Gayle C. Aruta and John C. de Sulima Przyborowski v. Inna Vladimirovna Cook

Case Number

24CV04385

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 07/02/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Demurrer of Defendant to First Amended Complaint

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiffs Gayle C. Aruta and John C. de Sulima Przyborowski: James F. Scafide, Tyler J. Sprague, Figueroa Law Group, LLP

                                   

For Defendant Inna Vladimirovna Cook: Miguel A. Avila, Sanger Law Firm, P.C.    

RULING

For the reasons set forth herein, the demurrer of Defendant Inna Vladimirovna Cook to Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint is sustained, with leave to amend, as to the complaint as a whole and to each cause of action therein. Plaintiffs shall file and serve their second amended complaint on or before July 17, 2025.

The trial date of 10/1/25 is confirmed.

Background

As alleged in Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint (FAC):

Trella H. McCartor, a senior or dependent adult, lives alone in Santa Barbara. (FAC, ¶¶ 1, 18.) Plaintiffs Gayle C. Aruta, who lives in San Diego, and John C. de Sulima Przyborowski, who lives in Los Angeles, are McCartor’s sister and brother, respectively. (FAC, ¶ 1.)

Defendant Inna Vladimirovna Cook is a neighbor of McCartor. (FAC, ¶ 10.)

Starting in 2020 but no later than April 2022, Cook began, and became entrenched in, a relationship of trust and confidence with McCartor. (FAC, ¶ 10.) Plaintiffs have repeatedly attempted to contact McCartor since that time with little or no success, and have been refused visitation by Cook. (FAC, ¶¶ 3, 11.)

Prior to May 2, 2023, Plaintiffs were named as successor trustees of a trust set up by McCartor, upon McCartor’s death or incapacity. (FAC, ¶ 12.)

On May 2, 2023, McCartor created The Trella Helene McCartor Living Trust, dated May 2, 2023, into which McCartor placed real property located at 634 Calle de Amigos, Santa Barbara, valued at over $1 million (the Real Property). (FAC, ¶¶ 4, 12.)

In November 2021, McCartor acquired a new Toyota, which was then transferred to Cook. (FAC, ¶ 13.) In July 2023, McCartor acquired a new Prius vehicle, which was then transferred to Cook. (Ibid.)

On April 11, 2024, a deed was recorded transferring the Real Property to Cook. (FAC, ¶ 14.)

On August 6, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this action asserting six causes of action: (1) financial elder abuse; (2) unfair or deceptive practices against senior citizens and disabled persons; (3) nullification of trust; (4) unjust enrichment; (5) conversion; and (6) theft through false pretense (Pen. Code, § 496).

On October 1, 2024, Cook filed a demurrer to the complaint as a whole, and as to the first, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action. The demurrer was not opposed by Plaintiffs. On December 4, the Court sustained the demurrer as to the complaint as a whole and to each cause of action, with leave to amend, on the grounds that Plaintiffs had not sufficiently pleaded their standing. Because of the standing issue, the Court did not address the alternative grounds for demurrer asserted by Cook.

On December 19, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their FAC asserting the same causes of action as the original complaint. The FAC repeats the allegations of the original complaint, but adds the allegation that prior to May 2, 2023, Plaintiffs had been named as successor trustees in a prior trust of McCartor.

On January 29, 2025, Cook filed this demurrer to the FAC as a whole, and as to the first, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action. Plaintiffs have filed a brief opposition asserting that the added allegation is sufficient to address standing and that the FAC is otherwise adequately pleaded.

Analysis

“ ‘The rules by which the sufficiency of a complaint is tested against a general demurrer are well settled. We not only treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but also ‘give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.’ ” (Zhang v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364, 370, internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)

Cook demurs to the entirety of the complaint on the ground that Plaintiffs do not have standing to assert these claims.

“ ‘Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except as otherwise provided by statute.’ [Citation.] ‘A “real party in interest” is generally defined as “the person possessing the right sued upon by reason of the substantive law.” ’ [Citation.] In other words, it is the person ‘ “who has title to the cause of action, i.e., the one who has the right to maintain the cause of action.” ’ [Citation.]” (Wanke, Industrial, Commercial, Residential, Inc. v. AV Builder Corp. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 466, 474.) “Standing is the threshold element required to state a cause of action and, thus, lack of standing may be raised by demurrer.” (Martin v. Bridgeport Community Assn., Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1024, 1031.)

In ruling on the demurrer to the original complaint, the Court stated:

“Plaintiffs do not allege that they themselves are owners of, or have any property right in, the Real Property or any other property at issue in this action. Plaintiffs instead allege that all such property is, or was, owned by McCartor. Although Plaintiffs allege that they are the sister and brother of McCartor, without something more, familial relationship does not give Plaintiffs the right to sue on their own behalf for damages alleged against McCartor. [¶] Plaintiffs also do not allege that they are asserting these claims on behalf of McCartor, as, for example, a guardian or conservator.” (Minute Order, filed Dec. 4, 2024, at p. 2.)

Cook argues that Plaintiffs have still not alleged any injury to them, and Plaintiffs have not alleged that they are asserting claims on behalf of McCartor. Plaintiffs’ response neither cites to the FAC nor cites to any authority by which Plaintiffs’ new allegation would be sufficient to address the standing issue.

“The person who creates a trust is the settlor.” (Rest.3d Trusts, § 3(1).) “The property held in trust is the trust property.” (Id., § 3(2).) “The person who holds property in trust is the trustee.” (Id., § 3(3).) “A person for whose benefit property is held in trust is a beneficiary.” (Id., § 3(4).)

“The trustee has the power to prosecute or defend actions, claims, or proceedings for the protection of trust property and of the trustee in the performance of the trustee’s duties.” (Prob. Code, § 16249.)

“The powers of a trustee are not personal to any particular trustee but, rather, are inherent in the office of trustee.” (Moeller v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1124, 1131.) Plaintiffs do not allege that either of them was acting as trustee at any time relevant to this action.

Plaintiffs do not cite to any allegation of the FAC that Plaintiffs are, or were, beneficiaries of any trust or otherwise have any interest in McCartor’s estate. (See Barefoot v. Jennings (2020) 8 Cal.5th 822, 825; Hamlin v. Jendayi (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 1064, 1067.) There are no allegations that any Plaintiff is acting, generally or specially for this litigation, as conservator or guardian for McCartor.

The allegations, at least as articulated in the opposition, are insufficient to plead standing. Since there are no allegations that McCartor is deceased or that Plaintiffs themselves have either a personal right in any of the property at issue or a right to assert claims of McCartor on behalf of McCartor (or McCartor’s trust from which property was improperly transferred), it must be assumed that McCartor remains as the real party in interest to assert those claims and not Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs may be in a position to assert claims arising from improper transfers from McCartor to Cook, but the allegations of the FAC are not now sufficient to establish their standing to do so. Plaintiffs similarly have failed in their opposition to explain how their allegations establish standing and have failed to cite authority for a legal basis upon which standing may be established. The demurrer will therefore be sustained on the grounds of lack of standing. Plaintiffs will be given further leave to amend.

In view of this determination of lack of allegations to support standing, it is unnecessary for the Court to address the remaining grounds asserted on demurrer.