Diana Sandoval v County of Santa Barbara Department of Planning & Development et al
Diana Sandoval v County of Santa Barbara Department of Planning & Development et al
Case Number
24CV04379
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Wed, 05/28/2025 - 22:00
Nature of Proceedings
Demurrers (3); Motion to Strike
Tentative Ruling
For Plaintiff Diane Sandoval, Trustee of the Sandoval Quiel Revocable Living Trust [“Sandoval”]: Stephen M. Sanders, Jeff G. Goyner, Nathanial Gade.
For Respondent/Defendant County Department of Planning & Development [“Planning”] AND County of Santa Barbara, Board of Building Appeals [“Building”], [collectively “County”]; Rachel Van Mullen, Valerie Janiel.
For Respondent/Defendant Robert Seidler [“Seidler”] and Polodonkey LLC [“PoloDonkey”] [collectively “Defendants”]: Todd A Amspoker, Jeff F. Tchakarov.
For Respondent/Defendant California Coastal Commission [“Commission”]: Rob Bonta, Norma N Franklin, Thomas Kinzinger.
Hearing
Demurrer #1. Commission’s demurrer to the first, second, third, and twelfth causes of action.
Demurrer #2. County Planning and Building’s (collectively, County’s) demurrer to the first, second, third, sixth, and twelfth causes of action.
Demurrer #3 and Motion to Strike. Seidler’s and PoloDonkey’s [“Defendants”] demurrer to the third, fourth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and eleventh causes of action and their motion to strike portions of the complaint.
Rulings
For the reasons set out below:
Demurrer #1. Commission’s Demurrer to the first, second, third, and twelfth causes of action is GRANTED; without leave to amend.
Demurrer #2. County’s Demurrer to the first, second, third, sixth, and twelfth causes of action is GRANTED; without leave to amend.
Demurrer #3 Defendants’ Demurrer to the third, fourth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and eleventh causes of action is OVERULED. Defendants’ motion to strike punitive damages is GRANTED, without prejudice and may be renewed if Sandoval found facts in the discovery process that would make a punitive damage claim viable. Defendants’ motion to strike attorneys’ fees pursuant to Civil Code § 3496 is GRANTED; however, Sandoval may file either a notice of errata or amend the SAC by June 10. Defendants Answer is due June 30, 2025.
Judicial Notice
Commission’s Request for Judicial Notice of the following is GRANTED:
Exhibits Part 1. County’s Legislative Enactments
a. Exhibit A: Excerpts from the County’s Coastal Zoning Ordinance; and
b. Exhibit B: Excerpt from the County’s Certified Coastal Land Use Plan; and
Exhibits Part 2. County’s Legislative Enactments
c. Exhibit C: Excerpts from the County’s Building Code; and
Exhibits Part 3. County’s Legislative Enactments
d. Exhibit D: Excerpts from the County’s Flood Management Code
Exhibits Part 3 (cont’d).
a. Exhibit E: Excerpts from the Coastal Act; and
b. Exhibit F: Excerpts of California Code of Regulations
Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice of the following is GRANTED:
Receipt for Coastal Development Permit Application by PoloDonkey, LLC, Permit
No. 25CDH-00009 for APN 005-270-006, with a screenshot from the County of
Santa Barbara’s website showing a Project Description re: bridge repairs.
The Court acknowledges and appreciates the professional work done by counsel in the case. The case has been contentious; acrimonious at times. The Court apologizes for the length of this decision; it is very long because the Court was not able to address the numerous issues at one sitting and so saved all its notes in one place.
Background
On February 6, 2025, Sandoval, filed her 67-page second amended petition and complaint (SAC) asserting 12 causes of action: (1) writ of administrative mandamus; (2) writ of mandate; (3) violation of California Coastal Act; (4) nuisance; (5) negligence; (6) inverse condemnation; (7) fraud/ deceit; (8) negligent misrepresentation; (9) waste & trespass; (10) ejectment; (11) quiet title on easement and action for possession based on unlawful use; and (12) declaratory relief.
The writ causes of action are asserted against County of Santa Barbara, Department of Planning & Development (Planning), County of Santa Barbara, Board of Building Appeals (Building), and the California Coastal Commission (Commission).
The third and twelfth causes of action are asserted against those respondents as well as Seidler and PoloDonkey.
The fourth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth causes of action are asserted against Seidler and PoloDonkey.
The sixth cause of action is asserted against Planning and Building, the eleventh cause of action is asserted against PoloDonkey. The fifth cause of action is asserted only against Doe defendants.
Demurrer #1. On March 17, 2025, the Commission filed its demurrer to the first, second, third, and twelfth causes of action. This demurrer is set for hearing on May 28.
On March 20, 2025, Sandoval filed her motion to compel production of the CEQA administrative record, to set a CEQA settlement hearing, to provide a list of responsible agencies, and for sanctions. This motion is set for hearing on June 11.
Demurrer #2. On April 4, 2025, Planning and Building (collectively, County) filed their demurrer to the first, second, third, sixth, and twelfth causes of action. This demurrer is set for hearing on May 28.
Demurrer #3 and Motion(s) to Strike. On April 18, 2025, Seidler and PoloDonkey collectively, Defendants) filed their demurrer to the third, fourth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and eleventh causes of action. These Defendants concurrently filed a motion to strike portions of the complaint. This demurrer and motion(s) to strike are set for hearing on May 28.
All these demurrers and the motion to strike raise numerous, complex issues, the disposition of which may affect the scope and timing of the remainder of the litigation.
Analysis
Demurrers in General
A defendant may demur to a complaint, or any of the complaint's individual counts, if
a defect appears on the face thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., §§430.30, 430.50.) California Code of
Civil Procedure section 430.10 subdivision (e) provides a party against whom a complaint has been filed may demur on the grounds "[t]he pleading does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action."
The Court's task in ruling on a demurrer is to determine whether the complaint states a
cause of action. (People ex rel. Lungren v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 294, 300.) A
demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) The Court also assumes the truth of all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the properly pleaded facts. (Reynolds v. Bement (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1075, 1083.) The assumption of truth does not apply, however, to contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law or fact. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters, and therefore lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Id.) "The absence of any allegation essential to a cause of action renders it vulnerable to a general demurrer. A ruling on a general demurrer is thus a method of deciding the merits of the cause of action on assumed facts without a trial." (Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, n. 4, as modified (Aug. 9, 2000).) Where there is no reasonable possibility that another amendment would cure the defect in the pleading, it is proper to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend. (McKelvey v. Boeing North American, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 151, 163.) The burden is on plaintiff to show how the complaint can be amended and how such amendment will change the legal effect of the pleadings. (Id.)
Motion to Strike in General
The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) “Irrelevant matter” includes a “demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subds. (b)(3), (c).) “The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).)
Demurrer #1. [Commission’s Demurrer]
On March 17, 2025, the Commission filed its demurrer to the first, second, third, and twelfth causes of action [21 pages]; summarized by the Court:
1. Commission demurs to the “First Cause of Action (Writ of Administrative Mandamus)” on the grounds that it is unripe, barred by Sandoval’s failure to exhaust her administrative remedies, and is moot.
2. Commission demurs to the “Second Cause of Action (Writ of Mandate)” on grounds that it is unripe, barred by Sandoval’s failure to exhaust her administrative remedies, and is moot.
3. Commission demurs to the “Third Cause of Action (Violation of California Coastal Act)” on grounds that it is unripe, barred by Sandoval’s failure to exhaust her administrative remedies, is moot, and fails to state facts sufficient to support a cause of action.
4. Commission demurs to the “Twelfth Cause of Action (Declaratory Relief)” on grounds that it is unripe, barred by Sandoval’s failure to exhaust her administrative remedies, and is moot.
Commission contends: Sandoval brought this lawsuit to try to force the Commission to act against an allegedly unpermitted bridge crossing her property. However, the parties that allegedly built the bridge are currently applying for a Coastal Development Permit (CDP) with the County of Santa Barbara, which has original permitting jurisdiction in the area. Any permitting decision must be made in the first instance by the County. The Commission has not yet had the duty, or even the opportunity, to decide on the legality of the bridge. For that reason, Sandoval’s claims against the Commission are unripe, are barred by her failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and are otherwise moot. This action should be dismissed.
The Commission reports its view of the background: Sandoval’s grievances stem from the reconstruction of a bridge crossing her property in Carpinteria; Sandoval alleges that Real Party in Interest PoloDonkey abandoned a road easement and a dilapidated bridge crossing that easement in or about 2007. In 2021, PoloDonkey constructed a new bridge crossing the same easement. Sandoval alleges the County improperly granted this
project a CDP exemption in 2022. Sandoval appealed the County’s approval of PoloDonkey’s bridge construction activities, but this appeal was denied at a County hearing on August 29, 2024. Sandoval then appealed the County’s decision to the Commission. Sandoval’s Commission appeal argued that PoloDonkey should have been required to seek a CDP for the bridge project. This appeal of the County’s exemption
determination was scheduled for hearing at the Commission’s November 14, 2024, meeting.
Prior to that hearing, however, the County formally rescinded its exemption determination
and stated that it would require a CDP for the bridge repair work. The Commission then withdrew the appeal from the hearing.
Commission argues; summarized: Sandoval’s claims against the Commission are premised on the Commission’s alleged failure to enforce the Coastal Act against the County and PoloDonkey, and the Commission’s alleged cancellation of a November 2024 hearing where Sandoval planned to argue PoloDonkey should have been required to apply for a CDP. But the Commission does not yet have jurisdiction over this matter, and the County has already decided that PoloDonkey must apply for a CDP.
Sandoval’s allegations demonstrate that her claims are unripe. California courts can decide
only justiciable controversies. (Wilson & Wilson v. City Council of Redwood City (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1573.) The ripeness requirement, a branch of the doctrine of justiciability, prevents courts from issuing purely advisory opinions. (Pacific Legal Foundation v. California 6 Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 170.) The requirement recognizes that judicial decision making is best conducted in the context of an actual set of facts so that the issues will be framed with sufficient definiteness to enable the court to make a decree finally disposing of the controversy. In determining whether a matter is ripe, California courts apply a two-part test: (1) whether there is an actual controversy appropriate for immediate judicial resolution; and (2) whether the parties will suffer hardship if the court withholds consideration.
The First Cause of Action for Writ of Administrative Mandamus is unripe. Sandoval’s 1094.5 writ claim is premised on the Commission’s alleged failure to enforce the Coastal Act against PoloDonkey’s bridge, and its alleged failure to carry out its general responsibilities to protect coastal resources. But this matter has not been properly presented to the Commission at all. Sandoval herself admits that the County rescinded PoloDonkey’s CDP exemption, meaning that PoloDonkey must proceed through the CDP application process with the County, not the Commission. And the Commission has no jurisdiction over the matter until the County concludes that process. Even then, the Commission would not have jurisdiction over this project unless and until an aggrieved person filed an appeal of the County’s decision to the Commission.
The Coastal Act requires local governments within the coastal zone to prepare a local coastal program (LCP) for development within the coastal zone. (Pub. Res. Code, § 30500(a)) If the Commission determines that the LCP conforms to the Coastal Act’s policies, it certifies the LCP. (Pub. Res. Code, § 30512.) Thereafter, the local government administers the program, assumes responsibility for permitting new development, and reviews applications for coastal development permits. (Id., § 30519.) Sandoval admits that Santa Barbara County has a certified LCP and is responsible for enforcing the Coastal Act. According to Sandoval’s own allegations, then, the County bears responsibility for PoloDonkey’s CDP application.
The facts as alleged in the SAP do not indicate that the Commission ever had permitting
jurisdiction over PoloDonkey’s project. It is only after a party appeals a local
government’s action on a CDP application, and if the Commission finds that the appeal raises a substantial issue, that the Commission assumes jurisdiction. (Pub. Res. Code, § 30603; 30625(b)(1).) Sandoval admits that the County recently notified PoloDonkey
that the bridge project would require a CDP, and she does not allege that the County has acted on the required CDP application.
As against the Commission, this matter would only become ripe after (1) the County approves the CDP application, (2) Sandoval appeals that approval with the County, (3) the County denies Sandoval’s appeal, (4) Sandoval then appeals that determination to the Commission, and (5) the Commission makes a substantial issue finding and a de novo determination on the CDP. (Pub. Res. Code, § 30603; 30625, subd. (b)(1).)
The SAP includes further allegations that when Sandoval appealed the County’s initial
exemption determination to the Commission, the Commission found a substantial issue
triggering a judicial duty to adjudicate the matter, that the existence of the unpermitted bridge constitutes neglect of the Commission’s responsibility under the Public Trust Doctrine, and that the Commission provided an inaccurate agenda classification for the cancelled hearing. But none of these allegations indicate the Commission properly had jurisdiction over the matter. And Sandoval does not and cannot allege the Commission has taken any final action with respect to the project, which means judicial review is not available. (Santa Barbara County Flower & Nursery Growers Assn. v. County of Santa Barbara (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 864, 875.)
Sandoval can hardly claim that she will suffer a hardship due to the Commission’s refusal to act when no law or policy requires the Commission to act at all. The facts, including whether the Commission will need to consider the bridge project at all, have not yet materialized. For that reason, Sandoval’s first cause of action is unripe.
The Second Cause of Action for Writ of Mandate is unripe. For similar reasons, Sandoval’s allegations also demonstrate that the second cause of action is unripe. The Commission has not yet had the opportunity to consider PoloDonkey’s bridge project and, if necessary, to enforce the Coastal Act.
Sandoval admits that the County rescinded PoloDonkey’s CDP exemption, meaning that PoloDonkey must proceed through the CDP application process with the County before the Commission could exercise appellate jurisdiction, assuming an appeal is filed, and the Commission finds a substantial issue. The Commission has not yet had a duty, or even the opportunity, to consider the legality of PoloDonkey’s bridge. Sandoval’s allegations do not demonstrate that the Commission has had a clear, present, and ministerial duty to consider the PoloDonkey project, and so a writ of mandate does not lie. (Santa Clara County
Counsel Attys. Assn. v. Woodside (1994) 7 Cal. 4th 525, 539–540.)
The first cause of action, which is incorporated by reference into the second cause of action,
also includes allegations related to the Commission’s cancellation of the November 2024 hearing on the appeal. But these allegations also demonstrate the second cause of
action is unripe. The County rescinded PoloDonkey’s exemption, which was the subject of that appeal, so the Commission has not had the opportunity, let alone the obligation, to make a final determination on this matter. There is no controversy appropriate for immediate judicial resolution, nor can Sandoval claim she will suffer hardship if the Court withholds its consideration until after the Commission has obtained jurisdiction and an obligation (if any) to act.
The Third Cause of Action for Violation of the Coastal Act is unripe. Sandoval claims the Commission separately violated the Coastal Act by, among other things, (1) cancelling its appeal of the County’s decision to grant PoloDonkey a CDP exemption, (2) cancelling the hearing on that appeal, (3) refusing to enforce the Coastal Act against the County, and (4) conspiring with County officials to require submission and application for CDP with a previously expired permit, an abandoned easement, and an unlawful use. These claims are all unripe.
The PoloDonkey bridge issue has not yet been properly brought before the Commission. For that reason, any claims based on the Commission’s alleged refusal to hear an appeal or otherwise enforce the Coastal Act are all unripe. And as for the claim that the Commission conspired with the County to require PoloDonkey to apply for a CDP, that allegation is unsupported by specific details anywhere in the Petition and is nonsensical. And this claim is also unripe, since Sandoval does not allege that PoloDonkey has yet submitted a CDP application, much less that the County or Commission has acted upon it.
There is no ripe controversy over whether the Commission has failed to enforce the Coastal
Act, and Sandoval cannot claim she will be harmed absent an order from this Court that would force the Commission to act in excess of its jurisdiction. Thus, the third cause of action fails.
The Twelfth Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief is unripe. Sandoval asserts a cause of action for declaratory relief. She does so via boilerplate paragraphs asserting that a controversy exists. A declaratory relief claim is subject to general demurrer where it relates to a substantive claim that is invalid as a matter of law. Where a plaintiff fails to state sufficient facts to support a statutory claim, a general demurrer may be sustained both to the statutory claim and to a claim for declaratory relief that is wholly derivative of the proposed statutory claim. (Ball v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 794, 800.)
California courts can decide only justiciable controversies. (Wilson & Wilson, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at 1573.) Even an action for declaratory relief must involve an actual controversy, which necessarily requires that the controversy be ripe. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060.) Courts may dismiss a declaratory relief action in any case where its declaration is not necessary or proper at the time under all the circumstances. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1061.) And the doctrine is fully applicable to actions for declaratory relief. (Sacramento County Deputy Sheriffs' Assn. v. County of Sacramento (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 280, 286 fn. 7.)
Such is the case here. None of Sandoval’s three statutory causes of action are ripe. As such, they fail to state the existence of an actual, present controversy on which this Court could issue declaratory relief. Sandoval’s twelfth cause of action for declaratory relief should therefore be dismissed.
Sandoval’s allegations also demonstrate that she has failed to exhaust her administrative
remedies. In general, a party must exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the courts. Under this rule, an administrative remedy is exhausted only upon termination of all available, nonduplicative administrative review procedures. (Williams & Fickett v. County of Fresno (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1258, 1267.)
The exhaustion rule is a fundamental rule of procedure, and not a matter of judicial discretion.
The First Cause of Action is barred for failure to exhaust. Sandoval has not begun to exhaust her administrative remedies before the Commission because PoloDonkey’s CDP application process with the County, which bears primary permitting authority over the bridge, has only just begun. The Commission has no jurisdiction over the matter until the County concludes its process.
The County bears primary permitting responsibility for PoloDonkey’s CDP application, and the SAP lacks any allegation that the Commission ever assumed jurisdiction over PoloDonkey’s CDP application. It is only after a party appeals a local government’s action on a CDP application, and if the Commission finds that the appeal raises a substantial issue, that the Commission assumes jurisdiction over the application. (Pub. Res. Code, § 30603; 30625(b)(1),)
Sandoval does not allege that the County has taken a final action on PoloDonkey’s CDP application, that Sandoval has exhausted her administrative remedies on the CDP with the County, that she has appealed the County’s determination on the CDP to the Commission, or that she has exhausted her administrative remedies on the CDP with the Commission.
Nor could she, because Sandoval admits that the County only recently notified PoloDonkey
that the bridge project would require a CDP. Sandoval does not allege that this subsequent application has been approved. Sandoval would be deemed to have exhausted
the required administrative remedies only after (1) the County approves the CDP application, (2) Sandoval appeals that approval with the County, (3) the County denies Sandoval’s appeal, (4) Sandoval then appeals that determination to the Commission, and (5) the Commission ultimately makes a substantial issue finding. (Pub. Res. Code, § 30603; 30625, subd. (b)(1).)
To the extent Sandoval bases her claims on the alleged “finality” of the Commission’s
decision not to act against the PoloDonkey bridge, she has failed to exhaust her remedies there too. Sandoval alleges the Commission’s actions took on the requisite finality when it declined to take an enforcement action after a planned November 13, 2024, hearing on the County’s exemption determination. But Sandoval also admits that the County rescinded the exemption determination and that the Commission subsequently “cancelled” that hearing; not that the Commission decided not to act. Sandoval’s allegations indicate only that the Commission withdrew the appeal after the County’s rescission mooted the matter, and further, that the Commission lacked jurisdiction over the PoloDonkey project unless and until a final County action came back to it on appeal. Far from demonstrating exhaustion of remedies, Sandoval’s allegations indicate the administrative process has barely begun. The SAP fails to include the necessary factual allegations to establish that Sandoval exhausted her administrative remedies before the Commission. The Court should grant the Commission’s demurrer as to her first cause of action on this independent ground.
The Second Cause of Action is barred for failure to exhaust. The exhaustion rule also
applies to ministerial actions that are challenged by traditional mandamus rather than
administrative mandamus. (Lopez v. Civil Service Com. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 307, 314-315.) Sandoval has not begun to exhaust her administrative remedies. Sandoval has not exhausted her administrative remedies with the County, which bears primary permitting authority over the bridge. Sandoval does not allege that the County has taken a final action on PoloDonkey’s CDP application, that Sandoval has exhausted her administrative remedies with the County, or that she has appealed the County’s determination to the Commission. Neither has Sandoval yet appealed that determination to the Commission, nor has the Commission found a substantial issue exists.
Sandoval has not yet exhausted any of her administrative remedies, and therefore her
second cause of action for writ of mandate is barred.
The Third Cause of Action is barred for failure to exhaust. In addition to her two writ causes of action, Sandoval brings a claim for “Violation of California Coastal Act,” without specifying which provision of the Act the Commission has purportedly violated. These allegations, demonstrate that Sandoval has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Sandoval has not begun to exhaust her administrative remedies for any alleged violations of the Coastal Act. Sandoval has not exhausted her administrative remedies with the County, which bears primary permitting authority over the bridge pursuant to its certified LCP. Nor does she allege PoloDonkey’s CDP is even properly before the Commission, let alone that the Commission has been obligated to act. Because Sandoval did not exhaust any of her administrative remedies before she sought injunctive relief, the third cause of action is also barred.
Sandoval’s allegations also demonstrate that her claims against the Commission are moot. A moot case “is one which seeks to determine an abstract question which does not arise upon existing facts or rights.” (Wilson v. Los Angeles County Civil Service Comm'n (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 450, 452.) It is the job of a court to “decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it….” (Paul v. Milk Depots, Inc. (1964) 62 Cal.2d 129, 132.)
The First Cause of Action is moot. Sandoval’s first cause of action is moot. Sandoval seeks review of Commission actions (or inactions) that have already been undone. Sandoval’s first cause of action challenges the Commission’s alleged failure to adjudicate Sandoval’s appeal after finding a substantial issue, alleged failure to enforce the Public Trust Doctrine, and alleged provision of an inaccurate agenda classification for the November 2024 meeting. All these challenges are now moot. As Sandoval admits, the Commission cancelled the hearing after the County rescinded its CDP exemption determination—which was exactly the action Sandoval sought to challenge via appeal. This Court cannot order the Commission to hear an appeal of the County’s determination that is no longer in effect.
Sandoval seeks a writ to direct and require the Commission to “take any action necessary pursuant to its legal duties” to enforce the County’s obligations under the LCP and Coastal Act. But Sandoval fails to allege that the Commission has not acted according to law, because nothing has occurred that would obligate the Commission to act at all. The first cause of action should be dismissed based on this independent ground.
For similar reasons, Sandoval’s second cause of action is also moot. Sandoval seeks review
of Commission actions (or inactions) that have already been undone. Sandoval’s first cause of action, which is incorporated by reference into the second cause of action, challenges the Commission’s alleged failure to adjudicate Sandoval’s appeal after finding a substantial issue, failure to enforce the Public Trust Doctrine, and provision of an inaccurate agenda classification for the November 2024 meeting. But as Sandoval admits, the Commission withdrew the appeal from consideration after the County rescinded its CDP exemption determination—which was exactly the action Sandoval sought to challenge via appeal.
This Court cannot issue a writ ordering the Commission to hear an appeal of a County determination that is no longer in effect. Sandoval’s second cause of action is therefore moot.
The third cause of action under the Coastal Act fares no better. With respect to the
allegations involving the cancellation of the appeal and cancellation of the appeal hearing,
Sandoval asks the Court to “determine an abstract question which does not arise upon existing facts or rights.” (Wilson & Wilson, supra, 112 Cal.App.2d at p. 452.)
Sandoval expressly admits that PoloDonkey’s CDP exemption was withdrawn and that the
County is now requiring PoloDonkey to proceed with a CDP application. Sandoval has thus already obtained the relief she seeks under the third cause of action — enforcement of the Coastal Act against the PoloDonkey bridge.
The County must decide how it will enforce the Coastal Act against PoloDonkey’s development in the first instance.
Sandoval’s third cause of action is therefore similarly moot. In her third cause of action, Sandoval seeks civil fines and penalties for alleged Coastal Act violations, invoking Public Resources Code section 30820, subdivision (a)(1). She also seeks a restoration order and a cease and desist order issued against the Commission that would force the Commission to remove the bridge and restore Sandoval’s property.
But the SAP’s allegations fail to make any showing of a Coastal Act violation that would entitle her to such relief.
Public Resources Code section 30820 provides for civil liability where “any person who
performs or undertakes development that is in violation of this division or that is inconsistent with any coastal development permit previously issued by the commission, a local government that is implementing a certified local coastal program, or a port governing body that is implementing a certified port master plan…” (Pub. Res. Code, § 30820(a)(1).)
But the Commission has not had jurisdiction, much less the opportunity, to enforce the Coastal Act against PoloDonkey’s development. (Pub. Res. Code, § 30512; 14 Cal. Code Regs. § 13301.)
Nothing in the Act has even brought the PoloDonkey development into the Commission’s
jurisdiction, much less obligated the Commission to act. Thus, Sandoval has not stated facts
sufficient to support a claim that the Commission is “in violation of” the Coastal Act.
The third cause of action fails to state facts to support a claim against the Commission. It
should be dismissed on that independent ground.
In determining whether a plaintiff should be granted leave to amend, a court should “consider whether on the pleaded and noticeable facts there is a reasonable possibility of an
amendment that would cure the complaint’s legal defect or defects.” (Nealy v. County of Orange (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 594, 600.) The “plaintiff bears the burden of proving an amendment would cure the defect.” (Mendoza v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 802, 809.)
Here, no amendment could cure the manifold defects in Sandoval’s Petition. All of her
claims are unripe. Sandoval failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with the County and with the Commission, which is a jurisdictional prerequisite to this Court’s review, even under the declaratory relief statutes. Sandoval seeks review of a Commission action that is now moot. And Sandoval’s request for injunctive relief failed to plead facts demonstrating any violation of the Coastal Act.
Thus, this action should be dismissed without leave to amend. The Commission urges this Court to dismiss the Petition in its entirety, without leave to amend.
Supported by the Declaration of Thomas P. Kinzinger: On March 10, 2025, he met and conferred by phone with Stephen Sanders, counsel for Sandoval, for the purpose of determining whether the parties could reach an agreement that would resolve the objections raised in the instant demurrer; the parties were unable to reach an agreement that would resolve the objections raised.
Sandoval’s Opposition
Filed 5/8/25; 19 pages; summarized: Sandoval sets out the relevant facts as follows: This case arises from disputes involving real property located at 3196 Serena Avenue, Carpinteria, California, owned by the Sandoval Quiel Revocable Living Trust and represented by Sandoval, and the adjacent property at 3215 Foothill Road, Carpinteria, California, owned by PoloDonkey and represented by Robert Seidler. The dispute concerns the unlawful reconstruction of a previously abandoned and deconstructed residential road and bridge by Seidler, which was rebuilt outside the previously recorded and disputed 1915 easement. The unlawful new bridge and tertiary road is in an Environmentally Sensitive Habitat Area (ESHA), FEMA high-flood hazard area (AE zone), encroaches on Sandoval's private property, and remains with defect or nuisance conditions, including environmental hazards.
On March 20, 2024, Building Inspector Carl Lindberg abated violation 22BDV-00076,
titled “PoloDonkey LLC Unpermitted Repair of Bridge,” without obtaining any necessary permits or conducting a site visit, as required by the Stop Work Order. On March 22, 2024, the Building Official reviewed a survey of the bridge and acknowledged that it encroached on Sandoval's property, noting, “It looks like the bridge is about a 60/40 or so split”
On April 1, 2024, Building Official Craig Johnson misapplied any environmental exemption when he emailed County Planning and Development Director Lisa Plowman,
stating that the County considered the work to be permit-exempt under the County's policy for structures under 30 inches above grade, despite the bridge being 60 inches above grade.
On April 4, 2024, Director Plowman emailed Assistant County Executive Officer Wade Horton that the Stop Work Notice remained in effect until the Division authorized the bridge repair. However, Director Plowman incorrectly claimed that the bridge was exempt from permits, including environmental review, under a policy for structures under 120 square feet, despite the bridge being 218 square feet.
On April 16, 2024, Building Official Craig Johnson issued the unlawful “express” permit 24CNP-00475, without plans, engineering or environmental review.
On June 6, 2024, Director Plowman informed Sandoval of the decision to exempt the abandoned bridge from zoning and a Coastal Development Permit.
On June 14, 2025, Sandoval appealed both decisions, which Director Plowman later rejected on June 25, 2024.
On June 18, 2024, Director Plowman unlawfully exempted the bridge from the Toro Canyon Plan, misclassifying it as non-conforming despite the applicable contrary provisions of the Plan, and refused to open a formal complaint filed by Sandoval regarding property rights violations.
On June 27, 2024, Sandoval submitted another timely appeal. Director Plowman then unlawfully rejected this appeal on June 28, 2024.
After exhausting all zoning administrative remedies at the local level, Sandoval appealed
to the Commission on July 1, 2024.
On July 24, 2024, the Commission issued a letter notifying Sandoval of the acceptance of the appeal.
On Sept. 27, 2024, during a virtual meeting, Commission staff and counsel confirmed that the development raises a “substantial issue” under the CCA.
On Oct. 23, 2024, the Commission unilaterally declined to further consider or hear Sandoval's appeal and refused to enforce the CCA.
On Nov. 13, 2024, the Commission’s administrative decision became a final action when they scheduled the de novo appeal hearing on the agenda but refused to hear the appeal.
Sandoval argues: The Commission’s failure to address the previously unpermitted and unlawful development in the ESHA and the ongoing environmental harms at the bridge, tertiary road and waterway, including in those areas of encroachment outside of the easement, caused by Defendants and maintained by County, illustrate the need for judicial intervention.
The CCA (Public Resources Code (PRC) § 30000 et seq.) protects the California coast from
unregulated development and ensures that development aligns with environmental protection policies to prevent the deterioration and destruction of the coastal zone (PRC § 30001.) To the extent that conflicts arise between development and those promoting conservation of coastal resources, the Legislature has mandated that such conflicts be resolved in a manner which on balance is the most protective of significant coastal resources. (PRC § 30007.5). The CCA accomplishes its objectives through a comprehensive scheme to govern land use planning for the entire coastal zone of California. (Pac. Palis. Bowl v. City of LA (2012) 55 Cal.4th 783, 793.)
The Commission has primary responsibility to implement the CCA. (Marine Forests Soc. v. Calif. Coast. Com. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1, 20.) Further, “each local government lying, in whole or in part, within the coastal zone shall prepare a Local Coastal Program [LCP] for that portion of the coastal zone within its jurisdiction.” (PRC § 30500(a)). With exceptions, any person wishing to perform or undertake any development in the coastal zone must first obtain a coastal development permit and any other permits required from any state, regional, or local agency (PRC § 30600(a)).
Under the code, each ESHA shall be protected against any significant disruption of habitat
values and only uses dependent on those resources shall be allowed within those areas. (PRC § 30240(a)).
As explicitly outlined in Santa Barbara’s County’s Coastal Zoning Ordinance (CZO),
which forms part of the County’s certified LCP, development standards for Stream Habitats state that no structures shall be located with the stream corridor . . . bridges (when support structures are located outside the critical habitat) may be permitted when no alternative route/location is feasible.
Additionally, the law limits alterations of rivers and streams to only water supply, flood control, or habitat improvement projects, all requiring the best feasible mitigation measures (PRC § 30236).
The local government’s authority is subordinate to the Commission’s enforcement. “The
fact [County] is the first agency to work on the plan is not determinative of the scope of
Commission's powers (City of Chula Vista v. Superior Ct., (1982) 133 Cal. App. 3d 472, 488–489.) In fact, a fundamental purpose of the CCA is to ensure that state policies prevail over the concerns of local government. (Pac. Palis. Bowl Mobile Ests., LLC v. City of LA, (2012) 55 Cal. 4th 783, 794.)
Local government approvals are subject to appeal to the Commission. (PRC §§ 30603,
30621(a), 30625(b); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 13114.) Moreover, any aggrieved person may file an appeal of a local government’s decision to the Commission. (PRC, § 30625 (a)). Once the Commission accepts an appeal, the Commission reviews the matter de novo “as if no local governmental unit was previously involved, deciding for itself whether the proposed project satisfies legal standards and requirements.” (Kaczorowski v. Mendocino Cnty. Bd. of Super., (2001) 88 Cal. App. 4th 564, 569, 106; PRC § 30621.) The standard of review for appealable development is whether the development conforms to the certified LCP (PRC § 30604; Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 13119.)
In an appeal, the Commission is “the ultimate decision maker.” (City of Chula Vista v. Sup.
Ct., 133 Cal. App. 3d 472, 489.) Pursuant to the PRC §30801(a), any aggrieved person shall have a right to judicial review of any decision or action of the commission by filing a petition for a writ of mandate in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) §1094.5.
Sandoval incorporates her authorities cited, referenced averments and arguments thereon as applicable to Commission contained in its concurrently served and filed “Petitioner’s Opposition to Demurrer by Respondents County of Santa Barbara…” etc., pp. 1-16.
The Commission’s demurrer fails as a matter of law and should be overruled in its entirety. Under well-established California law, a demurrer tests only the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged in the operative pleading; it does not resolve factual disputes or weigh the credibility of allegations.
The Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and construe them liberally in favor of the pleader. The Commission disregards this standard by relying on disputed, incomplete, and inaccurate representations of the facts set forth in the verified 2ACP and its exhibits. Instead of addressing the legal sufficiency of the 2ACP, Commission improperly attempted to inject factual disputes and evade judicial review by raising arguments of ripeness, exhaustion, and mootness.
The 2ACP and its exhibits directly contradict Commission’s assertions and establish both (1) the Court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter and (2) that Sandoval has stated valid causes of action upon which relief can be granted.
Commission’s core argument is that Sandoval’s claims are unripe because they allege a lack of jurisdiction over the matter. However, Commission clearly exercised their jurisdiction when Sandoval filed her appeal on July 1, 2024, when they accepted
the appeal on July 24, 2024, there is no further administrative remedy thereon.
Further, the final decision to withdraw Sandoval’s appeal and refusal to have a de novo
hearing deprived Sandoval of due process, and renders Commission’s exhaustion of remedies argument meritless.
Sandoval did in fact exhaust and has properly alleged that she has exhausted all available remedies, which ultimate facts pled must be taken as true, and any further administrative efforts, even if they existed, would be futile given these prior actions taken by Commission. The Commission continues to violate Sandoval’s due process and property rights under the California Coastal Act (CCA), in derogation of the public’s interest therein, leaving the core issue unresolved and requiring judicial intervention.
Contrary to Commission’s claim of mootness, the matter is not moot; Commission’s assertion only underscores the existence of an ongoing controversy. Sandoval continues to suffer harm that can be remedied only through judicial review. The ultimate facts pled clearly demonstrate that, at the very least, the Demurrer rests on factual questions that cannot be resolved at this stage and confirms that the issues raised are not properly subject to a demurrer.
Commission repeatedly misrepresents the facts to the court – at least 19 times -- falsely asserting variations of “the Commission has not had jurisdiction, much less the opportunity to enforce the Coastal Act.”
This ignores or distorts the record as pled and is not supported by either the ultimate facts as pled, the facts, or the law. The Commission is entrusted with both executive and quasi-judicial authority under the CCA to ensure compliance with its provisions.
Additionally, the Commission had jurisdiction because 1) the bridge project is within the Commission's appeal jurisdiction; 2) the project is in an ESHA; and 3) they accepted the appeal (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 13576; PRC §§ 30240, 30519.) Any one of these grounds independently supports actual jurisdiction.
As Commission wrongly addressed in the demurrer, Sandoval has alleged in the 2APC the Commission rendered a “final” decision effective when -- after they accepted the appeal -- they then unilaterally withdrew Sandoval's appeal and cancelled the hearing, and it “became final as of November 13, 2024”. The ultimate facts as pled are:
(1) On July 1, 2024, Sandoval filed an appeal with the Commission, contesting the illegal and unpermitted reconstruction of the tertiary access road and new bridge, as direct violations of the CCA; and
(2) On July 24, 2024, the Commission exercised jurisdiction when they accepted the appeal; and
(3) On Sept. 27, 2024, during a virtual meeting, Commission Staff and Commission Counsel confirmed that the development raises a “substantial issue” under the Coastal Act; and
(4) On Oct. 23, 2024, the Commission unilaterally declined to further consider or hear Sandoval's Appeal and refused to enforce the CCA; and
(5) Under PRC §30801, the Commission’s decision became a final action as of Nov. 13, 2024, when they had scheduled the de novo appeal hearing but then later refused to hear the appeal; and
(6) After the cancellation, the 1ACP naming Commission, was timely filed on Nov. 27, 2024.
Sandoval’s claims are ripe for judicial review because concrete harm from prejudicial
abuses of discretion, as sufficiently demonstrated in the 2ACP. The law requires compliance with strict environmental protections for development in the coastal zone. (PRC § 30000 et seq.)
The Commission has primary responsibility for enforcing these standards and local
government decisions are subject to their review. (PRC §§ 30603, 30621(a), 30625(b); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 13114.)
The Commission has failed to fulfill its obligations, including enforcement, under the CCA violates protections for an ESHA. (PRC § 30240(a)) Sandoval is entitled to judicial review under CCP § 1094.5 and PRC § 30801. PRC § 30801 grants any aggrieved person the right to judicial review of the Commission’s actions, and judicial intervention is necessary to enforce Commission's compliance with the CCA, or any applicable local, state, and federal laws.
The Commission’s acceptance of the appeal, withdrawing of the appeal and hearing, and refusal to enforce the CCA, are final decisions, and under PRC §30801, warrants judicial review. For the reasons outlined above, as well as those detailed below, Commission’s argument regarding ripeness is without merit, and the demurrer should therefore be overruled, or leave to amend granted.
Pursuant to PRC §30801(a), any aggrieved person shall have a right to judicial review of any decision or action of the Commission by filing a petition for a writ of mandate within 60 days after the decision in accordance with CCP §1094.5. Sandoval timely filed this action within 60 days of Nov. 13, 2024, when the Commission's decision became final.
Commission concedes multiple times that a matter becomes ripe when a local government's
decision (County’s) becomes final, which it did as alleged on July 2, 2024, in writing.
This final decision was appealed to the Commission, and the Commission subsequently made a substantial issue finding. Commission in their demurrer judicially admits they had jurisdiction then, while misrepresenting in the brief that Sandoval never alleged the County, after its rescission, required a CDP application, misinforming the Court. Given this concession, and their failure to address the express “final” facts as pled, Sandoval has clearly established ultimate facts as to ripeness.
Additionally, as pled, when on July 1, 2024, Sandoval filed an appeal with the Commission, they invoked the CCA’s “chain of responsibility” to contest the illegal reconstruction of the tertiary access road and new bridge in the ESHA, which directly violates the CCA law and Sandoval’s constitutional rights (McAllister v. Cnty. of Monterey, (6th Dist. 2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 253, 286.)
On July 24, 2024, the Commission then exercised jurisdiction when they accepted the appeal.
On Sept. 27, 2024, during a virtual meeting, the Commission staff and counsel confirmed that the development raises a “substantial issue” under the CCA. Despite the substantial issue determination, the Commission cancelled Sandoval's appeal and hearing in violation of their duties under the law. By withdrawing after confirming a “substantial issue”, ignoring its duty to “hear” an appeal, then Sandoval is excused from further exhaustion and the dispute is final (PRC §30625(b)).
Therefore, Sandoval has met the requirements for ripeness, and the matter is now firmly within the Court’s jurisdiction for review.
Sandoval was denied the fundamental right to present evidence and arguments at a de novo hearing, a core due process safeguard. The Commission’s unilateral cancellation of Sandoval’s appeal deprived Sandoval of crucial protections for her property against ongoing trespass, environmental harm, and safety hazards caused by the illegal bridge and tertiary road. Therefore, the Commission’s demurrer to the first cause of action should be overruled.
To qualify for declaratory relief, Sandoval must show (1) a proper subject of declaratory relief, and (2) an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to the rights or obligations of a party. Here, reviewing the Commission’s demurrer, there is clearly an actual controversy over the application of Causes of Action 1, 2 & 3 based on statutory interpretation of whether written communications as pled on a “substantial issue”
and cancelling the hearing thereon in violation of the express language of the statute constituted a “final” decision, disapproving Sandoval’s administrative appeal.
Commission claims, however, and despite this, that declaratory relief is unripe and
derivative, generic as pled and those sufficient facts provided necessary to overrule the demurrer were not provided. To support this theory, unfortunately they cite to rely on analysis of an unpublished case (citing to Ball v. Fleetboston Fin. Corp.) Citing to an unpublished case is sanctionable (CRC Rule 2.30), and their reliance thereon makes this attack on COA 12 pleading deniable as a matter of law on that basis alone. [The Court has ignored the cited case.]
Otherwise, the unripe argument fails also on its merits, because the 2ACP alleges ongoing harm (unsafe bridge conditions, environmental damage, as alleged, supra) and
the Commission’s duty to enforce the CCA each of which courts deem sufficient for a live
controversy (Environmental Defense Project of Sierra County v. County of Sierra (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 877, 887.) PRC §§ 30803-30804 also independently authorizes courts to grant declaratory relief for Coastal Act violations. §30803 empowers any person to seek enforcement, while §30804 confirms judicial authority to compel statutory compliance.
These provisions establish declaratory relief as a standalone remedy for the CCA enforcement disputes and are not merely derivative claims. The Commission’s failure to address unpermitted ESHA development and issue cease-and-desist orders constitutes precisely the violations §30803 targets.
Furthermore, Commission ignores the public interest exception to ripeness, which applies to recurring Coastal Act violations in an ESHA, as pled. (Cucamongans Utd for Reas. Exp. v. City of Ran. Cuca, 82 Cal. App. 4th 473, 479-480 (4th Dist., 2000).) Commission does not dispute the substance of the ongoing violations (unpermitted bridge use, nuisance, environmental hazards) which must be accepted as true on demurrer. Dismissing this cause would evade judicial review and resolution of the controversy over the Commission’s failure to enforce the CCA.
The Court’s Conclusions
The Opposition was not persuasive. The Court found the Commission’s arguments in this matter persuasive and deserved the relief sought. The Court should decide for the Commission and against Sandoval; without leave to amend.
Sandoval’s claims against the Commission are premised on the Commission’s alleged failure to enforce the Coastal Act against the County and PoloDonkey, and the Commission’s alleged cancellation of a hearing appealing the County’s decision to exempt the bridge project from a CDP. Accepting all facts as alleged by Sandoval as true, the Commission does not have present appellate jurisdiction over this matter, as the County already decided that PoloDonkey must apply for a CDP and vacated the determination that the project was exempt, which was the only County determination subject to review by the Commission at the time of Sandoval’s appeal. Further, nothing in the law mandates the Commission must bring an enforcement action. Sandoval’s claims all fail.
Sandoval’s allegations demonstrate that her claims are unripe. California courts can decide
only justiciable controversies. And there is no justiciable controversy here.
The first cause of action for Writ of Administrative Mandamus is unripe. Sandoval’s Opposition confirms that all her claims are premised on the Commission’s alleged failure to enforce the Coastal Act against PoloDonkey’s bridge, and its alleged failure to carry out general responsibilities to protect coastal resources. As explained in the Commission’s Demurrer, this matter has not been presented to the Commission at all.
In summary:
- The Commission does not have permitting jurisdiction over the Project.
- The Commission does not have present appellate jurisdiction over the Project.
- The Second Cause of Action for Writ of Mandate is unripe and invalid.
- The Third Cause of Action for Violation of the Coastal Act is unripe.
- The Twelfth Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief is unripe.
- Sandoval’s allegations demonstrate that she has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.
- Sandoval’s allegations demonstrate that her claims against the Commission are moot.
In her third cause of action, Sandoval seeks civil fines and penalties for alleged Coastal Act
violations, a restoration order, and a cease and desist order—all apparently issued against the Commission—that would force the Commission to remove the bridge and restore Sandoval’s property. But the SAP’s allegations fail to make any showing of a Coastal Act violation that would entitle her to such relief against the Commission.
Sandoval’s facts as alleged cannot support any cause of action against the Commission.
Moreover, despite her repeated requests in the Opposition that this Court grant leave to amend, Sandoval does not provide even one additional allegation that could fix the fatal defects in the SAP. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving an amendment would cure the defect. (Mendoza v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 802, 809.) By failing to provide even a single hypothetical additional allegation that could cure the irremediable defects in her claims, Sandoval has not carried that burden.
Demurrer #2. [County’s Demurrer]
On April 4, 2025, Planning and Building (collectively, County) filed their demurrer to the first, second, third, sixth, and twelfth causes of action; 20 pages; summarized: County Demurs to the Verified Second Amended Petition for Writs of Mandamus/Mandate and Complaint for Damages on the following grounds:
Sandoval’s First Cause of Action for Writ of Administrative Mandamus fails
to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(e).)
Sandoval’s Second Cause of Action for Writ of Mandate fails to state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc § 430.10(e).)
Sandoval’s Third Cause of Action for Violation of the California Coastal Act
fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e).)
Sandoval’s Sixth Cause of Action for Inverse Condemnation fails to state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(e).)
Sandoval’s Twelfth Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief fails to state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(e).)
A summary of County’s argument: Although Sandoval's Verified Second Amended Petition for Writs of Mandamus/Mandate and Complaint for Damages is unclear, it appears that Sandoval is challenging two decisions on several bases as to the County. Sandoval appears to be claiming the County acted unlawfully by: (1) exempting a neighboring property's bridge repair from a Coastal Development Permit ("CDP") and then rescinding that exemption decision and requiring the landowner to obtain a CDP; and (2) granting a building permit that was upheld on appeal. None of these challenges, however, have merit.
Sandoval's challenge to the County's actions fails for multiple reasons.
First, the decision to exempt the bridge repair from a CDP is moot as a CDP currently is being sought for that work. Any decision on that CDP can be challenged later after all administrative remedies are exhausted.
Second, any challenge to the exemption decision based on the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) is time barred. The exemption decision was made by the Planning and Development Department in September 2022. A challenge made in 2024 to that decision is well outside of the very short statutory timeframe to challenge the County's land use decisions.
Either form of writ relief is unavailable as it pertains to the building permit and the appeal. There is no allegation the County has not performed a required duty or that substantial
evidence does not support the County's decisions. Further, a ministerial building permit does not implicate CEQA review, and the provisions of the Coastal Act are not considered when reviewing a building permit under the County Code.
The County cannot be held liable for a Coastal Act violation based on the allegations
in the operative pleading. Reliance on policy statements and statutory requirements that did not apply as to the County's decisions do not give rise to a cause of action.
Sandoval has failed to demonstrate any property that has been taken for public use,
and as such, the County cannot be held liable for inverse condemnation. Sandoval claims
historical use by neighbors and potential private commercial use of the easement implies an intended use for the public, and that the County has facilitated that public access through the issuance of the exemption to the CDP and the building permit. The easement in which the Serena property and the Foothill property are in dispute over has not been taken for public use and the County has no easement or accepted dedication for public access.
Declaratory relief is also inappropriate at this time as there is no controversy ripe for judicial review for which the Court could grant prospective relief. The allegations
against the County involve past actions, which are not appropriate for redress via declaratory relief and, additionally, are not proper for declaratory relief currently.
County requests the Court sustain the demurrer as to the First, Second, Third, Sixth, and Twelfth causes of action against the County. The County requests the Court sustain the demurrer without leave to amend as the Sandoval cannot demonstrate how a third amended petition/complaint will cure the defects identified.
County’s summary of the alleged background; The matter before the Court concerns repair of a bridge spanning across two neighboring private residential properties - the Serena property and the Foothill property. There is a separate, related lawsuit currently pending between the two private parties involved in this matter regarding the easement in dispute. County found the Foothill property's repair of the bridge exempt from a coastal development permit (CDP) in September 2022. Repairs on the bridge commenced. County issued an over-the-counter building permit to the Foothill property for the bridge on April 16, 2024. Sandoval - the owner of the Serena property - began attempts to appeal the County's exemption to the CDP on or around June 14, 2024. The untimely appeals of the September 2022 exemption were rejected.
On July 1, 2024, Sandoval submitted an appeal to Commission of County's determination to exempt the Foothill property repair from requiring a CDP and the Commission accepted the appeal on July 24, 2024. Commission scheduled to hear the appeal on November 13 or 14, 2024.
This action was filed on August 5, 2024.
On August 29, 2024, County heard the appeal as to the building permit and upheld its issuance.
On October 23, 2024, County rescinded the exemption to a CDP and advised the Foothill property landowner that a CDP was required for the work on the bridge. On the same day, Commission advised Sandoval the appeal would no longer be considered due to the County's rescission of the decision that was to be reviewed.
After the appeal of the building permit was heard and the exemption was rescinded, the Petition was amended on November 7, 2024, and amended again on February 6, 2025.
County argues; summarized: The Writ challenges are moot and time-barred; In the SAP, Sandoval seems to challenge the County's prior decision to exempt the alleged bridge work under traditional mandamus, administrative mandamus, CEQA, and the Coastal Act and seeks a writ as relief. County's decision to exempt the bridge has been rescinded and therefore any writ action based on it is moot. In addition, any challenge to County's prior exemption under any of these causes of action fails as the statute of limitations has long since passed. Sandoval cannot circumvent the statute of limitations by discussing the subsequent appeal of the building permit issuance.
County's decision to exempt the bridge from a Coastal Development Permit is moot as County currently is requiring one. The pivotal question in determining if a case is moot is whether the court can grant the plaintiff any effectual relief. (Giles v. Horn (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 206, 227.) "'Although a case may originally present an existing controversy, if before decision it has, through act of the parties or other cause, occurring after the commencement of the action, lost that essential character, it becomes a moot case or question which will not be considered by the court."' (Wilson v. Los Angeles County Civil Service Com., (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 450, 453.)
In September 2022, County's Planning and Development Department found the bridge at issue in this matter to be exempt from a CDP. Per Section 35-5 of the County Code, a determination that a use, activity, or structure is exempt is subject to appeal by the Commission. (Pub. Resources Code, § 30625.) Upon receipt of the appeal in this matter, Commission determined there were grounds for appeal and set a hearing for November 13, 2024. On October 23, 2024, County rescinded the decision to exempt the bridge. County notified the property owner and the Commission that the County would be requiring a CDP for the bridge.
Here, through the writ causes of action, Sandoval challenges in part County's
exemption determination. County, however, has since rescinded that determination.
Sandoval 's challenge of County's decision to exempt the repair has been mooted by
events that have transpired during the pendency of this action and, therefore, there is no relief that the Court can order on the issue.
A challenge to County's decision to exempt the bridge from a CDP is time barred. Public Resources Code section 21167 subdivision (a) provides the time frame in which an action must be brought to challenge an agency's decision based on noncompliance with CEQA. When a petitioner alleges that an agency's actions failed to determine whether there may be a significant effect on the environment, suit shall be commenced within 180 days of the decision, unless a notice of exemption is filed with the county clerk, which shortens the timeline for a challenge. If no formal decision was made, then suit shall be commenced within 180 days of the start of construction. (Stockton Citizens for Sensible Planning v. City of Stockton (2010) 48 Cal.4th 481, 500.) Other, even shorter limitations apply to Sandoval's challenge here and as to the challenge of land use decisions in general (e.g. 90 days pursuant to Gov. Code 65009 subd. (c)(l).). However, County will proceed with the most generous timeframe and statute of limitations available to Sandoval.
The decision to exempt the bridge from requiring a CDP was made on September 30,
2022. Therefore, any challenge based on CEQA grounds must have been brought within 180 days of the decision - by March 29, 2023. Under the alternative calculation, repairs on the bridge had commenced by March 10, 2023, or as early as October 4, 2022. Thus, a challenge to the exemption, considering the latest construction start date of March 10, 2023, should have been brought by September 6, 2023. The original petition/complaint, filed on August 5, 2024, was not timely filed under either calculation.
Sandoval claims that she did not have "notice" of a decision made on an exemption. No regulation or statute required notice to Sandoval of this action. In any event, Sandoval was aware a decision had been made when repairs on the bridge continued to occur after 2022
and into 2023 and 2024, as evidenced by Sandoval 's own conduct.
County anticipates that Sandoval will argue the formal decision was made at a different, later point in time, to attempt to evade compliance with the strict filing timelines that apply to land use decisions and challenges regarding failure to comply with CEQA. The
limitations period starts running, however, on the date the public agency makes a decision on a development and is not retriggered on each subsequent date that the public agency takes some action toward implementation. (Van de Kamps Coalition v. Board of Trustees of LA Community College Dist. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1044.)
Sandoval was aware of the work occurring on the bridge since at least March 2023, and potentially as early as June 2022. The original verified petition/complaint filed on August 5,
2024, contained no allegations of CEQA violations. The first allegation of CEQA violations
was made in the First Amended Petition/Complaint filed on November 27, 2024. Sandoval is attempting to resuscitate a time barred cause of action by bootstrapping it to the decision on appeal on the building permit. Sandoval failed to timely challenge the County's decision
as to the exemption to the CDP.
Sandoval seeks relief under Section 1085 for traditional mandamus and Section 1094.5 for administrative mandamus. Sandoval fails to plead facts to show either writ relief is
appropriate as to the building permit. A traditional mandamus petition under Section 1085 is only appropriate to challenge legislative or quasi-legislative actions of broad application and to compel an agency to comply with a ministerial duty. The SAP fails to adequately allege either.
On the other hand, a writ under Section 1094.5 is appropriate when the party seeks
review of adjudicatory or quasi-judicial decisions of a public agency, made because of a
proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken, and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in a public agency, on the grounds of noncompliance with the law.
Simply put, Sandoval is attempting to revive the moot and time barred cause of action of the exemption to the CDP by shoehorning it to this later ministerial decision. Sandoval demonstrates this in the SAP and exhibits. The SAP alleges a "final approval" occurred May 31, 2024. However, the exhibits show a "case date" of June 23, 2022, noted by Sandoval's appeals submitted in June 2024 to the County.
A Writ of Mandate under section 1085 is inappropriate as no Legislative Action is
challenged and no ministerial duty is alleged. Traditional mandamus under Section 1085 is appropriate to challenge an agency's failure to perform a ministerial or mandatory act required by law. (Bollengier v. Doctors Med. Ctr. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1115, 1122-1124.) Section 1085, however, cannot be used to compel the exercise of discretion in a particular manner or to order a specific result when the underlying decision is purely discretionary. (Orange County Employees Assn v. County of Orange (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 833, 844.)
However, a traditional mandamus can correct abuses of discretion and force a particular action where the law clearly establishes a petitioner's right to such action. (Bollengier v. Doctors Med. Ctr. (supra) 222 Cal.App.3d 1115, 1124.) The SAP fails to demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion with respect to any action or any duty that the County has failed to carry out.
Here, Sandoval seeks a traditional writ of mandate to require County to set aside their prior decisions. Sandoval is not challenging a general rule of conduct or public policy. Sandoval is challenging the County's application of code to this particular situation - namely the Board of Building Appeals' application of the building code as to the permit for the bridge - and asks the court to order County to make a specific decision.
An action for a relief under Section 1085 is inappropriate to review County's decision to
uphold the permit, and Sandoval has failed to show that the Board of Building Appeals
abused its discretion in upholding the permit.
Additionally, the Petition does not allege County failed to perform a ministerial duty, as required by Section 1085. The County has a duty to issue building permits and hear appeals on building permits, and in fact the Petition admits County did carry out these duties. County does not have a mandatory duty to independently research and review history of easements or access as a part of its permitting authority and relies upon the applicant to submit accurate information regarding the project. The SAP does not identify a clear abuse of discretion in County's actions. Therefore, traditional writ of mandate is inappropriate to review the issuance of the building permit.
A request for a Writ of Mandamus under 1094.5 is inappropriate as Sandoval fails to establish abuse of discretion. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (b), "[t]he inquiry in [an administrative mandamus case] shall extend to the questions whether the respondent has proceeded without, or in excess of, jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion.
Abuse of discretion is established if the respondent has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence." The petitioner in an administrative mandamus proceeding has the burden of proving that the agency's decision was invalid and should be set aside, because it is presumed that the agency regularly performed its official duty. (Young v. City of Coronado (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 408, 419.)
Here, Sandoval alleges that the Building Official of the County abused its discretion
by issuing the building permit in April 2024 and not conducting environmental review.
However, environmental review is not required for the issuance of a ministerial building
permit. The SAP does not demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion.
Sandoval also alleges the Board of Building Appeals abused its discretion in upholding the building permit but does not plead specifically how the Board failed to proceed as required by law or how the decision was not supported by the findings or the evidence. The SAP merely alleges the County's decision is invalid due to a failure to conduct environmental review but avoids the fact that no review was required when the building permit was issued due to the bridge being exempt from a CDP. Additionally, environmental review is not required in a purely ministerial building permit. (Pub. Resources Code, §21080.) Sandoval has failed to meet their burden to show County's decision to uphold the building permit was invalid and not supported by substantial evidence.
Sandoval's challenge of the Building Permit under CEQA or the Coastal Act fails. Santa Barbara County's CEQA Guidelines, issued in September 2020, provide that building permits are presumed ministerial and are, as such do not trigger CEQA review. Although Sandoval claims that CEQA has been violated by the issuance and upholding of the building permit, CEQA review is not required with a ministerial permit.
In addition, the authority of the Board of Building Appeals to review a building permit is limited to whether the permit complies with the County Building Regulation, and thus the California Building Code. (Santa Barbara County Code, Chapter 10, Section 10-1.12.) There is no authority for the Board of Building Appeals to determine whether the permit complies with the Coastal Act. The petition fails to establish how County is liable for Coastal Act violations in its authority to issue building permits.
Sandoval relies upon various sections of Public Resources Code 30000 et. al. to set
forth the grounds for a claim of violation of California Coastal Act. However, the policy statements cited do not support a cause of action against the County. The petition relies upon policy statements and statutory requirements for environmental to allege the County has violated the Coastal Act. However, general definitions and policy statements do not give rise to a cause of action unless the statements include express language demonstrating a legislative intent to the contrary. (Schaeffer Land Trust v. San Jose City Council (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 612,634.)
Further, the statutory requirements the petition alleges County failed to perform are not applicable to an exemption from a CDP or issuance of a building permit. Thus, there was no requirement for the County to carry out those duties. The policy statements and definitions cited in the SAP do not give rise to a cause of action without express statutory language intending otherwise. The SAP fails to state a viable cause of action as to a violation of the California Coastal Act.
Sandoval’s claim of inverse condemnation fails as private property has not been taken for public use. An inverse condemnation cause of action derives from article I, section 19, of the California Constitution, which states in relevant part: "Private property may be taken or damaged for public use only when just compensation ... has first been paid to, or into court for, the owner." Property is "taken or damaged" within the meaning of article I, section 19, of the California Constitution when: (1) the property has been physically invaded in a tangible manner; (2) no physical invasion has occurred, but the property has been physically damaged; or (3) an intangible intrusion onto the property has occurred that has caused no damage to the property but places a burden on the property that is direct, substantial, and peculiar to the property itself. (Dina v. People ex rel. Dept. of Transp. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1029, 1048.)
It is well settled that the private individual should not be required to bear a disproportionate share of the costs of a public improvement. (Holtz v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 296, 303.) In Yox v. City of Whitter, the court declined to find that inverse
condemnation extends to impose liability on a community for a loss resulting from a strictly
private improvement. (Yox v. City of Whittier, supra, 182 Cal.App.3d 247, 355.) This is the
situation at hand.
An inverse condemnation action will fail if a plaintiff cannot establish that the public
entity's conduct was in pursuance of a public use. (Yox v. City of Whittier (1986) 182
Cal.App.3d 347, 352.) The term "public use" may be '"defined as a use which concerns the
whole community or promotes the general interest in its relation to any legitimate object of
government."' (Id)
The Petition alleges County committed a taking of property by allowing unlawful construction improvements and issuing permits for the bridge. Sandoval has not demonstrated that County's issuance of the permit was in pursuance of a public use or that Sandoval is bearing costs of a public improvement. In Yox, the public entity was not liable for inverse condemnation for injury to property resulting from completely private construction - "privately designed, financed, and built" where the entity's sole action was the issuance of permits.
Here, County's actions alleged in the SAP are limited to administrative decisions relating to the bridge. Absent an easement or accepted dedication by the public entity, liability is imposed only when the public entity has exercised dominion and control over the private property. (Ruiz v. County of San Diego (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 504, 523.) Sandoval has not alleged County has an easement or accepted dedication for public use.
Here, the petition speculates possible public or private commercial use may occur. There is no allegation or showing County has taken dominion or control over the property for the benefit of the public, rather the petition alleges "public access" was facilitated to their private residential road easement.
Sandoval claims "traditional use" by the neighborhood "demonstrates" County's intent to allow and facilitate public use of the bridge. A purported intent by a public agency is insufficient to support an inverse condemnation cause of action without being supported by substantial evidence, not mere speculation. The petition fails to allege that County's has taken Sandoval's private property for public use and merely alleges County intends to allow and facilitate public use based on the historic uses the former property owner allowed. Echoing the court in Yox, “plaintiffs chose to buy on a private street . . . their remedy is against . . . their uphill neighbor." (Yox v. City of Whittier, supra, 182 Cal.App.3d 347, 355.)
Declaratory relief is inappropriate here. Sandoval's cause of action for declaratory relief against County fails for several reasons. Declaratory relief is appropriate only where there is an actual controversy, not simply an abstract or academic dispute. (Newland v. Kizer (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 647, 657.) For purposes of declaratory relief, an "actual controversy" is one which" ... 'admits of definitive and conclusive relief by judgment within the field of judicial administration, as distinguished from an advisory opinion upon a particular or hypothetical state of facts. The judgment must decree, not suggest, what the parties may or may not do.' (Id)
Code of Civil Procedure section 1060 provides: "Any person . . . who desires a
declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to another . . . may, in cases of actual
controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, bring an original action . . . in the superior court. . . " "The purpose of a judicial declaration of rights in advance of an actual tortious incident is to enable the parties to shape their conduct so as to avoid a breach. Declaratory procedure operates prospectively, and not merely for the redress of past wrongs." (Babb v. Superior Court (1971) 3 Cal.3d 841, 848.)
A declaratory relief action is an improper way to prevent the judicial enforcement of a past claim and cannot be used to "attempt to set up defenses (under desirable auspices and venue) to an action which may, or may never, [be brought]." (Watson v. Sansone (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 1, 3-5.)
Here, Sandoval seeks review of County’s past decisions unrelated to any current controversy. Thus, the purpose of a declaratory relief action - to prevent the commission of a prospective wrong by declaring the rights of the parties - is not met.
In addition, a declaratory relief action is an appropriate remedy in circumstances such as these only if the party is seeking a declaration that the statute or regulation is unconstitutional or invalid. (Western States Petroleum Ass'n v. State Dep 't of Health Servs. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 999.)
Sandoval is not challenging the constitutionality or validity of the Local Coastal Plan and the regulations therein at issue, but only their application as to the bridge repair. Thus, Sandoval does not have a valid declaratory relief action based on the allegations within the SAP.
Even if this Court found Sandoval stated a cause of action for declaratory relief, it should refuse to exercise the power to entertain declaratory relief because such relief "is not necessary or proper" at this time pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1061. To
the extent Sandoval is challenging a decision the County may make in the future to grant, or even review, a CDP application, that decision is not ripe for review. If County grants a future CDP application, further administrative remedies are available during the process.
Generally, a party must exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the courts. (Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist. v. California Public Employment Relations Bd. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1072, 1080.) Under Public Resources Code section 30625, the Commission has jurisdiction to hear an appeal on a CDP. It is only after Commission hears the appeal and issues a ruling on the CDP that an aggrieved party can attack Commission's decision by writ of mandate. (McAllister v. County of Monterey (2007) 14 7 Ca.App.4th 253, 288; Fudge v. City of Laguna Beach (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 193, 200.)
Declaratory relief is not appropriate currently. Declaratory relief is inappropriate when the controversy is not yet ripe for review. (Newland v. Kizer, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d 647, 657.) Here, the exemption for a CDP that is being challenged has been rescinded and County is requiring a CDP. County retains the authority under the LCP to hear applications on CDPs, and Commission retains authority under statute to hear appealable actions on any CDP.
Judicial review on a CDP application that has not yet been submitted to County is not ripe for adjudication. The controversy must be definite and concrete ... [i]t must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive
character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts. (Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth (1937) 300 U.S. 227, 240-241.)
Until an available "administrative procedure has been invoked and completed, there is nothing that the . . . court may review; it cannot interfere in the intermediate stages of the proceeding." (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 291.)
Sandoval prays for an order that an application for a CDP for the bridge shall be invalid for County to consider. However, declaratory relief is not ripe, as the CDP has
not been submitted.
A demurrer should be sustained without leave to amend where it is probable from the
nature of the defects that the plaintiff cannot state a cause of action. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at 318; Oddone v. Superior Court (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 813, 823.) For instance, "leave to amend should be denied where the facts are not in dispute and the nature of the claim is clear, but no liability exists under substantive law." (Lawrence v. Bank of America (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 431,436.)
Such is the case here. The defects in the Petition are not curable. Sandoval has amended the operative pleading already, and another amendment cannot cure the Petition from the foundational defects identified herein.
Based on the foregoing, County requests that the Court dismiss the First, Second, Third, Sixth, and Twelfth causes of action against County with prejudice.
Sandoval’s Opposition.
Filed 5/8/25; 19 pages; summarized: County’s demurrer to Sandoval’s First, Second, Third, Sixth and Twelfth causes of action each fails as a matter of law, sufficient ultimate facts are already pled, and the demurrer should be overruled in its entirety. The Court must accept all facts in the operative pleading as true and construe them liberally in favor of the pleader. Here, County disregards this standard by relying on disputed, incomplete, and inaccurate representations of the facts set forth in the verified Second Amended Petition & Complaint voluntarily amended on February 6, 2025 (“2APC”). Instead of addressing the legal sufficiency of contentions in the 2APC actually as pled, County instead makes conclusory arguments on extrinsic facts not pled, and fail to raise any legitimate arguments as to the sufficiency of ultimate even undisputed facts in the 2APC to support their demurrer, nor do they presume as true the very thorough and specific ultimate facts in
a 67-page, verified 2APC document with 177 pages of Exhibits, except to misrepresent or distort them.
Instead, their arguments are improperly based on generic ripeness, exhaustion, mootness and other arguments with no acknowledgment or reference to the contrary, very specific factual allegations. For these reasons, County’ demurrer is unsupportable and should be entirely overruled. If the Court disagrees, then they should liberally grant Sandoval leave to amend on any issue demurred, as no arguments in the demurrer here are uncurable, not subject to amendment.
This case arises from disputes involving property at 3196 Serena Avenue, Carpinteria, in
Santa Barbara County owned by Petitioner Trust, represented by trustee Sandoval, along with the adjacent property at 3215 Foothill Road, Carpinteria, California, owned by PoloDonkey and represented by Seidler. The dispute concerns the unlawful reconstruction of a previously abandoned and deconstructed residential tertiary road and bridge by
PoloDonkey/Seidler, no longer qualifying as a non-conforming structure when approved.
This was knowingly by each involved and unlawfully allowed to be rebuilt and approved outside the previously abandoned and disputed 1915 easement, encroaching on Sandoval’s private property. The unlawful new bridge and tertiary road are located in an Environmentally Sensitive Habitat Area (ESHA), FEMA high-flood hazard area (AE zone), and remain with defect or nuisance conditions. It is alleged that during 2006-2007, Seidler’s predecessor, Michael Rothbard, formally relinquished the disputed Serena entrance in favor of two new driveways via Foothill Road, later confirmed by PoloDonkey/Seidler with its commercial access on Foothill Road.
On October 1, 2017, a neighbor had trespassed and fell through the hole in the pre-existing,
abandoned bridge at Serena, leading to a lawsuit filed on March 19, 2018, against Sandoval's predecessor, contributing to the abandonment and dismantling of the bridge, preventing any use for a period of years.
It is further alleged that on March 20, 2024, County Inspector Carl Lindberg abused his
discretion by abating violation 22BDV-00076, titled “PoloDonkey LLC Unpermitted Repair of Bridge,” without obtaining any necessary permits or conducting a site visit, as required by a Stop Work Order [2APC ¶51]. On March 22, 2024, the Building Official had reviewed a survey of the bridge and acknowledged that it encroached on Sandoval's property, noting, “It looks like the bridge is about a 60/40 or so split”. On April 1, 2024, Building Official Craig Johnson erroneously misapplied an exemption when he emailed Director Plowman, stating that the County considered the work to be permit-exempt under the County's policy for structures under 30 inches above grade, despite the bridge being 60 inches above grade. On April 4, 2024, Planning and Development Director Plowman admitted to Assistant County Executive Officer Wade Horton that the Stop Work Notice remained in effect until the Division authorized the bridge repair. However, Director Plowman incorrectly claimed that the bridge was exempt from permits under a policy for structures under 120 square feet, despite the bridge being 218 square feet. Sandoval later timely appealed this zoning decision to County.
On April 16, 2024, Building Official Craig Johnson issued the unlawful express permit, knowing that the bridge encroached onto Sandoval’s property without proper authorization or compensation, constituting an illegal taking by the County as alleged.
Sandoval later timely appealed this building permit decision to County.
On June 6, 2024, Director Plowman informed Sandoval of the decision to exempt the
abandoned bridge from zoning and a Coastal Development Permit (CDP). On June 14, 2024, Sandoval submitted a further timely appeal.
However, on June 25, 2024, Plowman rejected the timely appeal.
On June 18, 2024, Director Plowman exempted the bridge from the Toro Canyon Plan, misclassified it as non-conforming despite the Plan, and refused to open a formal complaint regarding property rights violations.
On June 27, 2024, Sandoval submitted a further timely appeal. Plowman rejected this appeal on June 28, 2024, and expressly indicated her decision was final. Sandoval asserts each of these acts by County were an abuse of discretion. After exhausting all administrative remedies at the County level, and Sandoval filed her original Petition on August 5, 2024.
Sandoval appealed to the Commission on July 1, 2024.
On October 23, 2024, Commission unilaterally declined to further consider or hear her Appeal and refused to enforce the Coastal Act.
On Nov. 13, 2024, Commission’s administrative decision became a final action when they scheduled a de novo appeal hearing on the agenda but refused to hear the appeal.
The First Amended Petition and Complaint (1APC) was filed on Nov. 27, 2025. County’s continual failure to address the unpermitted and unlawful development in the ESHA and the ongoing environmental harms, unsafe bridge conditions, and encroachment, as outlined in the Complaint, illustrate the need for judicial intervention.
Sandoval seeks relief from the unlawful actions taken each by Defendants, County, and Commission under the California Coastal Act (CCA), California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), and other applicable local and state laws and regulations. The CCA (Public Resources Code (PRC) §30000 et seq.) protects the State’s coast from unregulated development and ensures environmental protection to prevent the deterioration and destruction of the coastal zone. (PRC §30001.) The Legislature has mandated that “conflicts be resolved in a manner which on balance is the most protective of significant coastal resources.” (PRC §30007.5)(UL added).
The CCA sets forth a “comprehensive scheme to govern land use planning for the entire coastal zone of California.” (Pac. Palis. Bowl v. City of L.A. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 783, 793). The CCA requires that each local government within the coastal zone prepare a local coastal program [LCP] for the area of the coastal zone within its jurisdiction. (PRC §30500(a)).
Under the CCA, with exceptions, any person wishing to perform or undertake any development in the coastal zone must first obtain a CDP in addition to obtaining any other permit required by law from any state, regional, or local agency or government (PRC §30600(a)). The CCA clearly states that ESHA’s shall be protected against any significant disruption of habitat values and only uses dependent on those resources shall
be allowed within those areas. (PRC § 30240(a)).
As explicitly outlined in the County’s Coastal Zoning Ordinance (CZO), which forms part of the County’s certified Local Coastal Program (LCP), development standards for Stream Habitats state that “No structures shall be located with the stream corridor…bridges (when support structures are located outside the critical habitat) may be permitted when no alternative route/location is feasible.” (CZO §35.97.19). Also, CCA PRC §30236 limits alterations of rivers and streams to only water supply, flood control, or habitat improvement projects, all requiring the best feasible mitigation measures. A fundamental purpose of the CCA is to ensure that state policies prevail over the concerns of local government. (Pac. Palis. Bowl Mobile Ests., 55 Cal. 4th (supra) at 794).
County is also charged and CEQA applies to “discretionary projects proposed to be
carried out or approved by public agencies ….” (Pub. Res. Code, § 21080, subd. (a).) “‘Project’ means an activity which may cause either a direct physical change in the environment, or a reasonably foreseeable indirect physical change in the environment, and which is any of the following: (a) An activity directly undertaken by any public agency. (b) An activity undertaken by a person which is supported, in whole or in part, through contracts, grants, subsidies, loans, or other forms of assistance from one or more public agencies. (c) An activity that involves the issuance to a person of a lease, permit, license, certificate, or other entitlement for use by one or more public agencies.” (Pub. Resources Code, § 21065; see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15378.)
With narrow exceptions (inapplicable here), CEQA requires an Environmental Impact Report [EIR] whenever a public agency proposes to approve a project with any significant effect on the environment. (Sust. Transp. Adv. of S. Barb. v. S.B. Cnty Assn. of Gov’ts (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 113, 117). “Approval” means the decision by a public agency which commits the agency to a definite course of action for a project intended to be carried out by any person.
A demurrer lies only where a defect appears on the face of the challenged pleadings. (CCP
§430.30.) This Court must "deem to be true all material facts that were properly pled, along with "those facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged." (City of Morgan Hill v. Bay Area Quality Mgmt. Dist., (2009) 118 Cal. App. 4th 861, 869.) A demurrer is simply not the appropriate procedure for determining the truth of disputed facts. (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113-114.) A pleading is adequate if it contains a reasonably precise statement of the ultimate facts, in ordinary and concise language, and with sufficient detail to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and extent of the claim. (CCP §§ 425.10(a), 459; in accord, Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Gray v. Dignity Health (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 225, 236 n.10.)
On demurrer, the operative pleading "must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties." (Code of Civ. Proc. § 452.) If the complaint states any valid claim entitling the plaintiff to relief, the complaint is good against a general demurrer. (Quelimane Co., Inc. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38.)
Should the Court grant any part of the Demurrer, Sandoval requests leave to
amend. There is no incurable or “knock out” issues that should warrant a denial of such leave. If there is any reasonable possibility that a defective pleading may be cured by amendment, the Court must grant leave to amend. (Beckstead v. Superior Court (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 780, 782 [denial of leave to amend is an “extraordinary judicial procedure”); Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 (court shall not “sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment”); Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1037 (“A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment.”).) Leave to amend should only be denied on a showing of bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing
party, or futility of the amendment. (Royal Ins. Co. of Am. V. Sw. Marine, 194 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 1999)). “Where there is a reasonable possibility an amendment will cure a defective pleading, it is ordinarily an abuse of discretion to deny a party the chance to cure the defect (Greenberg v. Equitable Life Assur. Society (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 994, 998.)
Here, if any part of the Motion is granted, justice requires the granting of leave, and particularly since there can be and has been no showing by Demurring Respondents of any futility, bad faith, undue delay, or prejudice.
County’s demurrers to each cause of action alleged should be overruled – because -
1. Mootness fails as a basis for demur on all applicable COAs; the 2APC is sufficiently pled. First, the issues addressed are not actually “moot”, since County is still actively unlawfully exercising its authority and abusing its discretion, as expressly alleged, despite any alleged voluntary cessation through rescission of a prior exemption and permit (infra). Otherwise, exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply. Three discretionary exceptions to “mootness” are: (1) when the case presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur; (2) when there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the parties; and (3) when a material question remains for the court's determination.” (Cucamongans Utd for Reas. Exp. v. City of Ran. Cuca, 82 Cal. App. 4th 473, 479-480 (4 Dist., 2000)). All three exceptions are present in the 2APC since: (1) this case involves ongoing violations of the CCA in an ESHA and stream, in a matter of broad public interest, and the controversy is likely to recur due to unmitigated or abated conditions (infra); (2) the controversy have already recurred, while the County’s failure to enforce its duties has persisted, allowing the violations to continue unabated, while prosecuting a wrongful code enforcement
action; and (3) a material question remains for the court’s determination: whether the County’s refusal to act on its statutory duties under the Coastal Act or CEQA, despite knowing the ongoing harm, constitutes a violation of law, as noted in the 2APC, that warrants judicial intervention as to County’s abuse of discretion.
Additionally, County’s so-called ‘rescission’ of any CDP exemption does not make moot or even resolve the core issue: the County’s continued failure to enforce the Coastal Act, CEQA, and other entitlement obligations, and past violations, to protect Sandoval and the public. “The voluntary cessation of allegedly wrongful conduct destroys the justiciability of a controversy and renders an action moot unless there is a reasonable expectation the allegedly wrongful conduct will be repeated.” (See Ctr. for Local Gov't Accountability v. City of San Diego, 247 Cal. App. 4th 1146, (4th Dist. 2016) citing to Environmental Defense Project of Sierra County v. County of Sierra (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 877, 887; Pittenger v. Home Sav. & Loan Asso. (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 32, 36.)
The County abused its discretion in not enforcing the CCA and CEQA and instead
granted an express permit. The verified pleadings show the acts to deprive Sandoval’s
rights are indeed a “reasonable expectation” because County is actually repeating these unlawful acts and abuses of discretion since County has filed improper code enforcement citations against Sandoval to enforce unlawful access. County and Defendants are each repeating their wrongful violations of property rights of Sandoval, before and after applying for a new CDP as alleged.
These Defendants through code enforcement seek to remove a fence to enforce Defendants’ alleged use rights even before any approval of a CDP or any abatement or mitigation of their prior defects or nuisance conditions, which no longer qualified or qualifies as non-conforming, are now unlawful and remain in the ESHA and FEMA high-risk flood zone, posing unresolved risks.
The “public interest exception” to mootness also applies because Coastal Act violations in an ESHA, affecting broad public interests (Cucamongans, supra), including anyone using the road, using the adjacent public trail, or proximate to the waterway.
County’s duty to enforce the Coastal Act persists, and judicial review is mandated to
ensure compliance and prevent future evasion of statutory obligations. Unlike Wilson
& Wilson v. City Counsel of Redwood City (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1559 cited in the Demurrer, which involved a fully resolved dispute, here the unlawful, unsafe bridge remains structurally deficient, hazardous, and unrepaired as specifically alleged. Wilson is
inapposite, as it addressed abstract disputes, not ongoing statutory violations threatening public safety and ecological integrity. Trespass and environmental contamination continue due to Defendants unauthorized actions, tacitly and actively supported by County officials in a past and continuing abuse of discretion as alleged, where the County has failed to issue cease-and-desist or restoration orders despite finding the Commission previously finding a “substantial issue.”
Meanwhile, County’s alleged rescission of its CDP exemption and permit did not resolve the ongoing impacts on public safety, environmental integrity, property rights, transparency, and obligations under the Coastal Act or CEQA.
While conflating CEQA authorities with the CCA, the Demurrer also fails to provide any
factual or legal authority to support their mootness argument for COA 3, based on County’s continuing duty to enforce the CCA against unpermitted development in an ESHA and address ongoing harms, including the unsafe bridge, trespass, and environmental damage. Despite County rescinding its alleged prior CDP exemption and permit, County retains authority under Public Resources Code §§ 30810-30812 to issue cease-and-desist orders, restoration orders, or notices of violation, which it has failed to utilize despite the Commission finding a “substantial issue”. Clearly, this matter meets the “Giles” test of whether any “effectual” relief, with ample enforcement bases available including code enforcement “red tagging” and citing Defendants for their previous deficient construction and failure to follow code or abate such nuisance and hazard conditions, or to protect the ESHA, and abate the contamination thereof, as alleged.
County’s inaction maintains a live controversy, as the bridge remains structurally
deficient in the ESHA, trespass and contamination persist, and Defendants unpermitted gas line reactivation continues to pose risks. County’s duty to enforce the CCA is independent of County’s rescission, and judicial intervention is necessary to prevent future evasion of statutory obligations. The writ sought to compel County to “take any action necessary pursuant to its legal duties,” remains viable because County has failed to act on its enforcement powers despite County’s ongoing noncompliance.
Defendants’ demurrer as to mootness each fails, is unsupported by legal authority, and should be overruled, or leave granted to Sandoval to amend.
Demurrers to causes of action 1-3 should be overruled, County’s continuing abuse of
discretion requires judicial review.
a. COA 1 CCP §1094.6 for Administrative Mandamus are sufficiently pled. The
appropriate facts, taken as true, and authority under CCP §§ 1094.5, 1094.6 setting forth the basis for timely filing of a writ of administrative mandamus are each already properly set forth as pled, with filing not later than the 90th day from a “final” decision by County. County makes no dispositive or even persuasive or argument otherwise. The Yox case (182 Cal.App.3d 347) cited in the demurrer sets forth a trial standard of proof, not demurrer of ultimate facts at a pleading stage. There is no evidence in the pleadings as to when the Defendants construction actually commenced. What is known and pled is that construction by Defendants commenced before any effort was made to obtain entitlements and a building permit.
b. COA 2 for CCP §1085, 1086 for Mandate are sufficiently pled. This “continuing”
action is not time barred, subject to COA 2 for Writ of Mandate pursuant to CCP 1085, 1086, alternatively to COA 1, and is subject to dispute, also as expressly alleged in the 2APC. CCP § 1085, 1086 have no express limitations period, and the County has set forth no basis for laches, or any overriding prejudice thereon, or any other authority to limit Sandoval’s rights to file a Writ of Mandate under any other applicable authority, and so there is no legal or factual basis to find that COA 2 for Mandate is time-barred.
County’s Demurrer also argues that the application of CCP § 1085 would require
essentially a specific express pleading whether the duties alleged in County are either
“ministerial” or “mandatory”, including with respect to Mandate regarding Building Permits and other issues. There is no language in the statute to that effect, or in any of the authorities cited by Defendants requiring such a distinction in ultimate facts at the pleading/demurrer stage, nor can we locate any. Bollengier (222 Cal. App. 3d 1115, 1123) cited in demurrer only states Mandate “usually” compels a ministerial duty. The ultimate facts of the County’s duties are pled already adequately alleged in the 2APC; averments essentially ignored in the Demurrer.
County’s assertion that the underlying decision on permits was “purely discretionary” is purely conclusory. Quite the opposite, County’s decision is not discretionary (reinforced by their rescission of the permit) since County is bound to enforce state laws for the CCA and CEQA, and the Public Trust Doctrine as pled in the 2APC. If County’s actions were purely “ministerial” in approving an over-the-counter permit, County would not have rescinded their alleged prior exemption and required – post hoc – that Defendants apply for a CDP after previously completing their work (supra).
Considering the ‘rescission’ in context, this is just another denial of Sandoval’s use and
enjoyment and other property rights, in essentially a quasi-legislative action, where County gets to pick and choose what statutes and ordinances they can ignore, while reinterpreting and essentially rewriting these rules for Defendants, ignoring the legislature’s language and policy applications of the Coastal Act, CEQA and other authorities. Further, County
itself joined in Defendants’ unlawful behavior, allowing the unlawful exemption and
construction to continue for months without a CDP, EIR, abatement or mitigation, and then – with no provision or demand for mitigation or environmental abatement related to the previous construction activities -- merely invited Defendants to wrongfully (and on prior notice thereof) apply for a CDP to entitle permitting for a previously expressly abandoned easement, without right, title or interest therein by any applicant. County’s demurrer to COA 3 is without merit, unsupported by facts or legal authority. It should be overruled or leave to amend granted.
c. Limitations for CEQA PRC § 21167 are not time-barred. Given that County was an original defendant in the Mandamus or Mandate Causes of Action and were not added as a new defendant to the action in bringing CEQA claims in the verified 1APC as well as the 2APC, these issues under CEQA in the 2APC each relate back to the 1APC verified petition filing date of November 27, 2024. Sandoval has alleged that County initially allowed construction on a previously abandoned bridge, which no longer qualifies as non-conforming, to continue without permits, and sought to avoid their responsibilities for issuance altogether, with an decision thereon delayed even as late as May 31, 2024, and the administrative appeal was filed on June 14, 2024, on which date County ultimately issued its formal approval of the Defendants’ project, and the within CEQA action was filed in the 1APC on Nov.27, 2024, and so was timely filed as alleged under the code, since this was exactly 180 days from the initial May 31, 2024 decision, or the date of the initial “formal approval”. This was therefore within 180 days of the “formal approval” as required and therefore meets the first prong test CEQA PRC §21167(a). These facts as alleged are to be taken as true. If the Court disagrees, then Sandoval should be granted leave to amend these sections to set forth applicable facts and law.
d. “September 2022” exemption approval arguments are disputed in the 2APC. The
Court does not now determine whether, when the entire record is considered, Sandoval has shown a CEQA violation whether County ever, in “September 2022” or thereafter,
originally issued an “exemption” to any requirement for a CDP is a fact in controversy and subject to dispute, as specifically pled and alleged by Sandoval. We can find no corroborative evidence to support Director Plowman’s empty and conclusory assertions that any such prior findings on a basis for a CDP exemption were ever previously considered by County, or thereafter expressly issued on any basis to avoid a CDP in 2022 or otherwise, before the express permit (with no plan, CDP, EIR) issued, nor has County produced any such documentation, and this controversy is set forth expressly and plainly in the verified 2APC.
In addition to County’s bare and conclusory assertion, the demurrer misrepresents that the
content of evidence supporting a time bar, or admission by Sandoval that there was then any such exemption issued, noticed or otherwise, as of “September 2022”, “September 23, 2023” or “September 30, 2022” date. This is an entirely fatuous and baseless argument, ignoring the true facts as pled in a verified pleading and even those expressly addressed by Sandoval in her appeal on the same page 2 of Exhibit 5.
The Demurrer also misconstrues and misapplies the theories and holding in Stockton
Citizens for Sensible Planning v. City of Stockton, 48 Cal. 4th 481, (2010), which should not be dispositive or even persuasive herein. Unable to prove any undisputed evidence of any “formal approval” by County before May 31, 2024, as alleged by Sandoval, County in their demurrer provides no analysis or undisputed facts in the 2APC to support any limitations application to CEQA PRC § 21167 to any prior “informal” approval and public notice in the within action, distinguishing this case from Stockton, at any point before May 31, 2024 when per the 2APC approve, file or publish a notice of exemption (NOE) from CEQA, for any earlier limitation deadline other than November 27, 2024, calculated as “180 days from the date of the public agency’s decision to carry out or approve the project …” set forth in CEQA PRC § 21167, so that any application of the alternative calculation basis, “180 days from commencement of construction” or any earlier deadline thereof, might apply.
Further, the Stockman case is readily distinguishable from the issues in this case. Here, there was no notice of exemption (NOE) from CEQA ever filed or published, nor any other notice of entitlement exemption approval prior to May 31, 2024, nor is there here any actual corroborating express evidence of same. Also, no prior EIR or engineering study documents were filed with the county, then made subject to entitlement review, to compare later work to these bases for an exemption entitlement.
Van de Kamps Coalition, cited in the Demurrer is also readily distinguishable, since there a contract (lease) relevant in that case documented a basis for an original agency approval.
The County provides no such “contract” or similar instrument documenting approval before May 31, 2024, and no citations to the 2APC or its Exhibits (except as setting forth evidence of the “September 2022” controversy in Sandoval’s administrative appeal documents) as actual undisputed facts that “subsequent” actions by the County were merely additional further “discretionary” decisions, only made after some prior express “approval” occurring before May 31, 2024, nor is there any analysis as to how this case may actually even apply in this case, without such a “contract”. (Van de Kamps Coal. v. Bd. of Trs. of L.A. Cmty. Coll. Dist., (2012) 206 Cal. App. 4th 1036.)
3. COA 3 violation of Coastal Act is sufficiently pled; the Demurrer should be overruled.
Defendants complain that the contentions of ultimate facts are only “policy statements”
and “general definitions” and therefore do not give rise to a cause of action by the County. This section of the demurrer is so generic, it's like they are reading a different pleading from another case. The 2APC is replete with specific averments, setting forth Sandoval’s standing to sue (PRC§ 30804), and including ultimate facts where even named County officials, how they specifically failed to perform and breached their public duties through specific violations of the CCA (and also CEQA for that matter).
Schaeffer Land Trust (215 C.A. 3d 612) is a CEQA case cited by County, not CCA, and further distinguishable since there was a City Counsel decision based on traffic studies (nothing like that here) and inapplicable as it addresses the National Environmental Policy Act, as giving rise to such policies and definitions, not at issue here, nor is there any analysis why it should be considered.
Sierra Club (222 C.A. 3d 30) also cited is also distinguishable (a CEQA case, not CCA) and inapplicable here.
Further, it is County that rescinded the CDP exemption; Commission retains statutory authority under PRC § 30810-30812 to issue cease-and-desist orders or restoration requirements for Coastal Act violations but failed to issue same.
County’s history of noncompliance creates a “reasonable expectation” of future violations (Ctr. for Local Gov't Accountability v. City of San Diego, 247 Cal. App. 4th 1146, 1157 (2016).) County’s failure to fulfill its obligations, including enforcement, under the Coastal Act violates protections for Environmentally Sensitive Habitat Areas (ESHA). (PRC § 30240(a). Sandoval is entitled to judicial review under CCP § 1094.5 and PRC § 30801. County’s demurrer to COA 3 is without merit and is unsupported by facts or legal
authority: It should therefore be overruled or leave to amend be liberally granted.
4. COA 6 for inverse condemnation is sufficiently pled; the Demurrer should be denied.
The Serena entrance adjacent to a public trail and is therefore “public” is expressly alleged
and in dispute. Counsel conveniently, in ‘quoting’ the language as a “private residential
road easement,” they conveniently and misleadingly leave off the language before that stating such characterization is “disputed” in their brief, like other such “disputed” averments on other issues.
This not a judicial admission, just a statement of ultimate facts in controversy, specifically pled. Specific ultimate facts are also alleged in the 2APC where (1) the property has been physically invaded in a tangible manner; (2) the property has been physically damaged, re: unabated nuisance conditions (bridge, gas line) and/or (3) there has been an intangible intrusion that places a direct, substantial, and peculiar to the property itself, here a new bridge and access substantially located outside of the meets and bounds of a disputed tertiary road easement.
These are pled generally, including particularly specific action, with knowledge, by the County Building Official to support a constitutional taking, inverse condemnation and a violation of Sandoval’s rights, therefore specific enough to sufficiently plead the necessary ultimate facts for the elements of COA 6, to put County and others on notice of the extent of the claims thereon.
5. COA 12 for Decl. Relief is sufficiently pled, ripe; the Demurrer should be Overruled.
Declaratory relief is proper to resolve where there is an actual controversy whether County’s actions violated the LCP or Coastal Act (Newland v. Kizer, 209 Cal.App.3d 647, 657 (4th Dist. 1989).) To qualify for declaratory relief, Sandoval must show (1) a proper subject of declaratory relief, and (2) an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to the rights or obligations of a party. (Lee v. Silveira (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 527, 546.) Both elements are met, since the statutes approve declaratory relief as a proper subject, and an actual controversy exists. Critically, PRC §§30803–30804 independently empower courts to grant declaratory relief for CCA violations, irrespective of derivative statutory claims. PRC §30803 explicitly authorizes “any person” to seek declaratory relief to enforce the Coastal Act, while §30804 reinforces judicial authority to compel compliance with statutory duties and is not merely derivative but a standalone remedy for unresolved controversies over enforcement by County of the CCA.
County’s refusal to address unpermitted development in an ESHA and its failure to
issue cease-and-desist orders constitute precisely the violations § 30803 targets.
County’s claim that declaratory relief is unripe, and derivative fails because the
complaint alleges ongoing harm (unsafe bridge conditions, environmental damage and the Commission’s duty to enforce the CCA, which courts deem sufficient for a live controversy (Environmental, supra). County’s assertion that challenges to the CDP exemption and building permit are premature ignores Sandoval’s timely appeals to the Board of
Building Appeals and the Coastal Commission, both of which were later rejected or rendered final. Under McKee v. Bell-Carter Olive Co. (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1230, exhaustion of administrative remedies is jurisdictional, and Sandoval complied by appealing to County, then Commission, each appropriately under Cal. Admin. Code Tit. 14 §§13111–13112.
Each demurring Respondent here, and Commission, were effectively separate agencies deciding separate administrative claims with different responsibilities, hearing separate appeals on separate applicable facts and/or legal authorities, even with different bases for accruing and calculating statutes of limitations for their actions. County Board of Building Appeals and Commission administrative appeals were still pending when the OrigPC was filed on August 5, 2024. County Planning and Development was named in Sandoval’s OrigPC when all County administrative remedies and appeals on Zoning were exhausted by August 5, 2024. Not to do so would have exposed Sandoval to the double-edged sword of the 90-day deadline to file a writ on a decision-maker’s “final” decision, here by Director Plowman, in writing.
The Board of Building Appeals and Coastal Commission were named in the 1APC on Nov. 27, 2024, when the remedies for the “final decisions” and administrative remedies by Commission were exhausted, before the deadline of 60-days had elapsed. As of the 2APC, all administrative remedies on previous “final” decisions by the agencies were exhausted, and the Demurrer sets forth no substantive basis why any Cause of Action, COA 12 for Declaratory Relief or otherwise, would not be “ripe” when filed as of February 6, 2025.
Further, County’s rescission of the exemption in October 2024 does not negate ripeness, particularly since, applying the “futility exception” to ripeness, akin to the circumstances here, where the manner in which the prior appeals have been rejected make it clear after 8 prior appeals (4 for zoning; 4 for building and safety) that no future appeal will be substantively and lawfully considered in good faith by County officials. (See Toigo v. Town of Ross, 70 Cal. App. 4th 309, 327 (1998)).
In arguing ripeness, County ignores the public interest exception, which applies to ongoing and continuing recurring CCA violations in an ESHA. (Cucamongans, supra). Also, County’s failure to address the futility of further administrative exhaustion tacitly concedes that the Commission’s cancellation of Sandoval’s appeal made further administrative action futile, making both the 1APC and the 2APC certainly “ripe” (see, Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist., 2015.) County’s demurrer to the COA 12 of action should therefore be overruled or otherwise leave should be granted.
For the foregoing reasons, Sandoval requests that the Court overrule County’s Demurrer in its entirety, or alternatively and otherwise, liberally exercise their authority and grant Sandoval leave to amend.
The Court’s Conclusions
The Court should decide for the County and against Sandoval.
The Demurrer should be sustained and the First, Second, Third, Sixth, and Twelfth causes of action against County should be dismissed without leave to amend.
The Second Amended Petition/Complaint fails to state a cause of action because Sandoval cannot overcome the long past statute of limitations to challenge County’s decision of the CDP exemption. Despite claims that no evidence alleges a CDP exemption was issued in September 2022; Sandoval ignores the documents that she attached to her Second Amended Petition/Complaint. These exhibits contain numerous public documents that state a September 2022 decision date, as well as Sandoval’s continued unwillingness to accept the decision date provided.
The September 2022 decision date is detailed throughout the Compendium - in Sandoval’s communications with the County, County’s communications to Sandoval, and the “Chronological Activity with Notes and Labor Hours for CAP Number 22BDV-OOOOO-00076”. The time to challenge the exemption determination made in September 2022 on
CEQA, traditional mandamus, or administrative mandamus has run. This even considers the most favorable timeline available for Sandoval to seek review – 180 days of the decision
pursuant to Government Code 65009(c)(1) rather than within 90 days of final decision
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.6.
Sandoval attempts to enlarge the statute of limitations by hitching the CDP exemption
to a discrete building permit which was granted approximately 19 months after the CDP
exemption was decided. The building permit and upholding of the permit is separate and
distinct from any action or decisions on coastal development permits or exemptions thereof.
The Board of Building Appeals does not consider environmentally sensitive habitats (ESHA) and does not consider CEQA when reviewing the sufficiency of a building permit.
Further, the Opposition demonstrates Sandoval’s real challenge is to the CDP exemption, rather than the decision of the Board of Building Appeals to uphold the lawfully issued building permit. The Opposition asserts no allegations of how the building permit or
the Board of Building Appeals upholding that permit violates CEQA or was an abuse of
discretion. Sandoval’s continuing attempts to manufacture a “final decision” date are demonstrated in the pleadings. But for Sandoval’s appeal of the building permit and the Board of Building Appeals’ decision of the to uphold of that permit, Sandoval would not have been able to create a “final decision” date by which to challenge the 2022 exemption by this instant writ petition. Thus, the Demurrer to the first, second, and third causes of action should be upheld on this basis.
Although the Opposition states that all three exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply, this is unsupported. There is no broad public interest warranting court review with regard to this very specific and insular issue between two neighboring landowners with a disputed easement across a dry creek bed. There also is no likelihood of recurrence of the issue regarding a rescinded CDP exemption. In fact, a CDP must be submitted for review by County.
Further, while a question may at some point in the future be appropriate for the Court’s determination, there is no claim ripe for review as there are further administrative remedies that Sandoval must exhaust before seeking Court intervention. Until an
administrative agency or legislative body has reached a “final, definitive position” regarding the issue, a court cannot conclusively identify the impact of any decision and thus must dismiss the suit as premature. (Williamson County Reg'l Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank (1985) 473 U.S. 172, 191.)
The Petition ignores the fact that County, then Commission, then the Court, has authority to review a decision on a CDP or a decision on an exemption to a CDP. Here, the exemption to the CDP has been rescinded and no decision has yet been made on a subsequent CDP application. The administrative remedies available must be exhausted prior to seeking this Court’s review.
The Opposition alleges a new basis for the claims –County’s alleged failure to take enforcement actions. Whereas the Second Amended Petition/Complaint focused on the
CDP exemption and to some extent the building permit, the Opposition adds allegations
regarding County’s alleged lack of enforcement. This new theory of the case also fails.
It is well established that taking enforcement action on an alleged violation is discretionary unless required by specific statutory language. Courts routinely find that enforcement actions, such as the enforcement of zoning violations, are discretionary actions not subject to traditional mandate. (Riggs v. City of Oxnard (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 526, 530
Similarly, it is well established that unless a statute clearly makes prosecution mandatory, an enforcing officer is vested with discretionary power to investigate, determine if a violation has occurred, and prosecute any charges. (Wilson v. Sharp (1954) 42 Cal.2d 675, 678.)
Based on the foregoing, County has no ministerial or mandatory duty subject to a
writ of traditional mandate.
Here, the Opposition claims that the issues are not moot, that County violated the
Coastal Act, and/or that writ relief is warranted due to County’s alleged lack of
enforcement actions, such as issuing cease and desist orders, restoration orders, and/or notices of violations. Whether to take such enforcement actions, however, is within the discretion of County and does not give rise to the statutory and writ causes of action alleged.
Sandoval incorrectly, and without any legal support, claims that because their private
property is adjacent to a public trail, there is a factual dispute as to whether the private
property, and the disputed easement, is public. Essentially, Sandoval claims that an inverse
condemnation claim can be actionable if private property abuts public property, simply by its location and proximity to public property. This theory, in practice, would wreak havoc as to inverse condemnation proceedings for public entities in California and would discourage public entity ownership of property for risk of such threats to the public fiscally. Therefore, the demurrer to this cause of action should be sustained.
A demurrer should be sustained without leave to amend where it is probable from the
nature of the defects that the plaintiff cannot state a cause of action. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985), 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Oddone v. Superior Court (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 813, 823.) Such is the case here.
The defects in the Petition are not curable. Sandoval claims there are no knock-out
issues that warrant denial of leave to amend. However, Sandoval ignores the knock-out issue of Sandoval’s untimely challenge of the CDP exemption that was granted in 2022, the
incurable issue that the CDP exemption being challenged has been rescinded, and the
improper inverse condemnation claims regarding private property interests. Sandoval fails to identify how there is any reasonable possibility of curing these fatal defects. A fourth
amendment cannot cure the Petition from the foundational defects identified herein.
Demurrer #3 and Motion(s) to Strike [Defendant’s Demurrer and Motion(s)]
The Demurrer addresses the third [Violation of California Coastal Act], fourth [Nuisance], seventh [Fraud], eighth [Negligent Misrepresentation], ninth [Waste & Trespass], tenth [Ejectment] and the twelfth cause of action [Declaratory Relief] which are asserted against defendants Seidler and PoloDonkey; the eleventh cause of action [Quiet Title on Easement & Servient Action for Possession Based on Dominant Unlawful Possession (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 810; 811] is asserted against PoloDonkey.
Demurrer filed 4/18/25; 29 pages; summarized: Defendant PoloDonkey, LLC is the owner of a recorded 1915 access easement over real property owned by Sandoval. The Easement provides access to PoloDonkey’s real property from Serena Avenue. The Easement traverses a small creek, and a bridge has been in place over the creek and within the Easement for many decades. In 2024, the bridge was in a state of disrepair, and PoloDonkey sought and obtained a permit from County to make the needed repairs. In issuing the permit, County determined that the repairs were exempt from the requirement of a Coastal Development Permit. County inspected and approved the repairs, finding that the bridge was adequate for use of pedestrians, bicycles and motorcycles. After the permit had been closed out, County formally rescinded its prior decision to exempt the bridge repairs from the requirement of a CDP.
The CDP permitting process has not yet commenced, but PoloDonkey intends to pursue that process in due course. Sandoval incorrectly contends that PoloDonkey has violated the Coastal Act. This is not legally possible. County administers and enforces the Coastal Act, not PoloDonkey. PoloDonkey obtained a permit from County for the bridge repairs, and properly pursued that work in reliance on the permit. County has now determined that the Coastal Act must be complied with, but that process has not been completed, and this controversy is not ripe for adjudication. Sandoval’s claim for a nuisance is also based on violation of the Coastal Act and is invalid for the same reasons.
Sandoval’s claims for waste and trespass, similarly based on PoloDonkey’s permit issued by County, are also deficient.
Sandoval also claims that PoloDonkey made misrepresentations in its permitting application to County. Such claims cannot possibly constitute fraud or misrepresentation, as the alleged statements were made to County, not Sandoval. In addition, these statements are absolutely privileged in connection with legislative proceedings, pursuant to Civil Code section 47(b).
Sandoval’s 3rd Cause of Action.
Under its third cause of action, the SAC alleges that Defendants violated the California
Coastal Act by “seeking an express and unlawful building permit for an unlawful use on a previously abandoned easement, road, and bridge and performing construction activities at BRIDGE” without the requisite CDP. At the same time, the SAC readily admits that – prior to commencing repairs to the Bridge – Defendants did apply for and obtain a Building Permit from the County, which informed Defendants that the project would be exempt from any CDP requirements, and thus – naturally – Defendants did not even apply for a CDP.
Subsequently, the County inspected and approved Defendants’ reconstruction of the Bridge and successfully closed out the Building Permit.
Defendants cannot be liable or responsible for any alleged deficiencies, irregularities or
illegalities in the approval and issuance of the Building Permit and/or the County’s determination that the Bridge repairs were CDP-exempt. As admitted in the SAC, Defendants abided by state and local laws in obtaining a Building Permit prior to repairing the Bridge, albeit without a CDP in reliance upon County’s exemption determination.
Furthermore, County officials concluded that all Bridge repairs were completed in conformity with the Building Permit requirements, as well as state and local building codes and regulations, or otherwise the Bridge reconstruction would not have passed inspection, and County would not have closed out the Building Permit. Defendants’ failure to obtain a CDP for the project did not violate the Coastal Act’s permit requirements set forth in Section 30600 of the California Public Resources Code because – at the time –County granted Defendants a CDP exemption pursuant to its delegated authority under the Coastal Act (see Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 30600.5).
The SAC fails to allege violations of any other provisions of the Coastal Act, and therefore, to the extent that Sandoval’s third cause of action is based on the alleged unlawfulness of the Building Permit and/or Defendants’ failure to obtain a CDP, the SAC fails to state a cause of action against Defendants for violations of the Coastal Act.
This claim is also not “ripe” for adjudication because no final administrative determination
has been reached as to whether the Bridge repairs violated the Coastal Act or the Local Coastal Plan (“LCP”), as Defendants are still in the process of complying with the County’s instructions and preparing their application for a CDP retroactively approving the reconstruction of the Bridge.
Sandoval’s failure to exhaust all administrative remedies with respect to her claim that Defendants failed to obtain a CDP for the Bridge repairs provides additional grounds for sustaining Defendants’ Demurrer to the SAC’s third cause of action. [Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com., 33 Cal.3d 158, 170-71 (1982) (holding that a controversy is ripe “when it has reached, but has not passed, the point that the facts have sufficiently congealed to permit an intelligent and useful decision to be made”]; Alta Loma School Dist. v. San Bernardino County Com. on School Dist. Reorganization, 124 Cal. App. 3d 542, 554 (1981) (“It is a well-recognized rule in this state that if an administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief must be sought from the administrative body and such remedy must be exhausted before judicial review of the administrative action is available.
The rule is not a matter of discretion; compliance is a jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial review. A party must proceed through the full administrative process to a final decision on the merits.”).
The SAC also alleges that Defendants violated the California Coastal Act by failing to obtain a CDP prior to trespassing on Plaintiff’s property to “modify and reactivate a previously unlawful, unpermitted natural gas line …, which actions constitute a Development as defined by the Coastal Act without entitlement or authority . . . SAC ¶ ¶ 140, 144. Sandoval’s “gas line” allegations fail to amount to a cognizable cause of action for violation of the California Coastal Act. While Section 30600 of the Coastal Act requires a CDP for any development in the coastal zone (with certain exceptions discussed below), the term “development” is defined, inter alia, as: “… the placement or erection of any solid material or structure; … construction, reconstruction, demolition, or alteration
of the size of any structure, including any facility of any private, public, or municipal utility. . . . ” Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 30106.
The Coastal Act defines the term “structure” to include “any building, road, pipe, flume, conduit, siphon, aqueduct, telephone line, and electrical power transmission and distribution line.” Ibid. The SAC alleges – in the vaguest possible terms – that Defendants modified and reactivated a gas line; however, assuming that the alleged gas pipe falls within the definition of “structure,” the SAC fails to place Defendants on notice as to how exactly the gas line was modified and whether its size, location, function and/or capacity was altered and thus constituted a “development” under the Coastal Act.
Instead, the SAC merely alleges - in the most conclusory fashion – that Defendants’ modification and reactivation of a gas line was a “development” requiring a CDP.
Furthermore, the Coastal Act exempts certain developments from the CDP requirement,
such as “repair or maintenance activities that do not result in an addition to, or enlargement or expansion of, the object of those repair or maintenance activities,” and “installation, testing, and placement in service or the replacement of any necessary utility connection.” Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 30610(d), (f). The SAC fails to allege that the gas line modification and reactivation resulted in any addition to, or enlargement or expansion of the gas line, or that the gas line modification and reactivation was not part of any installation, testing, and placement in service or the replacement of any necessary utility connection. Therefore, the SAC fails to allege that the purported gas line modification and reactivation was not exempt from the Coastal Act’s CDP requirements, and the Demurrer to Sandoval’s third cause of action should be sustained without leave to amend.
Sandoval’s 4th Cause of Action.
Under its fourth cause of action, the SAC alleges that Defendants’ reconstruction of the Bridge constitutes a public nuisance pursuant to Coastal Zoning Ordinance § 35-185.4(1)(a), which merely provides that any structure that is built or used “contrary to the provisions” of the ordinance is deemed a public nuisance. he SAC utterly fails to specify which provisions of the Coastal Zoning Ordinance Defendants have violated and how. Instead, Sandoval reiterates her absurd allegation that the nuisance was caused by the “dangerous, hazardous, unsafe, unpermitted and unlawfully constructed” Bridge. The
SAC admits that Defendants obtained a Building Permit prior to repairing the Bridge, County inspected and approved the repairs, and then declared the Bridge safe for use by pedestrians, bicycles and motorcycles prior to closing out the Building Permit. Accordingly, Sandoval’s nuisance claim cannot be based on the allegation that the Bridge is dangerous and unpermitted – an allegation contradicted by the facts set forth in the SAC itself.
The SAC also asserts public and, alternatively, private nuisance based on the allegation that Defendants created hazardous conditions by modifying and reactivating a previously unlawful and unpermitted gas line. However, an indispensable element of both public and private nuisance under common law is that Sandoval suffered harm as a result of Defendant’s conduct. Instead of describing the type of harm Sandoval has suffered, the SAC again makes a conclusory allegation that the dangerous and unpermitted Bridge, together with the modified and reactivated gas line, interfered with Sandoval’s enjoyment of the Serena Property and caused Sandoval unreasonable harm and substantial actual damages, including emotional distress.
Exactly how did Defendants’ alleged conduct interfere with Sandoval’s enjoyment of the Serena Property? And what exactly is the Sandoval has suffered? The SAC is completely silent on these issues and vaguely alleges emotional distress without articulating any annoyance, discomfort or mental anguish proximately caused by Defendants’ alleged conduct, as required to demand emotional distress damages under a nuisance claim.
Sandoval’s 7th Cause of Action.
The SAC alleges that Defendants defrauded Sandoval by making misrepresentations to the County in the Building Permit application and to Plaintiff herself. The elements of fraud are: (1) a representation, (2) that is false, (3) made with knowledge of its falsity, and (4) with an intent to deceive, coupled with (5) actual detrimental reliance and (6) resulting damage. Fraud must be pleaded with specificity rather than with general and conclusory allegations. This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.”
The SAC alleges that Defendants’ Building Permit application contained the following
misrepresentations/concealments: (1) Defendants misrepresented that they were entitled to use the Bridge, even though the Bridge is located on an abandoned Easement; (2) Defendants requested authorization for repairs to the Bridge, which Defendants never intended to perform; and (3) Defendants claimed exemptions from the California Coastal Act and the California Environmental Quality Act, to which they were not entitled.
Sandoval has no standing to plead a cause of action for fraud based on Defendants’ alleged
misrepresentations to County. The leading case on third-party standing to plead a cause of action for fraud is Geernaert v. Mitchell, 31 Cal. App. 4th 601 (1995), in which the court adopted the rule of Section 533 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
“The maker of a fraudulent misrepresentation is subject to liability for pecuniary loss to another who acts in justifiable reliance upon it if the misrepresentation, although not made directly to the other, is made to a third person and the maker intends or has reason to expect that its terms will be repeated or its substance communicated to the other, and that it will influence his conduct in the transaction or type of transaction involved.”
In adopting the standard of Section 533, the Geernaert court cautioned that the reason to
expect standard of Section 533 could not be uncritically equated with the familiar concept of foreseeability. Rather, the court held, in its comments under the more general section 531, the American Law Institute carefully distinguishes the concept of foreseeability with reason to expect, making clear that the latter term bears more similarity to actual intent to cause third party reliance than it does to foreseeability. Virtually any misrepresentation is capable of being transmitted or repeated to third persons, and if sufficiently convincing may create an obvious risk that they may act in reliance upon it. This risk is not enough for the liability covered in this Section. The maker of the misrepresentation must have information that would lead a reasonable man to conclude that there is an especial likelihood that it will reach those persons and will influence their conduct.
This is in accord with the holdings of other state and federal courts, which have not gone so far as to extend protection to a plaintiff whose reliance on a fraudulent statement was merely within the foresight of reasonable people. In this case, the SAC is completely devoid of any allegations indicating not only foreseeability that Defendants’ purported misrepresentations to County would be somehow transmitted to Sandoval, but also that Defendants either intended or had reasons to expect that the statements they made in their Building Permit application to the County would reach Sandoval and influence her conduct.
As the court explained in Geernaert, foreseeability does not suffice and a showing akin to actual intent to cause third party reliance is required. Specifically, absent intent, Sandoval’s burden in claiming standing to assert a cause of action for fraud in this case required her to allege that Defendants were in possession of information that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that there was an especial likelihood that Defendants’ statements to the County would reach Sandoval and would influence her conduct. The SAC fails to meet this burden, and Sandoval has no standing to allege fraud against Defendants.
The SAC also fails to allege that Defendants’ purported misrepresentations to County
influenced Sandoval’s conduct in the same or similar type of transaction involved in the issuance of the Building Permit, as required by Section 533 of Restatement (Second) of Torts. In fact, the SAC completely fails to allege that Sandoval justifiably relied on Defendants’ alleged misrepresentations in any transaction. How exactly did Sandoval alter her position to her detriment in reliance upon Defendants’ statements to the County? What exactly would Sandoval not have done but for Defendants’ statements to the County?
The SAC fails to provide the requisite answers to these questions and merely alleges harm in the most vague and general terms, such as deprivation of property rights, interference with enjoyment/ownership/use of land, damage to real property, legal fees, emotional distress and security risk.
Defendants’ statements to the County made in their Building Permit application are privileged and protected under Section 47(b) of the California Civil Code and the Noerr-
Pennington Doctrine. Section 47(b) of the Civil Code, commonly known as the “litigation
privilege,” protects statements made in the course of legislative and judicial proceedings, but also creates a privilege for communications made in any other official proceeding authorized by law. The litigation privilege is absolute, which means it applies regardless of the existence of malice or intent to harm and precludes recovery on all tort theories.
The Noerr–Pennington Doctrine protects private parties from tort liability when they engage in their constitutional right to petition the government. The Noerr–Pennington Doctrine has been extended to preclude virtually all civil liability for a defendant's petitioning activities before not just courts, but also before administrative and other governmental agencies. In this case, Defendants’ statements to the County were made as part of an official administrative building permit application proceeding, which is authorized and even mandated by state and local laws. Defendants submitted the statements to County in connection with and in furtherance of the objectives of their legally required Building Permit application, which petitioned a local governmental agency, i.e., County’s Department of Planning & Development, for authorization to perform repairs to the Bridge. Defendants’ statements to the County are privileged communications that fall under the protections of both Civil Code § 47(b) and the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine and said statements cannot serve as a basis for any tort liability Sandoval seeks in the SAC.
The SAC also alleges that Defendants made fraudulent misrepresentations directly to
Sandoval regarding her financial obligation to repair the Bridge and offered to pay for half of Sandoval’s share of repairs. Sandoval’s fraud allegations simply fail to state a cause
of action. What exactly did Defendant Seidler say to Sandoval? Was the communication verbal or in writing? If verbal, where did the parties’ conversation take place? If written, what medium did Defendant Seidler use to convey his message to Sandoval? The SAC’s failure to provide answers to these questions violates the specificity requirement for pleading fraudulent misrepresentations.
The SAC utterly fails to allege any reliance by Sandoval – let alone justifiable reliance – on Defendants’ vaguely alleged misrepresentations regarding Sandoval’s financial obligation to repair the Bridge. Did Sandoval reimburse Defendants for any part of the Bridge repairs Defendants performed pursuant to the Building Permit? How exactly did Sandoval alter her position to her detriment in reliance upon Defendants’ alleged misrepresentations? What exactly is Sandoval’s harm? The SAC is silent on these issues and offers only vague and self-serving allegations, and thus the Demurrer to Sandoval’s seventh cause of action should be sustained without leave to amend.
Sandoval’s 8th Cause of Action.
The SAC’s eighth cause of action for negligent misrepresentation is again based on Defendants’ alleged misrepresentations made to the County in Defendants’ Building Permit application. There are two circumstances recognized by California law and the Restatement of Torts where liability is not limited to the initial recipient of negligent misinformation but extends to third parties. One circumstance occurs when providing false information poses a risk of and results in harm to person or property. The rule extends to any person who, in the course of an activity which is in furtherance of his own interests, undertakes to give information to another, and knows or should realize that the safety of the person of others may depend upon the accuracy of the information. The other circumstance is inapplicable to this case as it involves negligent misrepresentation in a commercial setting for business purposes.
Here, the SAC merely alleges that Defendants knew or had substantial reason to know that
Sandoval would actually rely on Defendants’ statements to County included in the Building Permit application. The SAC fails to allege that Defendants either knew or should have known that physical or property damage would result through actions taken in reliance upon Defendants’ statements to the County. Instead, the SAC alleges – in the most conclusory terms – that Sandoval reasonably relied on the false impression thereby created and such reliance was reasonable. Exactly how did Sandoval rely on Defendants’ statements to the County? How exactly did Sandoval alter her position to her detriment in reliance upon Defendants’ statements to the County? And what exactly is Sandoval’s harm? The SAC alleges damages in excess of $35,000.00,” but conveniently fails to elaborate on the nature and extent of said damages.
Defendants’ statements to the County are privileged communications that fall within the protections of Section 47(b) of the Civil Code and the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, and thus said statements cannot serve as a basis for any tort liability.
Sandoval’s 8th Cause of Action.
To state a cause of action for waste or trespass, Sandoval was required to allege harm or injury to her real property interests. In this case, the SAC merely alleges that Sandoval was harmed and continues to be harmed by Defendants’ alleged conduct. Although the SAC attempts to clarify that, by making unlawful and defective construction improvements on the Serena Property, Defendants have also committed waste in the form of damage to the Serena Property, the SAC fails to specify the type of property damage inflicted, and furthermore, these allegations are squarely contradicted by Sandoval’s admission in the SAC that Defendants performed all Bridge repairs legally, pursuant to the Building Permit, and the County inspected and approved the repairs.
Sandoval’s 11th cause of action is for Quiet Title.
Sandoval contends that the subject recorded, written Easement has been terminated or abandoned. The bases for Sandoval’s allegations can be summarized as follows: (a) Defendants performed unlawful construction activities on the Bridge in areas outside the confines of the Easement, pursuant to the Building Permit PoloDonkey obtained from the County; (b) the prior owner of the Foothill Property stated in development documents filed with the County that he intended to abandon the subject Easement; (c) PoloDonkey removed boards from the damaged Bridge in order to prevent personal injuries, which prevented anyone from using the Bridge until the repair work commenced; and (d) PoloDonkey admitted that because of damage to the Bridge abutments, the Bridge was not suitable for use by cars.
In Paragraph 218 of the SAC, Sandoval alleges that PoloDonkey damaged or destroyed the
servient tenement by performing work on the Bridge pursuant to the County’s Building Permit. Sandoval admits that PoloDonkey obtained a Building Permit from the County for
the work, and that the County approved the work. These allegations cannot possibly support a quiet title claim. Civil Code section 811 provides 4 bases upon which an easement can be extinguished.
One of those bases is by “the destruction of the servient tenement.” Cal. Civ. Code § 811(2). For instance, an easement to use a stairway in a building is extinguished by the destruction of the building, because the stairway which was the subject of the easement had ceased to exist. This case is nothing of the sort. As alleged in the SAC, the Bridge was in a state of disrepair and PoloDonkey obtained a permit from County to repair and use it,
not destroy it. The repairs were made and approved by County. Nothing about the Easement was destroyed, and the SAC’s allegations cannot possibly support a claim for quiet title.
In addition to the statutory bases provided by Civil Code § 811, an easement may be
extinguished by abandonment. However, an easement expressly created by a formal recorded grant is not terminated by nonuse, in the absence of evidence of a clear, decisive, and unequivocal intent to abandon the easement.
In support of this allegation, Sandoval submits a page and two maps from an encroachment
permit application pursued for the Foothill Property by its former owner, Michael Rothbard. The encroachment permit application was submitted to the State of California Department of Transportation for two new driveways on Foothill Road completely on the other end of the Foothill Property from the subject Bridge over Plaintiff’s Serena Property. On the first page, Mr. Rothbard states that he was pursuing an encroachment on the shoulder of State Highway 192, at 3215 Foothill Road. In response to question 17 on the form, which asked him to completely describe work to be done within STATE highway right-of-way, Mr. Rothbard stated that he intended to abandon one existing residential driveway and create two new driveways, one for residential access and one for commercial equestrian facility use. The new driveways have been designed to meet current State standards as described in the Caltrans manual. As alleged in the SAC, Sandoval’s Serena Property is completely on the other side of PoloDonkey’s Foothill Property from State Highway 192 and provides access to the Foothill Property from Serena Avenue, not Highway 192. In paragraph 34 of the SAC, Sandoval incorrectly contends that the statements made by Mr. Rothbard were made to County. The statements were obviously made to Caltrans, and only concerned driveways within the existing state right of way on State Highway 192.
Sandoval also states that Rothbard depicts the abandonment of the Serena Property access. This is demonstrably untrue. Sheet AS.2 within Exhibit 13 does not indicate anything
about the subject Easement leading south from the Foothill Property to the Serena Property. On Exhibit A [attached] PoloDonkey has marked certain areas of the two maps included in Exhibit to the SAC to illustrate this point. On Sheet AS.2, PoloDonkey has placed the words “Plaintiff’s Serena Property and Bridge,” with an arrow depicting the approximate location of the subject Easement and Bridge. This is nowhere near the northern edge of the Foothill Property at State Highway 192. That area is depicted on which Polodonkey has outlined, in yellow, the areas where Mr. Rothbard proposed to establish two new driveways on State Highway 192, and outlined in red is the then-existing driveway encroachment to State Highway 192, which Mr. Rothbard intended to abandon.
It is demonstrably untrue that Mr. Rothbard indicated an intention to abandon the subject
Easement over Sandoval’s property on Serena Avenue. Sandoval does not advance her case when she incorrectly alleges that Mr. Rothbard made a statement to the County about abandoning the Serena access. The statements were only made to Caltrans with reference to encroachments on the Caltrans right of way for State Highway 192. The Court
should not accept as true factually incorrect statements included in a complaint but contradicted by exhibits attached, because facts appearing in exhibits to a complaint are given precedence over inconsistent allegations in the complaint.
In any event, Mr. Rothbard’s statements were made in connection with a legislative application to a state agency. As discussed above, such statements are absolutely privileged and cannot establish the basis for a claim of abandonment of the Easement.
Sandoval alleges that an injury occurred on the Bridge in 2017. Sandoval further alleges that in order to avoid other injuries, PoloDonkey removed boards from the Bridge, making it unusable for a period of years until PoloDonkey commenced repairs to the Bridge as part of the repair work done in 2022. Sandoval alleges that these events constitute abandonment of the Easement over the Bridge. Even assuming Sandoval’s allegations to be true, nonuse of an express written easement cannot constitute abandonment. Even the Easement grant itself expressly states that failure to use the Easement shall not work an abandonment of the Easement. These allegations do not constitute a proper claim for quiet title.
Sandoval alleges that the Bridge abutments have been compromised by age, and further alleges that PoloDonkey’s representative, Mr. Seidler, has admitted that the Bridge is not suitable for cars. Sandoval asserts that this constitutes destruction of the servient tenement. Whether the Bridge is suitable for pedestrians or cars has nothing to do with the ongoing validity of the Easement. This cannot constitute destruction of the Easement under Civil Code § 811(2).
Leave to amend should not be granted where, in all probability, amendment would be
futile. Here, after Sandoval commenced this litigation, counsel for the parties engaged in “meet and confer” discussions in an attempt to resolve the deficiencies subjecting Sandoval’s FAC to a demurrer. As a result of counsel’s discussion, Sandoval amended the FAC by filing the currently operative SAC. The SAC’s pleading deficiencies were again
discussed by counsel during their second meet and confer; however, Sandoval’s counsel declined to further amend the SAC. Sandoval already had an opportunity to amend her complaint and cure the deficiencies subjecting it to a demurrer. Sandoval failed to do so and refused to amend the SAC any further. In all probability, granting Sandoval’s leave to amend the SAC would be futile, and thus the Court should sustain the Demurrer with prejudice.
Sandoval’s Response
Filed 5/8/25; summarized: read and considered.
Defendants Reply
Filed 5/14/25; 13 pages; summarized; Sandoval argues that the SAC sufficiently pleads violations of the Coastal Act, “regardless of the County’s erroneous [CDP] exemption” which “does not relieve Defendants of liability under the Coastal Act.” Unsurprisingly, Sandoval fails to support this position with any legal authorities because no such authorities exist.
Sandoval continues to insist that “[t]he easement for the bridge was abandoned in 2006-
2007,” and thus “Defendants misrepresented their rights to obtain a building permit.”
As admitted in the SAC, there is an expressly recorded access Easement over the Serena
Property for the benefit of the Foothill Property, and therefore, in the absence of a court order declaring the Easement abandoned, Defendants could not have made any misrepresentations to the County when they asserted their Easement rights during the Building Permit application process.
Once the County issued the Building Permit and authorized Defendants’ Bridge repairs
without a CDP, Defendants relied on the County’s determination and proceeded with construction work compliant with all Building Permit requirements, as well as all state and local building codes and regulations, which is confirmed by Sandoval’s own admission that the County inspected and approved Defendants’ reconstruction of the Bridge, declared the Bridge safe for use by pedestrians, bicycles and motorcycles, and then successfully closed out the Building Permit.
No legal authority subjects Defendants to liability for any errors or omissions by the
County during the process of application, approval and issuance of the Building Permit and County’s determination that the Bridge repairs were CDP-exempt. Plaintiff’s third cause of action fails for this reason alone.
Sandoval argues further that her Coastal Act claim is ripe for adjudication because she has
exhausted all administrative remedies. As admitted in the SAC, County has formally rescinded its CDP exemption determination and has required Defendants to apply retroactively for a CDP approving their Bridge repairs. Defendants have already filed their CDP application with the County.
Until the CDP application process runs its course and results in a final administrative decision, Sandoval has not exhausted all her administrative remedies with respect to
Defendants alleged Coastal Act violations.
Sandoval also asserts that Defendants’ retroactive CDP applications cannot remedy the past ongoing violations without judicial review and cites Dunn v. Cnty. of Santa Barbara, 135 Cal. App. 4th 1281 (2006). Sandoval’s reliance on Dunn is inapposite. In Dunn, a
landowner filed a petition for administrative mandamus and a complaint against a county, arising out of a denial of his application to subdivide property because it contained wetland, alleging it constituted a taking without compensation. In reviewing the ripeness of the landowner’s takings claim, the Court of Appeal concluded that: Because the County has stated that it will not allow Dunn to subdivide his property, and that it will allow him to build only one residence on the remaining building site, the permissible use of the property is known to a reasonable degree of certainty and his takings claim is ripe for adjudication even though he has not sought permission to build that residence.
No such reasonable degree of certainty exists in this matter with respect to the issue of
whether the County will or will not approve Defendants’ retroactive CDP application and what terms and conditions would attach to the CDP, if issued. Accordingly, Sandoval’s claim for violations of the Coastal Act cannot be resolved in definitive terms until a court knows the extent of permitted development on the land in question. The primary question to be answered in resolving this issue is whether the landowner obtained a final decision from the agency determining the permitted use for the land. In the absence of such a final decision by County with respect to Defendants’ Bridge repairs’ compliance with the Coastal Act, Sandoval’s third cause of action is not ripe for adjudication and therefore fails.
Sandoval’s public nuisance claim is based on Coastal Zoning Ordinance § 35-185.4(1)(a) which merely provides that any structure that is built or used contrary to the provisions of the ordinance is deemed a public nuisance. Sandoval’s Opposition fails to address Defendants’ main argument in the Demurrer that the SAC does not specify which provisions of the Coastal Zoning Ordinance Defendants have violated and how. To the extent that Sandoval’s nuisance claim is based on the allegation that the Bridge is dangerous, hazardous, unsafe, unpermitted and unlawfully constructed, the SAC itself undermines Sandoval’s position as it admits that Defendants obtained a Building Permit prior to repairing the Bridge, the County inspected and approved the repairs, and then declared the Bridge safe for use by pedestrians, bicycles and motorcycles prior to closing out the Building Permit.
Sandoval’s Opposition also completely ignores, and therefore tacitly concedes, Defendants’
argument in the demurrer that the SAC fails to sufficiently allege an indispensable element of both public and private nuisance under common law, namely that Sandoval suffered harm because of Defendants’ conduct. Instead, Sandoval’s Opposition digresses into an argument that “a claim for nuisance may also be alleged in a construction defect case where negligence is pled” even though the SAC alleges negligence only against DOES 51 through 70 and does not allege negligence against Defendants. Sandoval’s reliance in the Opposition on Lynch v. Peter & Assocs. etc., 104 Cal. App. 5th 1181 (2024) is misguided. In Lynch, a property owner brought action against a soils engineering firm for professional negligence and nuisance. The Court of Appeal concluded that: Nuisance is an entirely separate cause of action from negligence, and the analysis should focus on whether the plaintiff has alleged all necessary elements of the claim. Even if the nuisance claim relies on the same facts about lack of due care supporting the negligence claim, it does not mean the claims are identical or duplicative. Indeed, many pleadings allege numerous causes of action based on the same facts. This does not mean the causes of action are all the same.
Lynch, 104 Cal. App. 5th at 1198.
In this case, even if the SAC had alleged negligence against Defendants, Sandoval necessarily would have had to plead all requisite elements of nuisance separately from the elements of negligence. Sandoval failed to do so and thus her nuisance cause of action fails as well.
Sandoval’s Opposition completely ignores, and therefore tacitly concedes, Defendants’
argument in the Demurrer that the allegations of fraud based on statements made directly to Sandoval are extremely under-pleaded and fail to satisfy the specificity requirement.
Sandoval’s cause of action for fraud is also based on Defendants’ alleged misrepresentations to the County contained in Defendants’ Building Permit application. In her Opposition, Sandoval attempts to inflate the basis for her fraud accusations to a decade-long pattern of misrepresentations to the County and argues that fraud schemes need not detail every individual incident when supported by sufficient evidence.
As explained in the Demurrer, the SAC’s deficiency is not that the alleged misrepresentations to the County are not sufficiently detailed, but that Sandoval fails to allege either that Defendants intended for their alleged misrepresentations to the County to reach Sandoval and influence her conduct, or that Defendants had reason to expect (i.e., they were in possession of information that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that there was an especial likelihood) that their alleged misrepresentations to the County would reach Sandoval and would influence her conduct.
Furthermore, the Opposition fails to point to any paragraphs in the SAC alleging that Defendants’ purported misrepresentations to the County influenced Sandoval’s conduct. To be placed on sufficient notice of their wrongdoing, Defendants are entitled to know exactly what Sandoval did or did not do in reliance upon Defendants’ alleged misrepresentations to the County.
The SAC merely alleges harm in the most vague and general terms, without the requisite allegations of reasonable and detrimental reliance upon Defendants’ alleged misrepresentations to the County.
For these reasons, Sandoval has no third-party standing to assert a claim for fraud against Defendants.
Sandoval insists in the Opposition that the litigation privilege under Section 47(b) of the
California Civil Code applies only to communications in judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, and the unlawful, same-day, over-the-county building permit and application are allegedly ministerial therefore do not qualify as a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. Sandoval supports this erroneous argument with citations to Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal. 3d 205, 212 (1990) and People ex rel. Gallegos v. Pac. Lumber Co., 158 Cal. App. 4th 950, 955 (2008) – the same authorities cited in the Demurrer, which clearly align with Defendants’ position on this issue.
As confirmed in Silberg, the statutory language of Section 47(b) eliminates the threat of liability for communications made during all kinds of truth-seeking proceedings: judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative and other official proceedings.
The absolute privilege created by Section 47(b) has been held to apply in a wide variety of
situations. The privilege is an absolute one because it protects publications made with actual malice or with the intent to do harm. Any publication made in a city planning commission or city council proceedings is within the protection of that section though the proceedings are not strictly judicial.
As noted in Sandoval’s Opposition, the litigation privilege indeed does not apply to the crimes of perjury and subordination of perjury because the crimes of perjury and
subornation of perjury would be almost without meaning if statements made during the course of litigation were protected from prosecution for perjury by the litigation privilege. This is a civil action – not a criminal one. Because Sandoval is not prosecuting Defendants for the crime of perjury under the Penal Code, the perjury exception to the litigation privilege has no bearing on this case.
Sandoval further asserts in the Opposition that the sham exception from the Noerr-
Pennington Doctrine applies to this case. However, it is only when efforts to influence government action are a sham that they fall outside the protection of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and within the scope of the Sherman Act, which is a landmark U.S. antitrust law aimed at promoting competition by prohibiting contracts, combinations, or conspiracies that unreasonably restrain trade or commerce. Blank v. Kirwan, 39 Cal. 3d 311, 321 (1985). Such efforts amount to a sham when though ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, they are actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor. Such efforts, by contrast, do not amount to a sham when, no matter how anticompetitive in purpose or effect, they constitute a genuine effort to influence government action. In other words, efforts to influence government action are a sham only when the person or persons making such efforts invokes the process of governmental decision making for the injury that the process alone will work on competitors.
In this case, the sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine is not applicable because there is no competitive business relationship between Sandoval and Defendants, and the SAC clearly fails to allege such a relationship that would otherwise be governed by the Sherman Act if the sham exception applied.
Moreover, the SAC fails to allege how the process of Defendants’ Building Permit application alone has caused any injury to Sandoval. In other words, the sham exception is inapplicable here because there are no allegations in the SAC indicating that Defendants caused injury to Sandoval solely by invoking the County’s building permit application process, as opposed to using the outcome of that process as an anticompetitive weapon. For these reasons, both the litigation privilege under Section 47(b) of the Civil Code and the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine shield Defendants’ statements to the County during the Building Permit application process and said statements cannot serve as a basis for any tort liability Sandoval seeks in the SAC.
The Opposition barely addresses Defendants’ challenge to Sandoval’s cause of action for negligent misrepresentation. After reciting the standard elements of direct negligent misrepresentation, the Opposition merely states: “Each element is met consistent with Section 3. Supra, absent a showing of intent. Sufficient facts are alleged, otherwise leave to amend is requested.” Sandoval’s negligent misrepresentation claim is based on Defendants’ alleged misrepresentations to the County – not Sandoval.
As discussed in detail in the Demurrer, the legal standard for third-party liability for negligent misrepresentation is different from the elements of direct negligent misrepresentation, and further differs from the elements of third-party fraud liability.
Sandoval’s failure to meaningfully address and rebut Defendants’ analysis of the negligent misrepresentation claim provides further support for the conclusion that said claim fails.
Defendants argued in the demurrer that Sandoval’s ninth cause of action for waste and
trespass fails to specify the property damage caused by Defendant’s alleged conduct. In her Opposition, Sandoval fails again to point to a single paragraph in the SAC rebutting Defendants’ arguments on this issue in the Demurrer. Instead, the Opposition
argues vaguely that defendant’s negligence and mismanagement resulted in physical alterations, negligence is sufficient to establish waste, and Defendants’ actions, including unlawful construction, caused physical interference with the property, leading to tangible damage and value loss.
As noted above, the SAC does not allege negligence against Defendants. More importantly,
the SAC fails to describe the physical alterations and interference asserted in the Opposition, and contains only vague and conclusory allegations of damages, which are squarely contradicted by Sandoval’s own admission that Defendants performed all Bridge repairs legally, pursuant to the Building Permit, and the County inspected and approved the repairs.
Sandoval’s claim for waste also fails because the SAC does not plead the requisite relationship between Sandoval and Defendants.
Contrary to Sandoval’s assertions in her Opposition, the demurrer does not introduce extrinsic evidence and disputes only those factual allegations which are squarely contradicted by the exhibits attached to the SAC.2 In an effort to visualize and explain the impossibility of Sandoval’s easement abandonment claim, Defendants used one of Sandoval’s own exhibits – Exhibit No. 13 to the SAC – to show the location of: (a) the Serena Property and the Bridge relative to the Foothill Property and Foothill Road; and (b) the abandoned driveway and the proposed two new driveways along Foothill Road, as described in Mr. Rothbard’s encroachment permit application attached as Exhibit 12 to the
SAC.
As explained in more detail in the demurrer, Mr. Rothbard’s encroachment permit
application unequivocally indicated that all the work for which he needed an encroachment permit was to be performed within STATE highway [Route 192, i.e., Foothill Road] right-of-way and consisted of: (a) abandoning one existing residential driveway; and (b) creating two new driveways, one for residential access and one for commercial equestrian facility use.
In other words, all three driveways – the abandoned one and the two new driveways – were located within the existing state right of way along State Highway 192 (Foothill Road).
Unsurprisingly, no other driveways are depicted as new or abandoned on either of the two maps submitted in support of Mr. Rothbard’s encroachment permit application. Regardless of which driveway was abandoned and which two remaining driveways were proposed to be newly built, Sandoval’s own exhibits in support of the SAC establish that all three subject driveways, including the driveway Mr. Rothbard abandoned, were located along Foothill Road – an indisputable fact which negates Sandoval’s insinuation that Mr. Rothbard abandoned his driveway located on his Easement over the Serena Property.
Sandoval’s remaining grounds for seeking quiet title are equally unavailing. Based on Civil
Code § 811(2), Sandoval insists that the servient tenement has been destroyed and therefore the Easement has been extinguished. Specifically, Sandoval argues that the Bridge was at some point demolished or damaged to such an extent as to be deemed unsafe by three structural engineers, which supposedly constitutes destruction of the servient tenement and extinguishment of the Easement.
As explained in the demurrer, Civil Code § 811(2) applies only in situations where an easement to use a stairway in a building was extinguished by the destruction of the building, because the stairway which was the subject of the easement had ceased to exist. In this case, there is no language in the publicly recorded Easement deed tethering the Easement’s existence to the existence of the Bridge or to the physical condition of the Bridge.
In other words, the Easement exists regardless of the existence or condition of the Bridge.
The SAC fails to allege destruction of the Serena Property (i.e., the servient tenement), and if the land is still there, so is the Easement.
Sandoval also seeks quiet title under Civil Code § 811(3), which provides that a servitude is
extinguished by the performance of any act upon either tenement, by the owner of the servitude, or with his assent, which is incompatible with its nature or exercise. Sandoval alleges that the installation of the fence by the previous property owner of the Serena Property and the subsequent non-use of the easement underscore the fact that the servitude has been effectively abandoned before April 16, 2024.
However, Sandoval fails to allege in the SAC that the previous owner of the Serena Property installed any fencing across the Easement area with Defendants’ assent, as required under Section 811(3). As for Defendants’ alleged non-use of the Easement, it is black-letter law in California that an expressly and formally recorded easement is not terminated solely by nonuse. Gerhard v. Stephens, 68 Cal.2d 864, 890 (1968).
Even the Easement grant itself expressly states that failure to use the Easement shall not work an abandonment of the Easement.
Finally, Sandoval’s quiet title claim is very loosely based on Civil Code § 811(4), which
provides that, when the servitude was acquired by enjoyment, the servitude is extinguished by disuse thereof by the owner of the servitude for the period prescribed for acquiring title by enjoyment. Civil Code § 811(4) obviously applies only to servitudes acquired by enjoyment (i.e., by prescriptive use/adverse possession), which could be deemed abandoned because of disuse for the prescriptive period.
The Easement in this case was created by an expressly recorded deed and is therefore not a prescriptive right subject to extinguishment under § 811(4).
Sandoval insists in her Opposition to Defendants’ MTS that the causes of action for nuisance and fraud are sufficiently pleaded in the SAC and can serve as a basis for awarding punitive damages against Defendants.
As explained in more detail in the demurrer and this Reply, the SAC fails to adequately plead nuisance and fraud, and therefore Sandoval’s basis for seeking punitive damages is nonexistent. Moreover, the SAC fails to allege the requisite state of mind for punitive damages, i.e., that Defendants desired or intended to inflict injury upon Plaintiff for the mere satisfaction of doing it, or otherwise engaged in a despicable conduct with a willful and conscious disregard for Sandoval’s rights.
While the SAC does attempt to allege injurious intent as part of its woefully under-pleaded
cause of action for fraud, the SAC does so only in relation to Defendants’ alleged misrepresentations stated directly to Sandoval. Sandoval’s fraud claims, on the basis of purported misrepresentations made directly to Sandoval, is so incurably deficient in the requisite pleading specificity that Sandoval chose not to even mention the issue in her Opposition to the Demurrer.
Finally, as agreed by Sandoval, the SAC’s request for attorneys’ fees pursuant to Civil Code § 3496 should be stricken, or Sandoval should be required to either file a notice of errata or amend the SAC accordingly.
For all of the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in the Demurrer and MTS,
Defendants request that the Court sustain the Demurrer and grant the MTS in their entirety.
The Court did not find these arguments persuasive.
The Court’s Conclusions
The Court should decide for Sandoval and against Defendants.
Defendants’ Demurrer fails as a matter of law and should be overruled; except for the Motion for punitive damages and the Motion to Strike attorneys’ fees which should be treated differently.
Under well-established California law, a demurrer tests only the legal sufficiency of the
facts alleged in the operative pleading; it does not resolve factual disputes or weigh the credibility of allegations. The court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and construe them liberally in favor of the pleader.
Here, Defendants disregard this standard by relying on hypothetical, disputed,
incomplete, and/or inaccurate representations of the facts outlined in the verified Second Amended Petition & Complaint and its exhibits.
Instead of addressing the legal sufficiency of the 2ACP, Defendants improperly attempt to inject factual disputes and evade judicial review by alleging Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts for the Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, Causes of Action.
Each of the are extensively and sufficiently pled in 67 pages of the 2APC, and 177 pages of Exhibits.
In the Demurrer, Defendants also inadvertently cite case law that supports and
strengthens Sandoval’s claims, while also demonstrating a fundamental misunderstanding and misapplication of the applicable standard for demurrer. Defendants improperly introduce claims extraneous to the pleadings, dispute the well-pleaded facts, and assert that fraudulent conduct directed at a local government is somehow exempt from legal accountability, even going so far as to argue that such conduct should be treated as a protected right.
Ultimately, Sandoval has properly alleged facts for the Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Causes of Action, and for those reasons and as set forth below, Defendants’ Demurrer should be overruled in its entirety.
In Summary the Court concludes
1. COA 3 for Violation of the California Coastal Act is sufficiently pled. The 2APC sufficiently asserts facts that Defendants violated the Coastal Act and are liable
under Public Resources Code section 30820, regardless of the County’s erroneous exemption. The easement for the bridge was abandoned in 2006-2007 and Defendants misrepresented their rights to obtain a building permit. The County later rescinded its exemption, acknowledging the project required a Coastal Development Permit (CDP).
The County’s closure of the permit and the Coastal Commission’s refusal to hear the appeal are final agency actions confirming that retroactive CDP applications cannot remedy the past ongoing violations without judicial review.
2. COA 4 for Nuisance is sufficiently pled. Defendants' argument that Sandoval’s nuisance claim fails due to insufficient allegations is without merit. “A public nuisance is one which affects at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon individuals may be unequal.” (Civ. Code, § 3480.) Actions for public nuisance are aimed at the protection and redress of community interests. A private party can maintain an action based on a public nuisance if it is especially injurious to himself, but not otherwise. (Civ. Code, § 3493.) To have standing to pursue a public nuisance as a private person, Sandoval must adequately allege the existence of a nuisance affecting the community at large, and also that they sustained a special injury, distinct in some way from the more general harm. (Civ. Code, §§ 3480, 3493.)
Not only does Sandoval have standing under Civ. Code, §§ 3480, and 3493, as demonstrated above, but she also has standing under “nuisance per se.” The concept of nuisance per se arises when a legislative body with appropriate jurisdiction, in the exercise of the police power, expressly declares a particular object or substance, activity, or circumstance, to be a nuisance. Here, Sandoval invoked it when she cited Coastal Zoning Ordinance § 35-185.4(1)(a) in her complaint which defined public nuisance. Private Nuisance is alternatively pled. Whether it is private or public nuisance is subject to proof at trial, not at a pleading stage.
Defendants had a duty of care because: (1) In undertaking the construction work, it was intended to be performed on Sandoval’s property for their use as well as others of the public including their invitees on their property; (2) Sandoval and their invitees or others of the public would foreseeably be harmed by inadequate performance; (3) such injury would be reasonably certain and (4) closely when failing to repair the 100 yr old abutments in gross failure supporting the bridge, supra, and (5) moral blame and (6) public policy concerns attach were permits were not properly pulled and engineered plans and entitlements including permits were not obtained prior to such work being performed.
In sum, Sandoval has sufficiently pled a nuisance claim, the facts accordingly are presumed
true. Defendants’ demurrer should be overruled, or leave granted to amend.
3. COA 7 for Fraud/Deceit is sufficiently pled. Fraud must be alleged factually and specifically, and the policy of liberal construction of pleadings will not be invoked to sustain a pleading that is defective in any material respect. (Wilhelm v. Pray, Price, Williams & Russell (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1324, 1331). The rule arose because allegations of fraud involve a serious attack on character, and fairness to the defendant demands that he should receive the fullest possible details of the charge in order to prepare his defense. The fraud claims alleged against Defendants as set forth in the pleadings and supported by the accompanying exhibits, exceed the required standard of factual specificity, satisfying both the substantive legal elements and procedural pleading requirements. Therefore, the Demurrer on the seventh cause of action fails and should be overruled.
Despite explicit conditions, Seidler and PoloDonkey chose not to maintain or bring the Serena entrance or the associated bridge into compliance, demonstrating either an intent to abandon the Serena entrance or a substantial and harmful disregard for regulatory compliance and public safety.
In any event the complaint and exhibit satisfy both the substantive legal elements and
procedural specific pleading requirements, not general or conclusory allegations, for fraud claims under California law, also as follows: Defendants made material verbal and written
misrepresentations falsely claiming entitlement to use the Serena property and abandoned bridge, despite knowing it was abandoned and outside the disputed 1915 easement on Sandoval’s property. Defendants promised to repair bridge defects to the County which they never intended to address. Defendants knew the easement was abandoned and rebuilt outside of the easement, such that their permit applications contained false claims in 2015/2016 and 2024. Additionally, Engineers identified safety defects which Defendants ignored, proving reckless disregard for truth. Defendants acted with intent to deceive both Plaintiff and County to rebuild an abandoned bridge, secure permits, avoid regulatory scrutiny, and unlawfully on Sandoval’s property. Defendants allegedly submitted fraudulent permits to the County to deceive County employees and representatives.
Both Sandoval and County relied on misrepresentations as alleged, delaying legal action and causing deprivation of property rights and financial harm. County relied on Defendants’ false claims to issue permits. Sandoval relied on County’s unlawful approval, believing Defendants had lawful access, which caused her to incur legal fees and suffer harm. The County issued permits based on Defendants’ fraudulent claims, which would not have been granted had the truth been disclosed.
Sandoval alleges property rights deprivation, emotional distress, legal fees, and stigma: Alleged damages include property rights deprivation, emotional distress, legal fees, and
stigma to property value: Injury, harm causing general damages exceeding $35,000 are also
specifically alleged. Sandoval suffered harm due to the reliance of County officials and
Sandoval’s based on Defendants’ misrepresentations in the inducement allowing unauthorized construction on Sandoval’s property. Other harms caused as alleged include emotional distress, safety risks, and financial losses (legal fees, property stigma) are also
adequately alleged, including unrepaired bridge defects create ongoing safety risks. The complaint satisfies both the substantive legal elements and procedural pleading
requirements under California law for a fraud claim. The misrepresentations made by Defendants, their knowledge of falsity, intent to deceive, and the resulting harm are thoroughly pled with precise facts and supporting exhibits. Defendants’ Demurrer to the seventh and eighth cause of action should therefore be overruled.
Defendants’ fraud and deceit to take Sandoval’s property is not a protected right
Defendants incorrectly assert and misapply the law by claiming that “Defendants’
statements to the County made in their Building Permit application are privileged and protected under Section 47(b) of the California Civil Code and the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine.” The defendants’ reliance on California Civil Code §47(b) and the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine fail under statutory requirements and case law and are inapplicable here to bar claims.
4. COA 8 for Negligent Misrepresentation is sufficiently pled. Alternatively pled as to Fraud – Intentional Misrepresentation, Negligent Misrepresentation occurs when a defendant makes a positive assertion of a material fact, honestly believing it to be true, but without reasonable grounds for that belief. Specific pleading of negligent misrepresentation requires the pleading of facts to show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were made. Reliance exists when the misrepresentation or nondisclosure was an immediate cause of the plaintiff’s conduct which altered his or her legal relations, and when without such misrepresentation or nondisclosure he or she would not, in all reasonable probability, have entered into the contract or other transaction.
5. COA 9 for Waste & Trespass is sufficiently pled. The 2APC meets the elements for a waste claim under Civil Code § 818 and CCP §732 by showing the defendant's duty to preserve the property and the substantial damage caused. The Defendant’s negligence and mismanagement resulted in physical alterations and a measurable loss in market value, which aligns with the harm addressed by these provisions. Negligence is sufficient to establish waste, not intentional harm. Defendants' attempt to dismiss the claim overlooks the direct evidence of damage linked to their failure to protect the property. The claim is legally sufficient and should not be dismissed. Sandoval’s trespass claim satisfies CCP §732 by alleging ownership, unauthorized entry, and harm. The Defendants’ actions, including unlawful construction, caused physical interference with the property, leading to tangible damage and value loss. A clear causal connection is established between the defendant’s actions and the harm caused, satisfying the trespass elements. Defendants' attempt to dismiss the claim ignores the sufficiently pled facts and mischaracterizes the nature of the trespass.
6. COA 11 for Quiet Title is sufficiently pled. In their Demurrer to the Eleventh Cause of Action titled “Quiet Title On Easement & Action For Possession Based On Unlawful Use (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 810; 811).” Defendants omit any reference to Cal. Civil Code Section 810 and egregiously attempt to dispute the factual allegations and introduce conclusory argument based on extrinsic evidence, denying truth of the 2APC facts, despite the standard for a demurrer. They go so far as to annotate “certain areas of the two maps included in Exhibit 13 to SAC to illustrate the point”. The Demurrer to the Eleventh Cause of Action should be overruled on this basis alone; a demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint; not factual disputes as disputed facts are not grounds for demurrer. The Court should not rely upon and disregard this and any extrinsic evidence as the authorities require. Cal. Civil Code section 810 expressly states the owner in fee of a servient tenement [Sandoval] may maintain an action for the possession of the land, against any one unlawfully possessed thereof [Robert Seidler and PoloDonkey, LLC]. Sandoval’s cause of action is expressly permitted by statute and is properly pled. Additionally, as stated in the complaint, Alternatively or concurrently, as applicable, this action is brought pursuant to CCP § 760.020, as well as Section 6357 of the Public Resources Code, to confirm the validity of the easement and its use. CCP § 760.020 expressly provides that an action may be brought under this chapter to establish title against adverse claims to real or personal property or any interest therein.
Defendants' Demurrer should be overruled because it improperly disputes factual allegations and introduces extrinsic evidence, which is not permitted at this stage.
Sandoval has adequately pled facts sufficient to establish a cause of action on all claims in
her 67-page Second Amended Complaint and the 177 pages of supporting exhibits included in her Compendium as to these Defendants.
Defendants Motions to Strike
Filed 4/18/25; summarized: seeks to strike portions of the SAC filed by Sandoval; specifically, Defendants move to strike the following, with prejudice, from the SAC:
1. Prayer item No. 15 at 65:21 for “Exemplary or punitive damages pursuant to Civil Code
Section 3294” on the Fourth Cause of Action for Nuisance.
2. Prayer item No. 20 at 66:7 for “Exemplary or punitive damages pursuant to Civil Code
Section 3294” on the Seventh Cause of Action for Fraud/Deceit.
3. Paragraph No. 156 at 44:27-45:1: “Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to recovery of
attorney’s fees pursuant to Cal. Civil Code Section 3496, costs of suit, plus interest
thereon at the maximum rate allowed by law.”
Defendants contend this lawsuit is about nothing more than an easement dispute and the legality of repairs to a bridge located in the easement area. Sandoval alleges that
Defendants have no easement rights with respect to Sandoval’s real property and performed illegal repairs to a bridge connecting the parties’ neighboring properties.
Sandoval’s SAC asserts causes of action for nuisance and fraud, which then serve
as a basis for her prayer for punitive damages.
As set forth in further detail in Defendants’ Demurrer to the SAC, causes of action for nuisance and fraud are woefully inadequate and under pleaded. The SAC also fails to sufficiently allege that Defendants acted with the intent to harm Sandoval or engaged
in a despicable conduct with a willful and conscious disregard for Sandoval’s rights. I
The SAC contains only conclusory allegations that Defendants’ conduct was malicious, fraudulent and oppressive, despite Sandoval’s admission in the SAC that Santa Barbara County permitted and approved Defendants’ bridge repairs. Setting aside the SAC’s conclusory language, Sandoval simply fails to allege any conduct by Defendants that could support a conclusion of malice or reckless disregard for Sandoval’s rights. In the absence of any supporting facts, Sandoval’s prayer for punitive damages should be stricken with prejudice.
In connection with her cause of action for nuisance, Sandoval insists in the SAC that she is
entitled to recovery of attorney’s fees pursuant to California Civil Code § 3496. This
statute, however, provides for recovery of attorneys’ fees only in cases in which a governmental agency seeks to enjoin certain activities. Cal. Civ. Code § 3494(a)-(d). Sandoval is not a governmental entity and therefore Civil Code § 3496 is completely irrelevant to the case at bar. Sandoval’s request for attorney’s fees under this statutory authority is not pleaded in conformity with California law and should be stricken from the SAC with prejudice.
Leave to amend should not be granted where, in all probability, amendment would be
futile.
Here, after Sandoval commenced this litigation, counsel for the parties met and conferred in an attempt to resolve the deficiencies subjecting Sandoval’s FAC to a motion to strike Sandoval’s prayer for punitive damages and request for attorney’s fees under
Civil Code § 3496. As a result of counsel’s discussion, Sandoval amended the FAC by filing the currently operative SAC, which is only cosmetically different from its predecessor as to the issues discussed herein and thus suffers from the same deficiencies subjecting it to a motion to strike.
Sandoval already had an opportunity to amend her complaint and cure the deficiencies
subjecting it to a motion to strike by alleging facts supporting Sandoval’s prayer for punitive damages and by eliminating her request for attorney’s fees under Civil Code § 3496. Sandoval failed to do so and has refused to amend her pleading any further. Accordingly, in all probability, granting Sandoval leave to amend the SAC would be futile, and thus the Court should strike Sandoval’s prayer for punitive damages, as well as Sandoval’s request for attorney’s fees under Civil Code § 3496, with prejudice.
Supported by the Declaration of Jeff Tchakarov.
Sandoval’s Opposition
Filed 5/8/25; summarized: Sandoval is required only to set forth the essential facts of his case with particularity sufficient to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action. Only ultimate facts need to be alleged—i.e., the facts constituting the cause of action. Immaterial or irrelevant matter is that which has no essential or important relationship to the causes of action being pled. Though irrelevant and redundant matter inserted in pleading may be stricken by court (CCP § 453), motion to strike cannot be made to serve purpose of special demurrer.
Where a motion to strike is so broad as to include relevant matters, the motion to strike must be denied in its entirety. In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation. The pleading is read as a whole, so even conclusory allegations will suffice where read in context with facts alleged to show defendants' wrongful conduct, and his state of mind. 6-7. Generally, motions to strike should not be granted unless it is clear that the matter to be stricken could have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the litigation.
Alternatively, should the Court grant any part of the Motion, Sandoval requests
leave to amend. Leave to amend should only be denied on a showing of bad faith, undue delay prejudice to the opposing party, or futility of the amendment. Where there is a reasonable possibility an amendment will cure a defective pleading, it is ordinarily an abuse of discretion to deny a party the chance to cure the defect. Here, if any part of the Motion is granted, justice requires the granting of leave, and particularly since there
can be no showing by Defendants of bad faith, undue delay, or prejudice as any basis for
denial of leave to amend.
Paragraph 156 to the fourth cause of action for Nuisance assumes a public nuisance in seeking fees but cites the wrong authority as a typographical error – Plaintiff is entitled to recovery of attorney’s fees pursuant to Cal. Civil Code Section 3496, should read Cal. Civil Code Section 1021.5. This reference is correct in the prayer. Sandoval can file an errata or modify this in any amendment. The public interest in the activities contributing to the Nuisance conditions are alleged supra, subpart (a), which for purposes of a motion to strike are all presumed to be true as pled, and the plain language of the statutes in Civil Code sections 3490 – 3496, gives a private right of action for a public nuisance, including both of these statutes that allow recovery of such fees by anyone who is a prevailing party, it is not merely limited to any public governmental agency, as the Defendants assert.
Further, Sandoval is entitled to fee recovery and the Defendants Motion to Strike should be
denied, because Sandoval’s prayer for attorney fees reads: fees incurred substantially in the public interest and inuring to benefit of the public at large, or otherwise to the extent allowed by law for nuisance, and generally at Page 67 on all causes of action, For reasonable attorney’s fees to the extent recoverable under the law, including pursuant to C.C.P. § 1021.5, Government Code § 800, or other applicable authority, and as a matter of proof, which is dependent on legal authority as a matter of proof. Further, all causes of action are subject to later requests for admissions discovery, and California Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420 authorizes attorneys’ fees as cost-of-proof sanctions against those who unreasonably refuse to admit undisputed facts therein.
The motion to strike the prayer for attorneys’ fees should be denied. If the
Court disagrees, Sandoval is entitled under the law to amend, because none of the foregoing are incurable defects in the pleadings.
Defendants Reply to Opposition of the Motion to Strike
Filed 5/14/25; read and considered.
The Court’s Conclusions on the Motion to Strike.
The Motion should be granted without prejudice.
Sandoval insists in her Opposition to Defendants’ MTS that the causes of action for nuisance and fraud are sufficiently pleaded in the SAC and can serve as a basis for
awarding punitive damages against Defendants. The SAC fails to allege the requisite state of mind for punitive damages, i.e., that Defendants desired or intended to inflict injury upon Sandoval for the mere satisfaction of doing it, or otherwise engaged in a despicable conduct with a willful and conscious disregard for Sandoval’s rights.
While the SAC does attempt to allege injurious intent as part of its cause of action for fraud, the SAC does so only in relation to Defendants’ alleged misrepresentations stated directly to Sandoval.
The Court fully understands and appreciates the tactical and strategic reasons for pleading punitive damages and having a jury answer the punitive damage question on a bifurcated trial related to that issue which is customary. The present pleading is deficient in pleading punitive damages, but the Court has found that sometimes during discovery, facts are discovered that meet the pleading [despicable acts] pleading requirement. Thus, the MTS should be granted without prejudice.
As for the SAC’s request for attorneys’ fees pursuant to Civil Code § 3496 Sandoval should be required to either file a notice of errata or amend the SAC.