James Knapp vs City of Santa Barbara et al

Case Number

24CV03988

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 12/06/2024 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Demurrer

Tentative Ruling

The court requests further briefing from the parties on the issues discussed herein. The parties shall file and serve their respective supplemental briefs on or before December 20, 2024. The parties shall file and serve their respective replies to the supplemental briefs on or before January 10, 2025. The hearing on the demurrer and the case management conference are continued to January 31, 2025, at 10:00 a.m.

Background:

As alleged in plaintiff’s first amended complaint (FAC):

Plaintiff James Knapp is the manager of a limited liability company (LLC) that owns an apartment building within the city limits of defendant City of Santa Barbara (City). (FAC, ¶¶ 1, 7, 13.)

On January 31, 2024, in his capacity as the manager of the LLC, Knapp caused to be served a 60-day written notice to terminate tenancy on a tenant so that the LLC could substantially remodel the apartment building’s electrical, wiring, and plumbing systems pursuant to lawfully issued building permits issued by the City. (FAC, ¶ 13.) The repairs authorized under the permits would require the tenant to be displaced from the unit for more than 30 days in order to be completed. (Ibid.) In serving the notice, Knapp contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration the filing of an unlawful detainer action in the event the tenant did not abide by the requirements of the notice. (Ibid.) In fact, thereafter, Knapp caused to be filed an unlawful detainer complaint in this Court based upon the eviction notice on April 5, 2024. (Ibid.)

On May 1, 2024, after Knapp had already caused to be filed the unlawful detainer action based upon the eviction notice at issue, the City Attorney filed a misdemeanor complaint against Knapp (Criminal Complaint) in People v. Knapp, Santa Barbara Superior Court case No. 24CR03332 (Criminal Action). (FAC, ¶ 15 & exhibit 2.) The Criminal Complaint contains three counts: (1) unlawfully terminating the tenancy of a qualified tenant without just cause stated in full in the termination notice in violation of Santa Barbara Municipal Code section 26.50.010; (2) unlawfully failing to comply with the just cause eviction notice requirements in violation of Santa Barbara Municipal Code section 26.50.040; and (3) unlawfully failing to serve tenants with a copy of the permits along with the written notice stating the reason for the termination, the type and scope of work to be performed, why the work cannot be reasonably accomplished in a safe manner with the tenant in place, and why the work requires the tenant to vacate the residential real property for at least 30 days when seeking to recover possession of a property to totally demolish or to substantially remodel in violation of Santa Barbara Municipal Code section 26.50.070, definition of “Just Cause,” subdivision (2)(d). (FAC, ¶ 16 & exhibit B.)

The Criminal Action remains pending. (FAC, ¶ 18.)

On July 18, 2024, Knapp filed his original complaint against City and against the Office of the City Attorney. Defendants filed a demurrer to the original complaint. Shortly thereafter, and before that demurrer was heard, Knapp filed his FAC. The FAC asserts two causes of action: (1) for declaratory relief (facial violation of Civil Code, § 47); and (2) for declaratory relief (as-applied violation of Civil Code, § 47). In both causes of action Knapp asserts that Civil Code section 47 preempts the provisions of Santa Barbara Municipal Code chapter 26.50 that allow the City Attorney to bring an “administrative, civil, or criminal action” for penalties, damages, or imprisonment against a rental housing owner who files a court action to recover possession of a rental unit. (FAC, ¶¶ 24, 33.)

The City withdrew its demurrer to the original complaint as superseded by the FAC. On October 18, 2024, the City filed its demurrer to the FAC. The City argues that Civil Code section 47 does not preempt chapter 26.50 of the City’s Municipal Code (Chapter 26.50). Knapp opposes the demurrer, arguing in favor of preemption.

Analysis:

Before the court can address the merits of the demurrer, there is a jurisdictional issue that the parties have not discussed for which further briefing is required. Some background is useful to understand the nature of this jurisdictional issue.

Knapp does not argue that Chapter 26.50 is entirely invalid. Knapp argues that Chapter 26.50 is invalid as preempted by Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) (also known as the “litigation privilege”) only to the extent that (i) it purports to go beyond allowing the City Attorney to obtain an injunction and authorizes the City Attorney to bring an “administrative, civil, or criminal action,” (ii) purports to require the City Attorney to seek attorney fees and costs, and specifically (iii) authorizes the Criminal Action against Knapp. (FAC, ¶¶ 24-26, 32-34.) Knapp seeks declarations to that effect and permanent injunctions enjoining all enforcement and criminal prosecutions. (FAC, prayer ¶¶ 1-6.)

The only causes of action asserted in the FAC are for declaratory relief, for which injunctive relief is an addition remedy. “It is well established that parties may seek declaratory relief with respect to the interpretation and application of local ordinances. [Citations.] It is also well established that preemption, like other affirmative defenses, may be raised in a complaint seeking declaratory or other prospective relief.” (Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1250, fn. 5.) “Declaratory relief is not foreclosed simply because the subject matter of the action is a penal statute or ordinance. [Citations] But this does not mean that declaratory relief is always appropriate to challenge the validity of a penal statute or to obtain a construction of it for a plaintiff’s benefit. Declaratory relief is properly denied, for example, if the factual matrix is insufficiently set to permit a useful and intelligent adjudication to be made [citation], or if the issues can be better decided in a criminal proceeding [citations].” (California Water & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles County (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 16, 24.) Where there is an adequate remedy at law, declaratory relief is generally unavailable. (Ellis v. County of Calaveras (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 64, 73.) The particular remedy at law available under the allegations of the FAC is the pending criminal action. (See Miller v. State of California (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 202, 204–205.)

A corresponding equitable limitation exists to preclude injunctions as to pending criminal actions. “Courts of equity will, in proper cases, enjoin the attempt to enforce a law or ordinance making certain acts a criminal offense and imposing a punishment therefor, where the law or ordinance is invalid and its enforcement will injure or destroy the plaintiff’s property or property rights.” (Sullivan v. San Francisco Gas & Elec. Co. (1905) 148 Cal. 368, 371.)

“We know of no principle of jurisprudence which authorizes a court of equity, on the ground that it will prevent a multiplicity of actions, or that it will prevent an injurious interference with plaintiff’s business, to proceed to investigate as to the truth of criminal charges that have been or may be preferred against him, to hear the evidence in regard to his guilt or innocence, to determine, in advance of the decision of the lawfully constituted criminal courts, the question of his guilt or innocence of pending charges and his probable guilt or innocence of future charges, and, if found in his favor, to forestall the action of the law courts and enjoin the enforcement of a constitutional and valid law against him, on the sole ground that there is not, and never will be, sufficient evidence of his guilt. This, in substance, is the relief which the plaintiffs demand. The answer to the application is that the plaintiffs’ remedy in the courts of law is complete and adequate. Every person is subject to the chance that he may be prosecuted for some offense of which he is not only not guilty, but as to which there is no reasonable or probable cause to believe him guilty. The prosecution must of course be in some court having jurisdiction of the offense. In that court he has an opportunity to make his defense to the charge, to rebut the evidence against him, and introduce evidence in his favor. The presumption that such court will give him a fair trial and decide justly in his case is as strong as the presumption that a court of equity will fairly try and justly decide his application for an injunction involving the same facts. There is no rule which permits a person to substitute a court of equity for the courts of law in the decision of such matters of fact, and, by anticipatory action therein, take from the regularly constituted criminal courts their jurisdiction of the particular offense in question. All persons must submit to the due process of law in the courts vested with lawful jurisdiction of legal offenses charged against them, and the fact that such courts may give an erroneous decision is no ground for relief in a court of equity by way of injunction to prevent them from acting at all, or to interfere with their judgments when made.” (Sullivan v. San Francisco Gas & Elec. Co., supra, 148 Cal. at pp. 372–373

“The object apparently sought by the suit is a judicial determination of these questions in a court of equity, to be used as a precedent in the criminal courts upon the trial of prosecutions …, or which would have the effect of deterring the defendants from beginning such prosecutions. The superior court is as competent to decide such questions when sitting as a criminal court in the trial of a criminal cause as it would be upon the trial of a suit in equity, and there is no reason why the plaintiffs should not be restricted to the criminal courts for the preservation of their rights and the maintenance of their defenses. However desirable and beneficial such a predetermination by a court of equity would be, it gives no right to invoke equity jurisdiction.” (Sullivan v. San Francisco Gas & Elec. Co., supra, 148 Cal. at p. 373; see Civ. Code, § 3423, subd. (a); Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subd. (b)(1)

“As a general rule an injunction will not be granted to protect a person from prosecution for the alleged commission of a criminal offense on a showing that he is not guilty of such offense or that the law does not apply to him. The court having jurisdiction over criminal offenses is the forum in which such questions of fact must be determined. [Citations.] [¶] An exception has been made to this general rule in both federal and state courts where constitutional statutes are being unconstitutionally applied to suppress constitutional rights guaranteed to all citizens by either the federal or state constitutions [citations]. [¶] In determining whether these exceptional circumstances exist, a trial court must proceed with great caution. In [City of Santa Monica v. Superior Court (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 223, 226], this standard of care is set forth as follows: ‘[W]e regard it as beyond question that trial courts should be extremely cautious, and even hesitant and reluctant, when asked to enjoin law enforcement officials from enforcing an ordinance obviously approved and adopted by duly elected representatives of the people for the purposes of promoting and protecting public morality prior to a trial on the merits.’ ” (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 644, 648–649.)

These equitable considerations come into play at this stage of the proceeding with respect to the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction. “The doctrine of ‘ “exclusive concurrent jurisdiction” ’ provides that when two or more courts have subject matter jurisdiction over a dispute, the court that first asserts jurisdiction assumes it to the exclusion of the others. [Citations.] The rule is ‘a judicial rule of priority or preference and is not jurisdictional in the traditional sense of the word,’ in that it ‘does not divest a court, which otherwise has jurisdiction of an action, of jurisdiction.’ [Citation.] The purpose of this rule ‘is to avoid unseemly conflict between courts that might arise if they were free to make contradictory decisions or awards at the same time or relating to the same controversy’ and ‘to protect litigants from the expense and harassment of multiple litigation.’ [Citation.] Because it is a policy rule, the application of the rule in a given case depends upon the balancing of countervailing policies.” (BBBB Bonding Corp. v. Caldwell (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 349, 374.)

As the traditional rules of equity, discussed above, generally, but not necessarily, preclude a court of equity from interfering with the disposition of pending (and not merely threatened or potential) criminal action, those policies strongly imply the application of the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction in this case. The parties here seek a legal declaration as to the enforceability, or not, of Chapter 26.50 as it applies to criminal proceedings generally, and as it applies in the Criminal Action specifically. Such a declaration would have the effect of supplanting the jurisdiction of the criminal court on this issue. In their demurrer, defendants have asserted that the court in the Criminal Action has already overruled Knapp’s criminal demurrer on this issue. (Demurrer, at p. 8.) Assuming for the purpose of this discussion this is true (no request for judicial notice of that fact has been made), the declaration sought by Knapp is directly contrary to that ruling and would create the “unseemly conflict” to be avoided by the application of the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction.

This issue is raised by the court sua sponte because, as both parties point out, the issues presented here are principally issues of law. Thus, the court’s ruling on the merits of the demurrer would—however resolved—intrude upon the subject matter of the Criminal Action. (It is important to point out that nothing herein should be construed as suggesting how the court would rule on the merits of the demurrer.) This issue is not addressed by the parties in their papers. The court therefore requests that the parties submit supplemental briefing on the following issues:

1.         While the Criminal Action remains pending, does the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, an abstention doctrine, or other limitation on the court’s jurisdiction or discretion preclude further litigation in this matter?

2.         If further litigation is precluded by the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction or another doctrine or limitation, what action should the court take now?

The court will continue the hearing on this matter to permit the parties to submit supplemental and reply briefing on these issues.