Deanna Cardona, et al. v. The Devereux Foundation, et al

Case Number

24CV03696

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 07/02/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Defendant Tri-Counties Association for the Developmentally Disabled’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiffs Deanna Cardona and Brianna Cardona: Gregory J. Ramirez, Law Office of Gregory J. Ramirez; Alexander Rosenberg, Rosenberg Law, P.C.

                                   

For Defendant The Devereux Foundation: Brett Schoel, Vanessa R. Cornejo, La Follette, Johnson, DeHaas, Fesler & Ames

                                   

For Tri-Counties Association for the Developmentally Disabled: Paul J. Bauer, Daniella M. Crisanti, Sagaser, Watkins & Wieland, PC

For Additional Parties: See List

RULING

Defendant Tri-Counties Association for the Developmentally Disabled’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

Background

On July 2, 2024, Plaintiffs Deanna Cardona (Deanna) and Brianna Cardona (Brianna) (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed their original complaint in this action against Defendants The Devereux Foundation (Devereux), Tri-Counties Community Housing Corporation (Tri-Counties CHC), Tri-Counties Association For The Developmentally Disabled, Inc. (TCADD), and additional Defendants, alleging four causes of action: (1) gross negligence; (2) premises liability; (3) sexual battery; and (4) sexual assault. (Note: To avoid confusion due to common surnames, the Court will refer to Plaintiffs by their first names. No disrespect is intended.)

Following the partial sustaining of a demurrer to the original complaint, on February 3, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the operative first amended complaint (FAC), setting forth the same four causes of action. As relevant to the present motion, only the first two causes of action are alleged as to TCADD.

As alleged in the SAC:

On April 7, 2022, Deanna began working for Devereux as a Direct Support Professional 2 for the Tularosa Home located in Lompoc and as a Registered Behavior Technician. (FAC, ¶ 19.) Prior to being trained at Tularosa Home, Deanna was required to complete approximately 40 hours of online training classes at home. (Id. at ¶ 21.) Deanna was also required to complete orientation, First Aid, and CPR training along with other mandatory classes she was required to attend in person. (Ibid.)

Around the end of May 2022, and the beginning of June 2022, Devereux started sending Deanna from Tularosa Home to the Foothill Home in Santa Barbara. (FAC, ¶ 23.) On June 12, 2022, Deanna was transferred to the Foothill Home permanently. (Id. at ¶ 24.)

While working at the Foothill Home, Deanna was exposed to Genaro, Courtney, and Sam who were “physically violent, sexually harassing, sexually assaulting, and sexually battering . . ..” (FAC, ¶ 25.) On October 8, 2022, Genaro physically assaulted, sexually assaulted, and sexually battered Deanna, causing Deanna to suffer serious injuries. (Id. at ¶¶ 28, 29.)

Brianna started working with “Defendants” in mid-July 2022, at the Foothill Home. (FAC, ¶ 30.) Brianna was also exposed to Genaro, Courtney, and Sam who were “physically violent, sexually harassing, sexually assaulting, and sexually battering . . ..” (Id. at ¶ 31.) Genaro would become violent towards Brianna. (Id. at ¶¶ 32, 33, 34.)

In August 2022, Deanna and Brianna advised Devereux, Tri-Counties CHC, and TCADD that their patients were becoming increasingly physically and sexually aggressive at the Foothill House, but their complaints were ignored. (FAC, ¶¶ 36, 37.)

Devereux, Tri-Counties CHC, and TCADD started alienating and retaliating against Deanna and Brianna after they reported the abuse to a supervisor. (FAC, ¶¶ 38, 39.) Plaintiffs were required to “maintain a code of silence” regarding the physical and sexual assaults. (Id. at ¶ 40.)

As relevant here, on March 5, 2025, TCADD filed its answer to Plaintiffs’ FAC, asserting a general denial and 35 affirmative defenses, including failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

TCADD now moves for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication.

Plaintiffs oppose the motion.

Analysis

Evidentiary Objections

“In granting or denying a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the Court need rule only on those objections to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion. Objections to evidence that are not ruled on for purposes of the motion shall be preserved for appellate review.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).)

“ ‘The same rules of evidence that apply at trial also apply to the declarations submitted in support of and in opposition to motions for summary judgment. Declarations must show the declarant’s personal knowledge and competency to testify, state facts and not just conclusions, and not include inadmissible hearsay or opinion.’ ” [Citation.] “ ‘The declarations in support of a motion for summary judgment should be strictly construed, while the opposing declarations should be liberally construed. [Citation.] This does not mean that Courts may relax the rules of evidence in determining the admissibility of an opposing declaration. Only admissible evidence is liberally construed in deciding whether there is a triable issue.’ ” [Citation.]” (Fernandez v. Alexander (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 770, 779.)

“To defeat a motion for summary judgment, a party cannot rely on legal conclusions or assertions of ultimate facts. [Citation.] Rather, the party must provide admissible evidence, for example, in the form of declarations that cite evidentiary facts.” (Knox v. Dean (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 417, 432.)

“Matters which would be excluded under the rules of evidence if proffered by a witness in a trial as hearsay, conclusions or impermissible opinions, must be disregarded in supporting affidavits.” (Hayman v. Block (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 629, 639.)

TCADD objects to 18 portions of the declaration of Deanna. The Court sustains objection Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 (only to the language: “owned, operated, maintained and managed by Defendant TCADD”), and 18. The other matters objected to by TCADD are not material to the disposition of the motion.

TCADD objects to 15 portions of the declaration of Brianna. The Court sustains objection Nos. 1, 12, and 15. The other matters objected to by TCADD are not material to the disposition of the motion.

Standard on Summary Judgment

A Defendant’s motion for summary judgment asks the Court to determine that the entire action has no merit, and to terminate the action without the necessity of a trial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a).) The procedure enables the Court to look behind the pleadings to determine whether the party against whom the motion is directed has evidence to back up the claims. The Court must determine from the evidence presented that there is no triable issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)

“[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) There is no obligation on the opposing party to establish anything by affidavit unless and until the moving party has by affidavit stated facts establishing every element necessary to sustain an adjudication in his favor. (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. Smilecare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.) “[W]e liberally construe Plaintiff’s evidentiary submissions and strictly scrutinize Defendant’s own evidence, in order to resolve any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in Plaintiff’s favor.” (Johnson v. American Standard, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 56, 64.)

“A Defendant … has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. Once the Defendant … has met that burden, the burden shifts to the Plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)

In resolving the motion, the Court may not weigh the evidence. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) Rather, the role of the trial Court in resolving a summary judgment motion is to determine whether issues of fact exist, not to decide the merits of the issues. (Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1107.) A triable issue of material fact exists only if the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) Any doubts as to the propriety of granting the motion should be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion. (Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn., supra at p. 1107.)

Separate Statement

“Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (b)(1), requires each motion for summary judgment to be accompanied by a separate statement “ ‘setting forth plainly and concisely all material facts that the moving party contends are undisputed. Each of the material facts stated shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence.’ ” California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d)(2)4 states: “ ‘The separate statement should include only material facts and not any facts that are not pertinent to the disposition of the motion.’ ” Under the Rules of Court, “ ‘ “Material facts’ “ are facts that relate to the cause of action, claim for damages, issue of duty, or affirmative defense that is the subject of the motion and that could make a difference in the disposition of the motion.’ ” (Rule 3.1350(a)(2).)” (Beltran v. Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 865, 874-875.)

“The point of the separate statement is not to craft a narrative, but to be a concise list of the material facts and the evidence that supports them. “ ‘The separate statement serves two important functions in a summary judgment proceeding: It notifies the parties which material facts are at issue, and it provides a convenient and expeditious vehicle permitting the trial Court to hone in on the truly disputed facts.’ ” [Citation.]” (Beltran v. Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc., supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at page 875.)

“The duty to comply with the law regarding separate statements applies to both sides of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication. The opposing party’s responses to the separate statement must be in good faith, responsive, and material. Responses should directly address the fact stated, and if that fact is not in dispute, the opposing party must so admit. It is completely unhelpful to evade the stated fact in an attempt to create a dispute where none exists.” (Beltran v. Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc., supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at page 875.)

“In opposing a Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the Plaintiff must submit a separate statement setting forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. [Citations,] Without a separate statement of undisputed facts with references to supporting evidence in the form of affidavits or declarations, it is impossible for the Plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of disputed facts.” (Lewis v. County of Sacramento (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 107, 116; disapproved on other grounds by Kaufman & Broad Communities, Inc. v. Performance Plastering, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 26, 41-42.)

Plaintiffs’ separate statement in opposition to the motion for summary judgment is not at all helpful, is not made in good faith, and almost entirely avoids responding directly to the fact being stated. Instead, Plaintiffs attempt to create triable issues where none exist.

Additionally:

“[T]he allegations in a complaint do not, at trial, constitute evidence of the truth of the allegations made therein [citation], and a party cannot rely on its own pleadings as evidence to support or oppose a summary judgment motion.” (Cassady v. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 220, 241; accord Bitner v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1067, fn. 5.)

Plaintiffs refer to their complaint as “evidence” in response to every fact that they dispute. This is improper and the complaint will not be considered evidence.

Likewise: “At the trial or any other hearing in the action, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, the propounding party or any party other than the responding party may use any answer or part of an answer to an interrogatory only against the responding party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.410; italics added; see also Bayramoglu v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 726, 740.)

As they did with their complaint, Plaintiffs also refer to their own discovery responses as “evidence” in each fact that they dispute. This is also improper, and the Plaintiffs’ own discovery responses will not be considered evidence when used by them.

As further noncompliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (b)(3), Plaintiffs fail to cite to any specific portions of their “supporting evidence.” Rather, they just refer to entire documents, collectively consisting of hundreds of pages, that they claim supports their statements.

As just one example of the impropriety of the separate statement in opposition, undisputed material fact (UMF) No. 1 states:

“Defendant is not a residential facility or vendor.

[Supporting Evidence:]

Declaration of Phil Stucky in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication (‘Stucky Decl.’), Exhibit ‘A.’ ”

In response to UMF No. 1, Plaintiffs state:

“Plaintiffs dispute this allegation. Plaintiffs allege that the TRICOUNTIES ASSOCIATION FOR THE DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED, INC. ("TCADD") is licensed as an Adult Residential Facility (‘ARF’) Enhanced Behavioral Support Home (EBSH’) with The Devereux Foundation as its ‘Agent’.

Supporting Evidence:

Plaintiffs Complaint; Declaration of Deanna Cardona Exhibit ‘A.’ Declaration of Deanna Cardona; Declaration of Brianna Cardona; Plaintiff Deanna Cardona’s Responses to Devereux Set 1 of Discovery; Plaintiff Brianna Cardona’s Responses

to Devereux Set 1 of Discovery; Plaintiffs’ complaint filed with Department of Social Services. Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s Department Report Number: 25-5402.”

While TCADD’s cited evidence provides admissible evidence that TCADD is not a residential facility or vendor, Plaintiffs provide no admissible evidence that the UMF is false. Thus, it is not reasonably disputed. Nearly all of the other UMFs follow the same pattern of Plaintiff failing to point to any admissible evidence in dispute of the stated fact and, in many instances, not directly addressing the stated UMF at all.

As TCADD has provided admissible evidence of the truth of each of their UMFs, and Plaintiffs have provided no admissible evidence in dispute, all of TCADD’s UMFs are effectively undisputed. Also, Plaintiffs did not provide any additional UMF’s of their own in attempting to establish the existence of a triable issue of material fact.

Those facts that are either undisputed or not reasonably disputed include:

1. TCADD is not a residential facility or vendor.
2. TCADD contracted services by vendor Devereux commencing July 1, 2021, through June 30, 2025.
3. Devereux then leased the property known as the “Foothill Home” located at 4084 Foothill Blvd., Santa Barbara from Tri-Counties CHC to provide services to TCADD’s customers.
4. TCADD does not own, possess, or control the Foothill Home property.
5. TCADD and Tri-Counties CHC are separate and distinct entities.
6. TCADD “is registered as a Defendant has its own legal structure, has its own separate bylaws, separate bank accounts, separate financial records, their own individual board of directors, and operate separately and independently from one another.”
7. None of TCADD’s officers, directors or managers are officers, directors or managers for Tri-Counties CHC.
8. Not only does TCADD not own or have control over the Foothill Home, TCADD also does not have control over which customers Devereux accepts for the Enhanced Behavioral Support Home (EBSH).
9. While TCADD can provide suggestions for facilities based on its assessment of a consumer, TCADD does not decide whether a consumer is accepted by or placed into a particular EBSH.
10.  Vendors such as Devereux do their own behavioral assessment on prospective consumers to determine whether the vendor is able to accommodate that consumer’s individual program plan (IPP) and what EBSH has the capability to do so.
11. TCADD has no control over which individuals Devereux hires, fires, reprimands nor does TCADD participate in those processes.
12.  No employee of TCADD exercised supervisory or managerial authority over Devereux employees, including Plaintiffs.
13.  Deanna began working for Devereux on or about April 7, 2022, as a direct support professional 2 and as a registered behavioral technician.
14. TCADD did not hire or refer Deanna to Devereux nor was TCADD consulted about hiring nor was its opinion sought.
15. Prior to being hired by Devereux, Deanna had experience working as a direct support professional 2 with adults with disabilities.
16.  During onboarding, Deanna received various documents outlining Devereux’s policies and procedures which included a document titled “Job Offer Important Points” that reiterated the expectations of Deanna during her employment with Devereux.
17. That document explicitly states: “As a Devereux DCP, you WILL be working with individuals with aggressive behaviors. You have been informed of this, and by accepting this job offer you have agreed to work with these individuals. [. . .]”.
18. Deanna signed that document on April 7, 2022, agreeing to its terms.
19. During Deanna’s employment with Devereux, she was required to complete approximately 40 hours of online training classes from home.
20. Deanna also had to complete orientation, First Aid, and CPR training along with other mandatory in-person classes such as Safety Techniques training which was completed on May 5, 2022.
21. In summer 2022, Deanna was reassigned to work at the Foothill Home.
22. Within the first 40 hours of starting at the Foothill Home, Deanna completed a 32-hour on-site staff mentored orientation which took place from July 7, 2022, through July 9, 2022, which went over, among other things, The Foothill Home’s specific policies, procedures, and safety.
23.  Deanna alleges in her FAC that during her time working at the Foothill Home she was subjected to consumers who were physically violent, sexually harassing, sexually assaulting, and sexually battering. [Note: Deanna specifically refers to Genaro, Courtney, and Sam in paragraph 25 of the FAC.]
24.  While working at the Foothill Home, Deanna never reported, in writing or verbally, any workplace issues to TCADD, including those now being alleged in the FAC.
25. Deanna ceased working at The Foothill Home on or about October 8, 2022.
26.  Brianna was hired by Devereux in mid-July of 2022, and she resigned in October 2022.
27.  TCADD did not hire or refer Brianna to Devereux nor was TCADD consulted about hiring nor was its opinion sought.
28.  As with Deanna, Brianna received and signed the document titled “Job Offer Important Points” that reiterated the expectations of Brianna during her employment with Devereux and provided notice that she would be working with an aggressive clientele.
29.  Brianna signed that document on June 20, 2022.
30.  Brianna received various training from Devereux including a Safety Training course that provided techniques for caregivers to use in the event a consumer gets violent.
31.  As with Deanna, upon starting at the Foothill Home, Brianna completed a 32-hour on-site staff mentored orientation which took place from August 18, 2022, through August 24, 2022, which went over, among other things, the Foothill Home’s specific policies, procedures, and safety.
32.  Brianna alleges in her FAC that during her time working at the Foothill Home she was subjected to consumers who were physically violent, sexually harassing, sexually assaulting, and sexually battering. [Note: Brianna specifically refers to Genaro, Courtney, and Sam in paragraph 25 of the FAC.]
33. While working at the Foothill Home, Brianna never reported, in writing or verbally, any workplace issues to TCADD, including those now being alleged in the FAC.
34. Brianna resigned from her employment at Devereux in October 2022.
35. Nowhere in Plaintiffs’ original complaint, or their FAC, do Plaintiffs allege that they filed an administrative complaint with the California Civil Rights Department (CRD) or that they obtained a right-to-sue letter by the CRD. [Note: By way of their separate statement in opposition, Plaintiffs claim that they acquitted a right-to-sue letter on August 22, 2023. However, they failed to specifically refer to or provide a document or any other proof that they obtained a right-to-sue letter as to TCADD.]
36. TCADD’s Public Records Act request to the CRD found that there no responsive documents.
37.  In this case, both Plaintiffs were employees of Devereux that provided services to consumers.
38.  Throughout their employment with Devereux, both during onboarding and upon starting at the Foothill Home, Plaintiffs received trainings and written notice as to inherent risks of their job.

Role of Pleadings

“The pleadings play a key role in a summary judgment motion.” (Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493 (Hutton).) “The materiality of a disputed fact is measured by the pleadings [citations], which ‘set the boundaries of the issues to be resolved at summary judgment.’ [Citations.]” (Conroy v. Regents of University of California (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1244, 1250.) “Accordingly, the burden of a Defendant moving for summary judgment only requires that he or she negate Plaintiff’s theories of liability as alleged in the complaint; that is, a moving party need not refute liability on some theoretical possibility not included in the pleadings. [Citations.]” (Hutton, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 493.)

As noted above, the two causes of action asserted against TCADD are: (1) Gross negligence in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, and (2) Premises liability.

First Cause of Action for Gross Negligence in Violation of FEHA

Important to the analysis of the present motion, TCADD is a “regional center” that operates pursuant to the Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Act (the Lanterman Act), codified at Welfare & Institutions Code section 4500, et seq., and Title 17 of the California Code of Regulations. Plaintiffs do not dispute this fact and, in fact, cite to the Lanterman Act in their opposition.

1. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

TCADD first argues that Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to bringing their first cause of action for gross negligence in violation of FEHA.

“[W]here an administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief must be sought from the administrative body and this remedy exhausted before the Courts will act.” (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, Third Dist. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 292.)

“An employee who wishes to file suit under the FEHA “ ‘must exhaust the administrative remedy provided by the statute by filing a complaint with the’ ” [Department of Fair Employment and Housing] DFEH, “ ‘and must obtain from the [DFEH] a notice of right to sue.’ ” [Citation.] “ ‘The timely filing of an administrative complaint’ ” before the DFEH “ ‘is a prerequisite to the bringing of a civil action for damages.’ ” [Citation.]” (Pollock v. Tri-Modal Distribution Services, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 918, 931.)

“Failure to exhaust an administrative remedy is a jurisdictional, not a procedural, defect. [citation] and dismissal is proper where the Court lacks jurisdiction.” (Wilkinson v. Norcal Mutual Ins. Co. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 307, 318.)

TCADD has met its initial burden of showing it has a complete defense to the first cause of action due to Plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust their administrative remedies. The burden now shifts to Plaintiff to show that there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether they have exhausted their administrative remedies.

In opposition, Plaintiffs fail to address this argument. While Plaintiffs state in their separate statement of UMFs that they did receive a right-to-sue letter on August 22, 2023, they have provided no proof. And though Plaintiffs failed to reference any specific evidence in support of their claim, the Court reviewed the several hundreds of pages of documents submitted by Plaintiff. The only right-to-sue letter contained in the exhibits is directed at Devereux. TCADD and Devereux are separate entities. (Rosenberg Decl., Exhs. C & F.)

Because TCADD met its initial burden of establishing a complete defense to the first cause of action, and Plaintiffs failed to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact, the first cause of action for gross negligence in violation of FEHA is barred.

Additionally, and in the alternative, the first cause of action is barred because TCADD did not owe Plaintiffs’ a legal duty as set forth below.

2. Lack of Legal Duty of Care

TCADD next argue that it did not owe Plaintiffs a legal duty of care.

In opposition, Plaintiffs rely on unsupported arguments that TCADD had oversight over Devereux and, as a result, owed a duty to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs, in fact, fashion their entire argument as if Devereux was TCADD’s agent. This argument ignores the facts that are established by the evidence presented.

“The Legislature has enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme known as the Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act (hereinafter the Lanterman Act or the Act) (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 4500-4846)2 to provide a “ ‘pattern of facilities and services . . . sufficiently complete to meet the needs of each person with developmental disabilities, regardless of age or degree of handicap, and at each stage of life.’ ” (§ 4501.) Such services include locating persons with developmental disabilities (§ 4641); assessing their needs (§§ 4642-4643); and, on an individual basis, selecting and providing services to meet such needs (§§ 4646-4647). The purpose of the statutory scheme is twofold: to prevent or minimize the institutionalization of developmentally disabled persons and their dislocation from family and community (§§ 4501, 4509, 4685), and to enable them to approximate the pattern of everyday living of nondisabled persons of the same age and to lead more independent and productive lives in the community (§§ 4501, 4750-4751).

“In the Lanterman Act “ ‘[t]he State of California accepts a responsibility for its developmentally disabled citizens and an obligation to them which it must discharge.’ ” (§ 4501.) In so doing, the Legislature has not only recognized that “ ‘[p]ersons with developmental disabilities have the same legal rights and responsibilities [as those] guaranteed all other individuals by the Federal Constitution and laws and the Constitution and laws of the State of California’ ” (§ 4502), but has also granted them certain statutory rights, including the right to treatment and habilitation services at state expense. (See §§ 4502, 4620, 4646-4648.)

“To implement this scheme of statutory rights of developmentally disabled persons and the corresponding obligations of the state toward them, the Legislature has fashioned a system in which both state agencies and private entities have functions. Broadly, DDS, a state agency, “ ‘has jurisdiction over the execution of the laws relating to the care, custody, and treatment of developmentally disabled persons’ ” (§ 4416), while “ ‘regional centers,’ ” operated by private nonprofit community agencies under contract with DDS, are charged with providing developmentally disabled persons with “ ‘access to the facilities and services best suited to them throughout their lifetime’ ” (§ 4620).” (Association for Retarded Citizens v. Department of Developmental Services (1985) 38 Cal.3d 384, 388–389.)

“[T]he responsibility of a regional center is to “ ‘secure,’ ” not provide, care. (§ 4648, subd. (a)(1).) To read the list of services a regional center may be required to secure for a developmentally disabled individual is to understand that a regional center could not possibly be expected to provide those services itself. Indeed, “ ‘[e]xcept in emergency situations, a regional center shall not provide direct treatment and therapeutic services, but shall utilize appropriate public and private community agencies and service providers to obtain those services for its consumers.’ ” (§ 4648, subd. (f).)” (Morohoshi v. Pacific Home (2004) 34 Cal.4th 482, 489.)

“A Plaintiff can prevail on a negligence claim only if he establishes, as a “ ‘threshold matter,’ ” that the particular Defendant he is suing owes him a “ ‘legal duty of care.’ ” (Shalghoun v. North Los Angeles County Regional Center, Inc. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 929, 943 (Shalghoun).)

“Does a regional center have a special relationship with the consumers it serves that gives rise to a legal duty of care owed by the center to the employees of residential facilities that house the consumers when the center does not immediately relocate a consumer after the facility has so requested?

“We conclude that the answer is “ ‘no,’ ” . . .. (Shalghoun, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at pages 947–948.)

In Shalghoun, the Court found that the regional center (sitting in the same position as TCADD here) had no duty because: (1) The regional center lacked the ability, and hence the duty, to control the consumer, (2) Even if the regional center had the ability, and thus a duty, to control a consumer, any such duty would be to protect the consumer and not to protect a third party, including an employee of a facility such as Plaintiffs in this case, and (3) Even if the regional center had a duty to control the consumer that triggered a legal duty to protect others, public policy disfavors the recognition of liability for breach of that duty.

Based on Shalghoun, it is clear that TCADD owed no duty to Plaintiffs. The first cause of action also fails for this reason.

Because the first cause of action fails based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies and lack of duty, the Court need not address TCADD’s primary assumption of risk argument.

            Second Cause of Action for Premises Liability

“The elements of a premises liability claim such as the one at issue in these proceedings are: a legal duty of care; breach of that duty; and proximate cause resulting in injury.” (Moses v. Roger-McKeever (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 172, 177-178.)

“[T]he duty to take affirmative action for the protection of individuals coming upon the land is grounded in the possession of the premises and the attendant right to control and manage the premises.” (Sprecher v. Adamson Companies (1981) 30 Cal.3d 358, 368.)

The UMFs establish that TCADD did not own, possess, or control the Foothill Home property. TCADD therefore had no duty related to the property. Plaintiffs fail to address this argument or to present admissible evidence that shows a triable issue of material fact related to premises liability. The second cause of action fails for this reason.

            Plaintiffs’ Request to Continue the Hearing on the Motion

Plaintiffs request that in the event the Court is inclined to grant the motion for summary judgment, the hearing on the motion be continued to allow for additional discovery.

“If it appears from the affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, or both, that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for reasons stated, be presented, the Court shall deny the motion, order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had, or make any other order as may be just.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (h).)

“The nonmoving party seeking a continuance “ ‘must show: (1) the facts to be obtained are essential to opposing the motion; (2) there is reason to believe such facts may exist; and (3) the reasons why additional time is needed to obtain these facts. [Citations.]’ ” [Citation.] The decision whether to grant such a continuance is within the discretion of the trial Court. [Citation.]” (Frazee v. Seely (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 627, 633.)

Plaintiffs’ argument is: “Discovery is continuing to assess the findings of fact with the multiple criminal and licensing agencies investigating these serious allegations.” Plaintiffs fail to state what these investigations have to do with the liability of TCADD, fail to state how the results of any investigations are essential to opposing the motion for summary judgment, and fail to provide the Court with any sound reason to continue the hearing. Further, as trial is scheduled to begin in just over one month, discovery will soon be closed. TCADD owed no duty to Plaintiffs. No continuance of the hearing will be ordered.

The motion for summary judgment will be granted.