Jennifer Renga vs John Lawrence Freeman

Case Number

24CV03179

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 02/28/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion for Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling

For all reasons discussed herein, the motion of defendant for summary judgment is denied.

Background:

The first amended complaint (FAC) filed in this action by plaintiff Jennifer Renga (Renga) on August 8, 2024, is the operative pleading. In the FAC, Renga alleges twelve causes of action against defendant John Lawrence Freeman (Freeman): (1) retaliation in violation of Government Code section 12900 (the California Fair Employment and Housing Act or FEHA) (2) retaliation in violation of California state law (Civil Code section 1942.5); (3) breach of contract; (4) breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (5) breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment; (6) failure to use reasonable care to protect tenants in violation of California state law (Civil Code section 1714); (7) trespassing in violation of Civil Code section 1954; (8) nuisance; (9) negligence; (10) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (11) constructive eviction; and (12) violation of Civil Code section 52.1 (the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act).

As alleged in the FAC:

On August 18, 2022, pursuant to a rental agreement between the parties, Renga entered into possession of premises located at 1711 Grand Avenue in Santa Barbara, California (the premises) which is owned, maintained, operated, and managed by Freeman. (FAC, ¶¶ 10-11, 14 & 16.)

On March 25, 2023, Renga fell down a stairway within the premises, causing Renga to sustain severe injuries and be hospitalized for over a month. (FAC, ¶ 19.) Renga initiated a claim against Freeman’s homeowner’s insurance policy for damages related to the injuries she sustained from the fall (the Claim). (Id. at ¶¶ 19 & 31.) On March 19, 2024, Renga signed a release prepared by Freeman’s insurance carrier, State Farm, regarding the Claim. (Id. at ¶¶ 46-48.)

Beginning in December 2023, after receiving notice of the Claim, Freeman and his girlfriend, Tina, began sending messages to Renga urging Renga not to pursue her legal rights with respect to the Claim, and threatening to evict Renga, to take away Renga’s “section 8”, to tell the housing authority that Renga has a problem with substance abuse, and to turn off Renga’s hot water and electricity, among other things. (FAC, ¶¶ 22-26, 30-33, 36, 39.) Freeman also demanded that Renga vacate the premises and presented Renga with non-compliant termination notices and notices to quit the premises. (Id. at ¶¶ 30, 32, & 36.)

Tina admitted to slashing a tire on Renga’s car. (FAC, ¶ 27.) On two occasions, Freeman entered the premises without prior warning or Renga’s permission, yelling at Renga and calling her a “cunt”, among other things. (Id. at ¶¶ 35-36.) Freeman also blocked Renga’s access to her parking space, preventing her from leaving the premises. (Id. at ¶ 37.)

Though Renga complained about and asked Freeman to cease Freeman’s conduct, Freeman ignored Renga’s requests. (FAC, ¶ 41 & 43.) As a result of Freeman’s conduct, Renga experienced, among other things, symptoms of “PTSD”, had difficulty eating and sleeping, and lived in constant fear. (Id. at ¶¶ 28, 38, 42.) Renga was forced to move out of the premises on February 29, 2024. (Id. at ¶ 45.)

Freeman answered the FAC on September 9, 2024, generally denying its allegations and asserting forty-four affirmative defenses.

On November 4, 2024, Freeman filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Renga signed a release of the claims and causes of action alleged in the FAC. The motion is opposed by Renga.

The parties do not dispute or reasonably dispute that on March 25, 2023, Renga fell at the premises and sustained personal injuries. (Plaintiff’s Response To Defendant’s Separate Statement or “Resp. Sep. Stmt.”, UMF No. 1 & evidence cited therein.) On March 19, 2024, Plaintiff signed a document entitled a “Release” (the Release). (Id. at UMF No. 2 & evidence cited therein.) (Note: The copy of the Release submitted in support of the motion as exhibit A shows that Renga signed the Release on March 19, 2024, and not March 29 as stated in paragraph 2 of the supporting separate statement.) At the time Renga signed the Release, she was represented by attorney Anthony Kastenek (Kastenek), whose signature also appears on the Release. (Id. at UMF Nos. 3-4 & evidence cited therein.)

The Release states that Renga “forever release and discharge [sic] … Freeman, from any and all claims, demands, damages, actions, causes of action or suits of any kind or nature whatsoever, and particularly on account of all injuries known and unknown, which have resulted or may in the future develop from an incident on or about the 25th day of March 2023, at or near [the premises].” (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 10 & evidence cited therein [not reasonably disputed on this point].) The Release further states that Renga “expressly and intentionally waives all rights and benefits which the undersigned now has or in the future may have under the terms of Section 1542 of the Civil Code[.]” (Id. at UMF No. 12 & evidence cited therein.)

Renga declares in the Release that “the terms of this settlement have been completely read and are fully understood and voluntarily accepted for the purpose of making a full and final compromise adjustment and settlement of any and all claims, disputed or otherwise, known or unknown, on account of the injuries and damages above mentioned, and for the express purpose of precluding forever any further or additional claims arising out of the incident described above.” (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 11 & evidence cited therein.)

Analysis:

A motion for summary judgment “shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (c).) “From commencement to conclusion, the moving party bears the burden of persuasion that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).)

A defendant moving for summary judgment must show that “one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850 [also noting that the burden of production “entails only the presentation of ‘evidence’ ” as provided in Evidence Code section 110].) Once the defendant meets its initial burden of production, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue of one or more material facts as to the defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) In ruling on the motion, the court views the evidence, and all inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence, in the light most favorable to the opposing party. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.)

The pleadings define the issues to be considered on a motion for summary judgment. (Conroy v. Regents of University of California (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1244, 1250; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) In his answer to the FAC, Freeman contends that Renga’s claims are barred because Renga signed the Release which Freeman contends waives all claims that preceded its signing. (Answer at p. 5; see also Baker v. Ferrel (1947) 78 Cal.App.2d 578, 579 [“a release is an affirmative defense which must be specially pleaded”].) Therefore, as to each claim asserted in the FAC, Freeman “must respond by establishing a complete defense or otherwise showing there is no factual basis for relief on any theory reasonably contemplated by” the FAC. (Eriksson v. Nunnink (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 826, 848, internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)

Freeman contends the Release is not ambiguous, is not limited to injuries Renga sustained in when she fell at the premises, and does not exclude the claims alleged in the FAC. Freeman also contends that each of the causes of action alleged in the FAC arise from the fall sustained by Renga at the premises. Because the Release applies to all known or unknown claims “arising out of” Renga’s fall at the premises further described above, Freeman argues, the causes of action alleged in the FAC are barred by the Release.

“Contract principles apply when interpreting a release, and ‘normally the meaning of contract language, including a release, is a legal question.’ [Citation.]” (Benedek v. PLC Santa Monica, LLC (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1356; see also Civ. Code, § 1635.) “Under statutory rules of contract interpretation, the mutual intention of the parties at the time the contract is formed governs interpretation. [Citation.] Such intent is to be inferred, if possible, solely from the written provisions of the contract. [Citation.] The ‘clear and explicit’ meaning of these provisions, interpreted in their ‘ordinary and popular sense,’ unless ‘used by the parties in a technical sense or a special meaning is given to them by usage’ [citation], controls judicial interpretation. [Citation.] Thus, if the meaning a layperson would ascribe to contract language is not ambiguous, we apply that meaning.” (AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 807, 821-822.)

By its express terms, the Release encompasses the “incident” or “accident”, including injuries and damages or other claims or causes of action which “arise out of” the “incident” or “accident”. (Freeman Decl., Exh. A at p. 1.) The Release describes the “incident” or “accident” as the fall sustained by Renga on March 25, 2023, at the premises, and further described above. (Ibid.) The claims or causes of action encompassed by the Release include those which result from, or may develop in the future as a result of, the “incident” or “accident” including injuries and damages sustained by Renga as a result of that event. (Ibid.)

“Under well-established principles of contract interpretation, when a general and a particular provision are inconsistent, the particular and specific provision is paramount to the general provision.” (Kashmiri v. Regents of University of California (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 809, 834; see also In re Tobacco Cases I (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 42, 48 [discussing principal of ejusdem generis].) Though Freeman relies on general provisions of the Release which purport to discharge Freeman from “any and all” claims or causes of action of “any kind”, the Release includes language following these general provisions stating that it applies “particularly” to claims or causes of action “on account of”, arising, resulting, or developing from the injuries Renga sustained as a result of the “incident” or “accident” (i.e., the fall Renga sustained at the premises.) (Freeman Decl., Exh. A at p. 1.) “Under the principle of ejusdem generis … [citations], where specific words follow general words in a contract, ‘the general words are construed to embrace only things similar in nature to those enumerated by the specific words.’ [Citations.]” (Nygard, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1045.) For these reasons, and construing the terms of the Release in light of its particular provisions, it is evident that the Release applies to claims or causes of action for known or unknown injuries or damages which arise, develop, or result from the fall Renga sustained at the premises.

The term “arising out of” has been “generally equated … with ‘origination, growth or flow from the event.’ [Citation.]: (Southgate Recreation & Park Dist. v. California Assn. for Park & Recreation Ins. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 293, 301.) The causes of action alleged in the FAC do not originate or flow from, and are not predicated on, the “incident” or “accident” as that event is described in the Release, or any injuries sustained by Renga as a result of the incident. For example, the FAC does not include any allegations showing that Freeman retaliated against or sought to evict Renga because she fell or sustained injuries in a fall at the premises. Instead, the theories of liability asserted against Freeman in the FAC are predicated on Renga initiating the Claim, and arise from alleged retaliation by Freeman upon learning that Renga had initiated or filed the Claim, and alleged harassment by Freeman to dissuade Renga from pursuing the Claim.

The initiation of the Claim by Renga is a causal event which is different and distinct from the fall Renga sustained at the premises. Giving the terms of the Release an ordinary interpretation, these terms do not describe or relate to the act of initiating or filing the Claim, or indicate or suggest that the particular “incident” or “accident” as defined in the Release and to which the Release applies also includes the initiation or filing of the Claim by Renga. For these reasons, and as the Release expressly applies to only those particular claims which arise, result, or develop from injuries or damages sustained by Renga as a result of the fall at the premises, Freeman has failed to meet his burden to show that the Release bars the causes of action alleged in the FAC.

In addition, to determine the intent of the parties to a contract, “[e]xtrinsic evidence can be offered not only ‘where it is obvious that a contract term is ambiguous, but also to expose a latent ambiguity.’ [Citation.] Such evidence is admissible when ‘ “relevant to prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible.” ’ [Citation.]” (Employers Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Court (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 906, 920.) Noted above, Freeman does not contend, and offers no reasoned argument to show, that the Release is ambiguous. Freeman also offers no evidence to demonstrate that the parties intended that the “incident” described in the Release includes the act of filing of the Claim, or any claims or causes of action which may result, develop, or arise from Renga’s filing of the Claim, such as those alleged in the FAC.  

In the absence of any showing by Freeman that the release is ambiguous or subject to more than one interpretation, or any extrinsic evidence of an intent by the parties to include within the scope of the Release the filing of the Claim by Renga, Freeman has failed to meet his burden to show that the Release constitutes a complete defense or bar to, or that Renga cannot establish one or more elements of, each of the causes of action alleged in the FAC. Therefore, and for all reasons further discussed above, the Court will deny the motion.

In the opposing separate statement, Renga asserts objections to certain facts set forth in Freeman’s supporting separate statement. (See Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF Nos. 13 & 14.) On a motion for summary judgment, a party who wishes to raise objections to evidence must either submit the objections in writing under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354, or arrange for a court reporter to be present at the hearing on the motion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1352(1)-(2).) Though the objections of Renga are written, because they are included within Renga’s opposing separate statement, the objections do not comply with the formatting requirements set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(b). Therefore, the Court declines to consider Renga’s objections.

Freeman asserts objections to the entirety of the Renga declaration, the Kastenek declaration, and the declaration of Zachary Cantor submitted in support of Renga’s opposition to the motion. The court rules only on objections to evidence that are material to its disposition of the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).) Because Freeman failed to shift the burden to Renga to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact, the declarations to which Freeman objects are not material to the disposition of the motion.

Furthermore, written objections to evidence on a summary judgment motion must “[q]uote or set forth the objectionable statement or material[.]” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(b)(3).) Freeman has failed to quote or set forth the objectional material appearing within each of the declarations described above. The failure to quote the objectionable material prevents the Court from determining whether Freeman’s objections are meritorious. For this reason, even if Freeman was successful in shifting the burden to Renga, there exist sufficient grounds on which the Court may disregard the objections raised by Freeman. (Hodjat v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1, 8.)