Joan Doe et al vs Santa Barbara Unified School District et al
Joan Doe et al vs Santa Barbara Unified School District et al
Case Number
24CV05242
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Fri, 07/11/2025 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
Demurrers and Motion to Strike
Tentative Ruling
(1) The motion to strike of defendant Santa Barbara Charter School is denied.
(2) The demurrer of defendant Santa Barbara Charter School is overruled in its entirety.
(3) The demurrer of defendant Susan Salcido is sustained in part and overruled in part as follows:
The demurrer is overruled as to the first cause of action for mandamus, overruled as to the second cause of action for declaratory relief, overruled as to the third cause of action for injunctive relief, overruled as to the fourth and seventh causes of action for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, overruled as to the fifth and eighth causes of action for negligent supervision of a minor, and sustained as to the sixth and ninth causes of action for premises liability with leave to amend.
(4) The demurrer of defendant Santa Barbara Unified School District is sustained in part and overruled in part as follows:
The demurrer is overruled as to the first cause of action for mandamus, overruled as to the second cause of action for declaratory relief, overruled as to the third cause of action for injunctive relief, overruled as to the fourth and seventh causes of action for negligent hiring, supervision, and/or retention, overruled as to the fifth and eighth causes of action for negligent supervision of a minor, and sustained with leave to amend as to the sixth and ninth causes of action for premises liability.
(5) Plaintiffs are ordered to file and serve a second amended petition and complaint on or before July 25, 2025.
Background:
Petitioners and plaintiffs, Joan Doe, John Doe, Jane Doe, Roberta Roe, Richard Roe, and Rachel Roe filed their verified petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief on September 20, 2024. They filed their first amended verified petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief (FAC) on February 13, 2025.
According to the FAC:
Plaintiffs Joan Doe and John Doe (husband and wife) are the parents and guardians of plaintiff Jane Doe, a minor. (FAC, ¶ 10.) Plaintiffs Roberta Roe and Richard Roe (husband and wife) are the parents of plaintiff Rachel Roe, a minor. (Id., ¶ 11.)
Steven Schapansky was employed as a teacher at defendant and respondent Santa Barbara Charter School (the Charter School) from approximately 2017 through June 2024 during which time he regularly hosted on-campus activities for his students. (FAC, ¶ 21.) These activities were promoted by the Charter School and approved by the Santa Barbara School District (the District). (Ibid.) One of those events was a yearly sleep-over in his classroom, during which he would encourage his minor female students to change into or out of their pajamas in his classroom closet, with no parent in attendance. (Ibid.) Schapansky also regularly engaged with students related to student theater events, and in off-campus events. (Ibid.) It was known that he was highly proficient with technology. (Ibid.)
During Schapansky’s employment at the Charter School, he regularly created opportunities to engage with his minor female students, both on and off campus, to establish their trust. (FAC, ¶ 22.) This included sleep-overs with no parent or other adult supervision, of which Charter School and/or District administrative personnel were aware. (Ibid.) The District and the Charter School either knew or should have known, based on staff information and parent complaints or comments, that these unsupervised ongoing and regular contacts with minor female school children were inappropriate, and posed significant danger from Schapansky. (Ibid.)
The District and the Charter School failed to monitor Schapansky for approximately six years while he engaged in ongoing inappropriate contact with minor children and secretly recorded them. (FAC, ¶ 23.)
Schapansky was charged with two felony counts of a lewd or lascivious act upon a child, in violation of Penal Code section 288(a), and seventy counts of unlawful electronic peeping. (FAC, ¶ 24.)
Plaintiffs assert nine causes of action in their FAC: (1) petition for writ of mandamus by all plaintiffs against the District, the Charter School, and Susan Salcido, Superintendent of Schools for Santa Barbara County (the School Defendants); (2) declaratory relief by all plaintiffs against the School Defendants; (3) injunctive relief by all plaintiffs against the School Defendants; (4) negligent hiring, supervision and retention of an unfit employee by plaintiff Jane Doe against the School Defendants (Gov. Code, §§ 815.2, 820); (5) negligent supervision of a minor (Gov. Code §§ 815.2, 820) by plaintiff Jane Doe against the School Defendants; (6) premises liability by plaintiff Jane Doe against the School Defendants; (7) negligent hiring, supervision, and retention of an unfit employee (Gov. Code, §§ 815.2, 820) by plaintiff Rachel Roe against the School Defendants; (8) negligent supervision of a minor (Gov. Code, §§ 815.2, 820) by plaintiff Rachel Roe against the School Defendants; and (9) premises liability by Rachel Roe against the School Defendants.
Analysis:
(1) The Charter School’s Motion to Strike
“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) “Irrelevant matter” includes a “demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subds. (b)(3), (c).) “The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).)
The Charter School argues that portions of the FAC place are argumentative and otherwise place improper duties on it with respect to its school safety plan. As such, the Charter School argues, these allegations should be stricken. The subject allegations are contained in paragraphs 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 42, 43, 44, and 45 and generally relate to: plaintiffs’ claims that the defendants failed to provide the most basic care and supervision to their students despite the fact that it was inconceivable that they could not have realized Schapansky’s conduct was taking place (FAC, ¶¶ 2, 5); that defendants are legally required to enact and to implement certain policies to protect and ensure the safety of the minor children entrusted to them (Id., ¶ 6); requests for relief (id., ¶ 7); the timely filing of plaintiffs’ petition for writ of mandamus (id., ¶ 8); and citations to various portions of the District’s administrative regulations and board policies, as well as the Code of Regulations, California Constitution, and the Education Code (id., ¶¶ 42, 43, 44, 45.)
The Court finds that these allegations are not false, entirely irrelevant to plaintiffs’ claims, or otherwise improper. The background allegations in paragraphs 2, 5, 6, and 7 are supported by the other factual allegations in the pleading. The other allegations relate to plaintiffs’ various theories of liability on the part of the School Defendants and are otherwise pertinent to plaintiffs’ claims. (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subd. (b).)
The Charter School’s motion to strike is therefore denied in its entirety.
(2) The Charter School’s Demurrer
(A) The Standard Governing Demurrers
“‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. ... We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ ... Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Mathews v. Becerra (2019) 8 Cal.5th 756, 768, internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)
(B) Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial Notice
Plaintiffs, in connection with their opposition to the Charter School’s demurrer, as well as the demurrers of the other two defendants (the District and Salcido), request that the Court take judicial notice of the following: (1) The Charter renewal petition; (2) a facilities use agreement between the District and the Charter School; and (3) a memorandum of understanding between the District and the Charter School.
The Charter School only objects to the Court taking judicial notice of the MOU. No other objections have been made with respect to plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice.
The Court denies the request for judicial notice as to all three items as they are not necessary to resolve the issues presented in either the Charter School’s motion to strike, or any of the three demurrers. (Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063, overruled on another point in In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1276,)
(C) The First Cause of Action for Relief in Mandate
Plaintiffs request, in their first cause of action for mandate, that “the Court issue a writ of mandamus: (1) ordering the School Respondents promptly to re-evaluate all school safety plans in the District; (2) requiring inclusion in the re-evaluated safety plans of procedures such as regular facilities inspections or other means to prevent illegal recording of minor children in places for which those minors have an expectation of privacy; (3) requiring submission of such safety plans to this Court for review and approval; (4) retaining jurisdiction and appointing a referee and/or compliance monitor to ensure and report on the implementation of any plans after approval; and (5) ordering further or additional matters as necessary following any reports from the referee and/or compliance monitor.” (FAC, ¶ 52.)
A court may issue a writ of mandate to compel a public agency or officer to perform a mandatory duty. (Ellena v. Department of Ins. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 198, 205.) “In order to construe a statute as imposing a mandatory duty, the mandatory nature of the duty must be phrased in explicit and forceful language.” (Quackenbush v. Superior Court (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 660, 663.)
“This type of writ petition ‘seeks to enforce a mandatory and ministerial duty to act on the part of an administrative agency or its officers.’ ” (The H.N. & Frances C. Berger Foundation v. Perez (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 37, 46.) It cannot be used to control discretion conferred upon a public officer or agency. (Ellena, supra, at p. 205.)
A ministerial act is one that a public functionary is required to perform in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to his or her own judgment or opinion concerning the propriety of such act. (Ellena, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 205.) “While a party may not invoke mandamus to force a public entity to exercise discretionary powers in any particular manner, if the entity refuses to act, mandate is available to compel the exercise of those discretionary powers in some way.” (Ellena, supra, at p. 205.)
To state a cause of action for a writ of mandate, one must plead facts showing (1) a clear duty to act by the defendant, (2) a beneficial interest in the defendant’s performance of that duty, (3) the defendant’s ability to perform the duty, (4) the defendant’s failure to perform that duty or abuse of discretion if acting, and (5) no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy exists. (See Elmore v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 185, 193.)
The Charter School argues that plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that it has a mandatory duty to include specific items within its safety plan, such as regular facilities inspections and the submission of safety plans for court review. (Motion and Demurrer, p. 15.) According to the Charter School, “[w]hile [it] must have a school safety plan and annually review it, it is up to the Charter School to determine the contents of its school safety plan.” (Ibid.)
Plaintiffs allege that the Charter School has mandatory duties requiring it to undertake those matters which are identified in the mandamus relief plaintiffs request. For instance, plaintiffs cite Education Code section 32282 which sets forth those items which must be included in a comprehensive school safety plan. (Opposition, p. 14.) The listed items are not exclusive, however. The statute begins by stating: “The comprehensive school safety plan shall include, but not be limited to, all of the following . . . .” (Ed. Code, § 32282, subd. (a).) Here, plaintiffs argue that the Charter School should have “amplified” its school safety plan in light of the multiple red flags which Schapansky’s conduct raised, the existence of multiple lawsuits alleging sexual predation of minors by school staff in the community, and the fact that premises inspections could be performed inexpensively and were routinely done in the academic community. (Opposition, p. 14, citing FAC ¶¶ 2, 22, 44.)
Plaintiffs also argue that other provisions impose a mandatory duty on the part of the Charter School. They include article 1, section 28 of the California Constitution (the safe schools clause), Penal Code section 11165.7, Education Code sections 44691, 234.1, and 220, California Code of Regulations, title 5, sections 630 and 5530, and Education Code section 44805.
Most of the provisions which plaintiffs cite, however, either do not support mandamus relief at all (because they impose no mandatory duty), or do not support the specific type of relief which plaintiffs request.
For instance, the safe schools clause of the California Constitution does not impose a mandatory duty giving rise to a judicially enforceable right. (Bautista v. State of California (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 716, 729 [“the right to safe schools, just like the right to securing safety in employment, require(s) legislative action to make the constitutional provision operative as a judicially enforceable right”].) As the court in Clausing v. San Francisco Unified School District (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1224, 1237 explained:
“Under article I, section 26, of the California Constitution, all provisions of the state Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise. Unquestionably, section 28, subdivision (c), is mandatory. Thus, all agencies of government are required to comply with it, and are prohibited from taking official actions which violate it or contravene its provisions.
“However, it is an entirely different matter to conclude that section 28, subdivision (c), is self-executing in the sense that it establishes an affirmative duty to act on the part of school districts, provides remedies for its violation, or creates a private cause of action for damages. [Fn] The following rule has been consistently applied in California to determine whether a constitutional provision is self-executing in the sense of providing a specific method for its enforcement: A constitutional provision may be said to be self-executing if it supplies a sufficient rule by means of which the right given may be enjoyed and protected, or the duty imposed may be enforced; and it is not self-executing when it merely indicates principles, without laying down rules by means of which those principles may be given the force of law.
“As stated in the recent opinion of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, in Leger v. Stockton Unified School Dist., [(1988)], 202 Cal.App.3d 1448, with which we are in agreement, section 28(c) declares a general right without specifying any rules for its enforcement. It imposes no express duty on anyone to make schools safe. It is wholly devoid of guidelines, mechanisms, or procedures from which a damages remedy could be inferred. Rather, it merely indicates principles, without laying down rules by means of which those principles may be given the force of law . . . There is nothing in the legislative history of section 28, subdivision (c), to suggest that it was intended to create a civil action for damages or an affirmative duty to [e]nsure that schools are free from all risk of crime and violence. The right proclaimed in section 28, subdivision (c), although inalienable and mandatory, simply establishes the parameters of the principle enunciated; the specific means by which it is to be achieved for the people of California are left to the Legislature.” (Clausing, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 1237, citations, internal quotations, and parallel quotations omitted.)
Education Code sections 32280 to 32289, while imposing a duty to develop a school plan, do not impose a mandatory duty to include certain items in a school safety plan such those which plaintiffs seek to have included here. As the court observed in C.I. v. San Bernardino City Unified School District (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 974, 980, fn. 3:
“Education Code sections 32280-32289 require districts to develop a ‘comprehensive school safety plan that addresses the safety concerns identified through a systematic planning process,’ and that aims at preventing crime and violence on campus. (Ed. Code, § 32280.) While Education Code section 32280 imposes a duty to develop a school safety plan, it leaves implementation to the public entity’s discretion or judgment: ‘It is the intent of the Legislature that all California public schools ... develop a comprehensive school safety plan . . . It is also the intent of the Legislature that all school staff be trained on the comprehensive school safety plan.” (Ibid.) There is no mandatory requirement that a school’s safety plan must include specific action items. (Ed. Code, § 32282, subd. (a)(2)(J).) Rather, the ‘procedures to prepare for active shooters or other armed assailants shall be based on the specific needs and context of each school and community.’ (Ibid.)”
Other statutes which plaintiffs cite in their FAC and in their opposition to the demurrer also do not support all of the mandamus relief they seek. While an injured minor may, under Penal Code section 11165.7, bring a civil action for breach of the duty to report suspected child abuse where a breach of the mandated reporter’s duty to report child abuse causes the minor's injuries (Doe v. Lawndale Elementary School Dist. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 113, 138), this statute does not involve many of the remedies plaintiffs seek in the first cause of action.
Likewise, Education Code sections 44691, 234.1 and 220 are inapplicable to the relief sought in plaintiffs’ first cause of action as these statutes relate to the duty to provide annual training to mandated reporters of child abuse (§ 44691), the Department of Education’s duty to monitor whether local agencies have adopted a policy to prohibit discrimination, harassment, intimidation, and bullying based on specified actual or perceived characteristics (§ 234.1), and a general policy statement of the State of California to afford all persons in public schools equal rights and opportunities (§ 200.)
California Code of Regulations, title 5, section 630, which states that “[g]overning boards, superintendents, principals, and teachers are responsible for the sanitary, neat, and clean condition of the school premises and freedom of the premises from conditions that would create a fire or life hazard,” and section 5530 which provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]ll certificated personnel shall exercise careful supervision of the moral conditions in their respective schools,” are also inapplicable on their face.
Education Code section 44805, which generally declares that “[e]very teacher in the public schools shall enforce the course of study, the use of legally authorized textbooks, and the rules and regulations prescribed for schools,” also does not support the mandamus relief plaintiffs seek here.
Education Code section 47610, known as the mega-waiver statute, exempts charter schools from most of the laws that govern school districts. It also provides that charter schools shall comply with the provisions of set forth in its charter. Plaintiffs fail to show how this provision creates any ministerial duty which they now seek to enforce by mandamus.
In short, plaintiffs fail to allege that most of the relief they seek in the first cause of action is pursuant to any mandatory and ministerial duty on the part of the Charter School.
Despite the foregoing, plaintiffs have stated at least one potential ground for mandamus relief. In this regard, plaintiffs allege, and the Charter School acknowledges (Motion and Demurrer, p. 15), that the Charter School has a duty to evaluate its comprehensive school safety plan at least once a year. (See Motion and Demurrer, p. 15; see also Ed. Code, § 32282, subd. (d).) Further, plaintiffs have alleged that defendants, including the Charter School, have failed to re-evaluate comprehensive school safety plans as required each year. (FAC, ¶¶ 43-45.) Thus, there does appear to be a proper basis for at least one aspect of the relief requested in plaintiffs’ first cause of action. This relates to plaintiff’s request that the Court order defendants “to re-evaluate all school safety plans in the District.” (FAC, ¶ 51.) This request encompasses an order directing the Charter School to reevaluate its own safety plan. While a party may not invoke mandamus to force a public entity to exercise discretionary powers in any particular manner, if the entity refuses to act, mandate is available to compel the exercise of those discretionary powers in some way. (Ballard v. Anderson (1971) 4 Cal.3d 873, 884; Sego v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 250, 255 [“ ‘While mandamus will not lie to compel governmental officials to exercise their discretionary powers in a particular manner, it will lie to compel them to exercise them in some manner’ ”].)
Because a demurrer may not ordinarily be sustained as to a portion of a cause of action (Fire Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 446, 452), the demurrer to the first cause of action is overruled.
(D) Declaratory Relief
A declaratory relief action may be brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 1060:
“Any person ... who desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to another, ... may, in cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, bring an original action ... in the superior court for a declaration of his or her rights and duties ... including a determination of any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or contract.... The declaration may be had before there has been any breach of the obligation in respect to which said declaration is sought.”
A complaint for declaratory relief must set forth facts establishing such an actual controversy and must request the court adjudicate the rights and duties of the parties under dispute. (Columbia Pictures Corp. v. DeToth (1945) 26 Cal.2d 753, 760.) Declaratory judgment is proper where it serves some practical end in stabilizing an uncertain or disputed legal relationship between the parties, such as serving to guide the future conduct of the parties. (Meyer v. Sprint Spectrum L.P. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 634, 647-648.)
Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief includes the following:
“An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between plaintiffs and defendants concerning their respective rights and duties. Specifically, plaintiffs contend that defendants have failed and continue to fail in their duties to protect the minor schoolchildren in their district from predatory and other criminal behavior, and to inspect their premises and monitor their staff, and defendants contend that they have complied fully with their duties.
“A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time under the circumstances in order that plaintiffs and defendants may ascertain their rights and duties as alleged herein. Plaintiffs further seek ancillary injunctive relief as necessary and appropriate.” (FAC, ¶¶ 54, 55, capitalizations altered.)
The Charter School argues that the second cause of action for declaratory relief fails because it does not allege an actual controversy between the parties, and it is duplicative of the first cause of action for mandate relief. (Motion and Demurrer, pp. 16-17.) The Court finds that the second cause of action sets forth an actual controversy between the parties and that it is not unnecessarily duplicative of the first cause of action.
First, and contrary to the Charter School’s argument, the FAC alleges that “[a]n actual controversy has arisen and now exists between” the parties. (FAC, ¶ 54.) This cause of action therefore seeks a declaration with respect to an actual controversy between the parties, and not merely an advisory opinion as to some controversy which may or may not develop in the future.
Second, there is generally no impediment to joining a declaratory relief cause of action with a petition for traditional mandamus. (Californians for Native Salmon & Steelhead Ass’n v. Department of Forestry (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1419, 1428-1429 [declaratory relief is permissible cumulative remedy accompanying traditional mandamus to review “an overarching, quasi-legislative policy set by an administrative agency”].) As was stated in Kirkwood v. California State Automobile Association Inter-Insurance Bureau (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 49, 59-60:
“The remedy of declaratory relief is cumulative and does not restrict other remedies. Moreover, the court’s power to render declaratory relief is discretionary, and it may refuse to exercise the power ‘in any case where its declaration or determination is not necessary or proper at the time under all the circumstances.’ The mere fact that another remedy is available will not suffice as sufficient grounds for a court to decline a declaration, because declaratory relief is not intended to be exclusive or extraordinary. Rather, it is alternative and optional. A court is only justified in refusing a declaration because of the availability of another remedy when it concludes that more effective relief could and should be obtained by another procedure, and for that reason a declaration will not serve a useful purpose. [Citations].”
Accordingly, the demurrer to the second cause of action is overruled.
(E) Injunctive Relief
The Charter School demurs to the third cause of action, contending that injunctive relief is a remedy and not a cause of action. (Motion and Demurrer, p. 17.)
The Court agrees. Injunctive relief is a remedy, not a cause of action. (Roberts v. Los Angeles County Bar Assn. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 604, 618.) This is not to say, however, that plaintiffs are precluded from seeking injunctive relief in this case. Plaintiffs may still obtain injunctive relief if they prevail on a cause of action for which injunctive relief is a remedy. (Id., at p. 66.) Further, a demurrer is not the appropriate vehicle to challenge a portion of a cause of action demanding an improper remedy. (Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1047.)
The Court, therefore, on its own motion strikes the heading as to the third cause of action so that the allegations which follow are deemed to be in addition to the first two causes of action, and part of the relief requested in connection with those causes of action to which the Court has overruled the Charter School’s demurrer.
(F) The Negligence Claims
Plaintiffs’ fifth and eighth causes of action involve claims for negligent supervision of a minor, while the fourth and seventh causes of action are for negligent hiring, supervision and retention of an unfit employee. Plaintiffs bring each cause of action pursuant to sections 815.2 and 820 of the Government Code. Section 820 provides that a public employee is generally “liable for injury caused by his act or omission to the same extent as a private person” except as otherwise provided by statute. (Gov. Code, § 820, subd. (a).) Under section 815.2, “public entities are vicariously liable for the torts of their employees.” (Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972, 980.)
The Charter School argues that these provisions of the Government Code are inapplicable because charter schools such as itself are not public entities for purposes of the Government Claims Act. (Motion and Demurrer, pp. 18-19.) In doing so, the Charter School relies upon Wells v. One2One Learning Foundation (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1164, 1214. (Motion and Demurrer, p. 18.) Plaintiffs do not appear to dispute the inapplicability of the Government Claims Act to charter schools as stated in Wells, supra, but instead assert that “this is form over substance; and that the text of the claims (i.e., the factual allegations and those inferred), not just their titles, should result in the demurrers being overruled.” (Opposition, p. 18.)
The Court finds that the facts as plead in these causes of action sufficiently state negligence claim against the Charter School regardless of whether the Government Claims Act applies to it. The demurrer to the negligence claims as set forth in the fourth, fifth, seventh, and eighth causes of action is therefore overruled.
(G) Premises Liability
The Charter School demurrers to the sixth and ninth causes of action, contending that “both causes of action fail to allege a defective condition of the premises prior to Schapansky’s third-party harmful conduct.” (Motion and Demurrer, p. 19.)
“Broadly speaking, premises liability alleges a defendant property owner allowed a dangerous condition on its property or failed to take reasonable steps to secure its property against criminal acts by third parties.” (Delgado v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1406, fn. 1.)
Plaintiffs here allege that Schapansky secretly recorded minor children, including the minor plaintiffs, in locations where they had a reasonable expectation of privacy. (FAC, ¶¶ 21-23, 43.) Plaintiffs also allege that the School Defendants knew or should have known, based on staff information and parent complaints, that Schapansky was engaging in unlawful behavior with minor female school children, and posed a significant danger to them, requiring the defendants to investigate and monitor his ongoing retention as a teacher. (Id., ¶ 22.)
Further, plaintiffs allege that “premises inspections designed to detect hidden cameras are easily performed by use of inexpensive and available technology, and that such inspections are routinely employed in other arenas and/or local schools such as the University of California Santa Barbara and Santa Barbara City College who have retained law enforcement or private experts to sweep school buildings, classrooms, bathrooms, and other areas for hidden cameras.” (Id., ¶¶ 44-45.)
The Court finds that plaintiffs’ allegations, taken as a whole, are sufficient to state premises liability causes of action against the Charter School.
The demurrer to the sixth and ninth causes of action are therefore overruled.
(3) Salcido’s Demurrer
(A) Salcido Sufficiently Specifies the Grounds for Her Demurrer.
Plaintiffs argue that Salcido’s demurrer fails to meet statutory pleading requirements. (Opposition, pp. 9-10.)
The Code provides that unless the grounds for a demurrer are distinctly specified, it may be disregarded. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.60.) Where there are several grounds for demurrer, each ground must be stated in a separate paragraph. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1320(a).) The demurrer must also state whether the challenge is to the entire pleading or to some specific cause of action therein. (Ibid.)
The Court finds that the demurrer satisfies the foregoing requirements. It sets forth the basis for the demurrer to the entire FAC as well as the grounds for the demurrer to each of the causes of action. That it combines some of the causes of action in a single paragraph is inconsequential. The fourth and seventh causes of action are for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision. They are essentially identical with the only difference being the particular plaintiff who asserts them. The same is true with respect to the fifth and eighth causes of action for negligent supervision of a minor, and the sixth and ninth causes of action for premises liability.
(B) Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
Salcido argues that because plaintiffs’ claims relate to school safety plans, they were required to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to the Uniform Complaint Procedure (UCP) under Education Code sections 33315, subdivision (a)(1)(N), 32289, and California Code of Regulations, Title 5, sections 4610 and 4680 to 4687.
Education Code section 33315, subdivision (a)(1)(N) simply states that the UCP shall apply to school safety plans pursuant to section 32289. Meanwhile, Education Code section 32289, which deals with school safety planning requirements, states that “[a] complaint of noncompliance . . . may be filed with the department under the Uniform Complaint Procedures as set forth in Chapter 5.1 (commencing with Section 4600) of Title 5 of the California Code of Regulations. (Emphasis added.)” Given the permissive language in section 32289, it cannot be said that this statute requires exhaustion prior to the filing of a civil action.
Salcido also fails to demonstrate how exhaustion of administrative remedies is required by California Code of Regulations, title 5, sections 4610 and 4680 to 4687. Specifically, section 4680 states, in pertinent part: “Complaints regarding instructional materials, emergency or urgent facilities conditions that pose a threat to the health or safety of pupils or staff, and teacher vacancy or misassignment shall be filed with the principal of the school, or his or her designee, in which the complaint arises.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 4680, subd. (a).)
Salcido does not explain how the nature of plaintiffs’ claims here, which involve the alleged failure to monitor staff, supervise children, and respond to complaints of inappropriate behavior, involve the type of claims identified in section 4680, i.e., those relating to instructional materials, emergency or urgent facilities conditions, or teacher vacancy or misassignment issues. As such, the Court finds that this regulation does not impose upon plaintiffs any requirement to exhaust their claims as a prerequisite to bringing their civil action.
(C) Mandamus
Salcido argues that (1) plaintiffs have failed to allege a mandatory duty on her part to implement policies to protect and ensure the safety of students (Demurrer, pp. 13-14), (2) the constitutional right to safe schools clause as set forth in article I, section 28 of the California Constitution does not impose upon the District any specific duties or requirements related to any safety issues on school campuses (id., at pp. 15-16), (3) the provisions of the Education Code (sections 32280-32289.5) do “not impose a specific duty to monitor for, or prohibit, hidden cameras planted by employees to surreptitiously record students” (id., at pp. 16-17), and (4) the relief which plaintiffs seek “like the duties upon which they rely, requires broad discretion and is simply not subject to an order of mandate.” (Id., at pp. 17-18.)
To the extent plaintiffs rely upon many of the same statutory provisions and arguments which they raised in connection with their opposition to the Charter School’s demurrer, the Court finds them to be unpersuasive here for all of the reasons already discussed above in relation to the Charter School’s demurrer to this cause of action. Specifically, they do not establish a duty on the part of Salcido to implement any specific points in the school safety plan.
Moreover, plaintiffs’ allegation that Salcido was required to superintend the schools of the county, and to visit and examine each school in the county at reasonable intervals (FAC, ¶ 33) does not warrant the relief they seek here. Plaintiffs cite Education Code section 1240 which sets forth the general duties of the county superintendent of schools, including visiting and examining schools at reasonable intervals, observing the school’s operations, and learning of its problems. (Ed. Code, § 1240, subd. (C)(1).) It does not place upon the superintendent the duty to inspect, investigate, or take any other specific measures to ensure that a teacher at the Charter School is unable to place hidden cameras on school premises.
Nonetheless, and as set forth above in connection with the Charter School’s demurrer, plaintiffs have stated at least one potential ground for mandamus relief, i.e., the alleged failure of all defendants to review, at least annually, school safety plans. (FAC, ¶¶ 43-45, 52.) Salcido fails to explain why she would have no duty in this regard even though Education Code section 32281, subdivision (a) states that “[e]ach school district and county office of education [of which the superintendent is a part] is responsible for the overall development of all comprehensive school plans for its schools . . . .”
The demurrer to the first cause of action is therefore overruled.
(D) Declaratory Relief
Salcido argues that the declaratory relief is improper because plaintiffs “have not. . . alleged any mandatory duty, provided any legal authority for the creation of any mandatory duty, nor alleged facts to support a declaration that Salcido has failed to perform any mandatory duty.” (Demurrer, p. 18.)
However, and as explained above in connection with the Charter School’s demurrer to this cause of action, plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged an actual controversy between the parties. The demurrer to the second cause of action is therefore overruled.
(E) Injunctive Relief
Salcido asserts that the Court should sustain the demurrer to the third cause of action for injunctive relief for a slew of reasons, including her claims that the request for injunctive relief is impermissibly vague, and it would otherwise be impractical, if not impossible, for the Court to review all Charter School safety plans to ensure that they comply with the provisions of the Education Code (Ed. Code, § 32282, subd. (a) and include measures to protect students from predatory criminal behavior. (Demurrer, p. 19.)
It is unnecessary for the Court to address these claims since, as set forth in connection with the Charter School’s demurrer, injunctive relief is a remedy, not a cause of action. It is therefore not subject to demurrer for the reasons discussed above in connection with the Charter School’s demurrer to this cause of action.
(F) Negligent Hiring, Supervision and Retention
Salcido argues that the fourth and seventh causes of action for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention of an unfit employee fail as to her because “[t]here are no factual allegations (nor any Education Code provision) creating a duty (or even a right) [on Salcido’s part] to participate in hiring or supervision decisions related to school employees.” (Demurrer, p. 21.)
A school district and its employees have a special relationship with the district’s pupils, a relationship arising from the mandatory character of school attendance and the comprehensive control over students exercised by school personnel, analogous in many ways to the relationship between parents and their children. (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 869.)
Moreover, superintendents, such as Salcido, have a duty to visit and examine county schools at reasonable intervals, observing the school’s operations, and learning of its problems. (Ed. Code, § 1240, subd. (C)(1).)
Here, plaintiffs have alleged that the defendants, including Salcido, owed them a duty of care to use reasonable measures to protect them from foreseeable harm. (FAC, ¶ 30.) Plaintiffs have further alleged that defendants, including Salcido, knew or reasonably should have known of Schapansky’s unlawful behavior and failed to take proper action. (FAC, ¶¶ 22, 25, 27, 44, 45.) These allegations are sufficient to state a claim for relief.
The demurrer to the fourth and seventh causes of action is therefore overruled.
(G) Negligent Supervision of a Minor
Salcido demurs to the fifth and eighth causes of action for negligent supervision of a minor, claiming that “[t]he same principles and analyses apply to claimants’ fifth and eighth causes of action, for negligent supervision of a minor,” as were set forth in connection with the demurrer to the fourth and seventh causes of action above. (Demurrer, p. 21.)
For the reasons set forth above in connection with the fourth and seventh causes of action, the demurrer to the fifth and eighth causes of action is overruled.
(H) Premises Liability
Salcido argues that the sixth and ninth causes of action for premises liability must be based on statute since she “sued only in her official capacity as County Superintendent of Schools.” (Demurrer, p. 22.) Further, she argues, plaintiffs “have not alleged any facts from which a reasonable conclusion may be drawn that any property was in a ‘dangerous condition,’ ” or that she “had any duty with respect to the condition of the property . . . .” (Demurrer, pp. 22-23.)
As discussed above in connection with the Charter School’s demurrer to these two causes of action, plaintiffs have alleged that all defendants knew or should have known, based on staff information and parent complaints, that Schapansky was engaging in unlawful behavior with minor female school children, and posed a significant danger to them, requiring the defendants to investigate and monitor his ongoing retention as a teacher. (FAC, ¶ 22.) Further, plaintiffs have alleged that “premises inspections designed to detect hidden cameras are easily performed by use of inexpensive and available technology, and that such inspections are routinely employed in other arenas and/or local schools such as the University of California Santa Barbara and Santa Barbara City College who have retained law enforcement or private experts to sweep school buildings, classrooms, bathrooms, and other areas for hidden cameras.” (Id., ¶¶ 44-45.)
However, to the extent these causes of action seek to impose liability upon a public entity or individual acting in his or her capacity as a public employee, plaintiffs are required to allege a proper statutory basis which supports their claims of liability. “[I]n California, ‘all government tort liability must be based on statute.’ ” (Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 925, 932; see Gov. Code, § 815.) Plaintiffs have failed to do so here. The demurrer to the sixth and ninth causes of action is therefore sustained with leave to amend.
(4) The District’s Demurrer
(A) The District Sufficiently Specifies the Grounds for Her Demurrer.
Plaintiffs argue that the District’s demurrer fails to meet statutory pleading requirements. (Opposition, pp. 9-10.) For the reasons set forth above in connection with Salcido’s demurrer, the Court finds that the District sufficiently sets forth the grounds for its demurrer to the FAC.
(B) Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
The District, in asserting that plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, raises essentially the same arguments as did Salcido in her demurrer. For the reasons set forth above in connection with Salcido’s demurrer, the Court overrules the District’s demurrer to the entire FAC on the grounds that plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.
(C) Mandamus
In support of its demurrer to the first cause of action for mandamus, the District argues that plaintiffs have failed to allege a mandatory duty on the part of the District to take steps to ensure the safety of its students (Demurrer, pp. 12-13), the constitutional right to safe schools clause as set forth in article I, section 28 of the California Constitution does not impose upon the District any specific duties or requirements related to any safety issues on school campuses (id., at p. 13), and the provisions of the Education Code (§§ 32280-32282) cited in the FAC do “not impose a specific duty to monitor for, or prohibit, hidden cameras planted by employees to surreptitiously record students” (id., at p. 14).
Plaintiffs, meanwhile, argue that they “have specifically cited, inter alia, California Const., art. I, § 28(f)(1) [safe schools]; Cal. Ed. Code §§ 32280, 32281, 32282 [requiring the District to develop comprehensive school safety plans (‘CSSPs’), to reevaluate the CSSPs annually to ensure they are properly implemented, and to post the CSSPs]; Cal. Penal Code § 11165.7 and Ed. Code §§ 44691, 234.1, 220 [requiring annual training for mandated reporters related to sexual abuse and harassment]; 5 CCR §§ 630, 5530 [School Defendants’ responsibility for freedom from hazardous conditions of school premises]; and Cal. Ed. Code § 44805 [requiring teachers to enforce rules and regulations].” (Opposition, p. 13.)
The demurrer to the first cause of action is overruled for the same reasons as discussed above in connection with the demurrers of the Charter School and Salcido to this cause of action.
(D) Declaratory Relief
Plaintiffs’ allegations in paragraph 54 of the FAC are sufficient to state a claim for declaratory relief without, as the District argues, plaintiffs having alleged mandatory duties. The District cites no authority for the proposition that the existence of one or more applicable mandatory duties is a predicate for maintaining a declaratory relief action against a school district.
The demurrer to the second cause of action is therefore overruled.
(E) Injunctive Relief
In a manner similar to defendant Salcido’s demurrer to the injunctive relief claim, the District argues that plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief is impermissibly vague, and it would otherwise be impractical, if not impossible, for the Court to review all Charter School safety plans to ensure that they comply with the provisions of the Education Code (Ed. Code, § 32282, subd. (a)) and include measures to protect students from predatory criminal behavior. (Demurrer, pp. 17-18.)
Once again, it is unnecessary for the Court to address these claims since, as set forth in connection with the Charter School’s demurrer, injunctive relief is a remedy, not a cause of action. It is therefore not subject to demurrer for the reasons discussed above in connection with the Charter School’s demurrer to this cause of action.
(F) Negligent Hiring, Supervision, or Retention
In C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 869-870 the court explained:
“[A] school district and its employees have a special relationship with the district’s pupils, a relationship arising from the mandatory character of school attendance and the comprehensive control over students exercised by school personnel, analogous in many ways to the relationship between parents and their children. Because of this special relationship, imposing obligations beyond what each person generally owes others under Civil Code section 1714, the duty of care owed by school personnel includes the duty to use reasonable measures to protect students from foreseeable injury at the hands of third parties acting negligently or intentionally. [Fn.] This principle has been applied in cases of employees’ alleged negligence resulting in injury to a student by another student, injury to a student by a nonstudent, and
. . . injuries to a student resulting from a teacher’s sexual assault.” [citations and internal quotations omitted.]
The District recognizes that it can be held liable in appropriate circumstances for negligent hiring, supervision, or retention but argues here that plaintiffs “have only alleged sweeping conclusions,” and have not alleged “facts which, even if true, would give rise to liability” on the District’s part. (Demurrer, pp. 18-19.) The District’s arguments cannot be reconciled with the allegations of the FAC. Among other things, plaintiffs allege that during Schapansky’s employment at the Charter School he regularly created opportunities to engage with his minor female students, both on and off campus, to establish their trust. (FAC, ¶ 22.) This included sleep-overs without parent or other adult supervision. (Ibid.) Plaintiffs further allege that these events were known to the Charter School and/or District administrative personnel. (Ibid.) The District and the Charter School either knew or should have known, based on staff information and parent complaints or comments, that these unsupervised ongoing and regular contacts with minor female school children were inappropriate, and posed significant danger from Schapansky. (Ibid.)
Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficiently specific to support plaintiffs’ fourth and seventh causes of action. The District’s demurrer to these causes of action is therefore overruled.
(G) Negligent Supervision of a Minor
The District does not dispute that it has a duty to exercise due care in supervising students while on school premises. (Demurrer, p. 19, citing J.H. v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 123.) However, the District argues, plaintiffs have not alleged facts from which a reasonable conclusion may be drawn that it knew or should have known of any danger posed by an employee of the Charter School. (Ibid.) As set forth above in connection with the District’s demurrer to the fourth and seventh causes of action, plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged facts showing that the District knew, or reasonably should have known, that the Charter School employee, Schapansky, posed a significant threat to students.
The demurrer to the fifth and eighth causes of action is therefore overruled.
(H) Premises Liability
The District demurrers to the sixth and ninth causes of action, contending that plaintiffs have not alleged any facts from which a reasonable conclusion may be drawn that any property was in a “ ‘dangerous condition.’ ” (Demurrer, p. 19.)
For the reasons set forth above in connection with the Charter School’s demurrer, the Court finds that plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a condition on the premises which represented a danger to minor female students, such as plaintiffs Jane Doe and Rachel Roe. However, and as explained in connection with Salcido’s demurrer to these causes of action, plaintiffs are required to allege a proper statutory basis which supports their claims of liability against a public entity such as the District. They have not done so in their sixth and ninth causes of action.
The demurrer to the sixth and ninth causes of action is therefore sustained with leave to amend.