A-L Financial v. James E. Hale III

Case Number

24CV03755

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 04/23/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Defendant James E. Hale, III’s Motion Setting Aside Default, Vacating Default Judgment, and Staying Execution

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiff A-L Financial Corp.: Stephanie A. Newport

For Defendant James E. Hale III: Self Represented

                       

RULING

For the reasons set forth herein: Defendant’s motion setting aside default, vacating default judgment, and staying execution is denied.

Background

This action commenced on July 8, 2024, by the filing of the complaint by plaintiff A-L Financial Corp. (“plaintiff”) against defendant James E. Hale III (“defendant”) for breach of contract.

As alleged in the complaint, plaintiff is the assignee of a motor vehicle contract and security agreement, pursuant to which defendant purchased a 2012 Audi A6. (Compl., ¶ 8 & Exh. A.) On August 22, 2023, and thereafter, defendant breached the agreement by failing to make payments due. (Id. at ¶ 9.) Dure to the breach, the vehicle was repossessed and sold at auction leaving a deficiency balance in the amount of $8,454.09, plus interest in the amount of $2.31. (Id. at ¶¶ 11-13.) The contract provides that in the event of litigation the prevailing party shall be entitled to an award of attorney’s fees. (Id. at ¶ 14.)

Defendant was personally served with the summons and complaint on July 28, 2024. No answer to the complaint having been filed, on February 4, 2025, plaintiff requested entry of default and court judgment. The judgment was entered on February 5, 2025, in the total amount of $10,438.88.

On February 11, 2025, defendant filed the present motion to set aside default, vacate judgment and stay execution.

Plaintiff opposes the motion.

Analysis

“The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).)

The trial court has broad discretion to vacate the judgment and/or the clerk’s entry of default that preceded it.  However, “this discretion may be exercised only after the party seeking relief has shown that there is a proper ground for relief, and that the party has raised that ground in a procedurally proper manner, within any applicable time limits.” (Cruz v. Fagor America, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 488, 495.)

Unless the motion to set aside default is accompanied by an attorney affidavit of fault, which is not the case here, relief is discretionary, and the burden is on defendant to demonstrate mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. (See Lorenz v. Commercial Accept. Ins. Co. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 981, 989.) The party moving for relief because of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” must show specific facts demonstrating that one of these conditions was met. (Hopkins & Carley v. Gens (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1410.)

Defendant’s explanation of why he did not file a responsive pleading within 30 days of being served is insufficient. Defendant’s only argument is that he did not understand that he had to respond to the plaintiff’s papers within 30 days. He claims that his failure to answer the complaint constitutes excusable neglect. The summons, personally served on defendant July 28, 2024, clearly states, “NOTICE! You have been sued. The court may decide against you without your being heard unless you respond within 30 days”, and “You have 30 CALENDAR DAYS after this summons and legal papers are served on you to file a written response at this court and have a copy served on the plaintiff”. As noted above, plaintiff did not seek a default until February 4, 2025, which is more than six months after defendant was served. This does not constitute excusable neglect. Further, defendant does not dispute that the money is owed to plaintiff.

Due to defendant’s failure to sufficiently demonstrate mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, the motion will be denied.

The court notes that “mere self-representation is not a ground for exceptionally lenient treatment. Except when a particular rule provides otherwise, the rules of civil procedure must apply equally to parties represented by counsel and those who forgo attorney representation.” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985.)