Jennifer Renga vs John Lawrence Freeman

Case Number

24CV03179

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 01/31/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Two Motions to Compel; Motion for Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling

(1) For all reasons discussed herein, the motion of plaintiff to compel defendant’s further responses to form interrogatories-general, set one, no. 17.1, is granted as to plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions. Except as otherwise herein granted, the motion is denied as moot.

(2) For all reasons discussed herein, the motion of plaintiff to compel defendant’s further responses to requests for admissions, set one, is granted as to plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions. Except as otherwise herein granted, the motion is denied as moot.

(3) For all reasons discussed herein, the Court awards sanctions in favor of plaintiff Jennifer Renga and against defendant John Lawrence Freeman and his counsel in the amount of $5,250, payable to plaintiff’s counsel. Payment of sanctions is due by February 28, 2025.

(4) The motion of defendant for summary judgment is continued to February 28, 2025.

Background:

The first amended complaint (FAC) filed in this action on August 8, 2024, is the operative pleading. In the FAC, plaintiff Jennifer Renga (Renga) alleges twelve causes of action against defendant John Lawrence Freeman (Freeman): (1) retaliation in violation of Government Code section 12900 (the California Fair Employment and Housing Act or FEHA) (2) retaliation in violation of California state law (Civil Code section 1942.5); (3) breach of contract; (4) breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (5) breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment; (6) failure to use reasonable care to protect tenants in violation of California state law (Civil Code section 1714); (7) trespassing in violation of Civil Code section 1954; (8) nuisance; (9) negligence; (10) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (11) constructive eviction; and (12) violation of Civil Code section 52.1 (the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act).

As alleged in the FAC:

On August 18, 2022, Renga entered into possession of premises located at 1711 Grand Avenue in Santa Barbara, California (the premises) pursuant to a rental agreement (the Lease). (FAC, ¶¶ 10 & 14.) The premises is owned, maintained, operated, and managed by Freeman. (FAC, ¶¶ 11 & 16.) Renga agreed to pay, before a “Section 8” voucher, monthly rent for the premises of $2,295. (FAC, ¶ 14.)

On March 25, 2023, Renga fell down a stairway located within the premises, sustained severe injuries, and was hospitalized for over a month. (FAC, ¶ 19.) Renga initiated a claim (the Claim) to recover damages related to the injuries she sustained from the fall. (FAC, ¶ 19.) Beginning in November 2023, after receiving notice of the Claim, Freeman and his girlfriend, Tina, began sending messages to Renga urging Renga not to pursue her legal rights, threatening to evict Renga and take away Renga’s “section 8”, threatening to tell a housing authority that Renga has a problem with alcohol and marijuana abuse evidenced by the fall, threatening to turn off Renga’s hot water and electricity, demanding that Renga vacate the premises within 90 days, and presenting Renga with non-compliant notices to quit the premises. (FAC, ¶¶ 21-26, 30, 32-33, 36, 39.)

In addition, Tina admitted to slashing a tire on Renga’s car. (FAC, ¶ 27.) On two occasions, Freeman entered the premises without prior warning or Renga’s permission, yelling at Renga and calling her a “cunt”, among other things. (FAC, ¶¶ 35-36.) Freeman also blocked Renga’s access to her parking space, preventing her from leaving the premises. (FAC, ¶ 37.)

Though Renga verbally complained about Freeman’s conduct and asked Freeman to cease, Freeman ignored Renga’s requests and continued to carry out his conduct. (FAC, ¶ 41 & 43.) As a result of Freeman’s conduct, Renga experienced symptoms of “PTSD”, had difficulty eating and sleeping, and lived in constant fear, among other things. (FAC, ¶¶ 28, 38, 42.) Renga was forced to move out of the premises on February 29, 2024. (FAC, ¶ 45.) On March 19, 2024, Renga signed a release relating to the fall Renga sustained on March 25, 2023, which was prepared by Freeman’s insurance carrier. (FAC, ¶¶ 46-48.)

Freeman answered the FAC on September 9, 2024, generally denying its allegations and asserting forty-four affirmative ¶ defenses.

On October 23, 2024, Renga separately filed a motion (the RFA Motion) for an order compelling Freeman to provide further responses to set one requests for admission (the RFA) nos. 5, 11 through 14, 19, and 21, and a motion (the FI Motion) for an order compelling Freeman to provide further responses to set one form interrogatories – general (the FI) no. 17.1. The FI Motion and the RFA Motion (collectively, the discovery motions) each include requests for an award of monetary sanctions against Freeman and his counsel.

In support of the discovery motions, Renga submits separate declarations of her counsel, Zachary Cantor (Cantor). Each of the Cantor declarations submitted by Renga include identical or nearly identical information in identical numbered paragraphs. Therefore, the Court will refer to the Cantor declarations collectively.

Cantor states that Renga served the RFA and the FI on Freeman on August 2, 2024. (Cantor Decl., ¶ 2 & Exh. 1.) Freeman served responses to the RFA and the FI on September 6, 2024, via a “sharefile link” (the link) which was transmitted to Cantor by email. (Id. at ¶¶ 3-4 & Exh. 2.)

On September 9, 2024, Cantor, who states that he was busy preparing for a jury trial scheduled to start the next day, notified Freeman’s counsel that Cantor was having technical difficulties accessing the link. (Cantor Decl., ¶ 5.) In response, Freeman’s counsel again emailed the responses of Freeman to the RFA and FI. (Ibid.)

On October 16, 2024, after returning to the office following trials, mediations, and hearings, Cantor emailed Freeman’s counsel regarding Freeman’s responses to the RFA and FI. (Cantor Decl., ¶ 6.) Cantor was still having technical difficulties opening the link, and the responses of Freeman were not in Cantor’s case file. (Ibid.) Cantor requested an extension of time to file motions to compel pending resolution of the technical issue, and to allow the parties time to meet and confer regarding Freeman’s responses to the RFA and FI. (Ibid.) Freeman’s counsel refused to grant Regna an extension of time to file motions to compel, stating that Renga has had plenty of time to resolve the issues. (Ibid.)

Cantor subsequently looked back at the service emails and noticed that Cantor’s paralegal had not been included in those emails, which Cantor states explained in part why the documents were not in Cantor’s file. (Cantor Decl., ¶ 7.) Cantor forwarded the service email to his paralegal who was able to open the link. (Ibid.) Cantor “immediately” reviewed Freeman’s responses to the RFA and FI, and sent substantive meet and confer correspondence to Freeman on October 17, 2024. (Id. at ¶¶ 7-8 & Exh. 3.) Due to the impending deadline to file motions to compel, Cantor requested that Freeman provide supplemental responses to the RFA and FI by October 18, 2024. (Id. at ¶ 9 & Exh. 3.)

Though Freeman “alluded” to filing a motion for a protective order in response to the October 17, 2024, meet and confer correspondence described above, Freeman did not substantively respond to that correspondence or grant an extension of time to file the discovery motions in order to allow the parties to further meet and confer. (Cantor Decl., ¶¶ 9-10 & Exh. 4.)

In support of his consolidated opposition to the discovery motions, Freeman submits the declaration of his counsel, Guillermo E. Partida (Partida), who states that on the same day counsel for Renga stated that he could not access the link, Freeman confirmed that the link was functional and emailed “pdf” files of all the discovery responses. (Partida Decl., ¶ 4.) Partida further states that no further mention was made by Renga of any non-receipt of Freeman’s responses to the RFA and FI until October 16, 2024. (Id. at ¶¶ 4-5.)

Partida also asserts that, after Renga’s counsel claimed on October 16, 2024, that he had not received any responses to discovery Freeman, Partida’s “IT department” confirmed that the documents were accessible. (Partida Decl., ¶ 6 & Exh. C.) Partida also requested that Renga meet and confer regarding a protective order and amendments to Freeman’s discovery responses. (Id. at ¶¶ 7 & 9.) Partida asserts that he was unable to fully review Renga’s meet and confer correspondence or provide further responses within the 24 hour time frame demanded by Renga. (Id. at ¶ 9; see also Memorandum at p. 3, ll. 10-19.)

Partida states that, after Renga filed the discovery motions, he renewed his request for a phone call to determine how the responses of Freeman may be remedied. (Partida Decl., ¶ 11.) Partida further states that on October 22, 2024, he spoke to Renga’s counsel telephonically regarding information necessary to amend the responses. (Id. at ¶ 12 & Exh. G.) Freeman served supplemental responses to five of the RFA and the FI on November 8, 2024. (Id. at ¶ 13 & Exh. H; Memorandum at p. 4, ll. 4-15.) Partida contends that Renga made no further complaints of deficient responses. (Id. at¶ 13.)

On November 4, 2024, Freeman filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Renga signed a release of the claims and causes of action alleged in the FAC, which Freeman contends arise out of the injuries sustained by Renga as a result of the fall further described above, which is opposed by Renga.

Analysis:

(1) The Discovery Motions

Where, as here, a party serves supplemental responses to discovery after the filing of a motion to compel further responses to that discovery, and the propounding party proceeds with the motion, the court has discretion to determine what relief, if any, should be granted. (See Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 408-409.) Under the circumstances present here, the Court will deny the discovery motions as moot with respect to plaintiff’s requests for orders compelling Freeman to provide further responses to the FI and RFA based on the service by Freeman of supplemental responses, and will address only the issue of whether the imposition of monetary sanctions as requested by Renga is justified. (Id. at p. 409.)

In his opposition to the discovery motions, Freeman contends that Renga failed to meet and confer within a reasonable time and in good faith regarding the responses of Freeman to the RFA and FI. Freeman also contends that Renga failed to provide information as to the manner in which the responses should or could be amended. Freeman argues that the discovery motions could have been avoided if Renga had timely met and conferred with Freeman regarding the responses at issue and if Renga had provided a reasonable time for Freeman to provide a further response.

Freeman also contends that RFA at issue are vague and ambiguous, that his responses to the RFA were appropriate, and that the attorney’s fees sought by Renga are not reasonable. For these reasons, Freeman contends that he acted with substantial justification and the request of Renga for monetary sanctions should be denied.

Renga contends that if Freeman’s counsel had agreed to grant Renga’s multiple requests for an extension of time to file the discovery motions, the issues raised in these motions could have been resolved without the need for the Court’s intervention. For this reason, Renga argues, an award of sanctions is appropriate to compensate Renga for the unnecessary expenditure of her counsel’s time.

The parties’ record of correspondence shows that on October 16, 2024, Renga requested an extension of time to file the discovery motions based on Cantor’s purported inability to access the link, Cantor’s understanding that the issues with his ability to access the link had not been remedied by Freeman, and for the purpose of allowing Renga’s counsel time to resolve the purported technical difficulties and to meet and confer regarding Freeman’s responses to the RFA and FI at issue once Cantor was able to access and review those responses. (Partida Decl., Exh. C at PDF p. 29 & Exh. D at PDF p. 39.)

The undisputed information and evidence further detailed above also shows that, after Freeman received Renga’s October 17, 2024, correspondence describing purported deficiencies in Freeman’s responses to the RFA at issue, and ostensibly the corresponding FI, Freeman served supplemental responses to the RFA and FI. Though Freeman contends the RFA at issue are improper or deficient, there is insufficient information to show whether or to what extent Freeman effectively disputed each of the deficiencies described in the October 17, 2024, meet and confer correspondence described above. (See, e.g., Partida Decl., Exh. D [correspondence between the parties after Oct. 17, 2024, email].)

There is no information to suggest that the statements made by Cantor regarding his inability to access the link were untruthful. (See also Partida Decl., Exh. C at PDF p. 33 [email from FTI Services questioning whether Cantor has an “email link changer (for security) that might be changing that link when it gets emailed to them”].) In addition, the service by Freeman of supplemental responses to the RFA and FI suggests to the Court that Renga’s informal efforts to resolve the issues presented in the discovery motions were effective, and that the discovery motions are not without merit.

Subdivisions (c) of Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.300 and 2033.290 require Renga to give notice of the discovery motions “within 45 days of the service of [a] verified response” by Freeman. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (c), & 2033.290, subd. (c).) Freeman does not dispute that his responses to the RFA and FI were served electronically on September 6, 2024. (See Cantor Decl., Exhs. 2 [proof of service].) Based on the electronic service of Freeman’s responses to the RFA and FI, Renga’s deadline to give notice of the discovery motions was extended by two court days under Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6, subdivision (a)(3)(B).
 

The undisputed evidence and information offered by the parties also shows that the request of Renga for an extension of time to file the discovery motions was made approximately one week prior to the statutory deadline for Renga to give notice of the discovery motions. (See, e.g., Partida Decl., Exh. D at PDF p. 42.) Because Freeman denied Renga’s request for an extension of the notice period prescribed in Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.300 and 2033.290, Renga was required to give notice by the statutory deadline to avoid waiving her right to compel any further responses to the RFA and FI. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (c), & 2033.290, subd. (c).)

Even if the Court were to find that Renga unreasonably delayed in her efforts to address any purported difficulties in accessing the link or to informally resolve any deficiencies in Freeman’s responses to the RFA and FI, Freeman was provided with a meaningful opportunity to resolve the parties’ dispute and avoid the discovery motions. In addition, the arguments offered by Freeman are insufficient to show why Freeman was substantially justified in refusing to grant Renga’s request, also considering that Freeman served supplemental responses to the RFA and FI at issue approximately two weeks after Renga filed the discovery motions. Freeman also effectively contends, and Renga does not appear to dispute, that service of the supplemental responses to the RFA and FI ostensibly resolved the disputes presented in the discovery motions.

For all reasons further discussed above, the undisputed evidence and information is sufficient to show or suggest that the discovery motions could have been resolved and would have been avoided had Freeman agreed to extend the prescribed statutory time period for giving notice of those motions as requested by Renga. For these and all reasons further discussed above, the Court finds that an award of sanctions to compensate Renga for reasonable expenses incurred as a result of the discovery motions is warranted under the circumstances present here.

An award of monetary sanctions must be “reasonable under the circumstances ….” (Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1429, 1437; Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (a) [monetary sanctions may be awarded to compensate a party for reasonable expenses].) “The principle of reasonableness means a trial court has discretion to reduce the amount of fees and costs requested as a discovery sanction in order to reach a reasonable award.” (Cornerstone Realty Advisors, LLC v. Summit Healthcare Reit, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 771, 791.)

Based on information appearing in the Cantor declarations described above the monetary sanctions requested by Renga reflect 6 hours of her counsel’s time to review Freeman’s responses to the RFA and FI, to meet and confer with counsel for Freeman, and to draft the discovery motions. (Cantor Decl., ¶ 14.) Cantor further declares that he anticipates spending another 4 hours drafting a reply, and to prepare for and attend the hearing. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Considering the substance of the discovery motions, which do not present a large number of requests or complex factual or legal issues, the Court finds that the time expended by counsel to prepare the discovery motions is excessive.

Under the totality of the circumstances present here, including the Court’s experience with addressing attorney’s fee requests, the Court finds that 7 hours of time for attorney Cantor at counsel’s reasonable hourly rate of $750, for a total of $5,250, constitutes the reasonable amount of attorney’s fees incurred by Renga as a result of the discovery motions, and for which monetary sanctions are appropriately awardable.

(2) Motion for Summary Judgment

The Court will continue the hearing on the motion of Freeman for summary judgment to February 28, 2025.