Ronald Beardsley v. Alisal Properties, et al

Case Number

24CV03864

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 02/19/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion For Approval Of Settlement Pursuant To The Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”)

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiff Ronald Beardsley: Elliot J. Siegel, Julian Burns King, Lawrence W. Beall, King & Siegel LLP

                                   

For Defendants Alisal Properties dba Alisal Ranch and James Hiland Jackson: Leslie Joyner, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP

RULING

For all reasons discussed herein, the motion of plaintiff for approval of settlement pursuant to the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 is denied without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate future noticed motion for approval of settlement, in accordance with this ruling.

Background

On July 11, 2024, plaintiff Ronald Beardsley filed a class action complaint against Alisal Properties doing business as Alisal Ranch (the Ranch) and James Hiland Jackson (Jackson) (collectively, defendants), alleging eleven causes of action: (1) failure to pay minimum wages; (2) failure to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods or premium pay in lieu thereof; (4) failure to provide rest periods or premium pay in lieu thereof; (5) failure to reimburse necessary business expenses; (6) violation of sick leave laws; (7) failure to provide and maintain accurate records; (8) unlawful deductions from gratuities earned; (9) conversion; (10) failure to pay wages when due during employment and at separation; and (11) violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law.

On August 21, 2024, the Ranch lodged a stipulation executed by the parties’ counsel of record, for the dismissal of the class claims alleged in the complaint based on the existence of an agreement to submit the claims to binding arbitration. On the same date, the Court entered an order directing plaintiff to, on or before September 25, 2024, file a request for dismissal and with a supporting declaration as required under California Rules of Court, rule 3.770.

On August 22, 2024, the Court ordered a stay of the litigation based on a stipulation of the parties to engage in early mediation.

On August 30, 2024, the parties lodged a stipulation supported by the declaration of plaintiff’s counsel, Elliot Siegel (Siegel), for the dismissal of class claims alleged in the complaint.

On September 3, 2024, the Court entered an order dismissing the class and non-representative claims alleged in the complaint, and directing plaintiff to, on or before September 16, 2024, file his first amended complaint for civil penalties under Labor Code section 2698 et seq. (the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act or PAGA).

On September 18, 2024, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (the FAC) against defendants, alleging one cause of action for penalties under PAGA. As alleged in the operative FAC:

The Ranch is in the hotel and resort business, with its principal place of business located at 1054 Alisal Road in Solvang, California (the premises). (FAC, ¶ 7.) Jackson is the Chief Financial Officer of the Ranch. (FAC, ¶ 8.) Plaintiff worked for defendants as an hourly, non-exempt employee from November 2003 to June 24, 2024. (FAC, ¶ 6.)

During plaintiff’s employment with defendants, defendants required employees to monitor radios or cellphones for calls and messages while the employees were on a meal or rest period, interrupted meal and rest periods to discuss work-related matters or instruct employees on pending tasks, cut short or prohibited employees from taking breaks when workload was high or locations understaffed, and prohibited employees from leaving the premises during breaks. (FAC, ¶¶ 14-17.) Defendants also required employees to answer, respond to, or assist guests, or to otherwise remain on-call in case of emergencies, while employees were off-the-clock, and made unlawful deductions from or failed to pay the entirety of gratuities defendants collected from its customers. (FAC, ¶¶ 19, 21 & 23-25.)

On December 20, 2024, the parties lodged a joint notice that the parties resolved this matter on a representative-wide basis and were finalizing the terms of a settlement agreement. In the joint notice, the parties requested that the Court set a hearing date for a forthcoming motion for preliminary approval of the settlement on or after February 14, 2024.

On December 23, 2024, the Court entered an order scheduling a hearing for the motion for preliminary approval of settlement on February 19, 2025.

On January 22, 2025, plaintiff filed an unopposed motion for an order approving the terms of a Joint Stipulation of Settlement of PAGA Representative Action (the Settlement Agreement) entered into between plaintiff, acting as a private attorney general for the State of California, and defendants; payment of attorneys’ fees and costs described in the Settlement Agreement; payment of settlement administrator costs; and entering final judgment.

Analysis

There exist procedural problems with the present motion.

Subject to exceptions which do not apply here, under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1113(d), “no opening … memorandum may exceed 15 pages.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1113(d).) (Note: Undesignated rule references herein shall be to the California Rules of Court, unless otherwise indicated.) The memorandum submitted in support of the present motion is 29 pages, which exceeds the page limit set forth in rule 3.1113(d) by nearly 100 percent of the prescribed page limit. The supporting memorandum also fails to include an opening summary of argument as required under rule 3.1113(f).

“A party may apply to the court ex parte but with written notice of the application to the other parties, at least 24 hours before the memorandum is due, for permission to file a longer memorandum. The application must state reasons why the argument cannot be made within the stated limit.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1113(e).) The Court’s records reflect that plaintiff did not file an appropriate application with the Court requesting permission to file a longer memorandum.

Further, there is no information appearing in the memorandum submitted by plaintiff which would indicate or suggest that plaintiff’s arguments, many of which are repetitive, could not have been made within the limit stated in rule 3.1113(d). For example, plaintiff devotes nearly half of the opening memorandum to the issue of reasonableness of the attorney’s fees and litigation costs claimed by plaintiff. (Memorandum at pp. 15-28.) The Court’s review of the motion indicates that these arguments could, and should, have been advanced in fewer pages.

In addition, California Rules of Court, rule 2.100 et seq. “prescribe the form and format of papers to be filed in the trial courts. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.10(b).) Rule 2.104 requires that “all papers filed must be prepared using a font size not smaller than 12 points.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.104.) The Court’s review of the opening memorandum submitted in support of the motion shows that it is prepared using a font size which is 11.5 points, in violation of rule 2.104. The use of a smaller font size than permitted by court rules also causes the memorandum to further exceed the page limit prescribed in rule 3.1113(d).

The opening memorandum also includes 13 footnotes which are single-spaced and occupy approximately 43 lines of text. The Court’s approximate calculations show that the prolific use of footnotes which are prepared in a font size smaller than permitted by rule 2.104 adds an additional 2 pages of text to the opening memorandum.

In addition, while the use of footnotes can, in limited circumstances, be useful, the unsparing use of footnotes interrupts the flow of the text and is distracting. The use of footnotes to cite relevant authority (or state significant points) may also result in the cited authority being overlooked or ignored. (See, e.g., Holden v. City of San Diego (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 404, 419-420 [use of footnotes for stating contentions or substantive legal arguments is disfavored].) Furthermore, the use of footnotes to cite to relevant authority causes the Court to expend more time than would typically be required to review the papers, resulting in a waste of scarce judicial resources.

“A memorandum that exceeds the page limits of these rules shall be filed and considered in the same manner as a late-filed paper.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1113(g).) Under rule 3.1300(d), the Court may, in its discretion, to refuse to consider a late-filed paper. Considering that there is nothing in the present record to indicate or suggest that plaintiff’s position could not have been advanced in fewer pages, together with the added burden plaintiff’s violations of court rules has placed upon scarce judicial resources, under the circumstances present here the Court will exercise its discretion under rule 3.1113 to not consider the memorandum. Further, the Court will order the memorandum stricken from the record.

As the Court will strike the memorandum, the motion is without factual or legal support as required under rule 3.1113(a). On this basis, the Court will deny the motion.

The Court’s ruling herein is without prejudice to the filing of a procedurally appropriate motion for preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement by plaintiff in the future, or an appropriate application for permission to file a longer memorandum. Though the Court’s denial of the present motion is without prejudice, the Court notes there is nothing in the present record to show or suggest that there exists good cause to prescribe a shorter time for the filing and service of any future motion for preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement or any basis for granting relief ex parte with respect to the time for filing and serving any future similar motion. Therefore, the Court expects that any future motion for preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement will be filed and served within the time specified in Code of Civil Procedure section 1005. (See, e.g., Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.1200 et seq. & 3.1300(b).)

Though the Court will decline to consider the present motion, there also appear to exist substantive deficiencies which also justify the denial of the motion. For example, in the FAC, plaintiff asserts that he brings this action solely in a representative capacity under PAGA, does not bring this action in any individual capacity, and does not seek to recover anything other than civil penalties to the extent permitted under PAGA. (FAC, ¶ 3.) Notwithstanding these assertions, plaintiff requests that the Court approve a service award in the amount of $12,500, to be paid to plaintiff from the gross settlement amount pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement. (See Siegel Decl., ¶ 102 & Exh. 1 [Settlement Agreement], ¶ 31; Pl. Decl., ¶ 23; Memorandum at pp. 28-29.)

“A PAGA claim is legally and conceptually different from an employee’s own suit for damages and statutory penalties. An employee suing under PAGA ‘does so as the proxy or agent of the state’s labor law enforcement agencies.’ [Citation.] Every PAGA claim is ‘a dispute between an employer and the state.’ [Citations.] Moreover, the civil penalties a PAGA plaintiff may recover on the state’s behalf are distinct from the statutory damages or penalties that may be available to employees suing for individual violations. [Citation.] Relief under PAGA is designed primarily to benefit the general public, not the party bringing the action.” (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 81, original italics.)

Unlike enhancement or incentive awards which may be available to a named plaintiff in a class action lawsuit (see Clark v. American Residential Services, LLC (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 785, 806), plaintiff fails to cite, and the Court is unaware of, any legal authority authorizing a representative enhancement payment or service award in a PAGA action, such as the service award sought by plaintiff in the present motion.

Further, civil penalties recovered by an aggrieved employee under PAGA must be distributed as provided in Labor Code section 2699. (See Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (m) [requiring 65 percent of recovered civil penalties to be distributed to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency and 35 percent to aggrieved employees].) Plaintiff sets forth no authority under which the distributions set forth in Labor Code section 2699 may be reduced by any incentive or service award to plaintiff. For these reasons, there exist sufficient grounds to deny the motion to the extent the Settlement Agreement provides for a service award to plaintiff.

In addition, and as noted above, the supporting memorandum includes repetitive and unnecessarily lengthy factual and legal arguments. This suggests to the Court that there exists inefficiency rather than oversight in the preparation of a concise memorandum in support of the position advanced by plaintiff. The ostensible inefficiencies and duplication which exist in the memorandum also raise concerns with respect to whether or not there exists inefficiency or duplication in any other aspect of this litigation and, accordingly, the overall reasonableness of the attorney’s fees sought by plaintiff. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132 [“inefficient or duplicative efforts” are not subject to compensation].)

The Court expects that plaintiff will address the deficiencies and issues noted above, and any other issues or deficiencies that may exist which are not addressed herein, in any future motion for preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement.