Robert Decker v. Paul George Mihalec, et al

Case Number

24CV05419

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 07/21/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a First Amended Complaint; 2) Plaintiff’s Motion for Discovery of Defendant Paul George Mihalec’s Financial Information

Tentative Ruling

Robert Decker v. Paul George Mihalec, et al.

Case No. 24CV05419

           

Hearing Date:  July 21, 2025                                                 

HEARING:              Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a First Amended Complaint  

                                    Plaintiff’s Motion for Discovery of Defendant Paul George Mihalec’s Financial Information

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiff Robert Decker: Anthony C. Kastenek and Philip

                             Alexander, Harris Personal Injury Lawyers

                             For Defendant, Cross-Complainant, and Cross-Defendant Paul George Mihalec:  Gordon M. Park and Emma R. Reyes,                                     McCormick, Barstow, Sheppard, Wayet & Carruth, LLP

                                    For Defendant Lyft, Inc.:  Rosa Manchester, Gordon, Rees, Scully, Mansukhani, LLP

                                    For Defendant and Cross-Defendant Richard Joseph Baldiviez: K. Robert Gonter, Jr., Gates, Gonter, Guy, Proudfoot & Muench, LLP

TENTATIVE RULING:

(1)       The motion of plaintiff Robert Decker for leave to file a first amended complaint is granted. Plaintiff shall file and serve his first amended complaint in substantially the same form as attached to his motion on or before July 28, 2025.

(2)       The motion of plaintiff Robert Decker to discover defendant Paul George Mihalec’s financial information is granted. Subject to further order of the Court, all information produced in such discovery shall be confidential and shall not be used or disclosed by the propounding party except as required for purposes of this litigation.

Background:

As alleged in the complaint:

On June 25, 2023, defendant Paul George Mihalec negligently operated his vehicle, causing a collision with plaintiff Robert Decker. (Complaint, ¶ 9.)

On August 3, 2023, defendant Richard Joseph Baldiviez negligently operated his vehicle, causing a collision with plaintiff. (Complaint, ¶ 10.)

“Both collisions alleged herein involve motor vehicle accidents where the negligent

operation of motor vehicles caused plaintiff to become injured. Both collisions involve the same or similar injuries to plaintiff’s body. Both collisions involve common questions of law and fact relating to plaintiff’s injuries, and the nature and extent thereof.” (Complaint, ¶ 11, capitalizations altered.)

“On June 25, 2023, the vehicle in which plaintiff was operating, a moped, was hit

multiple times from behind by defendant . . .  Mihalec’s vehicle.” (Complaint, ¶ 12, capitalizations altered.) Immediately following the collision, Mihalec, who was driving for Lyft at the time, started a physical altercation with plaintiff. (Id., ¶¶ 13, 19-22.) Mihalec “violently, maliciously and willfully punched plaintiff multiple times.” (Id., ¶ 47, capitalization altered.)

Plaintiff asserts negligent claims against both Mihalec and Baldiviez. He also asserts claims for assault and battery against Mihalec, as well as punitive damages.

Plaintiff now seeks leave to file a first amended complaint to include a claim for negligent hiring, training, supervision, and/or retention of an unfit employee (Mihalec) as against Lyft. No opposition has been filed to plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint.

Plaintiff has also filed a motion seeking discovery of Mihalec’s financial information pursuant to Civil Code section 3295, subdivision (c). Mihalec has filed an opposition to this motion.

There is currently no scheduled trial date.

Analysis:

(1)       Motion for Leave to Amend

Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a)(1) provides:

“The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect; and may, upon like terms, enlarge the time for answer or demurrer. The court may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time limited by this code.”

A trial court has “ ‘wide discretion’ ” in allowing the amendment of any pleading, and as a matter of policy the ruling of the trial court in such matters will be upheld unless a “ ‘manifest or gross abuse of discretion is shown.’ ” (Tung v. Chicago Title Co. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 734, 747.)

Statutes like section 473 are “construed liberally so that cases might be tried upon their merits in one trial where no prejudice to the opposing party . . . is demonstrated.” (Rainer v. Community Memorial Hospital (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 240, 254.) Further, this liberal policy applies to amendments “ ‘at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial,’ ” absent prejudice to the adverse party. (Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 761.)

Plaintiff seeks leave to amend to include a new cause of action against Lyft for negligent hiring, training, supervision, and/or retention of an unfit employee (Mihalec). Plaintiff states in his motion that he “has recently learned that Lyft . . . negligently supervised, retained, and controlled the employment of their [sic] employee driver . . . Mihalec” who “had received at least 6 traffic citations in the five years prior to being hired by Lyft.” (Motion, p. 3.) Further, Mihalec had been “involved in another rear end auto accident six months prior” to the incident in this case. (Motion, pp. 3-4.)  

Given the strong policy which favors the liberal amendment of pleadings, coupled with the lack of any opposition to plaintiff’s instant motion, the Court grants plaintiff leave to file a first amended complaint.

(2)       Motion to Discover Mihalec’s Financial Information

A plaintiff’s right to pretrial discovery of the defendant’s financial condition is limited. Plaintiff may require defendant to identify documents in its possession that are admissible on the issue of its financial condition. Defendant may also be required to identify “witnesses employed by or related to the defendant who would be most competent to testify” to its financial condition. (Civ. Code, § 3295, subd. (c).)

Plaintiff may also subpoena documents or witnesses to be available at trial for purposes of establishing defendant’s financial condition. (Ibid.) 

Beyond the foregoing, no pretrial discovery by plaintiff is permitted without a court order which may only be granted if the court finds that there is a “substantial probability that the plaintiff will prevail” on the claim for punitive damages. (Civ. Code, § 3295, subd. (c).) In order to obtain such an order, plaintiff must file a motion supported by “appropriate affidavits” sufficient to establish “oppression, fraud or malice” under Civil Code section 3294. (Civ. Code, § 3295, subd. (c).) “ ‘Malice’  means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) “Oppression” is “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(2).)

Before discovery of the defendant’s financial condition will be permitted, the court must find “on the basis of the supporting and opposing affidavits” that plaintiff has “established a substantial probability” of prevailing on the punitive damages claim. (Civ. Code, § 3295, subd. (c).) In this regard, the court must (1) weigh the evidence presented by both sides “and (2) make a finding that it is very likely the plaintiff will prevail on his claim for punitive damages.” (Jabro v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 754, 758.) Under this standard, it is not enough for plaintiff merely to make a prima facie showing that would support a finding of “oppression, fraud or malice.” (Id. at p. 759.)

Plaintiff argues that it is very likely that he will prevail on his claim for punitive damages against Mihalec. (Motion, p. 5.) According to plaintiff, Mihalec’s conduct “was certainly malicious as he crashed into plaintiff’s vehicle three times, punched plaintiff multiple times, and finally ran over plaintiff’s right foot.” (Ibid., capitalizations altered.) Plaintiff also asserts that “[Mihalec] fled the scene.” (Ibid.)

Plaintiff’s evidence which he cites in support of his request to conduct discovery of Mihalec’s financial information consists of his counsel’s declaration, along with the police report concerning the incident, a photograph of plaintiff’s injuries, and the “Advisement of Rights, Waiver and Plea Form” concerning Mihalec’s guilty plea to  the charge of battery in People v. Mihalec, case number 22CR04429.

As the police report reflects, plaintiff told investigating officers that he was driving his scooter eastbound on West Carrillo Street when he “lane split” and pulled in front of Mihalec’s vehicle. (Ex. A to Motion, p. 5.) Plaintiff felt a bump from behind, and saw that Mihalec’s sedan had impacted the rear tire area of his scooter. (Ibid.) Plaintiff continued east, and noted that Mihalec was driving uncomfortably close to him, within a few inches of impacting plaintiff’s scooter again. (Ibid.) Plaintiff chose to pull over, and Mihalec pulled over as well. (Ibid.)

Plaintiff further reported to police that Mihalec immediately approached him and was cursing. (Ex. A to Motion, p. 5.) Mihalec then, without provocation, punched plaintiff in the face six to ten times. (Ibid.) Mihalec also grabbed plaintiff’s throat as he punched him. (Ibid.)

Significantly, in his statements to the investigating officers, Mihalec admitted that he was upset and struck plaintiff more than once with his hands. (Ex. A to Motion, p. 3.)

Mihalec, meanwhile, argues in his opposition that “the versions of what happened in this two-vehicle accident itself differ dramatically between the versions as reported by [plaintiff] and [Mihalec].” (Opposition, p. 2.) Further, defendant contends, “the two versions of what happened in the immediate aftermath

of the accident during the ‘altercation’ differ, depending on which party the jury finds to be more credible.” (Id.)

Mihalec, relying principally upon his own deposition testimony, asserts that “as he was coming to a stop at the limit line as the lead vehicle in the number two lane heading eastbound on [West] Carrillo, he first became aware of the plaintiff when [plaintiff] ‘lane split’ by pulling up on the driver’s side of Mihalec’s car and on the passenger side of the vehicle stopped next to them in the number one lane. Mihalec insists there had been no contact so far between their two vehicles.” (Opposition, pp. 4-5.)

Mihalec claims that when the light changed, and he began to accelerate forward, plaintiff suddenly moved a little faster on Mihalec’s driver’s side, still splitting the lanes, and without warning, pulled his scooter to the right as if to cut in front of Mihalec. (Opposition, p. 5.) Mihalec states that it was plaintiff who misjudged

the distance and “bumped” the left front fender of Mihalec’s car. (Id.) Plaintiff did not lose control of his scooter, but as both vehicles continued to move forward, plaintiff attempted to cut in front of Mihalec a second time, again misjudging the clearance and making contact with the left front fender of Mihalec’s vehicle. (Id.) This time, both plaintiff and Mihalec pulled over. (Id.)

According to Mihalec, plaintiff stated: “I’m going to have you put in jail. I’m

going to have you in handcuffs tonight, and I'm going to have your car impounded.” (Opposition, p. 6.) Mihalec claims that he was “very honest” and admitted that he has “ ‘bad ADHD and bad emotional control.’ ” (Id.) Mihalec insists that the  “threatening, taunting statements, made by the plaintiff who had just twice

bumped into Mihalec’s car with his scooter, made [Mihalec] react angrily and physically and he punched [plaintiff] in the face a few times.” (Id. at p. 7.) Mihalec also denies that he fled the scene. (Id.)

Mihalec, who claims he is older and much smaller than plaintiff, states that while it “may be considered fairly foolish for a much smaller, shorter, lighter and older man to take a swing at a man who is larger, taller, heavier and 20 years younger,” his actions here were not the result of “level headed consideration.” (Opposition, p. 10.)  Mihalec maintains that his conduct “was merely a physical reaction to being taunted and provoked,” and at most reckless, but otherwise not malicious or oppressive. (Ibid.)   

Any tort that involves sufficiently reprehensible conduct presents a proper case for punitive damages. This includes assault and battery. (Sheward v. Magit (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 163, 167 [willful battery with fists]; Bergevin v. Morger (1955) 130 Cal.App.2d 590, 593.)

The Courts finds that there is clear and convincing evidence that Mihalec acted with malice or oppression, and that there is a substantial likelihood that plaintiff will prevail on his claim for punitive damages in this case. Mihalec does not dispute that he punched plaintiff. Further, the record demonstrates that it was Mihalec who initiated the physical altercation which ensued after he and plaintiff pulled to the side of the road. In addition to the statements from plaintiff and Mihalec, two witnesses reported that Mihalec exited his vehicle, approached plaintiff, and then “began punching and attacking [him] without any provocation.” (Ex. A to Motion, p.  8.)

Even if plaintiff provoked or taunted Mihalec as he claims, the measures of reprisal adopted by Mihalec were so disproportionate to the provocation as to permit the inference of malice, and support a verdict for punitive damages. Simply put, there is a substantial probability that the jury will find that Mihalec’s response was not only excessive and unwarranted, but also malicious or oppressive, or both.

Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for discovery of Mihalec’s financial information is granted.

The Court also notes that plaintiff has stated in his reply that he is agreeable to a protective order which limits the disclosure of Mihalec’s financial information to safeguard his privacy rights. Even if discovery is ordered, defendant is “presumptively entitled to a protective order” limiting disclosure of the evidence obtained solely to opposing counsel and solely for the purposes of the lawsuit. (Richards v. Superior Court (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 265, 272.) The Court therefore also orders that disclosure of Mihalec’s financial information need be revealed only to counsel for the discovering party or to counsel’s representatives, and once so revealed, the information shall be used only for the purposes of this lawsuit.