Marie Iribarren vs Alejandra Diaz Perez et al

Case Number

24CV03336

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 10/20/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion: Contest Good Faith Settlement re TO CONTEST DEFENDANTS ALEJANDRA DIAZ PEREZ and HELIODORO PEREZ'S APPLICATION FOR DETERMINATION OF GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT

Tentative Ruling

Marie Iribarren v. Alejandra Diaz Perez, et al.

Case No. 24CV03336  

           

Hearing Date: October 20, 2025                                             

HEARING:              Motion of Defendant, Cross-Complainant, and Cross-Defendant Walgreen Co. to Contest Alejandra Diaz Perez and Heliodoro Perez’s Application for Determination of Good Faith Settlement

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiff Marie Iribarren: Ryan D. Bright, Aaron M. Lavine

                        For Defendants and Cross-Defendants Alejandra Diaz Perez and Heliodoro Perez: Thomas J. Murray

                        For Defendant, Cross-Complainant, and Cross-Defendant Walgreen Co.: Jeffrey S. Behar, Alyssa G. Guzman, and Mark P. LaScola

                        For Defendant and Cross-Complainant Lorene Franceschi as trustee of the Franceschi 1983 Revocable Trust: Michael N. Schonbuch

                       

TENTATIVE RULING:

The motion challenging determination of good faith settlement is denied. The application of Alejandra Diaz Perez and Heliodoro Perez for determination of good faith settlement is granted.

Background:

This action commenced on June 13, 2024, by the filing of the complaint by plaintiff Marie Iribarren (“plaintiff”) against Alejandra Diaz Perez (“Diaz Perez”), Heliodoro Perez (“Perez”) (collectively the “Perezes”), Lorene Franceschi as trustee of the Franceschi 1983 revocable trust (“Franceschi”), Walgreen Co. (“Walgreen”), and Walgreen National Corporation for: negligence as to the Perezes, and premises liability as to the remaining defendants.

As alleged in the complaint:

This action arises out of a motor vehicle versus pedestrian collision that occurred on June 30, 2022, in the parking lot of Walgreens located at 5900 Calle Real, Goleta. (Compl., ¶ 12.) Plaintiff, who was 87 years old, was lawfully on the subject property, walking across the parking lot to her son’s vehicle, when she was struck by a vehicle being driven by Diaz Perez and owned by Perez. (Compl., ¶¶ 14, 15, 18, 27.)

The premises liability defendants owned, controlled, operated, managed, leased or rented, supervised, constructed, designed, modified, or maintained the subject property. (Compl., ¶ 17.) The parking lot was dangerous, unsafe, negligently designed, and defectively designed such that it created distractions for drivers who were forced to recognize and react to numerous simultaneous potential hazards and impediments to safe driving. (Compl., ¶¶ 19, 20.) The defective parking lot design caused Diaz Perez, who was herself negligent, to be unable to safely operate her vehicle in the subject parking lot. (Compl., ¶ 22.)

On July 2, 2024, Walgreen answered the complaint with a general denial and 13 affirmative defenses.

Also on July 2, 2024, Walgreen filed its cross-complaint for indemnity, equitable contribution, and declaratory relief against the Perezes.

On August 8, 2024, the Perezes answered plaintiff’s complaint with a general denial and 10 affirmative defenses.

On August 19, 2024, Franceschi answered plaintiff’s complaint with a general denial and 22 affirmative defenses.

Also on August 19, 2024, Franceschi filed her cross-complaint against the Perezes and Walgreen.

On August 26, 2024, Walgreen filed its answer to Franceschi’s cross-complaint.

On September 19, 2024, the Perezes filed their answer to Franceschi’s cross-complaint.

On October 22, 2024, the Perezes filed their answer to Walgreen’s cross-complaint.

On July 21, 2025, the Perezes filed a notice and application for determination of good faith settlement with plaintiff, representing that they had settled for their automobile liability limits of $100,000.00

On July 24, 2025, Walgreen filed the present notice of motion and motion to contest the Perezes’ application for determination of good faith settlement.

The Perezes oppose the motion contesting their application for determination of good faith settlement and request that their application be approved.

Analysis:

“Any party to an action in which it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors or co-obligors . . . shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of a settlement entered into by the plaintiff or other claimant and one or more alleged tortfeasors or co-obligors . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (a)(1),)

Code of Civil Procedure section 877 provides:

“Where a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith before verdict or judgment to one or more of a number of tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the same tort, or to one or more other co-obligors mutually subject to contribution rights, it shall have the following effect:

“(a) It shall not discharge any other such party from liability unless its terms so provide, but it shall reduce the claims against the others in the amount stipulated by the release, the dismissal or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater.

“(b) It shall discharge the party to whom it is given from all liability for any contribution to any other parties.

“(c) This section shall not apply to co-obligors who have expressly agreed in writing to an apportionment of liability for losses or claims among themselves.

“(d) This section shall not apply to a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment given to a co-obligor on an alleged contract debt where the contract was made prior to January 1, 1988.”

“When confronted with motions for good faith settlements, judges should . . . not yearn for the unreal goal of mathematical certainty. Because the application of section 877.6 requires an educated guess as to what may occur should the case go to trial, all that can be expected is an estimate, not a definitive conclusion.” (North County Contractor’s Assn. v. Touchstone Ins. Services (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1090.) “ ‘[A] “good faith” settlement does not call for perfect or even nearly perfect apportionment of liability.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

“[T]he intent and policies underlying section 877.6 require that a number of factors be taken into account including a rough approximation of plaintiffs’ total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability, the amount paid in settlement, the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs, and a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial. Other relevant considerations include the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants, as well as the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants. [Citation.] Finally, practical considerations obviously require that the evaluation be made on the basis of information available at the time of settlement. ‘[A] defendant’s settlement figure must not be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate the settling defendant’s liability to be.’ [Citation.] The party asserting the lack of good faith, who has the burden of proof on that issue (§ 877.6, subd. (d)), should be permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that the settlement is so far ‘out of the ballpark’ in relation to these factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the statute.” (Tech-Bilt v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499-500 (Tech-Bilt).)

Walgreen includes the declaration of counsel, Mark P. LaScola, in support of its motion. “We recognize that it is very common for [attorneys] to include argument in their declarations (we know it is done all the time, and we do not want to single out the trial lawyers in this regard), but it is a sloppy practice which should stop. Even at its most benign, it is a practice that forces the trial and appellate courts, and opposing counsel, to sort out the facts that are actually supported by oath from material that is nothing more than the statement of an opinion ostensibly under oath. More fundamentally, however, it makes a mockery of the requirement that declarations be supported by statements made under penalty of perjury. The proper place for argument is in points and authorities, not declarations.” (In re Marriage of Heggie (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 28, 30 fn. 3.) LaScola’s declaration is almost entirely argument and matter of which he would have no possible personal knowledge, such as how the accident occurred, the extent of plaintiff’s injuries, and other things that have no value to Walgreen’s motion.

By way of the motion itself, Walgreen makes the incomplete, and misleading, argument that: “Where non-settling parties contest good faith, the moving party must make a sufficient showing that all the factors set forth in Tech-Bilt have been satisfied. (City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1261-1262.)” (Motion, p. 1, ll. 18-20.) By not quoting the actual language, Walgreens attempts to mislead the court regarding the standard of proof. What the case actually states, at the cited pages, is: “If the good faith settlement is contested, section 877.6, subdivision (d), sets forth a workable ground rule for the hearing by placing the burden of proving the lack of good faith on the contesting party. Once there is a showing made by the settlor of the settlement, the burden of proof on the issue of good faith shifts to the nonsettlor who asserts that the settlement was not made in good faith. [Citations.] If contested, declarations by the nonsettlor should be filed which in many cases could require the moving party to file responsive counterdeclarations to negate the lack of good faith asserted by the nonsettling contesting party.” (Italics added.) In short, it is Walgreen’s burden to prove the lack of good faith on the settling party.

In opposition to Walgreen’s motion contesting the settlement, the Perezes provide the declaration of their counsel, Thomas J. Murray, who declares the following:

“Defendants ALEJANDRA DIAZ PEREZ and HELIODORO PEREZ reached a settlement with Plaintiff MARIE IRIBARREN, in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Dollars and No Cents ($100,000.00) for the final resolution of any and all claims, including all causes of action alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint against Defendants ALEJANDRA DIAZ PEREZ and HELIODORO PEREZ arising from the motor vehicle and pedestrian collision that occurred on June 30, 2022 in the parking lot of the Walgreens retail store located at 5900 Calle Real, Goleta, California 93117.” (Murray Decl., ¶ 2.)

“This was a disputed liability accident, with numerous allegations of Plaintiff’s Complaint emphasizing the negligent design of Walgreens’ parking lot. There were issues as to the Plaintiff’s comparative fault, whether the defendant driver was negligent and whether the parking lot design issues were primarily to blame for the accident.” (Murray Decl., ¶ 3.)

“Defendants ALEJANDRA DIAZ PEREZ and HELIODORO PEREZ maintain that they bear no lability for the indemnity and contribution claims of cross- complainants WALGREEN CO. and LORENE FRANCESCHI. But, in the interest of settling and avoiding the continuing expenses of discovery and preparation for trial, Defendants have agreed to settle directly with Plaintiff for the sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS ($100,000), which is the bodily injury liability limit for the GEICO policy applicable to the incident which is the subject of this case.” (Murray Decl., ¶ 4.)

“The settlement of $100,000 represents the bodily injury liability limit for the GEICO policy applicable to the incident which is the subject of this case. The settlement offer and the agreed upon terms of the settlement were the product of considerable evaluation and communications between the settling parties. Specifically, based on the discovery responses, most of Plaintiff’s allegations and claims were rooted in Walgreens’ negligent design of the parking lot. As such, we pushed for our client’s early deposition and dismissal. Following numerous discussions with Plaintiff’s counsel, they agreed to accept our tender of the policy limits contingent upon a good faith settlement due to the outstanding cross-complaints against our client.” (Murray Decl., ¶ 5, emphasis omitted.)

The court has reviewed the complaint in this matter, the cross-complaints, the argument of counsel, and the evidence submitted in support of and in opposition to Walgreen’s motion. The court has considered all the Tech-Bilt factors and is satisfied that the settlement is within the reasonable range and that the settlement is in good faith. Walgreen has failed to meet its burden of proving that the settlement is so far ‘out of the ballpark’ in relation to these factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the statute.

Walgreens motion to contest the Perezes’ application for good faith settlement will be denied and the Perezes’ application for determination of good faith settlement will be granted.

The purpose of a motion for determination of good faith settlement is to discharge the party to whom it is given from all liability for any contribution to any other parties.

“A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (c).)