Azucena Gallegos Perez vs Mission Linen Supply

Case Number

24CV05583

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 07/18/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

CMC; Motion to Compel Arbitration; Dismiss Class Claims and Stay Proceedings

Tentative Ruling

For all reasons discussed herein, the motion of defendant Mission Linen Supply to compel arbitration, dismiss class claims, and stay proceedings is granted in accordance with this ruling. Plaintiff’s individual claims against defendant shall proceed to arbitration. Plaintiff’s class claims are dismissed. The litigation is stayed pending the parties’ completion of arbitration. Defendant shall submit a proposed order which conforms to the court’s ruling herein.

Background:

The class action first amended complaint for damages (the FAC) filed by plaintiff Azucena Gallegos Perez (Perez) on December 23, 2024, is the operative pleading. As alleged in the FAC:

Perez brings this action on behalf of all persons who were employed as non-exempt employees by defendant Mission Linen Supply (Mission Linen) during the four years prior to the filing of this action, and on behalf of eleven proposed subclasses of individuals who were or are currently employed by Mission Linen and who did not receive required rest or meal breaks, were not paid full and complete compensation for all hours worked including overtime and vacation, did not receive or were not paid for sick days or afforded Covid-19 supplemental sick leave, did not receive their final paycheck within 72 hours after the final day of work, did not receive at least minimum wages for all hours worked, were not reimbursed for business-related expenses, and whose wage statements did not accurately reflect gross wages earned. (FAC, ¶¶ 31-33.)

Mission Linen is a leading provider of products and services to hospitality, medical and industrial businesses and conducts business in five western states. (FAC, ¶¶ 1, 5, & 14.) Mission Linen maintains its headquarters in Santa Barbara, California, and hires employees from different counties in California including Ventura and Santa Barbara Counties. (Ibid.)

Beginning on February 9, 2022, Perez was employed as a non-exempt employee by Mission Linen in Ventura County, and performed work as a Flatwork Ironer Feeder. (FAC, ¶¶ 2 & 15.) Perez’s duties included feeding napkins thru an industrial flatwork ironer and stocking or lifting boxes of napkins. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Plaintiff worked five days per week at an hourly pay rate of $16.50. (Ibid.)

Throughout Perez’s pregnancy in 2023 and after returning from pregnancy leave, Perez’s supervisor overloaded Perez with work with no regard for her condition, which caused Perez stress, anxiety, and to be rushed to the hospital. (FAC, ¶ 28.)

On January 29, 2024, while carrying heavy boxes of napkins, Perez sustained an injury to her spine which Perez reported to her supervisor. (FAC, ¶ 27.) Perez’s supervisor sent Perez to Mission Linen’s authorized medical provider on January 31, 2024, who examined Perez, indicated that Perez’s injuries were non-industrial in nature, and discharged Perez on the same date. (Ibid.) Perez was told or made aware that Perez had to provide Mission Linen with a doctor’s note to evaluate her work capabilities moving forward, and that without this note, Perez could not resume employment or receive worker’s compensation benefits. (Ibid.)

When Perez was able to see her primary physician, that physician stated that, because Perez’s injuries were industrial related, he would not be able to provide Perez with a clearance note and that it was Mission Linen’s responsibility to provide Perez with medical care. (FAC, ¶ 27.) Perez informed her supervisor that Perez was not able to obtain a note from her primary physician and requested worker’s compensation treatment. (Ibid.) Perez was told that she would not be able to return to work until she provided Mission Linen with a note from her primary care physician, which forced Perez to seek worker’s compensation benefits on her own. (Ibid.)

On March 21, 2024, Perez’s worker’s compensation counsel presented Perez with a termination letter in which Perez’s former supervisor falsely stated that Perez was offered modified, lighter work assignments. (FAC, ¶ 28.) Mission Linen failed to timely tender to Perez a final paycheck with accurate dollar amounts reflecting all hours worked and premium wages to which Perez was entitled. (Id. at ¶¶ 15 & 30.) Mission Linen also failed to pay to Perez overtime and minimum wages, to provide Perez with uninterrupted rest and meal breaks, to reimburse Perez for expenses incurred to perform Perez’s work duties, and to pay for or provide sick leave. (Id. at ¶¶ 16-21 & 23-26.)

In the FAC, Perez alleges twenty-two causes of action against Mission Linen: (1) unpaid missed rest breaks (Lab. Code, §§ 226.7, subd. (a), 516, 1198, & IWC Wage Order No. 5-2001 section 11); (2) unpaid missed meal breaks (Lab. Code, §§ 226.7, subd. (a), 512, subd. (a), 516, 1198, & IWC Wage Order No. 5-2001 section 10); (3) failure to pay all overtime wages earned (Lab. Code, §§ 510, 1194, & IWC Wage Order No. 5-2001 section 3); (4) failure to pay minimum wage, pay for all wages earned, and pay for vacation time (Lab. Code, §§ 204, 227.3, 1194 & 1197); (5) failure to reimburse required business expenses (Lab. Code, § 2802); (6) failure to maintain and produce accurate payroll records – improper wage statements (Lab. Code, §§ 226, subd. (a), 432, 1174, 1174.5, 1198.5, & IWC Wage Order No. 5-2001 section 7); (7) failure to pay wages upon separation (Lab. Code, §§ 201-203); (8) failure to pay for sick days (Lab. Code, §§246, 246, subd. (a), & 246.5); (9) violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 (retaliation for complaining about wages and working conditions); (10) failure to pay Covid-19 supplemental sick leave (violation of Lab. Code, §§ 246, 248.1, 248.2, & 248.6); (11) failure to provide suitable seating (IWC Wage Order No. 5-2001 Section 14); (12) violation of California’s quota laws; (13) failure to maintain temperatures providing reasonable comfort (violation of Lab. Code, § 1198); (14) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq.; (15) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (16) failure to allow medical leave, violation of California Family Rights Act; (17) unlawful discrimination based on Government Code section 12940, subdivisions (a) and (j); (18) unlawful retaliation based on Government Code section 12940; (19) violation of Government Code section 12940, subdivision (m) – wrongful termination failure to accommodate; (20) violation of Government Code section 12940, subdivision (n) – wrongful termination failure to engage in the interactive process (21) violation of Labor Code sections 3600 and 3700 – failure to provide workers’ compensation coverage; and (22) civil penalties pursuant to Labor Code section 2699 (Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 or “PAGA” penalties). (Note: The twentieth, twenty-first, and twenty-second causes of action alleged in the FAC appears to be mis-numbered.)

On March 17, 2025, Mission Linen filed a motion for an order compelling individual arbitration of the claims alleged in the FAC, dismissing Perez’s class claims, and staying the litigation of claims alleged in the FAC pending the completion of arbitration.

The present motion is supported by a declaration of Brad Champagne (Champagne), who is the Vice President Human Resources for Mission Linen. (Champagne Decl., ¶ 1.) Champagne states that he has been continuously employed by Mission Linen since 2006, and has held his current position since January 2020. (Ibid.) As the Vice President Human Resources, Champagne is a custodian of employment-related or personnel records and regularly refers to these records which are prepared and kept in connection with Mission Linen’s regular business practices and operations. (Id. at ¶ 2.) Champagne is also familiar with how Mission Linen collects and maintains employment-related records on behalf of its employees. (Ibid.)

Champagne states that, once an item is determined to be an employment record, it is placed in that employee’s personnel file. (Champagne Decl., ¶ 2.) Based on Champagne’s review of Perez’s personnel file, Champagne asserts that Perez is an employee of Mission Linen. (Id. at ¶ 3.) Attached to the Champagne declaration is a copy of a “Dispute Resolution Agreement (the Agreement) which is written in Spanish, and which was ostensibly signed by Perez on February 9, 2022. (Id. at ¶ 3 & Exh. A [p. 4].) A copy of the English version of the Agreement that Perez ostensibly signed is also attached to the Champagne declaration. (Id. at ¶ 3 & Exh. B.)

Champagne asserts that the Agreement is a standard document that is used by Mission Linen in the ordinary course of business and is completed by employees and securely maintained in employee personnel files. (Champagne Decl., ¶ 3.) According to Champagne, to ensure that employees understand the Agreement, Mission Linen maintains and makes available both English and Spanish versions of the Agreement and provides the Agreement to employees in whichever language they indicate they are most comfortable with. (Id. at ¶¶ 3 & 5.)

Also attached to the Champagne declaration are what Champagne describes as additional employment documents that Mission Linen’s records reflect were signed by Perez on the same date that Perez signed the Agreement. (Champagne Decl., ¶ 4 & Exh. C.) Champagne asserts that the signatures on these documents match the signature which appears on the Agreement. (Id. at ¶ 4.)

Champagne is also familiar with the process by which employees review and complete documentation relating to Mission Linen’s employment policies and procedures. (Champagne Decl., ¶ 5.) According to Champagne, employees are instructed to review this documentation before signing it and allowed the opportunity to ask any questions related to the documents, including the Agreement. (Ibid.) Champagne asserts that Mission Linen’s employment policies and procedures are also available in both English and Spanish in order to ensure that employees understand the documents they are asked to sign. (Ibid.)

Champagne further states that if an employee speaks Spanish, it is Mission Linen’s regular practice to make a Spanish-speaking employee available to answer any questions or explain the documents the employee is asked to sign, and that it is Mission Linen’s regular custom and practice to allow the employee as much time as they need to review the documents prior to signing, including the Agreement. (Champagne Decl., ¶ 5.)

Champagne is also familiar with the business and operations of Mission Linen, and states that Mission Linen provides textile and linen supplies and services, uniform rentals, apparel programs, and facility services to customers from inside and outside the State of California and throughout the United States, including restaurants, hotels, gas stations, professional offices, government offices and retail stores, among other establishments. (Champagne Decl., ¶ 6.) Champagne asserts that, as an employee of Mission Linen, Perez’s duties were a part of the processes of transactions, services and distribution of products with out-of-state customers, consumers, vendors, or suppliers. (Ibid.)

Mission Linen also submits a declaration of its counsel, Rafael Gonzalez (Gonzalez), in support of the motion. Gonzalez states that on October 16, 2024, he sent correspondence to counsel for Perez concerning the Agreement and provided legal authority in support of Mission Linen’s position that the Agreement applies to the claims asserted by Perez in this action requires these claims to be arbitrated on an individual basis. (Gonzalez Decl., ¶ 2 & Exh. A.) Counsel for Perez responded to Gonzalez’s communication on October 29, 2024, stating that Perez was not willing to submit her claims to arbitration. (Id. at ¶ 3.)

Gonzalez further states that the Agreement signed by Perez has been translated from Spanish to English by a certified Spanish language interpreter, and submits a copy of the Certification of Accuracy with the Gonzalez declaration. (Gonzalez Decl., ¶ 4 & Exh. B.)

The motion is opposed by Perez, who submits a supporting declaration stating that she was born and went to school in Mexico, and that her schooling is limited to sixth grade. (Perez Decl., ¶¶ 2-3.) Perez never attended any type of schooling in the United States, never took English classes, and cannot read or write in English. (Id. at ¶ 2.) Though Perez’s primary language is Spanish and Perez can write and read “simple” words in Spanish, Perez cannot understand legal jargon in Spanish. (Id. at ¶ 3.)

Perez further states that on February 8, 2022, she learned that Mission Linen was hiring. (Perez Decl., ¶ 3.) Perez went to the office where Perez spoke to a Spanish speaking secretary who took Perez to supervisor Tony DeTillo’s office. (Id. at ¶ ¶ 4.) After a brief introduction and translation, supervisor DeTillo summoned another employee by the name of Maria Medina (Medina) and, with Medina as a translator, DeTillo explained to Perez that Mission Linen was hiring and gave Perez a tour of the plant during which DeTillo “signaled” everything to Perez. (Ibid.) After the tour, Medina told Perez that, if Perez wanted a job, to return the next day to start work. (Ibid.) Perez accepted the offer. (Ibid.)

Perez presented herself on February 9, 2022, and was greeted by Medina who stated that she was going to give Perez “‘standard onboarding paperwork’” for Perez to sign right away before Perez started her shift. (Perez Decl., ¶ 5.) Medina indicated that there were several standard procedure pages and instructed Perez to sign wherever Perez’s name appeared, or the word “signature” was indicated, stressing that the papers were standard new hire related forms. (Ibid.) Medina also stated that there was a lot of work to do and urged Perez to fill out the paperwork as quickly as possible and to let Medina know once Perez was done. (Ibid.)  Medina kept checking on Perez, rushing Perez to turn over the signed papers as soon as possible. (Ibid.)

Perez later learned that Medina was a worker in charge of ironing hospital uniforms and linen, and charged with the duty of translating for the non-English-speaking employees. (Perez Decl., ¶ 5.) For example, if DeTillo wanted to communicate work related instructions, he always brought Medina to translate for him. (Ibid.) Perez asserts that Medina was a laborer with no authority or qualification to explain to Perez the nature of any of the onboarding paperwork that contained legal terminology. (Ibid.)

Perez asserts that she was handed 20 to 30 pages written in either Spanish or English, and that Perez was overwhelmed because she was told to “finish them fast” in order to start the first work shift. (Perez Decl., ¶ 6.) Perez states that she was not able to read and understand the papers including the context of the forms in Spanish because the words were not simple, and some words Perez did not know. (Ibid.) Perez further states that no one was there to help Perez to understand difficult words contained in the forms which Perez did not know. (Ibid.) Perez could not read or understand the forms written in English. (Ibid.)

Because Perez needed the job, she gave up on reading the forms in Spanish and proceeded to sign them. (Perez Decl., ¶ 6.) Once Perez was done, Perez waved at Medina and asked her if somebody was going to explain the papers Perez signed. (Perez Decl., ¶ 6.) Medina stated that they were standard new-hire paperwork that every employee had to sign in order to get paid for wages, that Medina could not explain them, and that there was no need for explanation. (Ibid.) Perez asserts that there was no opportunity for negotiation, and that after Perez handed Medina the papers, Medina rushed Perez to her work area. (Ibid.)

Perez states that she had no opportunity to read the employment documents in their entirety, and did not know that there was an arbitration agreement within the documents Medina handed to Perez. (Perez Decl., ¶ 7.) Perez further states that it was not until her counsel’s staff showed Perez her personnel records that Perez understood what she had signed. (Id. at ¶ 8.) When Perez tried to read the documents provided by her counsel’s staff on her own, she could not understand any of the words which appear to Perez as legal jargon. (Ibid.) Perez also had never heard the words “arbitration” or “dispute resolution” before, and did not understand that agreeing to arbitration meant that Perez was giving up her right to a jury trial. (Ibid.) Perez also states that she has never negotiated, and would not have any idea how to attempt to negotiate, a legal document. (Ibid.)

Perez also generally asserts that the documents included in the new hire package include several misrepresentations as to whether discussions about, and Perez’s receipt of, certain materials took place. (Perez Decl., ¶ 9.)

Perez also describes the circumstances surrounding Perez’s termination from Mission Linen, as also alleged in the FAC and further described above. (See, e.g., Perez Decl., ¶¶ 10-11.)

Perez also submits a declaration of her counsel, Farrah Mirabel (Mirabel), in support of Perez’s opposition to the motion. Mirabel states that Perez was provided copies of the Champagne declaration, the Agreement, and copies of Perez’s personnel records. (Mirabel Decl., ¶¶ 3-4 & Exh. A.)

Perez’s opposition is also supported by a declaration of Nancy Calzadilla Wheeler (Wheeler), who states that she is a certified paralegal and translator who speaks, reads, and writes fluently in Spanish and English. (Wheeler Decl., ¶ 2.) Wheeler states that she personally translated to Perez, from English to Spanish, the Champagne declaration, the Agreement, Perez’s declaration, and the employment documents signed by Perez on February 9, 2022. (Id. at ¶¶ 3-8.)

Analysis:

“ ‘Arbitration is ... a matter of contract.’ [Citation.] ‘The policy favoring arbitration cannot displace the necessity for a voluntary agreement to arbitrate. Although the law favors contracts for arbitration of disputes between parties, there is no policy compelling persons to accept arbitration of controversies which they have not agreed to arbitrate. Absent a clear agreement to submit disputes to arbitration, courts will not infer that the right to a jury trial has been waived.’ [Citations]” (Remedial Construction Services, LP v. AECOM, Inc. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 658, 663, original italics.)

“Under both federal and state law, the threshold question presented by a petition to compel arbitration is whether there is an agreement to arbitrate.” (Cheng-Canindin v. Renaissance Hotel Associates (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 676, 683.) “[C]ourts must first apply state law principles in determining whether the parties entered into an agreement to arbitrate.” (Garcia v. Stoneledge Furniture LLC (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 41, 51.) “Because the existence of the agreement is a statutory prerequisite to granting the petition, the petitioner bears the burden of proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 409-410, 413 (Rosenthal).)

“The arbitration proponent must first recite verbatim, or provide a copy of, the alleged agreement. [Citations.] A movant can bear this initial burden ‘by attaching a copy of the arbitration agreement purportedly bearing the opposing party’s signature.’ [Citation.] At this step, a movant need not ‘follow the normal procedures of document authentication’ and need only ‘allege the existence of an agreement and support the allegation as provided in [California Rules of Court,] rule [3.1330].’ [Citation.]

“If the movant bears its initial burden, the burden shifts to the party opposing arbitration to identify a factual dispute as to the agreement’s existence…. To bear this burden, the arbitration opponent must offer admissible evidence creating a factual dispute as to the authenticity of their signatures. The opponent need not prove that his or her purported signature is not authentic, but must submit sufficient evidence to create a factual dispute and shift the burden back to the arbitration proponent, who retains the ultimate burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the authenticity of the signature. [Citation.]” (Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, 755, original italics (Iyere).)

Noted above, the Spanish version of the Agreement is attached as exhibit A to the Champagne declaration, and consists of a four-page document ostensibly signed by Perez and Mission Linen on February 9, 2022. (Champagne Decl., Exh. A at p. 4.) The substantive provisions of the Agreement are set forth in ten separately numbered paragraphs. (Ibid.)

The English version of the Agreement is attached as exhibit B to the Champagne declaration, and also includes ten separately numbered paragraphs setting forth the provisions of the Agreement over three pages. (Champagne Decl., Exh. B.) Though the English version of the Agreement attached to the Champagne declaration is not signed by either Perez or Misson Linen, there is no information or evidence in the present record which would permit the court to conclude that the English and Spanish versions of the Agreement differ or are inconsistent in any substantive respect.

The Agreement includes the following provision which is set forth in the first numbered paragraph:

“Covered Claims. Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, Mission Linen and I mutually agree that all disputes arising out of, or related directly or indirectly to, my employment relationship with, or the termination of my employment from, Mission Linen shall be resolved only by an Arbitrator through final and binding arbitration and not by way of court or jury trial. This includes, without limitation, disputes concerning any or all of the following: wage and hour law(s) (federal, state and local), trade secrets, unfair competition, compensation, breaks and rest periods, uniform maintenance, training, termination, discrimination, harassment, and claims arising under state and federal statutes and/or common law addressing the same or similar subject matters. This Agreement does not apply to claims for workers compensation, state disability insurance, unemployment insurance benefits, or any dispute that is expressly governed and timely initiated pursuant to an applicable and binding grievance arbitration procedure contained in a valid collective bargaining agreement, or any other subject matter precluded by law. This Agreement does not apply where applicable law permits access to an administrative agency, such as, for example, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or the National Labor Relations Board, despite the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. This Agreement does not prevent or excuse a party from bringing an administrative claim before any agency where the party is obliged to exhaust administrative remedies before making a claim in arbitration. Mission Linen and I mutually agree that any disputes relating to the interpretation or application of this Agreement shall be resolved by the Arbitrator, but that any disputes over the enforceability, revocability, or validity of this Agreement, or any portion of it, will be decided by a court and not by the Arbitrator. Nothing contained in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent or excuse me from utilizing Mission Linen’s internal complaint procedures.” (Champagne Decl., Exh. B at p. 1, ¶ 1.)

Based on the allegations of the FAC described above and the terms of the Agreement set forth immediately above, Mission Linen has sufficiently alleged the existence of an agreement to arbitrate the present dispute by providing a copy of the Agreement which appears to be signed by Perez and by reciting its relevant provisions including those that provide for arbitration of the claims alleged by Perez in the FAC. Perez fails to explain why the Agreement does not, on its face and to the extent it is valid and enforceable, require arbitration of claims alleged in the FAC.

For all reasons discussed above, Mission Linen has met its initial prima facie burden to provide evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the present controversy. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330; see also Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541, 543-544 [“[t]he party seeking arbitration can meet its initial burden by attaching to the petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the respondent’s signature”]; Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 219 [moving party may allege the existence of the agreement by reciting its terms in the motion].)

Mission Linen further contends that the Agreement is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (the FAA), codified as 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.

The parties to an agreement to arbitrate “may ... voluntarily elect to have the FAA govern enforcement of the Agreement....” (Victrola 89, LLC v. Jaman Properties 8 LLC (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 337, 355.) Further, “if a contract involves interstate commerce, the FAA’s substantive provision [citation] applies to the arbitration. But the FAA’s procedural provisions [citation] do not apply unless the contract contains a choice-of-law clause expressly incorporating them.” (Valencia v. Smyth (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 153, 173-174, original italics (Valencia).)

The Agreement includes language stating that it “is an arbitration agreement governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. sections 1 et seq., and evidences a transaction involving commerce.” (Champagne Decl., Exh. B at p. 1.) The Agreement further provides that “Mission Linen reserves the right to lawfully seek enforcement of this Agreement ... under the Federal Arbitration Act...” (Id. at p. 3.)

For all reasons noted above, Mission Linen has made a sufficient showing that the parties expressly agreed that the procedural provisions of the FAA would govern the Agreement. (Valencia, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at pp. 173-174.)

Mission Linen also contends that the FAA applies to the Agreement because Mission Linen provides products and services outside of the State of California, and because Perez’s duties were part of the transactions with, services provided, and distribution of products to out-of-state customers.

The FAA “provides for the enforcement of arbitration provisions in any contract evidencing a transaction involving interstate commerce.” (Mount Diablo Medical Center v. Health Net of California, Inc. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 711, 717 (Mount Diablo).) “[T]he United States Supreme Court has identified ‘three categories of activity that Congress may regulate under the commerce power: (1) the channels of interstate commerce, (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce and persons or things in interstate commerce, and (3) those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.’ [Citation.]” (Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 227, 238 (Carbajal).) “The party asserting FAA preemption bears the burden to present evidence establishing a contract with the arbitration provision affects one of these three categories of activity, and failure to do so renders the FAA inapplicable.” (Ibid.)

The terms “involving commerce” are “the functional equivalent of “affecting[]” commerce. (Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson (1995) 513 U.S. 265, 273-274.) “[T]he pertinent question is whether the contract evidences a transaction involving interstate commerce, not whether the dispute arises from the particular part of the transaction involving interstate commerce.” (Shepard v. Edward Mackay Enterprises, Inc. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1101; see also Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc. (2003) 539 U.S. 52, 56-57 [in individual cases, the economic activity at issue and in the aggregate must reflect a “general practice” which “bears on interstate commerce in a substantial way”].)

The undisputed evidence presented by Mission Linen and further detailed above is sufficient to show that Mission Linen conducts its business with out of state customers. (See Champagne Decl., ¶ 6.) Noted above, Perez also alleges in the FAC that Mission Linen conducts business in five states outside of California. (FAC, ¶ 1.)

Based on the multistate business activities of Mission Linen and the undisputed responsibilities and duties of Perez while employed with Mission Linen, the present record is sufficient to show that the aggregate economic activity of Mission Linen demonstrates a general practice that bears on interstate commerce. By virtue of Perez’s responsibilities as alleged in the FAC and described in the declarations submitted in support of and in opposition to the present motion as further detailed above, the record is also sufficient to show that Perez engaged in activity which affected or involved interstate commerce during her employment with Mission Linen.

For all reasons discussed above, Mission Linen has met its burden to show that the substantive provisions of the FAA apply, and that the employment activity at issue in this action substantially affected interstate commerce such that the Agreement is subject to and preempted by the FAA. (Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America (1956) 350 U.S. 198, 200-201 [FAA governs if employee performing duties was “working ‘in’ commerce, was producing goods for commerce, or was engaging in activity that affected commerce”]; Valencia, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 174.)

As Mission Linen has, for all reasons discussed above, met its initial prima facie burden to show the existence of an agreement to arbitrate the present dispute which is governed by the FAA, the burden now shifts to Perez to identify a factual dispute as to the existence of the Agreement and to produce evidence to challenge its authenticity. (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165.)

Wholly absent from the Perez declaration is any information showing that Perez did not sign the Spanish version of the Agreement or that the handwritten signature appearing on the last page of the Agreement is not authentic. (Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at pp. 756-758 [discussion of plaintiff’s failure to create a dispute as to authenticity of plaintiff’s signature on agreement to arbitrate]. Instead, Perez declares that she “proceeded to sign” the Agreement notwithstanding that Perez was overwhelmed. (Perez Decl., ¶ 6.)

“ ‘Reasonable diligence requires the reading of a contract before signing it. A party cannot use his own lack of diligence to avoid an arbitration agreement. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Brookwood v. Bank of America (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1667, 1674.). Further, “[a]n arbitration clause within a contract may be binding on a party even if the party never actually read the clause.” (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236 (Pinnacle) [also noting that “A party’s acceptance of an agreement to arbitrate may be express, as where a party signs the agreement....”].) For these and all reasons further discussed above, as Perez expressly accepted the Agreement by signing it, the Agreement is binding on Perez notwithstanding any failure by Perez to read it.

As further discussed above, Perez also offers no reasoned legal or factual argument showing why the disputes giving rise to the causes of action alleged by Perez in the FAC are not encompassed within the terms of the Agreement. (See Cronus Investments, Inc. v. Concierge Services (2005) 35 Cal.4th 376, 386 [“any doubts or ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself should be resolved in favor of arbitration”].)

Also absent from the opposition is any factual or legal argument to show that Champagne does not possesses sufficient personal knowledge regarding the Agreement or the circumstances surrounding its execution, or why any information or evidence offered by Champagne or in the motion fails to demonstrate that Perez was provided with and executed the Agreement at the time of hire. (Estate of O’Connor (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 159, 170 [general discussion of a “qualified” witness]; Ramos v. Westlake Services LLC (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 674, 684 (Ramos) [a writing may be authenticated by circumstantial evidence].)

Perez also does not appear to dispute that the Agreement, and its enforcement, is governed by the FAA.

Though the substance of Perez’s challenge to the Agreement based on fraud is not entirely clear, Perez appears to rely on the decision in Najarro v. Superior Court (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 871 (Najarro), to support an argument that there exists fraud in the execution of the Agreement. (Opp. at pp. 3, l. 22 – p. 4, l. 23.) To support this contention, Perez asserts that she cannot read or understand English, that no one helped Perez to understand difficult words contained in the Agreement, that Perez did not understand the terms of the Agreement, that Perez was rushed to sign the papers which Medina failed to explain, and that Mission Linen has failed to present evidence identifying persons who communicated with Perez regarding the Agreement. (Ibid.)

“ ‘California law distinguishes between fraud in the “execution” or “inception” of a contract and fraud in the “inducement” of a contract ... in the former case “ ‘the fraud goes to the inception or execution of the agreement, so that the promisor is deceived as to the nature of his act, and actually does not know what he is signing, or does not intend to enter into a contract at all, mutual assent is lacking, and [the contract] is void. In such a case it may be disregarded without the necessity of rescission.’ ” [Citation.] ‘[C]laims of fraud in the execution of the entire agreement are not arbitrable under either state or federal law. If the entire contract is void ab initio because of fraud, the parties have not agreed to arbitrate any controversy.’ [Citation.]” (Najarro, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 885-886, original italics.)

As noted by the court in Munoz v. Patel (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 761 (Munoz), “[f]raud in the execution most often arises where some limitation—such as blindness, illness, or illiteracy—prevents a party from reading or understanding a contract he or she is about to sign.” (Munoz, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 775-776.) The Munoz court described circumstances where fraud in the inducement “most often” arises, including where a party provides an incomplete oral reading of a contract to another party who cannot read English (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 427-428 [also finding that plaintiff had demonstrated reasonable reliance on incomplete oral reading of contract], where a party presents a Spanish translation of a contract which did not contain a provision which appeared in the English contract (Ramos, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at pp. 686-690 [Spanish translation did not contain arbitration agreement at issue]), where a party whose physical and mental condition prevents them from reading mortgage documents is “tricked” into signing the documents by another party’s misrepresentation of their true nature (Jones v. Adams Financial Services (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 831, 835-850 (Jones)), where one side to an agreement “surreptitiously swaps or modifies” the agreement without the other party’s knowledge (Hotels Nevada v. L.A. Pacific Center, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 754, 764), and where a party takes advantage of another’s physical and mental illness by fraudulently procuring that party’s execution and delivery of a deed (Erickson v. Bohne (1955) 130 Cal.App.2d 553, 554-557). (Munoz, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 775-776.)

For all reasons discussed below, Perez has failed to show that the Agreement is void based on any fraud in its execution.

For example, unlike the plaintiff in Najarro, Perez does not assert that she is wholly unable to read Spanish. (See Najarro, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 886-887 [noting that one plaintiff did not know how to read].) Instead, the information and evidence presented by Perez shows that Perez’s primary language is Spanish, and that Perez can write and read simple Spanish. Perez also fails to sufficiently explain, with appropriate citations to the record, why the Agreement includes legal jargon or is not “simple”.

The information and evidence presented by Perez is also insufficient to show that Mission Linen or Medina affirmatively misrepresented the nature or terms of the Agreement with the intent to induce Perez to unknowingly execute that document, obstructed Perez’s ability to review any portion of the Agreement, or presented Perez with different or inconsistent versions of the Agreement. (See., e.g., Najarro, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 887-888 [noting that plaintiff was told the arbitration agreement was “unimportant” and that employees “obstructed” another plaintiff’s view of the document]; see also Munoz, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 778 [allegations established that defendant engaged in swapping of leases with the intent to induce plaintiff to sign lease].) For example, Perez’s own evidence indicates that Medina described the documents presented to Perez as “new hire” paperwork which all employees were required to sign. (Perez Decl., ¶¶ 5-6.) Perez fails to explain why Medina’s description was false, fraudulent, or misleading with respect to the existence, nature, or terms of the Agreement.

Further, though Perez states that she felt “rushed” to sign the Agreement in order to commence work, “...the rule in California ... is that fraud in the execution does not render a written contract void where the defrauded party has a reasonable opportunity to discover the real terms of the contract before signing it.” (Jones, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 836.) Notwithstanding that Perez felt rushed to sign the Agreement because she needed start work, this alone is insufficient to show why Perez did not have any reasonable opportunity to discover the terms of the Agreement before signing it, or that Perez signed the Agreement “ ‘ “assuming it to be a paper of a different character.” ’ [Citations.]” (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 420.)

Moreover, the Agreement expressly states that Perez “may consult with an attorney as to any aspect of the Agreement.” (Champagne Decl., Exh. B at p. 3.) Perez offers no information to show that she was denied an opportunity to consult with an attorney or other third person regarding the Agreement. Perez also presents no information or evidence showing that she required or requested that Medina, or another person, read or explain the Agreement to Perez before Perez signed that document. (See, e.g., Perez Decl., ¶ 6 [stating that, after Perez signed the documents, Perez asked Medina if someone was going to explain the papers Perez signed]; Ramos, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 687 [noting that if plaintiff “did not speak or understand English sufficiently to comprehend the English Contract, he should have had it read or explained to him”].)

There is also no evidence or information to show that Perez suffers from a physical or mental impairment which was known to Mission Linen, and which prevented her from reading the Agreement. (Jones, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at pp. 837-839 [general discussion].)

As more fully discussed above, Perez also offers no reasoned argument showing why the English and Spanish versions of the Agreement are inconsistent in any material respect, or that the Spanish version omitted any material terms included in the English version such that Perez was “deprived ... of a reasonable opportunity to learn the character and essential terms of the documents [she] signed.” (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 428.)

As noted by the court in Ramos, “ ‘[o]ne who is ignorant of the language in which a document is written, or who is illiterate, [who] executes a writing proposed as a contract under a mistake as to its contents ... is bound.’ ” (Ramos, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p 687; 1 Williston on Contracts (4th ed. 2025) § 4:19.) Further, the information and evidence presented by Perez is insufficient to show why Perez was “deceived as to the nature of [her] act, and actually [did] not know what [she was] signing” such that the Agreement is void. (Ford v. Shearson Lehman American Express, Inc. (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1028.)

For all reasons discussed above, Perez has failed to identify a factual dispute as to the existence of the Agreement or to produce evidence challenging its authenticity or the authenticity of Perez’s handwritten signature. For these reasons, and considering the totality of the evidence and information offered by the parties, Mission Linen has met its burden to prove the existence of an agreement to arbitrate the present dispute.

Perez contends that the Agreement is unenforceable because it is unconscionable. “A written agreement to submit to arbitration an existing controversy or a controversy thereafter arising is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281; see also 9 U.S.C. § 2.)

Contract defenses such as unconscionability may be applied to invalidate an agreement to arbitrate. (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 125 (OTO).) “The overarching unconscionability question is whether an agreement is imposed in such an unfair fashion and so unfairly one-sided that it should not be enforced.” (Id. at p. 124.) “A contract is unconscionable if one of the parties lacked a meaningful choice in deciding whether to agree and the contract contains terms that are unreasonably favorable to the other party.” (Id. at p. 125.)

“Unconscionability consists of both procedural and substantive elements. The procedural element addresses the circumstances of contract negotiation and formation, focusing on oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power. [Citations.] Substantive unconscionability pertains to the fairness of an agreement’s actual terms and to assessments of whether they are overly harsh or one-sided. [Citations.] A contract term is not substantively unconscionable when it merely gives one side a greater benefit; rather, the term must be ‘so one-sided as to “shock the conscience.” ’ [Citation.]” (Pinnacle, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 246-247.)

In addition, though the party resisting arbitration must show both procedural and substantive unconscionability, “they need not be present in the same degree” but are evaluated on a “sliding scale”. (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 114 (Armendariz).) “[T]he more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.” (Ibid.) The party asserting unconscionability as a defense to enforcement of an arbitration agreement, “bears the burden of producing evidence of, and proving by a preponderance of the evidence, any fact necessary to the defense.” (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 413.)

Procedural Unconscionability:

Perez contends that the Agreement is procedurally unconscionable because it is a contract of adhesion which was presented to Perez on a “take it or leave it” basis, because the Agreement was “buried” in a stack of 20 or 30 pages of onboarding documents, because Perez was rushed to fill out and sign the Agreement without any explanation of or opportunity to negotiate its terms, because Perez was overwhelmed and unable to read or understand the new hire forms, and because Medina stated that there was no need to explain new hire paper work to Perez. (Opp. at pp. 7-8.)

“A procedural unconscionability analysis ‘begins with an inquiry into whether the contract is one of adhesion.’ [Citation.] An adhesive contract is standardized, generally on a preprinted form, and offered by the party with superior bargaining power ‘on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.’ [Citations.]” (OTO, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 126.) “[A] contract of adhesion is fully enforceable according to its terms [citations] unless certain other factors are present which, under established legal rules—legislativeor judicial—operate to render it otherwise.” (Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 807, 819-820, fn. omitted.) “It is only when the contract is (1) contrary to the reasonable expectations of the ‘adhering party’ or (2) is ‘unduly oppressive or unconscionable,’ that it will not be enforced. [Citation.]” (Painters Dist. Council No. 33 v. Moen (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 1032, 1040.)

Procedural unconscionability may also be established when “circumstances of the contract’s formation created such oppression or surprise that closer scrutiny of its overall fairness is required.” (OTO, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 126.) “ ‘Oppression occurs where a contract involves lack of negotiation and meaningful choice, surprise where the allegedly unconscionable provision is hidden within a prolix printed form….’ [Citation]” (Morris v. Redwood Empire Bancorp (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1317; accord, OTO, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 126.)

Though Perez contends that the Agreement was a “surprise” because it was buried in a stack of documents, the information and evidence offered by Perez is insufficient to show why the Agreement was hidden among other documents presented to Perez, or why the Agreement was inconspicuous in some manner.

For example, the Agreement includes on its first page a separate heading identifying that document as a “Dispute Resolution Agreement”. (Champagne Decl., Exh. B.) The Agreement consists of 3 or 4 separately numbered pages, and its material terms are set forth in separately numbered and labeled paragraphs with readable text. The separately numbered paragraphs are also not themselves unreadable, complex, or replete with statutory references or legal jargon. (Cf. OTO, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 128 [finding that the agreement contained complex sentences with legal jargon written in “extremely small font”].) Further, based on the court’s review of the Agreement, the court finds that it is not “unreasonably prolix or complex.” (Davis v. Kozak (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 897, 907.) For all reasons discussed above, the court does not find that the Agreement is procedurally unconscionable based on oppression or surprise in its formation.

Notwithstanding that Perez has failed to show why the Agreement was a “surprise”, the present record is sufficient to show that Perez could not opt out of the Agreement. For example, the first line of the Agreement states: “In consideration of my employment by [Mission Linen] and the mutual covenants in this Agreement, Mission Linen and I agree that this [Agreement] will apply to all covered legal claims between Mission Linen and me.” (Champagne Decl., Exh. B at p. 1.) Mission Linen also fails to explain why the Agreement authorizes an employee of Mission Linen to opt out of its provisions.

For all reasons discussed above, and as the parties do not and cannot reasonably dispute that the Agreement requires a signatory employee to arbitrate the claims or disputes described in that document as a condition of employment with Mission Linen, the present record is sufficient to show that the Agreement is a contract of adhesion. In the employment context present here, the adhesive nature of the Agreement presented as a condition of Perez’s employment, alone, is sufficient to establish a “modest degree of procedural unconscionability.” (Carbajal, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 243.)

The available evidence and information also suggest that Perez was never informed that she could negotiate the adhesive terms of the Agreement or opt out of arbitration, and that Perez is not a “sophisticated business person.” (See, e.g., Perez Decl., ¶¶ 2-3; Carbajal, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at pp. 245, 246 [noting that procedural unconscionability may not exist to the arbitration agreement was negotiable and the employee was sophisticated].)

For all reasons discussed above, the court finds that there exists a moderate level of procedural unconscionability based on the adhesive nature of the Agreement, Perez’s lack of business sophistication, and the ostensible inability of Perez to negotiate or opt out of its terms.

Substantive unconscionability:

“Substantive unconscionability pertains to the fairness of an agreement’s actual terms and to assessments of whether they are overly harsh or one-sided.” (Pinnacle, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 246.) A substantive unconscionability analysis “ ‘ensures that contracts, particularly contracts of adhesion, do not impose terms that have been variously described as “ ‘ “overly harsh” ’ ” [citation], “ ‘unduly oppressive’ ” [citation] “ ‘so one-sided as to “shock the conscience” ’” [citation], or ‘unfairly one-sided” [citation] All of these formulations point to the central idea that the unconscionability doctrine is concerned not with “a simple old-fashioned bad bargain” [citation], but with terms that are “unreasonably favorable to the more powerful party.” ’ [Citation.]” (OTO, supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 129-130; see also Pinnacle, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 246 [“[a] contract term is not substantively unconscionable when it merely gives one side a greater benefit”].)

Perez contends that the Agreement is substantively unconscionable because it includes contradictory material clauses which are not clear and unmistakable, and which forbid Perez from participating in a class or representative action.

Noted above, the Agreement is governed by the FAA. For this reason, any waiver of Perez’s right to bring a class action appearing in the Agreement is valid and enforceable. (Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 364 (Iskanian), overruled on another ground in Quach v. California Commerce Club, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 562, 582-583; Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. v. Superior Court (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1123 (Securitas) [employee’s wavier of right to bring class action claims was valid and enforceable under the FAA]; Marenco v. DirecTV LLC (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1420-1421 [rule established by case law that “that certain class action waivers in employment arbitration agreements are invalid under state law--is preempted by the FAA”].) For all reasons discussed above, the court does not find that the Agreement is substantively unconscionable based on any class action waiver appearing in its provisions.
 

The Agreement also includes the following provision: “PAGA Representative Action Waiver. There will be no right or authority for any dispute to be brought, heard, or arbitrated as a representative action under the California Private Attorney General Act (“PAGA Representative Action Waiver”)”. (Champagne Decl., Exh. B at p. 2, ¶ 8.)

“[A] predispute categorical waiver of the right to bring a PAGA action is unenforceable....” (Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1117 (Adolph); Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 360 [“the FAA does not preempt a state law that prohibits waiver of PAGA representative actions in an employment contract”].) Though it is unclear to the court on what basis Mission Linen contends that the “PAGA Representative Action Waiver” (the PAGA Waiver) appearing in the Agreement and set forth above is “entirely lawful” (see Reply at p. 9, ll. 12-13), Mission Linen asserts that this provision, to the extent it is unenforceable, is severable from the Agreement. Perez argues, in a general and conclusory manner, that the PAGA Waiver is not separable from the Agreement.

The question of whether the Agreement prohibits or permits severance of the PAGA Waiver “is one of contract interpretation” which constitutes “an issue of law....” (Securitas, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 1125.)

“ ‘ “The fundamental rule is that interpretation of ... any contract ... is governed by the mutual intent of the parties at the time they form the contract. [Citation.] The parties’ intent is found, if possible, solely in the contract’s written provisions. [Citation.] ‘The “clear and explicit” meaning of these provisions, interpreted in their “ordinary and popular sense,” unless “used by the parties in a technical sense or a special meaning is given to them by usage” [citation], controls judicial interpretation.’ [Citation.] If a layperson would give the contract language an unambiguous meaning, we apply that meaning.” ’ [Citation] The parties’ expressed objective intent, not their unexpressed subjective intent, governs. [Citation.]

“Likewise, ‘ “[w]hether a contract is entire or separable depends upon its language and subject matter, and this question is one of construction to be determined by the court according to the intention of the parties. If the contract is divisible, the first part may stand, although the latter is illegal. [Citation.]” [Citations.] It has long been the rule in this state that “ ‘When the transaction is of such a nature that the good part of the consideration can be separated from that which is bad, the Courts will make the distinction, for the ... law ... [divides] according to common reason; and having made that void that is against law, lets the rest stand....’ ” [Citation.] Thus, the rule relating to severability of partially illegal contracts is that a contract is severable if the court can, consistent with the intent of the parties, reasonably relate the illegal consideration on one side to some specified or determinable portion of the consideration on the other side.’ [Citations] Thus, a contract is not divisible ‘where there is a showing that it was the intention of the parties to treat [their] agreement as an entire contract, and where it appears that their engagements would not have been entered into except upon the clear understanding that the full object of the contract should be performed....’ [Citations.]” (Securitas, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1125-1126, original italics.)

The Agreement expressly provides that the PAGA Waiver “shall be severable from this Agreement in any case in which (1) the dispute is filed as a PAGA representative action; and (2) a court of competent jurisdiction finds this PAGA Representative Action Waiver is unenforceable. In such instances, the PAGA representative action must be litigated in a court of competent jurisdiction.” (Champagne Decl., Exh. B at p. 2, ¶ 8.) The Agreement further states that, if the PAGA Waiver “is deemed to be unenforceable, Mission Linen and [Perez] agree that this Agreement is otherwise silent as to any party’s ability to bring a class, collective, or representative action in arbitration.” (Id. at pp. 2-3, ¶ 9.)

Though Perez asserts that the Agreement includes non-severable provisions requiring Perez to give up her right to bring a representative action under PAGA, considering the clear and explicit meaning of the express language of the provisions set forth above, the Agreement reflects that the parties intended that, to the extent a dispute is filed as a PAGA representative action and the court determines that the PAGA Waiver is unenforceable, the PAGA Waiver is severable from the remainder of the Agreement.

“[I]f the contract contains a severance clause, the court should take it into account as an expression of the parties’ intent that an agreement curable by removing defective terms should otherwise be enforced.... [¶] Accordingly, courts may liberally sever any unconscionable portion of a contract and enforce the rest when: the illegality is collateral to the contract’s main purpose; it is possible to cure the illegality by means of severance; and enforcing the balance of the contract would be in the interests of justice.” (Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 478, 517, original italics.) Considering the severability provisions of the Agreement further detailed above, Perez fails to show why the Agreement may not be cured by removing the PAGA Waiver.

Further, “where a plaintiff has filed a PAGA action comprised of individual and non-individual claims, an order compelling arbitration of individual claims does not strip the plaintiff of standing to litigate non-individual claims in court.” (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1123.) As the Agreement expressly provides that the PAGA Waiver is severable from the remainder of the Agreement to the extent that waiver is unenforceable, Perez also fails to explain why the interests of justice would not be served by enforcing the balance of the Agreement by requiring Perez to submit her individual PAGA claims to arbitration and allowing Perez to maintain her non-individual or representative claims in court.

For all reasons discussed above, as the Agreement reflects an intent by the parties that the PAGA Waiver, which is unenforceable for all reasons further discussed above, is severable from the remainder of the Agreement, and considering that Perez would not lose standing to litigate her non-individual claims in court even if Perez’s individual PAGA claims were subject to arbitration, the court finds that the PAGA Waiver does not render the Agreement substantively unconscionable.

The remaining points and arguments advanced by Perez also fail to prove facts essential to establish that the Agreement is substantively unconscionable.

For example, Perez asserts that a delegation clause appearing in the Agreement, which provides that “any disputes relating to the interpretation or application of this Agreement shall be resolved by the Arbitrator, but that any disputes over the enforceability, revocability, or validity of this Agreement, or any portion of it, will be decided by a court and not by the Arbitrator” (Champagne Decl., Exh. B, ¶ 1), is not clear and unmistakable. Though “courts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is ‘clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]’ evidence that they did so[]” (First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan (1995) 514 U.S. 938, 939), “[t]his is a “ ‘heightened standard,’ and it ‘pertains to the parties’ manifestation of intent, not the agreement’s validity.’ [Citation.]” (Najarro, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 879-880.)

For all reasons discussed above, the delegation clause does not relate to the validity of the Agreement. Therefore, any ambiguity that may exist in that clause does not make the Agreement substantively unconscionable.

Perez further contends that the Agreement is substantively unconscionable because it includes a purportedly illegal confidentiality provision, and because it survives Perez’s termination and is not terminable at will.

The purportedly illegal confidentiality provision at issue states: “Except as may be permitted or required by law, as determined by the Arbitrator, neither a party nor an Arbitrator may disclose the existence, content, or results of any arbitration hereunder without the prior written consent of all parties.” (Champagne Decl., Exh. B, ¶ 6.) As Mission Linen is also bound by this provision, in includes the “requisite degree of mutuality.” (Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 638, 657 [also noting that “the paramount consideration in assessing conscionability is mutuality”].) Moreover, Perez fails to explain why this provision, on its face, prevents Perez from discussing her wages or otherwise violates a statutory provision including any provision of the Labor Code. (See Alberto v. Cambrian Homecare (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 482, 493-494 [describing circumstances where confidentiality agreement prohibiting discussion of wages was unconscionable].)

Further, “like other contracts, arbitration agreements that do not specify a term of duration are terminable at will after a reasonable time has elapsed.” (Reigelsperger v. Siller (2007) 40 Cal.4th 574, 580 (Reigelsperger).) The Agreement provides that it “shall survive the termination of [Perez’s] employment and the expiration of any benefit plan.” (Champagne Decl., Exh. B, ¶ 9.) As the Agreement does not, either expressly or by implication, specify a term of its duration, it is terminable at will. (Cf. Cook v. University of Southern California (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 312, 326 [arbitration agreement containing an express term of duration was not terminable at will].) Perez also submits no evidence or information to show that she tried to terminate the Agreement. (Reigelsperger, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 580.)

In addition, Perez contends that the Agreement is one-sided because its terms improperly limit discovery and fail to reference any rules of procedure.

“Adequate discovery is indispensable for the vindication of statutory claims. [Citation.] ‘ “[A]dequate” discovery does not mean unfettered discovery....’ [Citation.] And parties may ‘agree to something less than the full panoply of discovery provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 1283.05.’ [Citation.] However, arbitration agreements must ‘ensure minimum standards of fairness’ so employees can vindicate their public rights. [Citation.]” (Fitz v. NCR Corp. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 702, 715-716, original italics.)

The sole provision of the Agreement that addresses discovery states: “During arbitration, the parties will have the right to file pleadings, conduct adequate discovery, subpoena witnesses, bring dispositive motions, and present witnesses and evidence as needed to support their claims and defenses. Any disputes with respect to the preceding items shall be resolved by the Arbitrator.” (Champagne Decl., Exh. B, ¶ 4.) Based on these express terms, the court does not find that the Agreement denies Perez the opportunity to conduct discovery with respect to the claims alleged in the FAC. Instead, the Agreement contemplates that the parties will conduct appropriate discovery during the arbitration proceeding. Further, it can be inferred from the discovery provision described above that the parties recognize that “a limitation on discovery is one important component of the ‘simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.’ [Citation.]” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 106, fn. 11.)

For all reasons discussed above, the express provisions of the Agreement are sufficient to show that Perez may conduct appropriate discovery with respect to any claims alleged by Perez in arbitration. For this reason, Perez has failed to show why the terms of the Agreement deny Perez an opportunity to conduct discovery regarding her claims. Therefore, and considering the typical limitations on discovery in arbitration, the court does not find that the Agreement is substantively unconscionable based on any inappropriate limitation or wholesale denial of Perez’s ability to conduct discovery to the extent necessary to vindicate her claims.

Though the court finds that there exists a moderate level of procedural unconscionability in the Agreement for all reasons further discussed above, procedural and substantive unconscionability “must both be present in order for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce a contract or clause under the doctrine of unconscionability.” (Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc. (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1519, 1533, original italics; accord, Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 114.) As the court does not find that the Agreement is substantively unconscionable, Perez has failed to meet her burden to show that the Agreement is unenforceable under the doctrine of unconscionability.

“The FAA gives the courts no discretion to refuse to order arbitration that has been agreed to by the parties.” (Mount Diablo, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 718.) For all reasons discussed above, the court finds that a valid agreement to arbitrate exists which encompasses the individual claims, disputes, and controversies alleged in the FAC. Further, and considering the totality of all information and evidence presented by the parties, Perez has not met her burden to demonstrate that the Agreement is sufficiently unfair or unconscionable such that the court may not enforce it. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court will grant the motion of Mission Linen, in part, and order the parties to submit Perez’s individual claims to arbitration. Further, the court will order that Perez’s class claims be dismissed, and that the litigation of the non-individual claims brought under PAGA as alleged in the FAC be stayed.  

The court’s records reflect that Mission Linen has not submitted a proposed order for the court’s review. The court will order Mission Linen to submit a proposed order which conforms to the court’s ruling herein.

Mission Linen’s objections to Perez’s evidence:

In support of the motion, Mission Linen asserts objections to evidence submitted by Perez in support of Perez’s opposition to the motion. The court considers only that evidence which is admissible and relevant to the matters at issue in the present motion.

Mission Linen’s request for statement of decision:

Mission Linen has submitted a request that the court issue a statement of decision explaining the factual and legal basis for its decision on the present motion. The court’s ruling on the present motion, which explains the factual and legal basis for the court’s decision, constitutes a statement of decision. (Code Civ. Proc., § 632.