Deanna Cardona, et al. v. The Devereux Foundation, et al.

Case Number

24CV03696

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 07/09/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Defendant The Devereux Foundation’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiffs Deanna Cardona and Brianna Cardona: Gregory J. Ramirez.

                                   

For Defendant The Devereux Foundation: Brett Schoel, Vanessa R. Cornejo.

                                   

For Tri-Counties Association for the Developmentally Disabled: Paul J. Bauer, Daniella M. Crisanti, Lacy Taylor.

For Additional Parties: See List

RULING

The Devereux Foundation’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

Background

On July 2, 2024, Plaintiffs Deanna Cardona (Deanna) and Brianna Cardona (Brianna) (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed their original complaint in this action against Defendants The Devereux Foundation (Devereux), Tri-Counties Community Housing Corporation (Tri-Counties CHC), Tri-Counties Association For The Developmentally Disabled, Inc. (TCADD), and additional Defendants, alleging four causes of action: (1) gross negligence; (2) premises liability; (3) sexual battery; and (4) sexual assault. (Note: To avoid confusion due to common surnames, the Court will refer to Plaintiffs by their first names. No disrespect is intended.)

Following the partial sustaining of a demurrer to the original complaint, on February 3, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the operative first amended complaint (FAC), setting forth the same four causes of action. As relevant to the present motion, only the first two causes of action are alleged as to Devereux.

As alleged in the SAC

On April 7, 2022, Deanna began working for Devereux as a Direct Support Professional 2 for the Tularosa Home located in Lompoc and as a Registered Behavior Technician. (FAC, ¶ 19.) Prior to being trained at Tularosa Home, Deanna was required to complete approximately 40 hours of online training classes at home. (Id. at ¶ 21.) Deanna was also required to complete orientation, First Aid, and CPR training along with other mandatory classes she was required to attend in person. (Ibid.)

Around the end of May 2022, and the beginning of June 2022, Devereux started sending Deanna from Tularosa Home to the Foothill Home in Santa Barbara. (FAC, ¶ 23.) On June 12, 2022, Deanna was transferred to the Foothill Home permanently. (Id. at ¶ 24.)

While working at the Foothill Home, Deanna was exposed to Genaro, Courtney, and Sam who were “physically violent, sexually harassing, sexually assaulting, and sexually battering . . ..” (FAC, ¶ 25.) On October 8, 2022, Genaro physically assaulted, sexually assaulted, and sexually battered Deanna, causing Deanna to suffer serious injuries. (Id. at ¶¶ 28, 29.)

Brianna started working with “Defendants” in mid-July 2022, at the Foothill Home. (FAC, ¶ 30.) Brianna was also exposed to Genaro, Courtney, and Sam who were “physically violent, sexually harassing, sexually assaulting, and sexually battering . . ..” (Id. at ¶ 31.) Genaro would become violent towards Brianna. (Id. at ¶¶ 32, 33, 34.)

In August 2022, Deanna and Brianna advised Devereux, Tri-Counties CHC, and TCADD that their patients were becoming increasingly physically and sexually aggressive at the Foothill House, but their complaints were ignored. (FAC, ¶¶ 36, 37.)

Devereux, Tri-Counties CHC, and TCADD started alienating and retaliating against Deanna and Brianna after they reported the abuse to a supervisor. (FAC, ¶¶ 38, 39.) Plaintiffs were required to “maintain a code of silence” regarding the physical and sexual assaults. (Id. at ¶ 40.)

The Devereux Foundation now moves for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication.

Plaintiffs oppose the motion.

Analysis

Standard on Summary Judgment

A Defendant’s motion for summary judgment asks the Court to determine that the entire action has no merit, and to terminate the action without the necessity of a trial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a).) The procedure enables the Court to look behind the pleadings to determine whether the party against whom the motion is directed has evidence to back up the claims. The Court must determine from the evidence presented that there is no triable issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)

“[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) There is no obligation on the opposing party to establish anything by affidavit unless and until the moving party has by affidavit stated facts establishing every element necessary to sustain an adjudication in his favor. (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. Smilecare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.) “[W]e liberally construe Plaintiff’s evidentiary submissions and strictly scrutinize Defendant’s own evidence, in order to resolve any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in Plaintiff’s favor.” (Johnson v. American Standard, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 56, 64.)

“A Defendant . . . has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. Once the Defendant … has met that burden, the burden shifts to the Plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)

In resolving the motion, the Court may not weigh the evidence. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) Rather, the role of the trial Court in resolving a summary judgment motion is to determine whether issues of fact exist, not to decide the merits of the issues. (Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1107.) A triable issue of material fact exists only if the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) Any doubts as to the propriety of granting the motion should be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion. (Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn., supra at p. 1107.)

Separate Statement

“Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (b)(1), requires each motion for summary judgment to be accompanied by a separate statement “ ‘setting forth plainly and concisely all material facts that the moving party contends are undisputed. Each of the material facts stated shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence.’ ” California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d)(2)4 states: “ ‘The separate statement should include only material facts and not any facts that are not pertinent to the disposition of the motion.’ ” Under the Rules of Court, “ ‘ “Material facts’ “ are facts that relate to the cause of action, claim for damages, issue of duty, or affirmative defense that is the subject of the motion and that could make a difference in the disposition of the motion.’ ” (Rule 3.1350(a)(2).)” (Beltran v. Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 865, 874-875.)

“The point of the separate statement is not to craft a narrative, but to be a concise list of the material facts and the evidence that supports them. “ ‘The separate statement serves two important functions in a summary judgment proceeding: It notifies the parties which material facts are at issue, and it provides a convenient and expeditious vehicle permitting the trial Court to hone in on the truly disputed facts.’ ” [Citation.]” (Beltran v. Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc., supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at page 875.)

“The duty to comply with the law regarding separate statements applies to both sides of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication. The opposing party’s responses to the separate statement must be in good faith, responsive, and material. Responses should directly address the fact stated, and if that fact is not in dispute, the opposing party must so admit. It is completely unhelpful to evade the stated fact in an attempt to create a dispute where none exists.” (Beltran v. Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc., supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at page 875.)

“In opposing a Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the Plaintiff must submit a separate statement setting forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. [Citations,] Without a separate statement of undisputed facts with references to supporting evidence in the form of affidavits or declarations, it is impossible for the Plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of disputed facts.” (Lewis v. County of Sacramento (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 107, 116; disapproved on other grounds by Kaufman & Broad Communities, Inc. v. Performance Plastering, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 26, 41-42.)

Plaintiffs’ separate statement in opposition to the motion for summary judgment (PSS) is non-compliant. The PSS almost entirely avoids responding directly to the fact being stated. Instead, Plaintiffs attempt to create triable issues where none exist.

Additionally:

“[T]he allegations in a complaint do not, at trial, constitute evidence of the truth of the allegations made therein [citation], and a party cannot rely on its own pleadings as evidence to support or oppose a summary judgment motion.” (Cassady v. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 220, 241; accord Bitner v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1067, fn. 5.)

Plaintiffs refer to their complaint as “evidence” in response to every fact that they dispute. This is improper and the complaint will not be considered evidence.

Likewise: “At the trial or any other hearing in the action, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, the propounding party or any party other than the responding party may use any answer or part of an answer to an interrogatory only against the responding party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.410; italics added; see also Bayramoglu v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 726, 740.)

As they did with their complaint, Plaintiffs also refer to their own discovery responses as “evidence” in each fact that they dispute. This is also improper, and the Plaintiffs’ own discovery responses will not be considered evidence when used by them.

As further noncompliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (b)(3), Plaintiffs fail to cite to any specific portions of their “supporting evidence.” Rather, they just refer to entire documents, collectively consisting of hundreds of pages, that they claim supports their statements.

As just one example of the impropriety of the separate statement in opposition, undisputed material fact (UMF) No. 1 states:

“The Devereux Foundation’s facility located at 4084 Foothill Road, Santa Barbara, California (hereinafter, the “ ‘Foothill Home’ ”) is licensed by the State of California Department of Social Services as an “ ‘Enhanced Behavioral Supports Home.’ ”

Supporting Evidence:

Exhibit A.” [Note: Exhibit A is a copy of the license proving the fact stated.]

In response to UMF No. 1, Plaintiffs state:

“Plaintiffs dispute this allegation. Plaintiffs allege that the acts committed by the residents/clients and the complicity of Defendants will most likely cause a temporary or permanent license revocation for Defendants at the Foothill Home.

Supporting Evidence:

Plaintiffs Complaint; Plaintiff Deanna Cardona’s Declaration (Exhibit A; email correspondence between Plaintiff and Community Care Licensing Division Analyst confirm investigation); Plaintiff Brianna Cardona’s Declaration; Plaintiff Deanna Cardona’s Responses to Responses to Interrogatories Set One; Plaintiff Brianna Cardona’s Responses to Interrogatories Set One; Plaintiffs’ Declarations; Declaration of Rosamaria Romero, RN; Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s Department Report Number: 25-5402.”

While Devereux’s cited evidence provides admissible evidence that its facility is licensed as an Enhanced Behavioral Supports Home, Plaintiffs do not even address the fact stated. Instead, they speculate that the license may be revoked at some point in the future. The “supporting evidence” provides no proof that the UMF is false. Thus, it is not reasonably disputed. Nearly all of the other UMFs follow the same pattern of Plaintiff failing to directly address the fact stated or point to any admissible evidence in dispute of the stated fact.

However, Devereaux’s SSUMFs is deficient in certain respects as well. For example:

UMF No. 2 states: “The types of clients that are served by an Enhanced Behavioral Supports Home, such as Genaro Gamberdella, Sam Hertler, and Courtney that are served at Devereux’s Foothill Home, may display physically aggressive behaviors, for example, headbanging, headbutting, punching, nail digging, shirt grabbing, and hair pulling.”

UMF No. 3 states: “The types of clients that are served by an Enhanced Behavioral Supports Home, such as Genaro Gamberdella, Sam Hertler, and Courtney that are served at Devereux’s Foothill Home, may display socially inappropriate behaviors, for example, masturbating in the presence of others.”

For both UMF Nos. 2 and 3, Devereaux’s sole supporting evidence is “Exhibit B.” Exhibit B is the Declaration of Moraima Alvarez, who is an Administrative Support Coordinator for Central Records at Devereaux. The declaration consists of five paragraphs and does not support the facts stated as UMFs. Alvarez declares:

“The Devereux Foundation is a non-profit organization providing behavioral healthcare services in the areas of autism, intellectual and developmental disabilities, and specialty mental health (like bipolar disorder, psychotic disorders and disruptive behavior disorders). It offers programs for adults like community-based living, employment and transition services, and treatment in residential settings.” (Alvarez Decl., ¶ 3.)

“Devereux’s Foothill Home location provides care for adults who require enhanced behavioral health services, which is a higher level of care.” (Alvarez Decl., ¶ 4.)

The “supporting evidence” does not mention any specific behaviors that are set forth in the UMFs. As such, Devereaux has failed to meet its burden of establishing some of the UMFs. The UMFs that Devereaux has failed to establish are:

2. The types of clients that are served by an Enhanced Behavioral Supports Home, such as Genaro Gamberdella, Sam Hertler, and Courtney that are served at Devereux’s Foothill Home, may display physically aggressive behaviors, for example, headbanging, headbutting, punching, nail digging, shirt grabbing, and hair pulling.

3. The types of clients that are served by an Enhanced Behavioral Supports Home, such as Genaro Gamberdella, Sam Hertler, and Courtney that are served at Devereux’s Foothill Home, may display socially inappropriate behaviors, for example, masturbating in the presence of others.

9. The inherent risks of working with the types of clients that are served by an Enhanced Behavioral Supports Home, such as Genaro Gamberdella, Sam Hertler, and Courtney that are served at The Devereux Foundation’s facility located at 4084 Foothill Road, Santa Barbara, California, is possibly being subjected to, and having to address, the clients’ physically aggressive and socially inappropriate behaviors.

Those facts that are either undisputed or not reasonably disputed include:

1. The Devereux Foundation’s facility located at 4084 Foothill Road, Santa Barbara, California is licensed by the State of California Department of Social Services as an “Enhanced Behavioral Supports Home.”

4. The Devereux Foundation hired Deanna Cardona and Brianna Cardona to work at Devereux’s Enhanced Behavioral Supports Home (“EBSH”) with EBSH clients.
5. The Devereux Foundation informed Deanna Cardona and Brianna Cardona she would work with clients who may display physically aggressive behaviors.
6. The Devereux Foundation informed Deanna Cardona and Brianna Cardona she would work with clients who may display socially inappropriate behaviors.
7. The Devereux Foundation trained Deanna Cardona and Brianna Cardona on how to work with these clients who display physically aggressive behaviors.
8. Devereux trained Deanna Cardona and Brianna Cardona on how to work with these clients who display socially inappropriate behaviors.

10.  Deanna Cardona and Brianna Cardona were employed by The Devereux Foundation at the time the incidents alleged in the complaint occurred.
11.  The Devereux Foundation had worker’s compensation insurance coverage at the time Deanna Cardona’s and Brianna Cardona’s alleged injuries.
12. Deanna Cardona’s and Brianna Cardona’s alleged injuries occurred while they were working or performing a task for or related to the work The Devereux Foundation hired them to do.
13. Deanna Cardona’s and Brianna Cardona’s work contributed to causing their alleged injuries.

14. Genaro Gamberdella, Sam Hertzler, and Courtney reside at The Devereux Foundation’s facility located at 4084 Foothill Road, Santa Barbara, California, and require these enhanced behavioral health services and levels of care.

Role of Pleadings

“The pleadings play a key role in a summary judgment motion.” (Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493 (Hutton).) “The materiality of a disputed fact is measured by the pleadings [citations], which ‘set the boundaries of the issues to be resolved at summary judgment.’ [Citations.]” (Conroy v. Regents of University of California (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1244, 1250.) “Accordingly, the burden of a Defendant moving for summary judgment only requires that he or she negate Plaintiff’s theories of liability as alleged in the complaint; that is, a moving party need not refute liability on some theoretical possibility not included in the pleadings. [Citations.]” (Hutton, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 493.)

As noted above, the two causes of action asserted against Devereux are: (1) Gross negligence in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, and (2) Premises liability.

No Duty to Guard Against Inherent Risks

Devereux’s first argument is that Plaintiffs assumed the risks inherent in their job because they were hired to work at Devereux’s Enhanced Behavioral Supports Home (EBSH) with EBSH clients, and that Plaintiffs were informed that they would work with clients who might display physically aggressive and socially inappropriate behaviors. Devereaux’s argument hinges on the characterization of the facts of Plaintiffs’ employment at the EBSH as a primary assumption of the risk, as opposed to secondary assumption of risk.

As established by UMF Nos. 4, 5, and 6, Plaintiffs were hired to work at Devereux’s EBSH with EBSH clients that might display physically aggressive behaviors or socially inappropriate behaviors.

Plaintiffs’ entire argument opposing Devereux’s assumption of risk argument is contained in the following two paragraphs:

“Defendant Devereux had prior knowledge of its clients aggressive social and sexual behavior and failed to notify the Plaintiffs upon hiring. Additionally, Devereux failed to provide a safe working environment and to exercise a state mandated duty to care. This is directly in contradiction to California Labor Code §§ 6400-6403: (a) Every employer shall furnish employment and a place of employment that is safe and healthful for the employees therein. Additionally, California Labor Code § 2800 and § 2802 indemnifies employees against all losses at work caused by the employer’s want of ordinary care. The statutory requirements for summary judgment under CA Code of Civil Procedure § 437(c) require a showing of 1) no triable issue of material fact and 2) moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The defense of ‘assumption of risk’ cannot apply to employees under CA Labor Law and does not qualify under CCP § 437(c). Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 25 Cal. 4th 826, 843 (2001).

“The new employee paperwork and job description submitted in support of the Defendant’s position that the Plaintiffs ‘assumed the risk’ of working in an environment characterized by physically and sexually aggressive clients is disingenuous and presented out of context. The MSJ’s statement of their sexual policy is the chief admission that raises the question of criminal culpability: “ ‘Devereux also informed Plaintiff that clients may exercise their right to express their sexuality “ ‘consistent with the philosophy of normalization,’ ” pursuant to Devereux’s Sexuality Procedures, which states Devereux recognizes this right and requires staff to assist and guide clients in understanding the purpose and limits of public social-sexual behavior. (DC_167; BC_008; BC_080.)’ ” (Opp., p. 6, ll. 8-27; underlining omitted.)

While Plaintiffs have presented almost no relevant authority that directly addresses Devereux’s assumption of the risk argument, the Court finds that Devereux has failed to meet its initial burden of establishing that there is no triable issue of material fact with respect to assumption of the risk.

One of the cases cited by Devereux, as support for its assumption of risk argument, is Gregory v. Cott (2014) 59 Cal.4th 996 (Gregory). The Gregory Court held: “It is a settled principle that those hired to manage a hazardous condition may not sue their clients for injuries caused by the very risks they were retained to confront.” (Id. at p. 1000.)

Devereux ignores the language in Gregory stating: “Our holding does not preclude liability in situations where caregivers are not warned of a known risk, where Defendants otherwise increase the level of risk beyond that inherent in providing care, or where the cause of injury is unrelated to the symptoms of the disease.” (Gregory, supra, at p. 1000.)

While certainly some of the behaviors by the patients, as alleged in the FAC, are behaviors that Plaintiffs would be expected to experience in their jobs, Devereux has not established that Plaintiffs assumed the specific risks alleged in the complaint, or that Plaintiffs were specifically warned of known risks, such as potential sexual assault.  Devereux has further failed to show that its policies did not increase the level of risk to Plaintiffs.

The motion will not be granted based on Devereux’s assumption of risk argument.

Workers’ Compensation Exclusive Remedy

Devereux next argues that Plaintiffs’ case is barred because the exclusive remedy for Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries is Workers’ Compensation.

“Ordinarily, where an injured employee brings an action for damages against his or her employer, the burden is on the employer to plead and prove, as an affirmative defense, that the employee has satisfied all conditions of entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits.” (Childers v. Shasta Livestock Auction Yard, Inc. (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 792, 811.)

By way of its answer to Plaintiffs’ complaint, Devereux has asserted, as affirmative defense No. 22, that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the exclusive remedy rule.

Labor Code section 3600 sets forth the factors that must be established to invoke the conditions of compensation under the Workers’ Compensation scheme. Labor Code section 3602 sets forth the conditions of an employer’s liability, including exceptions to the exclusive remedy rule.

It is established that Plaintiffs were working for Devereux at the time of their alleged injuries, and that they were functioning in the course and scope of their employment at the time of their injuries.

“An employer has the duty to provide its employees a safe place of employment. (§ 6400 et seq.) The workers’ compensation act (§ 3200 et seq.) compensates employees for injuries arising out of unsafe work place conditions, including enhanced compensation under section 4553 in cases involving serious and willful employer misconduct.” (Spratley v. Winchell Donut House, Inc. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1408, 1411–1412.)

Plaintiffs’ one paragraph opposition to Devereux’s exclusive remedy argument is:

“Defendant alleges Worker’s Compensation is the exclusive remedy. However, Plaintiff alleges that the triable issue arises from Defendant’s a) intentional misrepresentation of safety issues; b) failure to disclose known risks; c) failure to address multiple employee complaints of sexually and physically aggressive behavior by clients, and; d) workplace retaliation against reporting parties; and, any one of these issues related to exclusive remedy, if proven at trial, could satisfy the Worker’s Compensation Exclusion elements for civil liability. These attending facts constitute triable issues that must be resolved by a reasonable jury as the trier of fact. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant created the duty to protect when it enacted its dangerous protocols for “normalization” of inappropriate / unlawful sexual behavior against licensing standards and incorporating them into its training.” (Opp., p. 9, ll. 6-15.)

“To defeat a motion for summary judgment, a party cannot rely on legal conclusions or assertions of ultimate facts. [Citation.] Rather, the party must provide admissible evidence, for example, in the form of declarations that cite evidentiary facts. [Citation.]” (Knox v. Dean (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 417, 432.)

Plaintiffs provide no statutory, or other authority, supporting their opposition to application of the exclusive remedy rule. Likewise, they provide no admissible evidence of the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to an exception. While the argument appears to be that there is an exception, none of four things mentioned by Plaintiffs constitute valid exceptions to the exclusive remedy rule. The statutory exceptions are:

“(1) Where the employee’s injury or death is proximately caused by a willful physical assault by the employer.

“(2) Where the employee’s injury is aggravated by the employer’s fraudulent concealment of the existence of the injury and its connection with the employment, in which case the employer’s liability shall be limited to those damages proximately caused by the aggravation. The burden of proof respecting apportionment of damages between the injury and any subsequent aggravation thereof is upon the employer.

“(3) Where the employee’s injury or death is proximately caused by a defective product manufactured by the employer and sold, leased, or otherwise transferred for valuable consideration to an independent third person, and that product is thereafter provided for the employee’s use by a third person.” (Lab. Code, § 3602, subd. (b).)

Plaintiffs do not argue that any of the above exemptions apply, and none of them appear to be applicable to the facts as alleged by Plaintiffs. Likewise, Plaintiffs fail to provide any judicially recognized exceptions to the exclusive remedy rule.

Exceptions to the Workers’ Compensation exclusive remedy rule must be “narrowly construed.” (Soares v. City of Oakland (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1822, 1830.)

Devereux has met its burden of establishing a complete defense to Plaintiffs’ causes of action contained in the FAC. Plaintiffs have failed to show the existence of any triable issues of material fact related to the two causes of action asserted against Devereux.

The motion for summary judgment will be granted.

Plaintiffs’ Request to Continue the Hearing on the Motion

Plaintiffs request that in the event the Court is inclined to grant the motion for summary judgment, that the hearing on the motion be continued to allow for additional discovery.

“If it appears from the affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, or both, that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for reasons stated, be presented, the Court shall deny the motion, order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had, or make any other order as may be just.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (h).)

“The nonmoving party seeking a continuance “ ‘must show: (1) the facts to be obtained are essential to opposing the motion; (2) there is reason to believe such facts may exist; and (3) the reasons why additional time is needed to obtain these facts. [Citations.]’ ” [Citation.] The decision whether to grant such a continuance is within the discretion of the trial Court. [Citation.]” (Frazee v. Seely (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 627, 633.)

Plaintiffs have failed to show that any facts to be obtained are essential to opposing the motion, have failed to show there is reason to believe such facts exist, and have failed to provide any reasons why additional time is needed. Trial of this matter is scheduled to commence less than 30 days from the date of today’s hearing, on August 6, 2025. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2024.020, discovery is closed, and no party has filed a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 2024.050 to complete discovery closer to the trial date.

No continuance of the hearing will be ordered.