Skip to main content
Skip to main content.

Fraud Alert: Scam Text Messages Claiming DMV Penalties -

We have been made aware of fraudulent text messages being sent to individuals claiming to be from the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) or the court system. These messages often state that the recipient owes penalties or fees related to traffic violations or DMV infractions and may include a link or phone number to resolve the matter. 

Take these steps to reduce the chances of falling victim to a text message scam:

  • Never respond to unsolicited or suspicious texts — If you receive a message asking for personal or financial information, do not reply.
  • Verify the source — If you are unsure, always contact the DMV through official channels.
  • Call the DMV if you have concerns — The DMV customer service team is available to help you at 800-777-0133.

Please see DMV warning about fraudulent texts: https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/news-and-media/dmv-warns-of-fraudulent-te…

Jury Scam alert -

The Santa Barbara Superior Court has received complaints about individuals trying to scam members of the public by pretending to be court officers or officials. The Jury Services office of the Santa Barbara Superior Court does not call citizens to request payments for failing to appear for jury duty. California law does not permit citizens to pay a fine in lieu of jury duty. If you receive such a call simply hang up and, if the scammer persists, call your local law enforcement agency. Learn more about the recent scam warning.

Notice to Jurors:

Prospective jurors summoned for jury service can expect to receive their jury summons in postcard form. Please check your mail for a postcard with important instructions to fulfil your jury service. Visit the Jury Services page for more information.

Estate of Silvia Manzo Velasco et al vs Uber Technologies Inc et al

Case Number

24CV03780

Case Type

Civil Law & Motion

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 11/22/2024 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Protective Orders; Motions to Compel

Tentative Ruling

(1) For all reasons discussed herein, each of the separately filed motions of defendants Uber Technologies, Inc., Portier, LLC, and Checkr, Inc., for a protective order are granted, in part. On or before November 26, 2024, defendants shall submit for the Court’s signature proposed copy of the Los Angeles Model Stipulation And Protective Order – Confidential Designation Only in the form provided by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County and appearing at the following link: https://www.lacourt.org/division/civil/pdf/formprotectiveorder1confiden…. With the exception of any modifications which may be necessary or appropriate to conform the model order to the procedural specifics of this case, defendants shall not otherwise modify the substance or the text of the model order. Except as herein granted, the motions of defendants for a protective order are otherwise denied.

(2) For all reasons discussed herein, the Court continues the hearing on the following motions to December 20, 2024: plaintiffs’ two separately filed motions for orders compelling defendant Checkr, Inc., to provide further responses and to produce documents and things responsive to plaintiffs’ set one and set two demands for production of documents; plaintiffs’ three separately filed motions for orders compelling defendants Checkr, Inc., Portier, LLC, and Uber Technologies, Inc. to produce their person or persons most knowledgeable regarding the Master Services Agreement for deposition and to produce documents responsive to plaintiff’s demand for production of documents accompanying deposition notice; and the three separately filed motions by plaintiffs for orders compelling Checkr, Inc., Portier, Inc., and Uber Technologies, Inc., to produce their person or persons most knowledgeable regarding insurance and insurance policies for deposition and to produce documents responsive to plaintiffs’ demand for production of documents accompanying deposition notice.

(3) Plaintiffs, and defendants Checkr, Inc., Portier, Inc., and Uber Technologies, Inc., shall, on or before December 9, 2024, file appropriate joint status reports or, if necessary, individual status reports setting forth which, if any, issues remain to be resolved or determined with respect to the motions continued herein.

Background:

This action was originally filed in the Superior Court of California for the County of San Francisco as case no. CGC-23-606780 entitled Estate of Silvia Manzo Velasco v. Uber Technologies et al. (the SF Action). Pursuant to court order, the SF Action was transferred to this Court on July 9, 2024, and assigned case number 24CV03780.

Records filed in the SF Action and transferred to this Court reflect that on May 30, 2023, plaintiffs the Estate of Silvia Manzo Velasco (Silvia) by and through its successor in interest Ricardo Velasco (Ricardo), Ricardo, Juan Velasco (Juan), Ana Velasco (Ana), Kasandra Velasco (Kasandra), Monica Velasco (Monica), Jose Alvarado (Jose) by and through is guardian ad litem Ana, and Francisca Solis (Solis) (collectively, plaintiffs) filed their original complaint against defendants Uber Technologies, Inc. (Uber), Portier, LLC (Portier), Checkr, Inc. (Checkr), and Andrew Raymond Burgher (Burgher) (collectively, defendants), alleging four causes of action: (1) negligence (against all defendants); (2) negligent hiring, supervision, or retention (against Uber, Portier, and Checkr); (3) wrongful death (against all defendants); and (4) survival action (against all defendants). (Note: Due to common familial surnames, the Court will, where necessary, refer to plaintiffs by their first names. No disrespect is intended.)

Records transferred to this Court further reflect that on June 6, 2023, plaintiffs filed in the SF Action a first amended complaint (the FAC) against defendants alleging the same four causes of action described above. As alleged in the operative FAC:

Ricardo is the husband of Silvia, and Juan, Ana, Kasandra, and Monica are Silvia’s children. (FAC, ¶¶ 6-10.) Jose is Silvia’s biological grandson, and Solis is the mother of Silvia. (Id. at ¶¶ 11-12.)

Uber operates a Transportation Network Company which provides transportation options and vehicles for users of its services through an online application (the Uber App). (FAC, ¶ 13.) Portier is a wholly owned subsidiary of Uber that runs the Delivery Network Company arm of Uber and that does business as Uber Eats, a division of Uber that provides on-demand food delivery services through an “Uber Eats App” mobile phone application. (Id. at ¶¶ 14 & 16.) Uber and Portier (collectively, the Uber Parties) employ drivers through the Uber App and Uber Eats App. (Id. at ¶ 16.) Portier generates leads for Uber Eats drivers through the Uber Eats App to facilitate the delivery of food to customers, and holds the insurance certificate for insurance carried by Uber. (Id. at ¶¶ 16 & 18.)

The Uber Parties perform background investigations of drivers through Checkr, a third-party investigative consumer reporting agency. (FAC, ¶¶ 19 & 52.) The background checks which the Uber Parties outsource to Checkr are based on unverified information submitted by prospective drivers either via the Uber Eats App or the website, and do not require a biometric identifier such as a fingerprint. (Id. at ¶ 46.) As a result, the background checks performed by Checkr on behalf of the Uber Parties fail to uncover criminal conduct and driving histories due to Uber and Portier’s self-imposed requirement for expediency. (Ibid.)

Burgher entered into a Technology Services Agreement with the Uber Parties in which Burgher agreed that Burgher’s transportation of passengers or delivery of food for Uber and Portier furthered an employer-employee relationship. (FAC, ¶ 61.) On October 26, 2021, Silvia was the passenger in a vehicle which, suddenly and without warning, was violently struck by a vehicle operated by Burgher. (Id. at ¶ 73.) At the time of the incident, Burgher was working as a commercial driver for Uber and Uber Eats. (Id. at ¶ 74.) Prior to the incident, Burgher had been operating his vehicle in excess of posted speed limits, including at speeds up to 120 miles per hour, while intoxicated. (Id. at ¶¶ 75-76.)

Checkr was employed by the Uber Parties to investigate Burgher’s criminal history and motor vehicle records, but failed to identify Burgher’s prior criminal convictions which include, among other things, that Burgher was on probation for a second “DUI” conviction until October 31, 2014, within the seven years prior to his background check in connection with his potential employment with the Uber Parties. (Id. at ¶ 82.)

On December 15, 2023, Uber and Portier separately answered the FAC, generally denying its allegations and asserting affirmative defenses. Burgher filed an answer to the FAC on January 16, 2024, generally denying its allegations and asserting affirmative defenses. Checkr filed its answer to the FAC on February 22, 2024, also generally denying its allegations and asserting affirmative defenses.

Plaintiffs’ motions for preference:

Records transferred to this Court further reflect that on April 19, April 23, and May 2, 2024, plaintiffs separately filed in the SF Action three motions or amended motions for preferential trial setting brought under either or both Code of Civil Procedure sections 36 and 37, based on Solis’ age and health and a guilty or no contest plea entered by Burgher in Santa Barbara County Superior Court case number 21CR07000 entitled People of the State of California v. Andrew Raymond Burgher. Each of the motions for preferential trial setting filed by plaintiffs were separately opposed by defendants.

Following the transfer of the SF Action to this Court, plaintiffs separately filed an amended motion and “second” amended motion for preferential trial setting on, respectively, August 8 and October 1, 2024, each of which also brought on the same grounds under Code of Civil Procedure sections 36 and 37, and separately opposed by defendants.

Plaintiffs’ discovery motions:

Plaintiffs also filed ten discovery motions with this Court which the Court will refer to collectively as the Discovery Motions:

On July 26, 2024, plaintiffs filed a motion for an order compelling Checkr (the Checkr Set One Motion) to serve further responses and to produce documents responsive to plaintiffs’ set one demand for production of documents (the Checkr Set One Demand), which is opposed by Checkr.

On September 13, 2024, plaintiffs filed a motion for an order compelling Checkr (the Checkr Set Two Motion) to serve further responses and produce documents responsive to plaintiffs’ set two demand for production of documents (the Checkr Set Two Demand), which is also opposed by Checkr.

On September 26, 2024, plaintiffs separately filed two motions for orders compelling Uber and Portier (respectively, the Uber Set Two Motion and the Portier Set Two Motion) to each serve further responses and produce documents responsive to plaintiffs’ set two demands for production of documents (respectively, the Uber Set Two Demand and the Portier Set Two Demand), which are separately opposed by Uber and Portier.

On October 1, 2024, plaintiffs separately filed three motions to compel the depositions of the most qualified individuals of Uber, Checkr, and Portier as to a Master Services Agreement executed on October 16, 2020 (the MSA), and to produce documents at the deposition (individually and respectively, the Uber MSA Motion, the Checkr MSA Motion, and the Portier MSA Motion, and collectively, the MSA Motions), which are each separately opposed by Uber, Checkr, and Portier.

On October 11, 2024, plaintiffs separately filed three motions for orders compelling the deposition of the person or persons most knowledgeable of Uber, Checkr, and Portier as to insurance policies applicable to this action and the incident at issue, and to produce documents at the deposition (respectively, the Uber Insurance Motion, the Checkr Insurance Motion, and the Portier Insurance Motion, and collectively, the Insurance Motions), which are each separately opposed by Uber, Checkr, and Portier.

The motions of the Uber Parties and Checkr for protective orders:

On September 30, 2024, the Uber Parties filed a motion for a protective order (the Uber Protective Order Motion) which Uber and Portier contend is necessary to prevent the disclosure of purportedly confidential, commercially sensitive, and proprietary information as a consequence of discovery conducted in this action including with respect to the MSA and the depositions of the Uber Parties’ persons most knowledgeable. In the Uber Protective Order Motion, the Uber Parties also request that the Court stay the deposition of their person most knowledgeable pending a ruling on the Uber Protective Order Motion. Plaintiffs oppose the Uber Protective Order Motion.

On October 3, 2024, Checkr filed a joinder to the Uber Protective Order Motion, and separately filed its own motion for a protective order (the Checkr Protective Order Motion) with respect to the disclosure of purportedly confidential and proprietary documents of Checkr and the Uber Parties with respect to the MSA. Checkr also effectively requests that the Court stay the deposition of its persons most knowledgeable with respect to the MSA.

On October 4, 2024, the Uber Parties filed a second motion for a protective order (the Second Uber Protective Order Motion) with respect to documents and information requested in the Uber Set Two Demand and the Portier Set Two Demand, which is effectively opposed by plaintiffs.

The orders of the Court:

A hearing on plaintiffs’ five motions or amended motions for trial preference, the Discovery Motions, and the motions for protective orders described above was held on November 8, 2024. On that date, the Court issued a Minute Order (the Minute Order) granting the “second amended” motion for trial preference filed by plaintiffs in this action on October 1, 2024, and ordering plaintiffs’ remaining motions or amended motions for trial preference off-calendar. The Court set a jury trial in this action for February 13, 2025. (See also Nov. 14, 2024, Trial Call Order.)

Pursuant to the Minute Order, the Court denied without prejudice the Uber Set Two Motion and the Portier Set Two Motion.

The Court also stated its intention to grant the Uber Protective Order Motion, the Checkr Protective Order Motion, and the Second Uber Protective Order Motion. To permit the parties sufficient time to meet and confer with respect to the terms of an appropriate protective order the effect of any stipulated protective order on the issues presented in the Discovery Motions, which the Court noted may be mooted by the entry of a protective order, the Court continued the hearing on the Uber Protective Order Motion, the Checkr Protective Order Motion, the Second Uber Protective Order Motion, and the remaining Discovery Motions, to November 22, 2024.

The Court further ordered the parties to, on or before November 15, 2024, submit joint or individual status reports setting forth the parties’ efforts to meet and confer regarding the terms of an appropriate protective order and to resolve the issues presented in the Uber Protective Order Motion, Checkr Protective Order Motion, the Second Uber Protective Order Motion, and the remaining Discovery Motions. To the extent the parties were unable to agree to the terms of a protective order or otherwise resolve the parties’ disputes, the Court also ordered that the parties identify in their joint or individual status reports which, if any, issues remain to be determined.

The joint status report of the parties:

On November 15, 2024, the Uber Parties filed a joint status report which is executed by their counsel and counsel for plaintiffs and Checkr, and in which the parties set forth their respective positions regarding the requested protective orders and discovery issues further detailed above.

In the joint status report, plaintiffs assert that on November 12, 2024, they submitted to the Uber Parties and Checkr a proposed protective order in the form attached to the joint status report as exhibit B. (Status Report at p. 3, ll. 3-6.) Plaintiffs contend that their proposed protective order includes all protections sought by these defendants who, according to plaintiffs, have not stated with specificity the language to which they object. (Id. at p. 3, ll. 5-10.)

Plaintiffs further assert that defendants take issue with the need for a party to prove the confidential nature of documents or information prior to a confidential designation being applied, (Status Report at p. 3, ll. 13-15.) Though plaintiffs do not specify whether or where the protective order includes this “need”, it is the Court’s understanding that defendants ostensibly object to provisions in the protective order proposed by plaintiffs which require a party designating any material as “confidential” to “provide a brief written justification accompanying each designation, detailing specific facts that justify confidentiality and potential harm if disclosed” which must be “sufficient to demonstrate a ‘good faith’ basis for designation as ‘Confidential’ under applicable law”, and which also require the designating party to, upon receipt of an objection to a “confidential” designation, either de-designate material identified as “confidential” or file with the Court a motion seeking to uphold a “confidential” designation. (Id. at Exh. B, ¶¶ 4 & 6.) The Court further notes that the protective order proposed by plaintiffs requires the designating party to support any motion seeking to uphold a confidential designation with “clear and convincing evidence.” (Id. at ¶ 6.)

Plaintiffs also contend that defendants “take issue” with the imposition of sanctions upon an improper confidential designation. (Status Report at p. 3, ll. 15-17.) Though plaintiffs also fail to cite these provisions, it is the Court’s understanding that the terms defendants “take issue” with include provisions which authorize the imposition of “penalties” for any “misuse” or “over-designation” of material as “confidential”, an award of attorney’s fees incurred to correct any improper designation of materials as confidential, and a waiver of confidentiality protections to the extent the Court finds that a designating party acted in bad faith. (Id. at Exh. B, ¶¶ 2 & 6.) Plaintiffs contend that these provisions are consistent with code requirements and not intended to penalize or punish the Uber Parties or Checkr. (Id. at p. 3, ll. 17-20.)

Plaintiffs also assert that defendants have sought what plaintiffs describe as an “entirely different” document, and that plaintiffs have specifically explained why they believe this document is unacceptable, overbroad, or deems all information or documents provided in discovery as confidential even if the material is not confidential. (Status Report at p. 3, ll. 25-26.) Plaintiffs explain that their concerns arise from defendants’ conduct in this matter in refusing to produce responses to discovery then later producing purportedly confidential documents without a protective order. (Id. at p. 3, l. 28-p. 4, l. 4.) Plaintiffs assert that defendants’ conduct demonstrates a lack of good faith in designating matters as confidential which plaintiffs contend requires that defendants prove the designation is reasonable and justified. (Id. at p. 4, ll. 5-7.)

Plaintiffs further state that, though they do not object to confidential matters remaining confidential, they should not be burdened with proving that any matters or materials are not confidential. (Status Report at p. 4, ll. 8-10.)

Uber asserts in the joint status report that, despite its efforts to meet and confer with plaintiffs and Checkr regarding the terms of an appropriate protective order, the parties remain at an impasse. (Status Report at p. 4, ll. 12-14.) Specifically, Uber states that on November 11, 2024, it asked plaintiffs to sign its proposed protective order to facilitate the production of materials identified as confidential and to enable the parties to select a date for deposition of Uber’s person most knowledge with respect to the MSA and insurance matters. (Id. at p. 4, ll. 24-28.)

Uber further asserts that on November 12, 2024, plaintiffs provided their proposed protective order but did not respond to Uber’s correspondences. (Status Report at p. 5, ll. 2-3.) Plaintiffs also requested dates for the depositions of Uber’s persons most knowledgeable, and requested that Uber amend its discovery responses. (Id. at p. 5, ll. 3-5.) Later that same day, Uber states that it advised plaintiffs that their proposed protective order proposes unfair penalties and burdens on the party seeking to designate matters as confidential. (Id. at p. 5, ll. 6-11.)

Uber also states that on November 13, 2024, plaintiffs identified modifications made by Uber to the Los Angeles Model Stipulation And Protective Order – Confidential Designation Only (the model protective order) provided by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, which appear in the protective order proposed by Uber. (Status Report at p. 5, ll. 13-15; see also Exhs. D & E.) Uber asserts that it informed plaintiffs that it would not oppose the use in this action of an unedited version of the model protective order. (Id. at p. 5, ll. 18-21 & Exh. F.) Uber also contends that Checkr agreed to use the model protective order, but that plaintiffs would not agree to use the model protective order. (Id. at p. 5, ll. 21-25 & Exh. F.)

Uber further states that on November 14, 2021, plaintiffs advised that they took issue with the assumption of confidentiality present in Uber’s proposed protective order. (Status Report at p. 6, ll. 7-11 & Exh. F.) In response, Uber reiterated its offer to use an unedited version of the model protective order. (Id. at p. 6, ll. 15-16 & Exh. F.)

Uber maintains that, upon entry of an appropriate protective order, it will produce its corporate representative or representatives for deposition with respect to the MSA and insurance policies. (Status Report at p. 4, ll. 16-20; p. 8, ll. 3-10 & 27-28.)

Checkr asserts its proposed protective order is the same as the order proposed by Uber, that it agrees with Uber’s position as stated in the joint report, that once a protective order is in place the deposition of Checkr’s persons most knowledgeable regarding the MSA will go forward upon a mutually agreeable date, and that the deposition of its person most knowledgeable regarding insurance policies is confirmed for December 4, 2024. (Id. at p. 6, ll. 19-22; p. 8, ll. 12-13; p. 9, ll. 7-8.)

With respect to the Checkr Set One Motion and Checkr Set Two Motion, plaintiffs effectively contend that any objections of Checkr to these motions should be moot to the extent a protective order is in place. (Status Report at p. 6, l. 26-p. 7, l. 3.) Checkr contends that its response to the Checkr Set One Demand and the Checkr Set Two Demand are verified, complete, and code compliant, and that Checkr has identified the documents it will produce pursuant to a protective order. (Id. at p. 7, ll. 7-10.) Checkr further asserts that the production of documents identified in the requests at issue in the Checkr Set One Motion and Checkr Set Two Motion will occur once a protective order has been issued or executed by the parties. (Id. at p. 7, ll. 10-15.)

Analysis:

(1) The Uber Protective Order Motion, Checkr Protective Order Motion, and The Second Uber Protective Order Motion

As noted in the Minute Order, the Court has reviewed the information and arguments presented in the Uber Protective Order Motion, the Checkr Protective Order Motion, and the Second Uber Protective Order Motion, including information and evidence appearing in the supporting declaration of Peter Sauerwein (Sauerwein), who is employed with Uber as a Senior Manager of Corporate Business Operations. The information appearing in the Sauerwein declaration is also relevant to arguments asserted by Checkr in the Checkr Protective Order Motion.

In its Minute Order, the Court stated that, considering the general nature of the protective order sought by the Uber Parties and Checkr, and based on the evidence, information, and arguments presented and advanced by the Uber Parties and Checkr, there exists sufficient good cause at this stage of the proceedings to justify the issuance of a general protective order for the purpose of protecting documents designated as confidential by the parties, subject to the Court’s review should any party contend that a confidential or other designation is not warranted or improper, and for the purpose of facilitating the production of documents and other discovery and depositions sought by plaintiffs. (Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 106-107 [general discussion]; Stadish v. Superior Court (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1130, 1145.)

The Court further noted that plaintiffs failed to sufficiently explain or offer a legitimate reason showing why the issuance of a general protective order for the sole purpose of designating documents as confidential, subject and without prejudice to the Court’s review of any such designation, is unwarranted or would impede or prejudice plaintiffs’ ability to conduct discovery in this action, also considering that the Uber Parties and Checkr have stated in each of these parties’ respective motions and again in the joint status report, their intention to produce information, documents, and witnesses for deposition subject to a general protective order. There is nothing appearing in the joint report that would change the Court’s analysis. Therefore, the Court will grant the Uber Protective Order Motion, the Checkr Protective Order Motion, and the Second Uber Protective Order Motion, in part.

The Court has reviewed the protective order proposed by plaintiffs which, under the provisions further discussed above, permits a “sparing” use of confidential designations, permits the recovery of unspecified “penalties” in addition to attorney’s fees by a party prevailing in a designation dispute, authorizes an imposition of waivers for bad faith, requires the filing of a motion to uphold a confidential designation within five days of receipt of an objection, and imposes a “clear and convincing” burden of proof on the designating party during all stages of a designation dispute with respect to whether materials designated as confidential qualify for protection.

Though a party seeking to protect confidential information from disclosure must show good cause justifying the protection sought by that party, plaintiffs fail to offer any reasoned argument showing which, if any, provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure require that the required good cause be established by “clear and convincing” evidence. (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2025.420, subd. (b)(13); 2031.060, subd. (b)(5) [authorizing the court to make a protective order “for good cause shown”].) Furthermore, discovery sanctions may not punish a party for failing to comply with its discovery obligations. (Victor Valley Union High School District v. Superior Court (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1121, 1158.) Because the sanctions authorized in the protective order proposed by plaintiffs appear to include waivers and unspecified penalties, these provisions are unwarranted and unauthorized by statute. In addition, plaintiffs fail to explain why the imposition of a five day time period to prepare and file a designation motion upon receipt of an objection is reasonable. For these reasons, plaintiffs have failed to show why their proposed protective order is reasonable, appropriate, or code compliant.

The Court has also considered the objections of plaintiff to the protective order proposed by the Uber Parties and Checkr, which are set forth in detail in the letters of plaintiffs’ counsel attached as exhibits D and E to the joint status report. As further discussed above, the Uber Parties and Checkr have stated, in response to plaintiffs’ objections, that they do not object to the use of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County’s model protective order.

The Court has reviewed the model protective order which appears at the following link as set forth in exhibit D, PDF page 49, and exhibit E, PDF page 54, of the joint report: https://www.lacourt.org/division/civil/pdf/formprotectiveorder1confiden…. Considering the objections of plaintiffs to the protective order proposed by the Uber Parties and Checkr, and that the Uber Parties and Checkr do not object to the use of the model protective order, the Court finds that the provisions of the model protective order are reasonable and appropriate to this case.

By way of example, though plaintiffs contend that they should not bear the burden to prove that materials are not confidential, the model protective order provides that, upon the filing of a motion seeking to uphold any confidential designations upon receipt of an objection, the designating party will bear the burden to establish the applicability of the designation. (Model Protective Order, ¶ 6.) For this reason, the model protective order appropriately places the burden on the designating party to justify its designation of any materials as confidential. The model protective order also does not impose any greater burden on a designating party not otherwise required by code and does not include any provisions which may effectively require the Court to impose penalties or sanctions which are not statutorily authorized or appropriate.

The examples provided above are intended to be illustrative but not exhaustive. For all reasons discussed above, the Court declines to adopt the protective order attached as exhibits A to the declarations of Dommond E. Lonnie and Emily Genge submitted in support of the Uber Protective Order Motion and the Checkr Protective Order Motion, and declines to adopt the protective order proposed by plaintiffs. Instead, the Court will adopt the model protective order, and will order the Uber Parties and Checkr to submit a copy of the model protective order for the Court’s signature, in the form provided by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The model protective order submitted for the Court’s signature must include all terms appearing in the original model protective order without modifications to its substance except as to those modifications which may be appropriate or necessary to conform the model protective order to the specifics of this action (for example, modifications that may be necessary with respect to the identity of the Court, the parties to the action and their counsel, or the case title or number).

The Court’s ruling herein is without prejudice to any future motion that may be filed by any party with respect to the designation of any matters as confidential under the protective order adopted by the Court herein, which will be entered in this action. Furthermore, nothing in the Court’s ruling shall be interpreted to prevent any party from making a procedurally appropriate request to modify any portion of the model protective order, if necessary and warranted.  

(2) The Checkr Set One Motion, the Checkr Set Two Motion, the MSA Motions, and the Insurance Motions

Based on the representations of the Uber Parties and Checkr as to the production of these parties’ persons or persons most knowledgeable or qualified with respect to the MSA and insurance policies upon the entry of a protective order in this action, and considering that Checkr presents information in the status report indicating that a date for the deposition of its person most knowledgeable with respect to insurance policies has been confirmed, it appears to the Court that the issues presented in the MSA Motions and the Insurance Motions are or will be mooted by the Court’s ruling herein.

In addition, information and arguments set forth in the opposition of Checkr to the Checkr Set One Motion and the Checkr Set Two Motion also indicate that the issues presented in these motions may or will also be mooted by the Court’s ruling herein, whether in whole or in part.

To permit plaintiffs, the Uber Parties, and Checkr sufficient time to schedule any remaining depositions with respect to the MSA and insurance policies, and to permit Checkr sufficient time to produce or provide any information or documents it has purportedly withheld based on any refusal of plaintiffs to enter into an appropriate protective order, the Court will further continue the hearing on the Checkr Set One Motion, the Checkr Set Two Motion, the MSA Motions, and the Insurance Motions. The Court expects that the parties will meet and confer fully and in good faith to expeditiously schedule any remaining depositions which are the subject of the MSA Motions or the Insurance Motions sufficiently in advance of the trial, and to expeditiously resolve any remaining issues or disputes as to the Checkr Set One Demand and the Checkr Set Two Demand in light of the Court’s ruling herein.

The Court will also require the parties to submit a joint report or, if necessary, individual reports prior to the continued hearing setting forth in detail what, if any, issues remain to be resolved or determined by the Court with respect to the Checkr Set One Motion, the Checkr Set Two Motion, the MSA Motions, and the Insurance Motions.

Was this helpful?

This question is for testing whether or not you are a human visitor and to prevent automated spam submissions.