Anel Vides vs Cottage Health et al

Case Number

24CV04835

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 07/07/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

CMC; Motion: Strike First Amended Complaint

Tentative Ruling

Anel Vides v. Cottage Health, et al. 

Case No. 24CV04835

           

Hearing Date: July 7, 2025                                         

HEARING:              Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

                                                           

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiff Anel Vides: Maribel B. Ullrich, Law Offices of            Maribel Ullrich

For Defendants Cottage Health and Pacific Diagnostic        Laboratories, LLC: Keith W. Carlson, Lil G. Delcampo,        Erika A. Iler, Jessica A. Thompson, Carlson & Jayakumar         LLP

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendants’ motion to strike portions of plaintiff’s first amended complaint is granted.

Plaintiff shall file and serve her second amended complaint no later than July 29, 2025.

Background:

This action commenced on September 3, 2024, by the filing of plaintiff Anel Vides (‘plaintiff”) against defendants Cottage Health (“Cottage”) and Pacific Diagnostic Laboratories, LLC (“PDL”) (collectively “defendants”) for: (1) Disability Discrimination in Violation of FEHA; (2) Disability Discrimination – Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process; (3) Failure to Accommodate a Disability in Violation of FEHA; (4) Wrongful Employment Termination; (5) Retaliation; and (6) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

On February 25, 2025, plaintiff filed her first amended complaint (“FAC”) setting forth the same causes of action except that the sixth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is not included.

As alleged in the FAC:

Plaintiff was hired by defendants in November 2014, as a phlebotomist. (FAC, ¶ 8.)

On March 16, 2022, plaintiff suffered a work injury due to being grabbed by a patient that was having blood drawn. (FAC, ¶ 9.) The patient pulled plaintiff by the hand separating plaintiff’s fingers. (Ibid.) The same day, she reported the injury to her supervisor, Steve Silva (“Silva”), who responded by asking her to contact Employee Health. (Ibid.) Plaintiff contacted Employee Health and was sent to Occupational Health by the Workers’ Compensation Case Manager Rose Hatmaker (“Hatmaker”). (Ibid.) Plaintiff was placed off work for two days and provided a note with work restrictions, which was provided to her employer. (Ibid.)

On March 19, 2022, plaintiff returned to work and was placed in a different lab to process blood, to open bags, collect the blood, place the blood in racks, and load the blood into machines. (FAC, ¶ 10.) She worked in this lab for a month before being moved back to the Santa Barbara lab to perform the same duties she was performing prior to her injury, even though doing so caused her pain. (Ibid.) She performed these regular duties until she was taken off work by her employers due to being notified that plaintiff required surgery. (Ibid.) Cottage took plaintiff off work in February 2023, which was one month earlier than the designated surgery date, causing plaintiff to lose her health insurance. (Ibid.) On March 16, 2023, plaintiff underwent the surgery. (Ibid.)

On May 19, 2023, plaintiff was told by Silva and Hatmaker that if she did not return to work in July 2023, her position would no longer be available and that she needed to return to work with no restrictions. (FAC, ¶ 11.)

On May 25, 2023, plaintiff was informed that she was going to transferred to the Alternate Cost Center because she was still out on leave two months post-surgery. (FAC, ¶ 12.) Plaintiff received a letter dated June 12, 2023, that stated: “Your employment status has been reassigned to the Alternate Cost Center as of June 4, 2023, due to your indefinite medical leave. We reviewed that this means the department is not required to continue holding your position and the department will start the process to fill that position.” (Ibid.) Plaintiff was placed in the alternate job search process of 60 days so she could apply for other positions, but she was not hired for any other position. (Ibid.)

Plaintiff was fired, and on January 30, 2024, plaintiff was released to work at full capacity. (FAC, ¶ 12.)

Defendants now move to strike portions of plaintiff’s complaint that pertain to punitive damages.

Plaintiff opposes the motion.

Analysis:

Defendants seek to have stricken from the FAC, the following portions:

1. FAC, ¶ 20, pg. 6, line 28 – pg. 7, line 5: “DEFENDANTS and the employees, officers, directors, and/or managing agents of DEFENDANTS have committed the acts herein alleged maliciously and oppressively, with the wrongful intention of injuring PLAINTIFF, with an improper and intentional motive amounting to malice and in conscious disregard of PLAINTIFF’S rights. Accordingly, PLAINTIFF requests the assessment of punitive damages against DEFENDANTS in an amount appropriate to punish and make an example of it.”

2. FAC, ¶ 28, pg. 8, line 1 – pg. 9, line 5: “DEFENDANTS and the employees, officers, directors, and/or managing agents of DEFENDANTS have committed the acts herein alleged maliciously and oppressively, with the wrongful intention of injuring PLAINTIFF, with an improper and intentional motive amounting to malice and in conscious disregard of PLAINTIFF’S rights. Accordingly, PLAINTIFF requests the assessment of punitive damages against DEFENDANTS in an amount appropriate to punish and make an example of them.”

3. FAC, ¶ 35, pg. 10, lines 14 – 24: “DEFENDANTS’ discrimination against PLAINTIFF because of her disabilities and because of PLAINTIFF’S request for reasonable accommodation was intentionally done in a malicious and oppressive manner, entitling PLAINTIFF to punitive damages. PLAINTIFF alleges that DEFENDANTS by terminating her, and without providing her with reasonable accommodations concerning her disabilities, acted with intent to cause injury or that DEFENDANTS’ conduct was despicable and was done with a willful and knowing disregard of the rights or safety of PLAINTIFF. PLAINTIFF further alleges that DEFENDANTS by terminating her because of her disability, and the treatment of her disability, and because of her request for a reasonable accommodation concerning her disabilities, acted with knowing disregard as they were aware of the probable consequences of their conduct and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.

4. FAC, ¶ 36, pg. 10, line 25 – pg., 11, line 6: “PLAINTIFF further alleges that DEFENDANTS’ termination of her employment because of her disabilities, the treatment of her disabilities and because of her request for a reasonable accommodation concerning her disabilities was despicable as DEFENDANTS’ actions were so vile, base, or contemptible that it would be looked down on and despised by reasonable people. PLAINTIFF further alleges that DEFENDNATS by termination of her employment because of her disabilities, the treatment of her disabilities and because of PLAINTIFF’S request for reasonable accommodation, DEFENDANTS subjected PLAINTIFF cruel and unjust hardship in knowing disregard of PLAINTIFF’S rights. Accordingly, PLAINTIFF, requests the assessment of punitive damages against DEFENDANTS in an amount appropriate to punish and make an example of them.”

5. FAC, ¶ 46, pg. 13, lines 9 – 14: “DEFENDANTS and the employees, officers, directors, and/or managing agents of DEFENDANTS have committed the acts herein alleged maliciously and oppressively, with the wrongful intention of injuring PLAINTIFF, with an improper and intentional motive amounting to malice and in conscious disregard of PLAINTIFF’S rights. Accordingly, PLAINTIFF requests the assessment of punitive damages against DEFENDANTS in an amount appropriate to punish and make an example of them.”

6. FAC, ¶ 55, pg. 14, line 28 – pg. 15, line 5: “DEFENDANTS and the employees, officers, directors, and/or managing agents of DEFENDANTS have committed the acts herein alleged maliciously and oppressively, with the wrongful intention of injuring PLAINTIFF, with an improper and intentional motive amounting to malice and in conscious disregard of PLAINTIFF’S rights. Accordingly, PLAINTIFF requests the assessment of punitive damages against DEFENDANTS in an amount appropriate to punish and make an example of them.”

7. Prayer, ¶ 4, pg. 15, line 14: “For exemplary and punitive damages according to proof.”

“Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).) In ruling on a motion to strike, a court may “strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading” or “strike  all or part of any pleading not filed in conformity with applicable law, court rules, or an order of the court” (Code Civ. Proc., §436.) The grounds for a motion to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or from matters which the court may take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).)

Here, plaintiff asks this court to consider extrinsic evidence. Doing so would be improper as, at the pleading stage, the court is only concerned with defects that appear on the face of the complaint. The court will disregard the extrinsic evidence.

To survive a motion to strike allegations of punitive damages, ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pleaded. (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) In addition, the facts and circumstances constituting the claim for punitive damages must be set forth “with sufficient particularity to apprise the opposite party of what he is called on to answer, and to enable the court to determine whether, on the facts pleaded, there is any foundation [for the claim].” (Lehto v. Underground Construction Company (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 933, 944.)

Under Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a), punitive damages are recoverable where it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with malice, oppression, or fraud. “Malice” means “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) “Oppression” means “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(2).)

While the term “despicable” is not defined in Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (c), the term includes “circumstances that are ‘base,’ ‘vile,’ or ‘contemptible.’ [Citation.]” (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(3).)

“In addition to the requirement that the operative complaint set forth the elements as stated in section 3294, it must include specific factual allegations showing that defendant’s conduct was oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious to support a claim for punitive damages. (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.)  Punitive damages may not be pleaded generally. (Ibid.)” (Today’s IV, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1193.)

Both named defendants are alleged to be plaintiff’s employers. (FAC, ¶ 8)

“An employer shall not be liable for [exemplary] damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).)

Here, taking the complaint as a whole, plaintiff has failed to plead as required. She has failed to identify any officer, director, or managing agent, for either defendant, that acted with malice, oppression, or fraud, or that either defendant authorized or ratified any wrongful conduct. She has also failed to plead, with specificity beyond conclusory statements, that either defendant had advance knowledge of the unfitness of any employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. Finally, plaintiff has failed to adequately specify which acts she contends constituted “despicable” behavior.

As there is a reasonable probability that the FAC is capable of amendment to state facts sufficient to support a prayer for exemplary damages, defendants’ motion to strike will be granted with leave to amend.