Samuel Schryver vs United Ground Express Inc

Case Number

24CV04090

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 04/07/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

CMC; Motion: Stay

Tentative Ruling

Samuel Schryver, et al. v. United Ground Express, Inc.  

Case No. 24CV04090

           

Hearing Date: April 7, 2025                            

HEARING:              Defendant United Ground Express, Inc.’s Motion to Stay Action

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiff Samuel Schryver, individually, and on behalf of all persons similarly situated: Piya Mukherjee, Blumenthal Nordrehaug Bhowmik De Blouw, LLP

                                    For Defendant United Ground Express, Inc.: Bailey K. Bifoss,       Seyfarth Shaw, LLP

                                                           

TENTATIVE RULING:

The motion to stay action is granted. The court has reviewed the proposed order and intends on signing. Counsel for the parties shall appear at the hearing, either in person or virtually, to discuss potential dates for a status conference.

Background:

This action commenced on July 22, 2024, by the filing of the original class action complaint by plaintiff Samuel Schryver against defendant United Ground Express, Inc. (“UGE”). On December 3, 2024, plaintiff filed his operative first amended complaint (“FAC”), setting forth 10 causes of action for various alleged violations of the Business and Professions Code, violations of the Labor Code, and violation of the Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”).

By way of the FAC, plaintiff alleges that he was employed by UGE from July 2022 to November 10, 2023, as a non-exempt hourly employee. (FAC, ¶ 3.) Plaintiff alleges that he, and other employees, were subjected to numerous violations of the Labor Code. (FAC, ¶¶ 8-22.) 

For purposes of the class action, the class is defined as “all individuals who are or previously were employed by [UGE] in California, including any employees staffed with [UGE] by a third party, and classified as non-exempt employees . . . at any time during the period beginning July 22, 2020, and ending on the date as determined by the Court . . ..” (FAC, ¶ 25.)

For purposes of the PAGA action, plaintiff, on behalf of the State of California, seeks PAGA penalties for the time period of July 12, 2023, until a date as determined by the court. (FAC, ¶ 118.)

On January 7, 2025, UGE filed its answer to the FAC, asserting a general denial and 36 affirmative defenses.

UGE now moves to stay this action, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 597, on the grounds that “an earlier-filed class action, alleging substantially similar Labor Code violations against [UGE] on behalf of the same employees as this action, entitled Hernandez v. United Ground Express, Inc., San Bernardino Superior Court Case No. CIVSB2326322 (the “Hernandez Action”)”, is now pending. (Notice of Motion, p. 1, ll. 2-8.)

Plaintiff opposes the motion on the grounds that: “While Plaintiff’s action is related to the Hernandez Action, the actions are not the same and do not involve the same parties.” (Opp., p. 1, ll. 7-8.)

Analysis:

            Request for Judicial Notice

UGE requests that the court take judicial notice of the following documents:

Exhibit A: Amended Consolidated Class and Representative Action Complaint in the Hernandez Action.

Exhibit B: A letter from plaintiff Hernandez’s counsel submitted to the Labor Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”), dated December 11, 2023.

Exhibit C: PAGA-only complaint for plaintiff in the current action, on behalf of the State of California v. UGE in Case No. CGC-24-618357, filed in the San Francisco County Superior Court.

Exhibit D: June 16, 2022, Notice of Entry of Minute Order staying action in Phoung v. Winco Holdings, Inc., Sacramento County Superior Court Case No. 34-2021-00312030.

Exhibit E: December 28, 2020, Order granting defendant Winco Holdings, Inc.’s motion to stay PAGA action, pending resolution of related class action, in Castanon, et al. v. Winco Holdings, Inc., Sacramento County Superior Court Case No. 34-2020-00282233.

Exhibit F: August 7, 2020, Notice of Ruling regarding defendant Marugame Udon USA, LLC’s motion to stay action and setting of CMC in Rodriguez, et al. v. Marugame Udon USA, LLC, Orange County Superior Court Case No. 30-2020-01127949-CU-OE-CXC.

Exhibit G: April 13, 2021, Order on defendants Inglewood Sportservice, Inc. and Delaware North Companies Incorporated’s motion to stay in Mejia v. Inglewood Sportservice, Inc., Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. 20-STCV19450.

Plaintiff objects to the request as to Exhibits D, E, F, and G on the grounds that UGE seeks their judicial notice for an improper purpose, in that they are State court orders on motions to stay in unrelated cases.

UGE replied to the objections, attempting to justify their inclusion in the moving papers, by attempting to convince the court that the documents are not being introduced for improper purposes, and that they are simply being offered because “the orders offer important procedural context for how other courts have managed similarly duplicative wage and hour matters.” (Reply in Support of Request for Judicial Notice, p. 2, ll. 19-20.)

UGE’s argument is disingenuous at best. The inclusion of other courts’ orders is a transparent attempt at influencing this court’s decision. In fact, in one of the documents that it requests this court take judicial notice of (Exhibit D), in the attached Minute Order, the Judge noted: “As a preliminary matter, in Plaintiff’s opposition Plaintiff relies on a minute order from the Ventura County Superior Court. However, “ ‘it is improper to cite or rely upon unpublished opinions except in limited circumstances not present here.’ ” (People v. Gray (214) 229 Cal.App.4th 285, 292 fn. 15 [citing Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.1115].) Plaintiff is directed to refrain from citing to unpublished California decisions in the future except where authorized by Rule 8.1115(b).” (June 8, 2022, Minute Order p. 1.)

While the court will consider an Order to Show Cause re Sanctions, should counsel for UGE continue with this unauthorized practice, for now, it will simply sustain plaintiff’s objections. The court will not take judicial notice of Exhibits D, E, F, or G.

The court will take judicial notice of Exhibits A, B, and C.

            Stay of Action

“A litigant will not be permitted to seek the same remedy upon the same state of facts in two different courts at the same time, and pursue them both concurrently to a conclusion.” (Reilly v. Police Court of City of Oakland, Alameda County, Department 1 (1924) 194 Cal. 375, 378.)

“General principles applicable to controversies in which the same parties and the same subject matter are involved are these: When two or more tribunals in this state have concurrent jurisdiction, the tribunal first assuming jurisdiction retains it to the exclusion of all other tribunals in which the action might have been initiated. Thereafter another tribunal, although it might originally have taken jurisdiction, may be restrained by prohibition if it attempts to proceed. [Citations.] One reason for the rule is to avoid unseemly conflict between courts that might arise if they were free to make contradictory decisions or awards at the same time or relating to the same controversy; another reason is to protect litigants from the expense and harassment of multiple litigation. [Citations.]” (Scott v. Industrial Acc. Commission (1956) 46 Cal.2d 76, 81-82.)

“To maintain both the practical nature of the rule [of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction] and the historically flexible rules of equity, exactitude is not required. That the parties in the two actions are not entirely identical, and that the remedies sought by the two actions are not precisely the same, is not controlling. Instead, it is sufficient for the exercise of equitable jurisdiction that the issue in both actions is the same and arises out of the same transaction or events. [Citation.]” (County of Siskiyou v. Superior Court (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 83, 89; italics added.)

Although plaintiff attempts to minimize the significance, there is no dispute that the Hernandez action was filed prior to the current action. It is of no consequence whether it was filed one day, or one year, earlier than the current action.

As noted above, the current action seeks remedies for a class defined as: “all individuals who are or previously were employed by [UGE] in California, including any employees staffed with [UGE] by a third party, and classified as non-exempt employees . . . at any time during the period beginning July 22, 2020, and ending on the date as determined by the Court . . ..” As for the PAGA relief sought by way of the FAC: plaintiff, on behalf of the State of California, seeks PAGA penalties for the time period of July 12, 2023, until a date as determined by the court.

In the Hernandez action:

The proposed class consists of all persons who worked for UGE in California as an hourly-paid or non-exempt employee at any time during the period May 5, 2019, and ending when notice to the class is sent. (RJN, Exh. A, ¶ 28.) Contrary to his argument to the contrary, plaintiff, in this action, is covered by the timeframe set forth in the Hernandez action, as he has alleged that he worked for UGE from July 2022 to November 10, 2023, as a non-exempt hourly employee. As such, he is a member of the class described in the Hernandez action. The Hernandez action, in fact, covers a longer period of time than the present action.

Essentially all of the alleged Labor Code violations in the Hernandez action are the same as the violations alleged in the present action, and both actions seek substantially identical relief.

The court finds plaintiff’s arguments in opposition unpersuasive. The actions both concern the same set of alleged facts, and this action is duplicative of the Hernandez action. Further, most of the authorities plaintiff cites in support of the opposition, when read in context, such as Farmland Irrigation v. Dopplmaier (1957) 48 Cal.2d 208 and Gregg v. Superior Court (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 134, are inapplicable to, and distinguishable from, the present motion. Despite plaintiff’s argument to the contrary, coordination of the cases is not the proper procedure as neither party has properly requested that the court do so.

Further, in reply to plaintiff’s opposition, UGE’s attorney declares that the Hernandez action went to mediation on February 18, 2025, and resolved the matter on a class-wide basis. (Supp. Bifoss Decl., ¶ 3.) A motion for preliminary approval of that settlement agreement is scheduled to take place on September 5, 2025. (Ibid.) Given these facts, it would be a waste of judicial resources, and the parties’ resources, to deny a stay of the present action. If the Hernandez settlement is approved, it will, in all likelihood, extinguish plaintiff’s class action claims.

The motion to stay this action pending the outcome of the Hernandez action will be granted.