claim are the existence of a material defective condition affecting the premises’ habitability, notice to the landlord of the condition within a reasonable time after the tenant’s discovery of the condition, the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the deficiency, and resulting damages.” (Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1297.)

Like the covenant of quiet enjoyment, the warranty of habitability runs from the landlord. For the same reasons discussed above, Griffin has not sufficiently alleged this action against Bristol, but has sufficiently alleged this action against Mathilda.

Griffin’s fourth cause of action is for negligence. “[T]he well-known elements of [a] negligence cause of action [are] duty, breach of duty, proximate cause and damages.” (Artiglio v. Corning Inc. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 604, 614.)

Defendants argue that this cause of action is insufficiently alleged because Griffin has only alleged a duty to keep the property safe from water leaks and mold growth and that defendants failed to do that.

“No strict requirements exist for the form of such allegations. The legal conclusion that a ‘duty’ exists is not necessary. … [T]he duty to exercise reasonable care can be inferred from the assertion of the fact that defendant owned and managed the property. [Citation.] The negligence element may be generally pleaded; the breach of duty of care may be alleged by stating the act was negligently done. [Citations.] Here, the complaint alleged defendant’s negligent management and maintenance of his property. Proximate cause, as here, may also be simply set forth.” (Pultz v. Holgerson (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1110, 1117, fns. omitted.)

Here, unlike in the first through third causes of action, Griffin has alleged a duty arising out of management of the Property, not simply a duty arising as a landlord. As noted, a cause of action for negligence may be generally stated. The allegations are sufficient. The demurrer will be overruled as to this cause of action.

Griffin’s fifth cause of action is for violation of Civil Code section 1940.2. Griffin quotes in the FAC from section 1940.2, subdivision (a)(3). (FAC, ¶ 43.)

“It is unlawful for a landlord to do any of the following for the purpose of influencing a tenant to vacate a dwelling: [¶] … [¶] (3) Use, or threaten to use, force, willful threats, or menacing conduct constituting a course of conduct that interferes with the tenant’s quiet enjoyment of the premises in violation of Section 1927 that would create an apprehension of harm in a reasonable person. Nothing in this paragraph requires a tenant to be actually or constructively evicted in order to obtain relief.” (Civ. Code, § 1940.2, subd. (a)(3).)

In support of this cause of action, Griffin alleges the offending conduct as issuing notices to terminate Griffin’s tenancy without basis and improperly raising rent. (FAC, ¶ 44.)

Issuing notices without basis and improperly raising rent, without more, do not constitute conduct “that would create an apprehension of harm in a reasonable person” so as to fall within section 1940.2, subdivision (a)(3). Griffin’s opposition does not otherwise explain how section 1940.2 might be applicable. The demurrer will be sustained as to the fifth cause of action.

Griffin’s sixth cause of action is for violation of the Santa Barbara Municipal Code.

“It is a violation of this section for an owner or the owner’s agent, contractor, subcontractor, or employee, to willfully engage in, aid, or incite a course of conduct that adversely affects a tenant’s use or enjoyment of a rental unit, housing opportunity, or housing-related services or facilities, that serves no lawful purpose, and includes, but is not limited to, the following:

1.         Reducing or eliminating housing services required by a lease, contract, or law, including the elimination of parking if provided in the tenant’s lease or contract, or access to common areas or amenities, except as necessary to comply with court order or local or State law, or to lawfully create an accessory dwelling unit or additional housing.

2.         Failing to perform and timely complete necessary repairs and maintenance required by local or State law.

3.         Failing to exercise due diligence in completing repairs and maintenance once undertaken or failing to follow appropriate industry repair, containment or remediation protocols designed to minimize exposure to noise, dust, lead paint, mold, asbestos, or other building materials with potentially harmful health impacts. [¶] … [¶]

6.         Misrepresenting to a tenant that the tenant is required to vacate a rental unit or enticing a tenant to vacate a rental unit through intentional misrepresentation or the concealment or omission of a material fact. This includes misrepresenting a tenant’s rights under Chapters 26.40 and 26.50 of this Code.” (Santa Barbara Mun. Code, § 26.60.010, subd. (A)(1)-(3), (6).)

“An aggrieved tenant under this chapter may institute civil proceedings as provided by law against an owner or an owner’s agent, contractor, subcontractor, or employee alleged to have violated the provisions of this chapter, regardless whether the rental unit remains occupied or has been vacated due to the alleged violation.” (Santa Barbara Mun. Code, § 26.60.020, subd. (A).)

Griffin alleges that defendants “have engaged in the following actions to influence the tenant to vacate the Property: [¶] i. Issuing notices to terminate Plaintiffs’ tenancy without basis; [¶] ii. Improperly raising Plaintiffs rent; [¶] iii. Failing to exercise due diligence in completing repairs and maintenance; and [¶] iv. Failing to perform and timely complete necessary repairs and maintenance.” (FAC, ¶ 51.)

“[S]tatutory causes of action must be pleaded with particularity ….” (Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 771, 790.)

Griffin’s allegations are insufficiently specific to state this cause of action. With respect to the first two listed items—notices and raising rent—there are no allegations of even an example of an improper notice or a rent increase.

With respect to the second two listed items—completing repairs and maintenance—Griffin alleges water leaks and mold. In other causes of action, the timing of learning of the habitability issues, giving notice to the landlord or property manager, and final repair are not allegations essential to state a cause of action. In this cause of action, however, the improper conduct is in failing to exercise due diligence and in failing to timely complete repairs. In order to allege these elements with specificity, Griffin must state facts showing lack of due diligence or lack of timeliness.

Because such allegations are lacking, Griffin fails to state this cause of action. The demurrer to the sixth cause of action will be sustained.

This is Griffin’s first complaint for which the court has ruled on a demurrer. Griffin will be given leave to amend.

(2)       Motion to Strike

Defendants have concurrently filed a motion to strike paragraphs 28, 34, 47, and 54 from the text of the FAC, and  paragraph 5 from the prayer of the FAC. Paragraphs 47 and 54 are within the fifth and sixth causes of action. As discussed above, the court will sustain the demurrer to the fifth and sixth causes of action as to all defendants. The motion is therefore moot as to those paragraphs.

Paragraph 28, within the third cause of action for breach of the warranty of habitability, is: “Defendants’ conduct described herein further constitutes malice and a conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s rights, thereby entitling Plaintiffs to punitive damages in an amount to be proven as to those causes of action which allow for punitive damages.”

Paragraph 34, within the fourth cause of action for negligence, is: “Defendants’ conduct described herein further constitutes malice and a conscious disregard of Plaintiffs rights, thereby entitling Plaintiff to punitive damages in an amount to be proven as to those causes of action which allow for punitive damages, as set forth below.”

“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) “Irrelevant matter” includes a “demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subds. (b)(3), (c).) “The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).)

“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff. [Citations.] In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth. [Citations.] In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)

“In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “ ‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).)

In the third and fourth causes of action, Griffin alleges only that the defendants knew or should have known of the habitability problems. (FAC, ¶¶ 32, 40.) These allegations are not sufficient to support the legal conclusion that the alleged conduct constitutes malice sufficient to entitle Griffin to an award of punitive damages. The motion will be granted to strike paragraphs 28 and 34 of the text of the FAC. Because no cause of action remains for which a claim for punitive damages has been adequately alleged, the motion will also be granted to strike paragraph 5 of the prayer of the FAC.

Again, this is the first motion to strike upon which the court has ruled. Griffin will be given leave to amend.