Salomon Morales vs Dylan Frederic Lyle Martin et al

Case Number

24CV05109

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 09/08/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

CMC; Mtn to Deem Truth of Matters; Mtn to Compel Discovery to Form Roggs, Set One; Mtn to Compel Discovery to RFP, Set One; Mtn to Compel Discovery re Special Roggs, Set One

Tentative Ruling

Salomon Morales v. Dylan Fredric Lyle Martin, et al.

Case No. 24CV05106

           

Hearing Date: September 8, 2025                                                      

HEARING:              (1)       Motion of Plaintiff to Compel re Special Interrogatories

                             (2)       Motion of Plaintiff to Compel re Form Interrogatories

                                    (3)       Motion of Plaintiff to Compel re Requests for Production of Documents

                                    (4)       Motion of Plaintiff to Deem Matters Admitted

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiff Salomon Morales: Sean O’Doherty, Hali Aziz, Yagoubzadeh Law Firm LLP

                                    For Defendants Dylan Martin and Crane Country Day School: Geoffrey P. Norton, Robert P. Mitrovich, Norton & Melnik, APC                               

TENTATIVE RULING:

The motions of plaintiff Salomon Morales to compel responses to special interrogatories, form interrogatories, and requests for production of documents served on defendant Dylan Martin, and to deem matters admitted, are denied. The court awards monetary sanctions for all motions combined in favor of plaintiff Salomon Morales and against defendant Dylan Martin and his counsel Norton & Melnik, APC, jointly and severally in the total amount of $1,740.00, to be paid to counsel for plaintiff on or before October 6, 2025.

Background:

On December 11, 2024, plaintiff Salomon Morales served on defendant Dylan Martin four sets of discovery: form interrogatories, set one, special interrogatories, set one, requests for production of documents, set one, and requests for admission, set one. (Aziz decl., ¶ 7.)

Following extensions, on March 11, 2025, Dylan served unverified responses to the discovery. (Aziz decl., ¶ 12.)

Martin lives in a remote area of Oregon, without email, and is difficult to reach. (Mitrovich decl., ¶ 2.) Martin was unable to provide the signed verification and, in order to provide responses as soon as possible, counsel for Martin initially served unverified responses. (Ibid.)

On April 1, 2025, plaintiff filed these four motions to compel/ deem matters admitted on the grounds that the responses were unverified. The motions also seek awards of attorney fees.

On May 1, 2025, counsel for Martin obtained authority to electronically sign the verification on Martin’s behalf and with his authority. (Mitrovich decl., ¶ 2 & exhibit 2.) Counsel then sent the fully executed electronically signed verifications to plaintiff’s counsel on May 1. (Mitrovich decl., ¶ 3.)

Martin opposes the motions.

In reply, plaintiff argues that the verifications are insufficient.

Analysis:

It is undisputed that the motions were initially served without verifications by Martin and with a notation that verifications were to follow. The remaining substantive issue in each of these motions is whether the verifications provided on May 1 are sufficient under the Civil Discovery Act. For convenience, and except where otherwise stated, the court will discuss this issue in the context of the responses to the special interrogatories.

“The party to whom the interrogatories are directed shall sign the response under oath unless the response contains only objections.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.250, subd. (a).)

The verification to the special interrogatories state:

“I, the undersigned, say:

“I have read the foregoing DEFENDANT’S RESPONSES TO SPECIAL

INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE PROPOUNDED BY PLAINTIFF and know its contents.

“[X] I am a party to this action. The matters stated in it are true of my own knowledge except as to those matters which are stated on information and belief, and as to those matters I believe them to be true. [¶] … [¶]

“Executed on ___May 1, 2025________________________, 2025, in ____Veneta______________, Oregon.

“I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

“______[typescript “Dylan Martin”]__________

“DYLAN MARTIN” (Mitrovich decl., ¶ 2 & exhibit 1.)

There is no dispute that the typescript signature is not a signature in Martin’s own hand.

Martin points to California Rules of Court, rule 2.257, which provides in part:

“An electronic signature is an electronic sound, symbol, or process attached to or logically associated with an electronic record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign a document or record created, generated, sent, communicated, received, or stored by electronic means.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.257(a).)

“When a document to be filed electronically provides for a signature under penalty of perjury of any person, the document is deemed to have been signed by that person if filed electronically provided that either of the following conditions is satisfied:

“(1)      The declarant has signed the document using an electronic signature and declares under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of California that the information submitted is true and correct. If the declarant is not the electronic filer, the electronic signature must be unique to the declarant, capable of verification, under the sole control of the declarant, and linked to data in such a manner that if the data are changed, the electronic signature is invalidated; or

“(2)      The declarant, before filing, has physically signed a printed form of the document. By electronically filing the document, the electronic filer certifies that the original, signed document is available for inspection and copying at the request of the court or any other party. In the event this second method of submitting documents electronically under penalty of perjury is used, the following conditions apply:

“(A)     At any time after the electronic version of the document is filed, any party may serve a demand for production of the original signed document. The demand must be served on all other parties but need not be filed with the court.

“(B)     Within five days of service of the demand under (A), the party or other person on whom the demand is made must make the original signed document available for inspection and copying by all other parties.

“(C)     At any time after the electronic version of the document is filed, the court may order the filing party or other person to produce the original signed document in court for inspection and copying by the court. The order must specify the date, time, and place for the production and must be served on all parties.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.257(b).)

Rule 2.257 is not directly applicable to this issue because rule 2.257 applies “[w]hen a document [is] to be filed electronically.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.257(b).) “The interrogatories and the response thereto shall not be filed with the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.280, subd. (a).)

Instead, the more general Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (Civ. Code, § 1633.1 et seq.) applies. (Civ. Code, §§ 1633.3, subd. (a), 1633.4.) Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.250, subdivision (a) requires that the responding party “sign the response under oath.” “If a law requires a signature, an electronic signature satisfies the law.” (Civ. Code, § 1633.7, subd. (d).) “ ‘Electronic signature’ means an electronic sound, symbol, or process attached to or logically associated with an electronic record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the electronic record. For purposes of this title, a ‘digital signature’ as defined in subdivision (d) of Section 16.5 of the Government Code is a type of electronic signature.” (Civ. Code, § 1633.2, subd. (h).)

Under section 1633.2, subdivision (h), an electronic signature need not be “executed” by the person intending to sign, but may instead be “adopted.” This alternative necessarily means that a different person may execute an electronic signature from the person who adopts the electronic signature.

“An electronic record or electronic signature is attributable to a person if it was the act of the person. The act of the person may be shown in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any security procedure applied to determine the person to which the electronic record or electronic signature was attributable.” (Civ. Code, § 1633.9, subd. (a).) “The effect of an electronic record or electronic signature attributed to a person under subdivision (a) is determined from the context and surrounding circumstances at the time of its creation, execution, or adoption, including the parties’ agreement, if any, and otherwise as provided by law.” (Civ. Code, § 1633.9, subd. (b).)

Here, the evidence from Martin’s counsel is that the electronic signature is attributable to Marin by his act of adoption. This is sufficient evidence for the court to determine that the electronic signature on the verification is effective as Martin’s signature.

(Note: In reply, plaintiff mistakenly asserts that the document was signed by “Veneta,” where Veneta is clearly indicated as the place of signature. (Reply, at pp. 2, 3.))

Because the court finds the electronic signatures sufficient as the signatures of Martin, the motions to compel verifications are moot and will be denied. The substantive sufficiency of the responses was not raised in the moving papers; accordingly, the court does not address any such issue in this motion.

The verifications were not provided until well after these motions were filed. The court therefore finds that monetary sanctions are appropriate. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1348(a) [“The court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though … the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed.”].)

Plaintiff requests $1,560.00 in monetary sanctions for each motion, comprising $1,500 in attorney fees and $60 in filing fees, including reply and appearance time. (Aziz decl., ¶ 16.) Given the duplication and redundancy in the motions, the court finds, and will award, reasonable attorney fees in the total amount of $1,500.00 for all motions plus filing fees in the amount of $240.00, for a total of $1,740.00.