Grand Santa Barbara LLC v. The City Of Santa Barbara

Case Number

24CV03870

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 12/02/2024 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Demurrer To Petition For Writ Of Mandate And Complaint

Tentative Ruling

Grand Santa Barbara LLC v. The City Of Santa Barbara

Case No. 24CV03870

           

Hearing Date: December 2, 2024                                                       

HEARING:              Demurrer To Petition For Writ Of Mandate And Complaint

                                   

ATTORNEYS:        For Petitioner Grand Santa Barbara LLC: Richard Jacobs

For Respondent City of Santa Barbara: Nicholas J. Muscolino, Eric S. Phillips, Burke, Williams & Sorensen, LLP, Sarah Jane Knecht, Tava Marie Ostrenger, Office of the City Attorney

TENTATIVE RULING:

The demurrer of respondent the City of Santa Barbara to the petition and complaint for writ of mandate of petitioner Grand Santa Barbara LLC is sustained without leave to amend.

Background:

On July 11, 2024, petitioner Grand Santa Barbara LLC (GSB) filed a verified petition for writ of mandate and complaint against respondent the City of Santa Barbara (the City), alleging four causes of action: (1) writ of mandate (requirements group 1); (2) writ of mandate (requirements group 2); (3) declaratory and injunctive relief (requirements group 1); and (4) declaratory and injunctive relief (requirements group 2). As alleged in the petition:

On October 30, 2023, GSB submitted a “SB330 Builder’s Remedy Preliminary Application” (the preliminary application) to the City, which was accepted on November 6, 2023. (Pet., ¶¶ 37-38.) At the time GSB submitted the preliminary application, the City was not in compliance with housing element requirements set forth in Government Code section 65580 et seq. (Id. at ¶¶ 18 & 34-35.) The City processed the preliminary application and informed GSB that it was required to submit a full application on or before May 6, 2024, which GSB submitted on May 2, 2024. (Id. at ¶¶ 39-41.) On May 6, 2024, the City sent an invoice for the payment of fees associated with the submission of the full application which GSB paid on May 7, 2024. (Id. at ¶¶ 42-44.)

After GSB paid the fees due for the full application, the City issued a letter (the response letter) stating that the full application was incomplete for a variety of reasons and imposing various requirements on GSB that require GSB to, among other things, provide and pay fees for a general plan and zoning amendment and to submit various plans, details, calculations and reports. (Pet., ¶¶ 50-65, 77.) The reasons set forth in the response letter issued by the City, and the requirements imposed in that letter, violate Government Code section 65589.5, subdivision (d)(5). (Id. at ¶¶ 51, 53-57, 60-65.)

GSB checked with the City to determine if there was an administrative appeal that was required. (Pet., ¶ 66.) The appeal procedure appearing on the webpage for the City requires that to administratively appeal a decision by the City, the action must be taken at a “meeting” by a “body” of the City. (Id. at ¶¶ 67-68.) As there was no such meeting by a body of the City, there is no administrative appeal available to GSB. (Id. at ¶ 69.) GSB accordingly seeks a writ of mandate ordering the City to comply with various provisions of the Government Code including section 65589.5 (Id. at ¶¶ 79, 93, 102, 109 & prayer ¶ 1.)

On September 26, 2024, the City filed a demurrer to each cause of action alleged in the petition on the grounds that GSB has failed to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action. The demurrer of the City is opposed by GSB.

Analysis:

In ruling on a demurrer, the court determines whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 125.) The pleading subject to demurrer is given a reasonable interpretation and read as a whole, with all its parts in their context. (Ibid.) A demurrer assumes the truth of properly pleaded material allegations including facts which may be inferred from those expressly alleged, but not of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Ibid.; McMahon v. Craig (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1509.) “If the complaint states a cause of action under any theory, regardless of the title under which the factual basis for relief is stated, that aspect of the complaint is good against a demurrer.” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38.)

In its demurrer to the petition, the City contends that the provisions of Government Code section 65943 and Santa Barbara Municipal Code section 30.205.150 each provide GSB with administrative rights under which the City’s determination regarding the completeness of the full application, as set forth in the response letter further described above, may be appealed. The City also contends that the response letter identified and referenced in the petition notified GSB that it could appeal the City’s determination that the full application was incomplete by filing an appeal within 10 calendar days. Because GSB did not appeal the City’s determination, the City argues, GSB has failed to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to filing the petition.

In support of its demurrer, the City requests judicial notice of the response letter referenced in the petition, a copy of which was also submitted in support of the ex parte application of GSB to stay statutory deadlines, which was filed in this action on August 19, 2024. (City RFJN, ¶ 2 & Exh. 2; see also GSB Aug. 19, 2024, Ex Parte App., Exh. 13.)

The Court will grant judicial notice of the response letter alleged in the petition. (Evid. Code §452, subd. (d) [judicial notice of court records]; see also Ingram v. Flippo (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1285, fn. 3, disapproved on another ground in Leon v. County of Riverside (2023) 14 Cal.5th 910, 1106 [the court may take judicial notice of documents summarized in complaint].) Judicial notice of the City’s response letter does not extend to the truth of its contents or any particular interpretation of its meaning. (Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 483.)

By its terms, Government Code section 65920 et seq. (the Permit Streamlining Act or Act) applies “to all public agencies to the extent specified in” Chapter 4.5 of the Government Code. (Gov. Code, § 65920, subd. (b).) Section 65943 of the Act sets forth the time period in which a public agency “shall determine in writing whether” an application for a development project is complete, and transmit any such determination to the applicant for the project. (Gov. Code, § 65943, subd. (a).) Pursuant to the Act, a public agency in receipt of an application for a development project must make the required written determination no later than 30 calendar days after the public agency has received the application. (Ibid.)

The response letter described in the petition and submitted with the request for judicial notice of the City states that the comments in that letter “constitute [GSB’s] first 30-day Planning Application review.” (City RFJN, Exh. 2 at p. 32.) GSB does not appear to dispute that the Act applies to the full application at issue in the petition, or to the project described in that application. (See, e.g., Gov. Code, § 65928 [defining “development project”]; Findleton v. Board of Supervisors (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 709, 713-714.)

The Act further provides that, to the extent an application such as the full application at issue in this action is determined by a public agency not to be complete, “the public agency shall provide a process for the applicant to appeal that decision in writing to the governing body of the agency or, if there is no governing body, to the director of the agency, as provided by that agency. A city or county shall provide that the right of appeal is to the governing body or, at their option, the planning commission, or both.” (Gov. Code, § 65943, subd. (c).) The response letter described in the petition also states that, while the full application of GSB was deemed incomplete by the City, the summary set forth in the response letter “does not constitute a final review” of the project proposed in the full application, and that GSB “may appeal the decision to require additional information ….” (City RFJN, Exh. 1 at p. 32.) The response letter further provides that an appeal may be filed by GSB within 10 calendar days of the date of the response letter, and must “consist of written notification” indicating any grievance with the City’s determination that GSB’s full application was incomplete, among other things. (Ibid.)

The Court further notes that the response letter is ostensibly authored and executed by a Project Planner from the City’s Community Development Department. (City RFJN, Exh. 1.) Santa Barbara Municipal Code section 30.205.150 also sets forth the procedure by which decisions of “the Planning Commission and Design Review may be appealed to the City Council in accordance with Chapter 1.30 and Title 22” of the Santa Barbara Municipal Code. (Santa Barbara Mun. Code, § 30.205.150, subd. (A)(3).) In its opposition to the demurrer, GSB offers no reasoned argument to show why these provisions of the Santa Barbara Municipal Code do not apply under the circumstances present here with respect to whether or not the decision set forth in the response letter may be appealed to the City Council. Further, the Community Development Department that issued the response letter appears to be a “body” that made a “decision” for purposes of the City’s administrative appeals process set forth in the City’s website cited by GSB.

 “Code of Civil Procedure section 1086 states a writ of mandate must be issued ‘in all cases where there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law....’ This provision imposes a requirement that a beneficially interested party must first exhaust administrative remedies before seeking a writ of mandate to compel agency action.” (Doe v. Albany Unified School Dist. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 668, 685 (Doe).) The primary purpose for the “fundamental” rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies “is to lighten the load on the courts in cases where administrative remedies are available and are as likely as the judicial remedy to provide the desired relief.” (Id. at pp. 685-686.) The failure of a beneficially interested party to exhaust available administrative remedies prior to seeking a writ of mandate deprives the court of jurisdiction to proceed. (Personnel Com. v. Barstow Unified School Dist. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 871, 889-890.)

Assuming the truth of facts alleged by GSB in the petition and of which the Court may take judicial notice, the petition demonstrates that GSB has failed to exhaust administrative appeal remedies provided under the Act and the Santa Barbara Municipal Code prior to filing the petition. Moreover, GSB does not set forth any reasoned factual or legal argument showing that the City’s Community Development Department has declared what its ruling would be in this case. (See Doe, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 686.) In addition, it can be inferred from the contents of the response letter that GSB may either submit the additional information required by the City or appeal the decision by the City to require the additional information set forth in the response letter. (City RFJN, Exh. 2 at p. 32, Sections IX & X.) For these reasons, GSB has failed to present a sufficient excuse for failing to take an appeal of the decision set forth in the response letter, or that the remedy of an appeal would be inadequate or would force it to continue to submit the required information pending a final decision. (See Phelan v. Superior Court (1950) 35 Cal.2d 363, 370-371.)

For all reasons discussed above, as there exists an available administrative remedy which GSB failed to exhaust, the Court is without jurisdiction to proceed. For this reason, the Court will sustain the demurrer. Further, as the allegations of the petition and information appearing in the opposition of GSB indicates, without dispute, that GSB has failed to appeal the decision reflected in the response letter or that any appeal of that decision would be futile, it appears that there exists no reasonable possibility that the deficiencies in the petition and further discussed above can be cured by an amendment. (Los Globos Corp. v. City of Los Angeles (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 627, 631-632 [plaintiff bears the burden to show a reasonable possibility that pleading can be cured by amendment].) For this reason, the Court will deny GSB leave to amend.