Ingrid Kristine Warren, et al. v. General Motors, LLC

Case Number

24CV03289

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 07/14/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Defendant General Motors, LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication

Tentative Ruling

Ingrid Kristine Warren, et al. v. General Motors, LLC 

Case No. 24CV03289

           

Hearing Date: July 14, 2025                                                   

HEARING:              Defendant General Motors, LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiffs Ingrid Kristine Warren and Richard Willis Warren: Kevin Y. Jacobson, Siyun Yang, Long Cao, Quill & Arrow, LLP

                                    For Defendant General Motors, LLC: Mary Arens McBride, Cameron Major, Austin Abernathy, Erskine Law, APC 

                                   

TENTATIVE RULING:

For the reasons set forth herein, defendant General Motors, LLC’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

Background:

This action commenced on June 12, 2024, by the filing of the complaint by plaintiffs Ingrid Kristine Warren and Richard Willis Warren ( collectively “plaintiffs”) against defendant General Motors, LLP (“defendant”) for: (1) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranty; (2) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Implied Warranty; and (3) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act Section 1793.2.

By way of the complaint, plaintiffs allege that they purchased a 2022 GMC Sierra, that was covered by warranties, on September 20, 2023. (Compl., ¶¶ 8, 9.) The Sierra was delivered to plaintiffs with defects and nonconformities including defects to the engine, electrical, and emission systems. (Compl., ¶ 10.)

On November 14, 2023, plaintiffs first presented the vehicle for repairs and reported the “SD Card Removed” message appearing on the infotainment unit, as well as the check engine and tire pressure monitoring lights being illuminated. (Compl., ¶ 11.) Plaintiff presented the vehicle again, on two separate dates, for the same recurring issues and the additional issue of the vehicle vibrating upon acceleration. (Compl., ¶¶ 12-13.)

Defendant was unable to conform the Sierra to the warranty after a reasonable number of attempts and failed to either promptly replace the Sierra or make restitution in accordance with the Song-Beverly Act. (Compl., ¶¶ 27-28.)

On July 15, 2024, defendant answered the complaint with a general denial and 24 affirmative defenses.

Defendant now moves for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication.

Plaintiffs oppose the motion.

Analysis:

                      Standard on Summary Judgment

A defendant’s motion for summary judgment asks the court to determine that the entire action has no merit, and to terminate the action without the necessity of a trial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a).) The procedure enables the court to look behind the pleadings to determine whether the party against whom the motion is directed has evidence to back up the claims. The court must determine from the evidence presented that there is no triable issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)

“[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) There is no obligation on the opposing party to establish anything by affidavit unless and until the moving party has by affidavit stated facts establishing every element necessary to sustain an adjudication in his favor. (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. Smilecare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.) “[W]e liberally construe plaintiff’s evidentiary submissions and strictly scrutinize defendant’s own evidence, in order to resolve any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in plaintiff’s favor.” (Johnson v. American Standard, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 56, 64.)

“A defendant . . . has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)

In resolving the motion, the court may not weigh the evidence. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) Rather, the role of the trial court in resolving a summary judgment motion is to determine whether issues of fact exist, not to decide the merits of the issues. (Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1107.) A triable issue of material fact exists only if the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.)

            Separate Statement

“Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (b)(1), requires each motion for summary judgment to be accompanied by a separate statement “ ‘setting forth plainly and concisely all material facts that the moving party contends are undisputed. Each of the material facts stated shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence.’ ” California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d)(2)4 states: “ ‘The separate statement should include only material facts and not any facts that are not pertinent to the disposition of the motion.’ ” Under the Rules of Court, “ ‘ “Material facts’ “ are facts that relate to the cause of action, claim for damages, issue of duty, or affirmative defense that is the subject of the motion and that could make a difference in the disposition of the motion.’ ” (Rule 3.1350(a)(2).)” (Beltran v. Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 865, 874-875.)

“The point of the separate statement is not to craft a narrative, but to be a concise list of the material facts and the evidence that supports them. “ ‘The separate statement serves two important functions in a summary judgment proceeding: It notifies the parties which material facts are at issue, and it provides a convenient and expeditious vehicle permitting the trial court to hone in on the truly disputed facts.’ ” [Citation.]” (Beltran v. Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc., supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at page 875.)

“The duty to comply with the law regarding separate statements applies to both sides of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication. The opposing party’s responses to the separate statement must be in good faith, responsive, and material. Responses should directly address the fact stated, and if that fact is not in dispute, the opposing party must so admit. It is completely unhelpful to evade the stated fact in an attempt to create a dispute where none exists.” (Beltran v. Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc., supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at page 875.)

“In opposing a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must submit a separate statement setting forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. [Citations,] Without a separate statement of undisputed facts with references to supporting evidence in the form of affidavits or declarations, it is impossible for the plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of disputed facts.” (Lewis v. County of Sacramento (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 107, 116; disapproved on other grounds by Kaufman & Broad Communities, Inc. v. Performance Plastering, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 26, 41-42.)

Defendant has submitted a separate statement of undisputed material facts (SSUMF) setting forth eight facts it contends are undisputed (UMFs). In opposition, plaintiffs filed their separate statement (PSS) admitting five of defendant’s UMFs, disputing one UMF, and failing to either admit or dispute two of defendant’s UMFs. Plaintiffs also provide an additional two UMFs.

The facts that plaintiffs admit are undisputed are:

The vehicle at issue is a model year 2022 GMC Sierra 1500, VIN 1GT49REY6NF255119, which Plaintiffs Ingrid Kristine Warren and Richard Willis Warren bought on September 20, 2023. (UMF No. 1.)

Plaintiffs did not buy the Sierra new; plaintiffs bought it used, with 33,619 miles, from Lexus of Santa Barbara. (UMF No. 2.)

Plaintiffs were not the Sierra’s original owners. (UMF No. 4.)

Moore GMC delivered the Sierra to its original owner on June 30, 2022, with 11 miles on the Sierra’s odometer. (UMF No. 5.)

In connection with the delivery of the Sierra to its original owner, defendant issued a new vehicle limited warranty with bumper-to-bumper coverage for the earlier of 36 months or 36,000 miles and powertrain coverage for the earlier of 60 months or 100,000 miles. (UMF No. 6.)

Plaintiffs claim that UMF No. 3 is disputed. That UMF is: “GM was not a party to the transaction, and Lexus of Santa Barbara is not a GM-authorized dealer.” Plaintiffs do not address the fact as stated. Rather, plaintiffs state: “Defendant benefits from used vehicle sales.” Plaintiff’s statement does not negate the UMF, nor does any evidence before the court negate the UMF as stated by defendant. As such, the UMF is not reasonably disputed.

Plaintiffs fail to provide any response to UMFs Nos. 7 and 8. UMF No. 7 states: “The Warranty’s coverages began when Moore GMC delivered the Sierra to its original owner(s) on June 30, 2022.” UMF No. 8 states: “Importantly, GM did not issue or provide any new or additional warranty coverage to Plaintiffs or the vehicle when Plaintiffs bought the Sierra used on September 20, 2023; Plaintiffs received only the balance of coverage under the Warranty that GM issued back in June 2022.” Because defendant has provided supporting evidence for UMFs Nos. 7 and 8, and because plaintiffs have failed to provide anything to disprove the stated facts, the UMFs will be considered undisputed.

Plaintiff’s two additional facts, in its PSS, are: “Defendant was in the sale of used vehicles and benefited from the sale of used vehicles,” and “Defendant sold and has been selling new and used vehicles manufactured by itself; as of fiscal year 2020, Defendant had been benefiting from used vehicle sale.”

Notably, plaintiff’s additional UMFs say nothing about the specific vehicle that is the subject of this action.

            First and Third Causes of Action

As noted above, the first cause of action is for Violation of the Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranty, and the third cause of action is for Violation of the Song-Beverly Act Section 1793.2.

Defendant argues that pursuant to the California Supreme Court holding in Rodriguez v. FCA US LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 189 (Rodriguez), plaintiffs are precluded from pursuing a breach of express warranty claim against defendant, as the manufacturer of the Sierra, because the Song-Beverly’s express warranty provisions only apply to “new motor vehicles.” Rodriguez is on point.

“[Civil Code] Section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2) gives new car buyers what is known as a refund-or-replace remedy: It requires manufacturers to “ ‘promptly replace’ ” a defective new motor vehicle or “ ‘promptly make restitution’ ” to the buyer when the manufacturer is “ ‘unable to service or repair a new motor vehicle, as that term is defined in paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 1793.22, to conform to the applicable express warranties after a reasonable number of attempts.’ ” . . . [Citation.] (Rodriguez, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 195.)

“Section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2) defines “ ‘new motor vehicle’ ” to include a new vehicle “ ‘bought or used primarily for personal’ ” purposes as well as “ ‘a dealer-owned vehicle and a ‘ “demonstrator” ’ or other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty.’ ” (Rodriguez, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 195.)

 The Rodriguez court ultimately held:

“[A] motor vehicle purchased with an unexpired manufacturer’s new car warranty does not qualify as a “ ‘motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty’ ” under section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2) ’s definition of “ ‘new motor vehicle’ ” unless the new car warranty was issued with the sale.” (Rodriguez, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 196.)

The UMFs establish that plaintiffs purchased the Sierra used from a dealership that was not a GM authorized dealership, and that defendant did not issue or provide any new or additional warranty coverage to plaintiffs or the vehicle when plaintiffs purchased the Sierra. Based on this, barring any additional facts that would impose liability, the holding in Rodriguez makes clear that the Sierra is not considered  a “new vehicle” under the Song-Beverly Act, and the defendant manufacturer of the Sierra is not subject to express warranty liability under the Song-Beverly Act.

Plaintiffs’ opposition argues that the questions is not whether defendant issued any new or additional warranty coverage at the time of plaintiffs’ purchase of the Sierra, rather, plaintiffs argue that there is a “high likelihood that Defendant played a substantial role of retail sale of the Subject Vehicle to original owner, as a new vehicle, and to Plaintiff[s], as a used vehicle.” This, plaintiffs argue, would subject defendant for liability as a distributor of the Sierra.

There in no evidence at all that defendant distributed the Sierra or played any role in the sale of the Sierra to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ argument is pure speculation, unsupported by any admissible evidence. The evidence, in fact, shows the opposite. UMFs Nos. 2, 3, and 8 are evidence that defendant was not involved in the distribution of the Sierra to plaintiffs and did not play any role in the sale of the Sierra to plaintiffs. The approximately 165 pages of documents submitted by plaintiffs do not in any way negate defendant’s UMFs or have a tendency to support plaintiffs’ argument.

“ ‘ “Speculation [ . . . ] is not evidence’ ” that can be utilized in opposing a motion for summary judgment. [Citations.]” (Knapp v. Doherty (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 76, 99.)

Defendant has shown that plaintiffs cannot establish required elements of their express warranty claims, and plaintiffs have failed to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact.

            Second Cause of Action

As noted above, the second cause of action is for Violation of the Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Implied Warranty.

“[I]n the sale of used consumer goods, liability for breach of implied warranty lies with distributors and retailers, not the manufacturer, where there is no evidence the manufacturer played any role in the sale of the used car to plaintiff.” (Nunez v. FCA US LLC (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 385, 398 (Nunez).)

“[O]nly distributors or sellers of used goods - not manufacturers of new goods - have implied warranty obligations in the sale of used goods. (See § 1795.5.) As one court has put it, the Song-Beverly Act provides similar remedies (to those available when a manufacturer sells new consumer goods) “ ‘in the context of the sale of used goods, except that the manufacturer is generally off the hook.’ ” (Nunez, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 399.)

Plaintiffs rely on the same argument as they did in opposition to the motion with regard to the first and third causes of action: Namely that defendant played a substantial role in used vehicle sales. The argument fails for the same reason discussed above.

Defendant has shown that plaintiffs cannot establish required elements of their implied warranty claims, and plaintiffs have failed to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact.

            Plaintiff’s Request that the Hearing on the Motion be Continued

“If it appears from the affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, or both, that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for reasons stated, be presented, the court shall deny the motion, order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had, or make any other order as may be just.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (h).)

“The nonmoving party seeking a continuance “ ‘must show: (1) the facts to be obtained are essential to opposing the motion; (2) there is reason to believe such facts may exist; and (3) the reasons why additional time is needed to obtain these facts. [Citations.]’ ” [Citation.] The decision whether to grant such a continuance is within the discretion of the trial court. [Citation.]” (Frazee v. Seely (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 627, 633.)

Plaintiffs have failed to show that any facts to be obtained are essential to opposing the motion, have failed to show there is reason to believe such facts exist, and have failed to provide any reasons why additional time is needed. Trial of this matter is scheduled to commence on August 25, 2025. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2024.020, discovery will be closed on July 28, 2025. Although plaintiffs claim that they intend to depose defendant’s person most knowledgeable, they have provided no evidence that they have even attempted to notice the deposition. At this point, there would be insufficient time for plaintiff to do so, and no party has filed a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 2024.050 to complete discovery closer to the trial date. No continuance of the hearing will be ordered.

Defendants motion for summary judgment will be granted.