Maria Santana vs General Motors LLC

Case Number

24CV04386

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 06/13/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion to Compel

Tentative Ruling

For the reasons set forth herein:

1. The hearing on plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to request for production of documents, set one, is continued to July 11, 2025, at 10:00 a.m.

2. Counsel for both parties are ordered to engage in a meaningful meet and confer process and attempt, in good faith, to resolve the dispute, or narrow the issues, no later than June 20, 2025, and to conduct follow-up meet and confer meetings if necessary.

3. Counsel for both parties are ordered to file a joint status report, no later than June 30, 2025, that sets forth their efforts to resolve the dispute, proposed modifications to any of the requests, and any aspects of the present motion that counsel were unable to resolve, along with each parties’ specific position as to each remaining request.

4. Any failure to meet and confer, or failure to file the joint status report, will result in the court issuing an Order to Show Cause as to why counsel should not be sanctioned for failure to comply with the order.

Background:

This action commenced on August 7, 2024, by the filing of the complaint by plaintiff Maria Santana (“plaintiff”) against defendant General Motors, LLP (“defendant”) for: (1) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranty; (2) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Implied Warranty; and (3) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act Section 1793.2.

By way of the complaint, plaintiff alleges that she purchased a 2022 Chevrolet Camaro, that was covered by warranties, on December 6, 2022. (Compl., ¶¶ 8, 9.) The Camaro was delivered to plaintiff with defects and nonconformities including defects to the electrical, engine, transmission, emission, and suspension system. (Compl., ¶ 10.)

On April 1, 2024, plaintiff first presented the vehicle for repairs and reported oil leakage and an illuminated SRS light. (Compl., ¶ 11.) Plaintiff presented the vehicle again, on three separate dates, for additional issues. (Compl., ¶¶ 12-14.)

Defendant was unable to conform the Camaro to the warranty after a reasonable number of attempts and failed to either promptly replace the Camaro or make restitution in accordance with the Song-Beverly Act. (Compl., ¶¶ 29-29.)

On September 9, 2024, defendant filed its answer to the complaint with a general denial and 24 affirmative defenses.

On November 13, 2024, plaintiff propounded requests for production of documents, set one (“RFPs”), on defendant. (Yang Decl., ¶ 17.)

On December 17, 2024, defendant responded to the RFPs. (Yang Decl., ¶ 21 & Exh. 6.)

On February 18, 2025, plaintiff’s counsel sent defense counsel a meet and confer letter, basically demanding that defendant withdraw all of its objections and provide further responses to most of the RFPs. (Yang Decl., ¶ 27 & Exh. 10.)

Two days later, on February 21, 2025, plaintiff’s counsel sent a follow-up email to defense counsel. (Yang Decl., ¶ 31 & Exh. 31.)

Also on February 21, 2025, plaintiff filed the present motion to compel further responses to requests Nos. 7, 8, and 23 through 31.

Defendant opposes the motion.

Analysis:

            Preliminary Issues

Motion papers must comply with the formatting requirements of the California Rules of Court. Specifically, “[u]nless they are submitted by a self-represented party, electronic exhibits must include electronic bookmarks with links to the first page of each exhibit and with bookmark titles that identify the exhibit number or letter and briefly describe the exhibit.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1110 (f)(4).)

“We recognize that it is very common for [attorneys] to include argument in their declarations (we know it is done all the time, and we do not want to single out the trial lawyers in this regard), but it is a sloppy practice which should stop. Even at its most benign, it is a practice that forces the trial and appellate courts, and opposing counsel, to sort out the facts that are actually supported by oath from material that is nothing more than the statement of an opinion ostensibly under oath. More fundamentally, however, it makes a mockery of the requirement that declarations be supported by statements made under penalty of perjury. The proper place for argument is in points and authorities, not declarations.” (In re Marriage of Heggie (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 28, 30, fn. 3.)

In addition to the argument contained in the declaration of plaintiffs’ counsel, she makes multiple representations based on her review of records and conversations with others. An attorney is competent to recite events occurring during the course of the litigation. An attorney’s declaration of what the client’s testimony would be, based on the attorney’s discussion with the client and an investigation of the facts, is not competent. (See Donnelly v. Ayer (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 978, 984.)

The declaration of plaintiff’s counsel, including exhibits, is 163 pages long and is not properly bookmarked. Further, the declaration of plaintiff’s counsel is replete with legal argument and matters of which plaintiff’s counsel would have no personal knowledge.

The declaration of defendant’s counsel also contains improper argument.

Counsel for both parties are reminded of their obligation to comply with the California Rules of Court and other legal authorities for any future filings with this court.

            Standard on Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production

“Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with this title, any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action. Discovery may be obtained of the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter, as well as of the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any document, electronically stored information, tangible thing, or land or other property.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.)

“A trial court must be mindful of the Legislature’s preference for discovery over trial by surprise, must construe the facts before it liberally in favor of discovery. . .” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 540.)

Code of Civil Procedure, section 2031.010 provides, in pertinent part:

“(a) Any party may obtain discovery . . . by inspecting, copying, testing, or sampling documents, tangible things, land or other property, and electronically stored information in the possession, custody, or control of the party on whom the demand is made.

“(b) A party may demand that any other party produce and permit the party making the demand, or someone acting on the demanding party’s behalf, to inspect and to copy a document that is in the possession, custody, or control of the party on whom the demand is made.”

“The party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling has been directed shall respond separately to each item or category of item by any of the following:

“(1) A statement that the party will comply with the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling by the date set for the inspection, copying, testing, or sampling . . .

“(2) A representation that the party lacks the ability to comply with the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of a particular item or category of item, or

“(3) An objection to the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.210, subd. (a).)

Code of Civil Procedure, section 2031.240, provides:

“(a) If only part of an item or category of item in a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is objectionable, the response shall contain a statement of compliance, or a representation of inability to comply with respect to the remainder of that item or category.

“(b) If the responding party objects to the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of an item or category of item, the response shall do both of the following:

“(1) Identify with particularity any document, tangible thing, land, or electronically stored information falling within any category of item in the demand to which an objection is being made.

“(2) Set forth clearly the extent of, and the specific ground for, the objection. If an objection is based on a claim of privilege, the particular privilege invoked shall be stated. If an objection is based on a claim that the information sought is protected work product under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 2018.010), that claim shall be expressly asserted.

“(c)(1) If an objection is based on a claim of privilege or a claim that the information sought is protected work product, the response shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim, including, if necessary, a privilege log.

“(2) It is the intent of the Legislature to codify the concept of a privilege log as that term is used in California case law. Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to constitute a substantive change in case law.”

A motion to compel further responses to a demand for production of documents “shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) To establish good cause, the burden is on the moving party to make a “fact-specific showing of relevance.” (Glenfed Development Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117.) (“Glenfed”) Once good cause is established by the moving party, the burden then shifts to the responding party to justify any objections made to document disclosure. (See Hartbrodt v. Burke (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 168, 172-174.)

            Meet and Confer

“ ‘The Discovery Act requires that, prior to the initiation of a motion to compel, the moving party declare that he or she has made a serious attempt to obtain ‘ “an informal resolution of each issue.” ’ [Citations.] This rule is designed ‘ “to encourage the parties to work out their differences informally so as to avoid the necessity for a formal order. . . .” ’ [Citation.] This, in turn, will lessen the burden on the court and reduce the unnecessary expenditure of resources by litigants through promotion of informal, extrajudicial resolution of discovery disputes. [Citations.]’ ” [Citation.]” (Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1293.)

“A meet and confer declaration in support of a motion shall state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040.) “A determination of whether an attempt at informal resolution is adequate . . . . involves the exercise of discretion.”  (Stewart v. Colonial Western Agency, Inc. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1016.)

As noted above, defendant served responses to the RFP’s on December 17, 2024.

Plaintiff sent a 23 page meet and confer letter to defendant on February 18, 2025. The letter primarily takes issue with defendant’s objections. (Yang Decl., Exh. 10.)

No explanation is given as to why plaintiff waited two months after receiving the responses before initiating meet and confer efforts.

Plaintiff sent a follow-up email on February 21, 2025, stating: “Good morning. Kindly follow up on our meet and confer request here.” (Yang Decl., Exh. 11.)

Plaintiff filed the present motion the same day as the follow-up email, which was only three days after the initial meet and confer letter.

Given the circumstances present here, plaintiff has failed to show “a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” It is not reasonable to expect resolution of a discovery dispute, with this many issues, to be resolved in three days, nor is it reasonable to assume that the attorney responsible for the responses is necessarily going to be available to meet and confer in such a short amount of time. This is especially true given that plaintiff did not even attempt to meet and confer until two months after receiving the responses.

As some of the requests, if clarified or limited, should be further responded to, the court will continue the hearing on the motion and order the parties to meet and confer in good faith. Counsel will also be ordered to file a joint status report that sets forth their efforts to resolve the dispute, proposed modifications to any of the requests, and any aspects of the present motion that counsel were unable to resolve along with each parties’ specific position as to each remaining request. Any failure to meet and confer, or failure to file the joint status report, will result in the court issuing an Order to Show Cause as to why counsel should not be sanctioned for failure to comply with the order.

In order to facilitate a productive meet and confer process, the court makes the following observations regarding the requests and responses:

Some of the requests contain language that is patently vague and ambiguous. For example, Request No. 7 reads: “Produce all DOCUMENTS that refer or relate to all diagnostic trouble codes that are electronically stored by YOU or YOUR authorized repair facility as a result of any inspections or repairs conducted on the SUBJECT VEHICLE.” (Italics added.) In this context, “refer or relate” could encompass almost anything. The request needs to be more narrowly tailored, and plaintiff needs to state exactly what it is that is being asked for.

On the other hand, some of the responses contain objections which are unjustified. For example, Request No. 8 reads: “Produce all DOCUMENTS, including recalls, technical service bulletins, and dealer advisories that were issued for the SUBJECT VEHICLE. [This request requires that the responding party produce the entire document. A production that only lists the name, number, and/or title of the documents will not be responsive to this request].” In response, defendant makes several improper boilerplate objections and then, essentially, states that it will produce a list and then, maybe, “a reasonable number of TSBs and ISBs . . ..” Defendant is not justified in refusing to produce the requested documents. The request is clear and seeks documents that are, at the very least, reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

The above two examples are not exhaustive. Counsel for both parties should discuss each disputed request in detail and make a good-faith effort at resolution.

It is also worth noting that defendant’s argument regarding the scheduled hearing on its motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication, is not persuasive, or even relevant to this discovery dispute. That motion has yet to be decided and has no bearing on this discovery motion. No matter how confident a party is that they will prevail on a dispositive motion, it does not excuse them from properly responding to discovery in the meantime.

“Civil discovery is intended to operate with a minimum of judicial intervention. “ ‘[I]t is a ‘ “central precept” ’ of the Civil Discovery Act . . . that discovery ‘ “be essentially self-executing[.]” ’ ” [Citations.]” (Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390.)

Counsel for both parties are experienced in this type of litigation and have been involved in many similar discovery disputes. The court believes that both counsel understand what is properly discoverable, and that they are capable of resolving this dispute, or significantly narrowing the issues, without further court intervention.