CHERLENA APARICIO V. YARDI SYSTEMS, INC.

Case Number

24CV02771

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 12/02/2024 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Defendant Yardi Systems, Inc.’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint

Tentative Ruling

Cherlena Aparicio v. Yardi Systems, Inc.                         

Case No. 24CV02771

Hearing Date: December 2, 2024                                           

HEARINGS:           Defendant Yardi Systems, Inc.’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint

                                   

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiff Cherlena Aparicio: Eric A. Woosley

For Defendant Yardi Systems, Inc.: John W. Baumann

                       

TENTATIVE RULINGS:  

The demurrer of defendant Yardi Systems, Inc.  to plaintiff’s complaint is overruled in its entirety. Yardi Systems, Inc. shall file and serve its answer to the complaint no later than December 16, 2024.

Background:

This action was commenced on May 20, 2024, by the filing of the complaint by plaintiff Cherlena Aparicio (“plaintiff”) against defendant Yardi Systems, Inc. (“defendant”) for: (1) Medical Condition or Physical Disability Discrimination; (2) Failure to Make Reasonable Accommodation; (3) Failure to Engage in Interactive Process; and (4) Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy.

As alleged in the complaint:

Plaintiff was hired by defendant on November 28, 2022, as an associate Technical Account Manager, until she was terminated on August 18, 2023, after defendant refused to extend plaintiff’s leave of absence due to plaintiff’s Stage 4 cancer diagnosis and treatment. (Compl., ¶ 8.)

Prior to her termination, plaintiff was “was well reviewed and was being groomed to increase her position and responsibilities. (Compl., ¶ 9.)

Following doctor’s appointments, and related medical tests, beginning on April 21, 2023, April plaintiff was informed that she had a massive tumor on her colon and lesions on her liver. (Compl., ¶¶ 10-11.) During that time, plaintiff kept defendant updated on her condition and told defendant that she would not be able to return to work for a few days. (Ibid.) On April 26, 2023, plaintiff received a call from defendant to discuss plaintiff’s medical situation and plaintiff was told that she would be sent documentation to get a leave of absence started. (Compl., ¶ 13.) The same day, plaintiff was emailed a form from defendant requesting that she open a leave of absence request with Reliance Matrix (the leave administration partner for defendant) which she completed and returned by email the same day. (Ibid.)

On May 1, 2023, plaintiff received an email from defendant with a form to request a medical leave of absence, which plaintiff completed and returned the next day. (Compl., ¶ 14.)

On May 3, 2023, plaintiff was diagnosed with Stage 4 colon cancer that had metastasized to her liver. (Compl., ¶ 15.)

On May 30, 2023, plaintiff’s hematologist and oncologist recommended that plaintiff stay off work until December 31, 2024, at which time plaintiff’s doctor anticipated that plaintiff could return to work without accommodation. (Compl., ¶ 17.)

Reliance Matrix secured accommodations for plaintiff from defendant from April 26, 2023, to June 23, 2023, and a second from June 24, 2023, to July 21, 2023. (Compl., ¶ 18.) After receiving the second accommodation notice via email on July 13, 2023, plaintiff contacted Reliance Matrix to discuss plaintiff’s ongoing chemotherapy, its negative effects, and plaintiff’s upcoming surgery that was to take place on August 29, 2023, for a bowel resection. (Compl., ¶ 19.) Reliance Matrix told plaintiff that it would seek another accommodation from defendant, but plaintiff never heard from Reliance Matrix again. (Ibid.)

“On August 11, 2023 Plaintiff received an email from Yardi, wherein Yardi indicated it had received an update from Reliance Matrix regarding her request for an ADA medical leave extension. It attached a letter to that email where, instead of authorizing a medical leave extension, it told Plaintiff her employment would be terminated on August 18, 2023 if she did not appear at work that day with a doctor’s note saying she was cleared for work. Plaintiff was unable to comply as she had her first bowel resection surgery on August 29, 2023, eleven days after her effective date of termination.” (Compl., ¶ 20 & Exh. 5.)

On February 2, 2024, plaintiff filed a Complaint of Employment Discrimination Before the State of California, alleging discrimination because of plaintiff’s cancer diagnosis. (Compl., ¶ 23.) On February 2, 2024, plaintiff received a notice of case closure and right to sue letter. (Ibid.)

Defendant now demurs to each cause of action contained in the complaint.

Plaintiff opposes the demurrer.

Analysis:

            Demurrer

“When any ground for objection to a complaint, cross-complaint, or answer appears on the face thereof, or from any matter of which the court is required to or may take judicial notice, the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer to the pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) “Our consideration of the facts alleged includes ‘those evidentiary facts found in recitals of exhibits attached to [the] complaint.’ [Citation.]” (Alexander v. Exxon Mobil (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1250.)

“[A] court must treat a demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, it does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.” (Travelers Indem. Co. of Connecticut v. Navigators Specialty Ins. Co. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 341, 358, citing Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)

“If the complaint states a cause of action under any theory, regardless of the title under which the factual basis for relief is stated, that aspect of the complaint is good against a demurrer. “ ‘[W]e are not limited to plaintiffs’ theory of recovery in testing the sufficiency of their complaint against a demurrer, but instead must determine if the factual allegations of the complaint are adequate to state a cause of action under any legal theory. The courts of this state have . . . long since departed from holding a plaintiff strictly to the ‘form of action’ he has pleaded and instead have adopted the more flexible approach of examining the facts alleged to determine if a demurrer should be sustained.’ ” [Citations.]” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38-39.)

“To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)

            First, Second, and Fourth Causes of Action

Defendant argues that these three causes of action fail because plaintiff “has failed to allege facts showing that she was a qualified individual who could perform her job with reasonable accommodation.” (Demurrer, p. 3, ll, 24-24.) Defendant then proceeds to, almost entirely, argue the merits of the case rather than what is pled in the complaint. For example: “Yardi provided a reasonable accommodation by granting a two-month leave of absence and then extending that leave twice so that it spanned almost four months, from April to August 2023.” (Demurrer, p. 3, ll. 25-26.) “On a demurrer a court’s function is limited to testing the legal sufficiency of the complaint. [Citation.] ‘ “A demurrer is simply not the appropriate procedure for determining the truth of disputed facts.” ’ [Citation.]” (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113-114.) The court will rule on this demurrer pursuant to that basic tenant and will disregard defendant’s attempt to argue the merits of the case. This is not a motion for summary judgment or a trial on the merits. Defendant’s attempts to use terminology indicating that it is the sufficiency of the pleading itself that is being objected to, is not persuasive. The substance of defendant’ argument is requesting factual determinations. Defendant’s reply to plaintiff’s opposition is no different. Defendant continues to argue the merits of the case and things such as whether defendant provided reasonable accommodation, etc. In fact, in both the demurrer and the reply, defendant relies primarily on cases involving summary judgment, which is a completely different analysis than a demurrer.

“The law of this state contains broad definitions of physical disability, mental disability, and medical condition. It is the intent of the Legislature that the definitions of physical disability and mental disability be construed so that applicants and employees are protected from discrimination due to an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment that is disabling, potentially disabling, or perceived as disabling or potentially disabling.” (Gov. Code, § 12926.1, subd.(b).)

“Physical and mental disabilities include, but are not limited to, chronic or episodic conditions such as HIV/AIDS, hepatitis, epilepsy, seizure disorder, diabetes, clinical depression, bipolar disorder, multiple sclerosis, and heart disease. In addition, the Legislature has determined that the definitions of ‘physical disability’ and ‘mental disability’ under the law of this state require a ‘limitation’ upon a major life activity, but do not require, as does the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, a ‘substantial limitation.’ This distinction is intended to result in broader coverage under the law of this state than under that federal act. Under the law of this state, whether a condition limits a major life activity shall be determined without respect to any mitigating measures, unless the mitigating measure itself limits a major life activity, regardless of federal law under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Further, under the law of this state, ‘working’ is a major life activity, regardless of whether the actual or perceived working limitation implicates a particular employment or a class or broad range of employments.” (Gov. Code, § 12926.1, subd.(c), italics added.)

“Physical disability” also includes being regarded or treated by the employer as having or having had a condition that currently has no disabling effect but may become an impairment limiting the individual’s ability to participate in major life activities. (Gov. Code, § 12926, subd.(m)(5).)

In order to state a claim for disability discrimination claim under the FEHA, a plaintiff must allege the following elements of a prima facie case: (1) she suffered from a disability of which her employer was aware; (2) she was capable of performing the essential functions of her position; and (3) she was subjected to an adverse employment action because of her disability. (Prue v. Brady Co./San Diego, Inc. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1378.)

Other than attempting to have the case decided on its merits, defendant’s only argument regarding the allegations of the complaint, is that plaintiff has failed to plead facts showing that she was a qualified individual, and that she has failed to allege that she was able to return to work after December 31, 2023. (Demurrer, p. 4, ll. 22-25.)

Defendant’s argument is without merit. Based on the allegations of a Stage 4 cancer diagnosis, and all of the resulting treatments, including surgeries and chemotherapy, plaintiff has clearly pled sufficient facts that she suffered from a disability of which her employer was aware, thus satisfying the first element of a disability discrimination claim under the FEHA. Plaintiff also alleges, at paragraph 17 of the complaint, that plaintiff’s hematologist and oncologist recommended that plaintiff stay off work until December 31, 2024, at which time plaintiff’s doctor anticipated that plaintiff could return to work without accommodation. This pleading satisfies the second element of a disability discrimination claim under the FEHA. Finally, plaintiff’s entire action revolves around her termination from employment that allegedly occurred as the result of her cancer diagnosis. Thus, satisfying the third element of a disability discrimination claim under the FEHA.

Defendant’s demurrer to the first, second, and fourth causes of action will be overruled.

            Third Cause of Action

Defendant’s demurrer to the third cause of action, for failure to engage in the interactive process, is likewise based on factual arguments rather than, as required on demurrer, deficiencies of the allegations. Defendant argues that the cause of action fails because “[p]laintiff refused the reasonable accommodation that Yardi offered through the interactive process.” (Demurrer, p. 6, ll. 6-7.) There is not a single argument raised by defendant, with respect to the third cause of action, that pertains to the sufficiency of the allegations.

“An employer’s failure to engage in the interactive process that causes harm to a disabled employee or former employee is also independently actionable. [Citation.] For the purposes of a FEHA claim, the cause of an employee’s disability is irrelevant; the focus is on the employer’s efforts to reasonably accommodate the disability, regardless of its cause.” (Shirvanyan v. Los Angeles Community College District (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 82, 89.)

The complaint clearly alleges sufficient facts, including at paragraphs 41 through 48, of failure to engage in the interactive process. At the pleading stage, it is completely irrelevant that defendant claims that it did engage in the interactive process. That has nothing to do with the sufficiency of the pleading.

The demurrer to the third cause of action will be overruled.