Adriana Salvatierra vs Sunfresh Flowers LLC

Case Number

24CV04737

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 08/22/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

CMC; Motion: Pre-Certification Discovery

Tentative Ruling

(1) For the reasons set forth herein, the motion of plaintiff for pre-certification discovery re new class representative is continued to September 19, 2025.

(2) On or before September 5, 2025, the parties shall meet and confer, fully and in good faith in accordance with this ruling, to discuss and agree to an appropriate procedure for conducting precertification discovery to ascertain a suitable substitute class representative as requested in the present motion of plaintiff. To the extent the parties agree to a procedure for conducting the precertification discovery discussed herein, the parties shall, on or before September 10, 2025, file joint or individual status reports notifying the court of the parties’ agreement, and lodge an agreed upon proposed order for the court’s review.

(3) To the extent the parties meet and confer efforts fail to result in an agreed upon procedure for conducting precertification discovery to ascertain a suitable class representative, the parties shall each, on or before September 10, 2025, file and serve individual status reports describing in full that party’s efforts to meet and confer in accordance with this ruling, and a procedure proposed by that party for conducting precertification discovery to ascertain a substitute class representative. The parties shall also each lodge a proposed order for the court’s review.

Background:

On August 27, 2024, plaintiff Adriana Salvatierra (Salvatierra) filed a complaint against defendant Sunfresh Flowers, LLC dba Maximum Flowers (Sunfresh), alleging eight causes of action: (1) failure to pay minimum wages for all hours worked; (2) failure to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods; (5) failure to indemnify necessary business expenses; (6) failure to pay wages of discharged employees – waiting time penalties; (7) failure to provide and maintain accurate and compliant wage records; and (8) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq.

On November 4, 2024, without any response to the complaint having been filed by Sunfresh, Salvatierra filed a first amended class and representative action complaint (the FACC), which is the operative pleading. The FACC alleges the same eight causes of action described above, and adds a ninth cause of action for civil penalties under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), codified as Labor Code section 2698 et seq. As alleged in the FACC:

Salvatierra worked for Sunfresh as a Packer from 2020 to November 2023. (FACC, ¶¶ 1, 8, & 14.) Sunfresh classified Salvatierra, who was typically scheduled to work 8 hours a day and 5 days a week, as a non-exempt employee. (FACC, ¶ 14.) During the time Salvatierra worked for Sunfresh, Sunfresh maintained a systematic, company-wide policy and practice under which Sunfresh failed to pay Salvatierra minimum and overtime wages, failed to provide or permit meal and rest periods, failed to maintain accurate records of hours worked and meal periods, failed to timely pay wages to terminated employees, failed to reimburse necessary business expenses, and failed to furnish accurate wage statements. (FACC, ¶¶ 1, 5(a)-(g), & 15-21.)

Salvatierra brings first through eighth causes of action individually and on behalf of all other persons who were employed by Sunfresh as hourly-paid, non-exempt employees in California, at any time during the period beginning four years before the filing of the initial complaint in this action. (FACC, ¶¶ 2 & 24.) Salvatierra brings the ninth cause of action individually and a representative on behalf of the State of California and all other persons who have been employed by Sunfresh during the applicable statute of limitations period under PAGA. (FACC, ¶ 3.)

Sunfresh filed an answer to the FACC on December 6, 2024, generally denying its allegations and asserting forty-four affirmative defenses.

On March 25, 2025, Salvatierra filed a motion for an order authorizing pre-certification discovery to permit Salvatierra to identify a new and suitable class representative. In the notice of the present motion, Salvatierra asserts that the motion is brought pursuant to the holding in La Sala v. American Sav. & Loan Assn. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 864. (Notice at p. 1, ll. 9-13.)

Salvatierra’s motion is supported by a declaration of her counsel, Jacquelyne VanEmmerik (VanEmmerik), who states that on December 5, 2024, the parties met and conferred to confirm that Salvatierra did not sign an arbitration agreement, to discuss a tentative agreement to engage in an informal exchange of data and documents, and to explore the feasibility of resolving this action through private mediation. (VanEmmerik Decl., ¶ 3.) On January 22, 2025, the parties met and conferred regarding Sunfresh’s request for an early evaluation conference pursuant to Labor Code section 2699.3, subdivision (c), and the possibility of pursuing private mediation. (VanEmmerik Decl., ¶¶ 5-6.)

According to VanEmmerik, on January 28, 2025, counsel for Sunfresh emailed Salvatierra’s counsel a copy of an individual settlement agreement (the settlement agreement) executed by Salvatierra and Sunfresh which contained a general release of claims. (VanEmmerik Decl., ¶ 7 & Exh. 1 [email], Exh. 2 [settlement agreement in Spanish] & Exh. 3 [English translation of settlement agreement].) Prior to this email, Salvatierra’s counsel was not notified about the settlement agreement or any negotiations which led to that agreement. (VanEmmerik Decl., ¶ 7.)

VanEmmerik further states that on February 13, 2025, counsel for the parties met and conferred as to whether Sunfresh would agree to provide to Salvatierra a class list for the purpose of finding a new class representative, which Sunfresh’s counsel refused to provide. (VanEmmerik Decl., ¶ 9.) VanEmmerik asserts that Salvatierra was left with no choice but to proceed with the present motion. (Ibid.)

The motion is opposed by Sunfresh. In support of its opposition, Sunfresh submits a declaration of its counsel, Christina M. Behrman (Behrman). Behrman states that she reviewed a “Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) Case Search” that is available on the State of California Department of Individual Relations webpage, and which, according to Behrman, shows the number of PAGA notices submitted by Salvatierra’s counsel to the Labor & Workforce Development Agency (the LWDA) from August 1, 2024, through June 26, 2025. (Behrman Decl., ¶¶ 2-3 & Exhs. A-B.)

Analysis:

“In the absence of privilege, the right to discovery in this state is a broad one, to be construed liberally so that parties may ascertain the strength of their case and at trial the truth may be determined. [I]n non-PAGA class actions, the contact information of those a plaintiff purports to represent is routinely discoverable as an essential prerequisite to effectively seeking group relief, without any requirement that the plaintiff first show good cause. Nothing in the characteristics of a PAGA suit, essentially a qui tam action filed on behalf of the state to assist it with labor law enforcement, affords a basis for restricting discovery more narrowly.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 538.)

Further, “[d]iscovery to ascertain a suitable class representative is proper. [Citation.] ‘[S]hould the trial court conclude that plaintiff cannot suitably represent the class, it should afford [her] “the opportunity to amend [her] complaint, to redefine the class, or to add new individual plaintiffs, or both, in order to establish a suitable representative.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Thus this use of discovery furthers [plaintiff’s] interest....

“To exercise its discretion, ‘the trial court must ... expressly identify any potential abuses of the class action procedure that may be created if the discovery is permitted, and weigh the danger of such abuses against the rights of the parties under the circumstances.’ [Citation.]” (Best Buy Stores, L.P. v. Superior Court (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 772, 779; see also Pirjada v. Superior Court (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1084 (Pirjada) [discussing the “balancing test” a trial court must apply].)

Undisputed available information and evidence appearing in the present record suggests or indicates that Salvatierra and Sunfresh “resolved their dispute directly.” (VanEmmerik Decl., Exh. 1 [Jan. 28, 2025, email].) The available information and evidence also shows that the settlement agreement was executed by Salvatierra and Sunfresh on January 23, 2025. (VanEmmerik Decl., Exh. 2 at pdf p. 11; Exh. 3 at pdf p. 16.)

The undisputed record further reflects that, pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement, Sunfresh agreed to pay Salvatierra the amount of $8,000. (VanEmmerik Decl., Exh. 3, ¶ 12.) Salvatierra also acknowledges in the settlement agreement that Sunfresh “has already paid her all wages and compensation owed” as of the date Salvatierra signed that agreement, and that Salvatierra “is not owed any additional wages, overtime, meal or rest break premiums, vacation pay, holiday pay, sick leave, expenses, bonuses, or any other form of compensation related to her employment with [Sunfresh].” (VanEmmerik Decl., Exh. 3, ¶¶ 9-10.) The settlement agreement includes a general release by Salvatierra of claims for, among other things, unpaid wages. (VanEmmerik Decl., Exh. 3, ¶¶ 13-14.)

Though, for present purposes, the present record indicates or suggests that Salvatierra is or may no longer be qualified to serve as a class representative (see Pirjada, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1083), “[c]lass actions rest on considerations of equity and justice.” (Starbucks Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 820, 825 (Starbucks).) “When a plaintiff sues on behalf of a class, he assumes a fiduciary obligation to the members of the class, surrendering any right to compromise the group action in return for an individual gain. Even if the named plaintiff receives all the benefits that he seeks in the complaint, such success does not divest him of the duty to continue the action for the benefit of others similarly situated.” (La Sala v. American Sav. & Loan Assn. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 864, 871 (La Sala).)

In addition, to the extent Salvatierra no longer represents the class as a result of the settlement agreement, Salvatierra should be granted “an opportunity to amend their complaint to redefine the class or to add additional representatives.” (La Sala, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 874.) At this stage of the proceedings, there is no information or evidence to show that the complaint cannot be amended to establish a suitable representative. Furthermore, to the extent any future amendment to the complaint “fails to establish a suitable representative, the court should not dismiss the action on this ground without undertaking such measures as it may direct to notify the members of the class.” (Ibid.)

Relevant here, to the extent a defendant settles with individual class members and files a motions to dismiss the action, “only members of the class who can afford to initiate or join litigation will obtain redress; relief for even a portion of the class would compel innumerable appearances by individual plaintiffs. Yet the function of the class action is to avoid the imposition of such burdens upon the class and upon the court. [Citation.] If we sanction [that defendant’s] tactic defendants can always defeat a class action by the kind of special treatment accorded plaintiffs here and thus deprive other members of the class of the benefits of the litigation and any notice of opportunity to enter into it.” (La Sala, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 873.)

Moreover, “our Supreme Court definitively ruled that unnamed class members are ‘parties’ for purposes of discovery.” (National Solar Equipment Owners’ Assn. v. Grumman Corp. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1273, 1281-1282.)

For all reasons discussed above, there exist potential benefits in this litigation which are available to the class alleged in the complaint. To the extent there exist grounds to dismiss this action based on the settlement agreement between Salvatierra and Sunfresh, allowing precertification discovery to identify a substitute class representative will make these benefits available to the putative class by permitting Salvatierra the opportunity to amend the complaint to add that representative. In addition, permitting precertification discovery for the purposes further discussed above would avoid imposing burdens on individual members of the class who cannot afford to initiate separate litigation or join this litigation. Sunfresh also does not appear to dispute that members of the class are entitled to notice before the court may dismiss this action based on the settlement agreement.

For all reasons discussed above, the present record is sufficient to show that precertification discovery to ascertain the identity of a suitable substitute class representative would further Salvatierra’s interests, including with respect to an opportunity to amend the complaint to add a suitable class representative plaintiff.

Though precertification discovery appears warranted under the circumstances present here, “[p]recertification class discovery is not a matter of right.” (Starbucks, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 825.) In ruling on the present motion, “in addition to applying the normal rules governing discovery motions, the trial court must also expressly identify any potential abuses of the class action procedure that may be created if the discovery is permitted....” (Parris v. Superior Court (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 285, 300-301.)

To show a potential for abuse of the class action procedure which may be created if the court permits the precertification discovery requested in the motion, Sunfresh contends that Salvatierra’s counsel is “likely filing boilerplate class actions in the dozens” based on the results of the “Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) Case Search” described in the Behrman declaration and above. Absent information or evidence showing that these purported “boilerplate” actions, or the PAGA notices further described above, are in any respects related to this action, this argument, which is conclusory and speculative, fails to show any potential for abuse of the class action procedure in this case.

Sunfresh also relies on several unrelated trial court rulings denying similar motions. “[A] written trial court ruling has no precedential value.” (Santa Ana Hospital Medical Center v. Belshe (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 819, 831 (Santa Ana).) “A trial court judgment cannot properly be cited in support of a legal argument, absent exceptions not applicable here.” (San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. v. County of San Diego (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1184 (San Diego).) The isolated rulings relied on by Sunfresh which the record reflects were entered in unrelated cases, are not binding, have no precedential value, and are not citable authority. The court does not consider unrelated trial court rulings in its analysis.

The remaining points advanced by Sunfresh regarding the early stage of these proceedings, the status of discovery, and the employment dispute alleged in the complaint, among other things, are also not persuasive.

By way of example, considering the nature of the claims alleged in the complaint, Sunfresh fails to explain why precertification discovery would necessarily include inquiries into any disability, medical condition, or other sensitive information of any former or current employees of Sunfresh. (Cf. CVS Pharmacy, Inc. v. Superior Court (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 300, 313 [precertification discovery that would inquire as to whether or not an employee was disabled “under cut the benefits” of that discovery]; see also Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360, 372 [precertification notice did not implicate an invasion of privacy].)

In addition, considering that the precertification discovery at issue in this proceeding ostensibly involves only the identities and locations of Sunfresh employees who are potential class members with respect to the purported employment or wage practices alleged in the complaint, “their identities and locations are properly discoverable.” (Belaire-West Landscape, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 554, 562.) To the extent there exists a reasonable expectation of privacy in an employee’s identity or contact information, Sunfresh also fails to explain why these privacy concerns could not be addressed by permitting employees to opt out of any disclosure of that employee’s identity or contact information. (Ibid.)

For all further reasons discussed above, Sunfresh has failed to show the existence of a potential for abuse of the class action procedure if the court grants the motion and permits precertification discovery for the purpose of ascertaining a suitable class representative in place of Salvatierra.

Considering the rights and duties of the parties and the court under the circumstances present here, the risk that members of the class may be deprived of the benefits of and any notice or opportunity to enter into this litigation if precertification discovery is disallowed, and Salvatierra’s broad right to conduct appropriate discovery to identify a suitable substitute class representative, among other things, the court agrees that, on balance, precertification discovery to ascertain a substitute representative for the putative class is appropriate under the circumstances present here. (See also Pirjada, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1087 [noting that the assumption of a fiduciary duty to class members may require a plaintiff to assist in efforts to find a substitute class representative].)

Though the court agrees that the precertification discovery proposed in the motion and further described above is appropriate and warranted, Salvatierra fails to describe or propose a procedure for conducting that precertification discovery. The court requires a complete record on which to determine the present motion. Therefore, and for all reasons discussed above, the court will continue the hearing on the motion to permit the parties to meet and confer as to an appropriate procedure for conducting precertification discovery to ascertain the identity of class members who may be suitable substitute plaintiffs in place of Salvatierra in this action. The court expects that the parties will meet and confer fully and in good faith.

To the extent the parties’ meet and confer efforts result in an agreement as to an appropriate procedure for conducting precertification discovery to ascertain a suitable substitute class representative, the court will further order the parties to file joint or individual status notifying the court of the parties’ agreement, and to lodge a proposed order for the court’s review.

To the extent the parties, notwithstanding their efforts to meet and confer, are unable to reach an agreement as to an appropriate procedure for conducting the precertification discovery described above, the court will require the parties to each file and serve individual status reports describing in full that parties’ efforts to meet and confer as required herein, and that party’s proposed procedure for conducting precertification discovery to obtain the identity of class members who may be suitable substitute class representatives in this action. The court will also require the parties to each lodge a proposed order for the court’s review.

Sunfresh’s request for judicial notice:

In support of its opposition to the motion, Sunfresh requests that the court take judicial notice of a minute order entered in Orange County Superior Court case number 30-2023-01303678-CU-OE-CXC entitled Bailey v. Golden Age Companions, LLC; a minute order entered in Orange County Superior Court case number 30-2019-01071977 entitled Hernandez v. Orange Corrosion Services Inc., and a minute order entered in Merced County Superior Court case number 21-CV-04121 entitled Avel Blanco v. Kandola Farms Produce, Inc., et al. (Sunfresh RJN, ¶¶ 1-3 & Exhs. A-C.)

Noted above, Sunfresh fails to explain why the minute orders described above relate to the present action. As further discussed herein, these written trial court rulings have no precedential value, and cannot be cited in support of the arguments advanced by Sunfresh in opposition to the present motion. (Santa Ana, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 831; San Diego, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 1184.) For these and all further reasons discussed above, and as the court does not consider unrelated trial court decisions in its analysis, the court will deny Sunfresh’s request for judicial notice of the minute orders described above.