Tentative Ruling: Matthew S. Payne, et al. v. Ford Motor Company, et al.

Case Number

24CV02703

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 10/07/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiffs Matthew S. Payne and Fen Liang: Tionna Carvalho, Sanam Vaziri, Strategic Legal Practices, APC

For Defendants Ford Motor Company and Perry Ford San Luis Obispo: Michael D. Mortenson, Craig A. Taggart, Chen Fei Liu, Mortenson Taggart Adams LLP

RULING

For the reasons stated herein, the motion of plaintiffs for attorneys’ fees is continued to November 18, 2026. Defendant Ford Motor Company shall file and serve any opposition to the motion on or before October 26, 2026. Any reply by plaintiffs shall be filed and served on or before November 10, 2026. Apart from that reply, Plaintiffs shall not file any further papers in support of the motion. On or before October 9, 2026, Plaintiffs shall serve, and file proof of service of, notice of the court’s ruling herein.

Background

The operative first amended complaint (FAC) filed in this case by plaintiffs Matthew S. Payne (Payne) and Fen Liang (Liang) (collectively, Plaintiffs) alleges that Plaintiffs and Ford Motor Company (Ford) entered into a warranty contract on May 17, 2018, regarding a 2018 Lincoln Navigator (the vehicle). The vehicle was manufactured and distributed by Ford and purchased by Plaintiffs from Ford’s authorized dealership. Defects allegedly manifested in the vehicle during the period of the warranty contract which the FAC alleges were known to and concealed by Ford at the time Plaintiffs purchased the vehicle.

The FAC further alleges that, though Plaintiffs delivered the vehicle to Perry Ford Lincoln Volkswagen (Perry Ford) for repairs, Perry Ford failed to repair the vehicle in accordance with industry standards. Ford was unable or failed to conform the vehicle to the terms of the warranty after a reasonable number of repair attempts and failed to replace the vehicle or make restitution.

On August 12, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the FAC against defendants Ford and Perry Ford asserting six causes of action: (1) violation of subdivision (d) of Civil Code section 1793.2 (against Ford only); (2) violation of subdivision (b) of Civil Code section 1793.2 (against Ford only); (3) violation of subdivision (a)(3) of Civil Code section 1793.2 (against Ford only); (4) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability (against Ford only); (5) negligent repair (against Perry Ford only); and (6) fraudulent inducement – concealment (against Ford only).

On September 13, 2024, defendants filed a demurrer to the fifth and sixth causes of action on the grounds that the FAC fails to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action, and that these causes of action are barred by the economic loss rule. Plaintiffs opposed that demurrer. On November 13, the court sustained that demurrer as to the fifth cause of action without leave to amend, and overruled the demurrer as to the sixth cause of action.

On November 25, 2024, Ford filed an answer to the FAC, generally denying its allegations and asserting twenty-six affirmative defenses.

On December 9, 2024, the court entered a judgment of dismissal of Perry Ford with prejudice.

At a settlement conference held on October 24, 2025, Plaintiffs’ counsel, Aylana Dias, with all parties present, read the terms of a settlement into the court record as follows: “Defendant shall submit to Plaintiff an offer, in writing, pursuant to CCP 998 that includes Defendant providing a buyback of the vehicle in question in exchange for $170,000.00 paid to the Plaintiffs. The offer, in writing, shall also include a 1542 waiver of all claims known and unknown. The 998 offer shall also detail how the parties will exchange the vehicle. Any award of fees will be handled by a future scheduled motion.” (Oct. 24, 2025, Minute Order.)

On December 8, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a notice of conditional settlement of the entire case.

On August 5, 2026, after a case management conference at which the parties appeared, the court ordered Plaintiffs to file and serve any forthcoming motion for attorney fees by August 25; ordered that any response to that motion be filed and served by September 10 and that any reply be filed and served by September 20; and set the hearing on Plaintiffs’ forthcoming motion for attorney fees for October 7, 2026.

On September 16, Plaintiffs late-filed a motion for an order awarding Plaintiffs attorney fees in the total amount of $38,416.43. As of this writing, Ford has not filed an opposition to the motion with the court.

Analysis

Noted above, Plaintiffs were required to file and serve the motion no later than August 26, 2026. The proof of service filed by Plaintiffs on September 16 shows that copies of the notice, the motion, and papers supporting the motion were served on Ford’s counsel of record on September 16, by electronic transmission pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6, subdivision (a)(6). (Sept. 16, 2026, Proof of Service at pdf p. 3.) That subdivision does not exist.

Relevant here, Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6 provides: “If a document may be served by mail, express mail, overnight delivery, or facsimile transmission, electronic service of that document is deemed complete at the time of the electronic transmission of the document or at the time that the electronic notification of service of the document is sent.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6, subd. (a)(3)(A).) Subject to exceptions which do not apply here, “[a]ny period of notice, or any right or duty to do any act or make any response within any period or on a date certain after the service of the document, which time period or date is prescribed by statute or rule of court, shall be extended after service by electronic means by two court days ....” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6, subd. (a)(3)(B).) Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1005, Plaintiffs were, notwithstanding the deadlines prescribed in the court’s August 5, 2026, minute order described above, required to file and serve the motion “at least 16 court days before the hearing.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).)

For the reasons discussed above, the period of notice and service of the present motion is 18 court days. As the motion is calendared for hearing on October 7, Plaintiffs were required to serve notice of the motion, and the moving and supporting papers, no later than September 10, 2026. The present record reflects that Plaintiffs’ service of the notice and moving papers on September 16 violates the August 5, 2026, minute order, and fails to comply with the minimum notice period prescribed in Code of Civil Procedure sections 1005 and 1010.6. “[A] trial court’s inherent power does not provide authority for a trial court to shorten minimum time periods when specified as mandatory by the Legislature.” (Urshan v. Musicians’ Credit Union (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 758, 767.)

In support of the motion, Plaintiffs submit a declaration of their counsel, Angel M. Baker (attorney Baker) which effectively requests permission to file and serve the motion after the prescribed deadline pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). Attorney Baker asserts that the motion was not filed by the court’s deadline due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, and excusable neglect arising from the unexpected error within attorney Baker’s calendaring department as further discussed below, and apologizes to the court and to Ford’s counsel for the late filing and service of the motion, and for any resulting confusion or inconvenience. (Baker Dec., ¶¶ 8 & 10.)

Attorney Baker concedes that on August 5, the court ordered Plaintiffs to file the motion no later than August 25. (Baker Dec., ¶ 3.) Attorney Baker states that their “docketing team” handles thousands of calendaring items per week; that their “fee motion” team internally tracks deadlines to file attorney fee motions based on the date of the dismissal of the matter unless the parties have made other arrangements; and that in this matter, because the case has not yet been dismissed, that internal tracking system was not triggered. (Baker Dec., ¶¶ 5-6.) Though attorney Baker asserts that their office’s dual docketing and fee motion internal tracking system is consistently reliable, in this case, the deadline prescribed by the court was inadvertently missed. (Ibid.)

On September 15, it came to attorney Baker’s attention that the deadline to file the motion was not calendared in their office system. (Baker Dec., ¶ 4.) Upon attorney Baker’s discovery of the missed deadline, attorney Baker caused the motion to be filed and served on September 16. (Baker Dec., ¶ 9.) In an effort to adhere to the court’s August 5, 2026, order, attorney Baker reserved a hearing date for the motion on November 18, 2026, at 10:00 a.m. in this Department. (Baker Dec., ¶ 7.)

Attorney Baker states that Plaintiffs will suffer significant prejudice if the motion is not heard because, according to attorney Baker, Plaintiffs are entitled to seek recovery of statutory attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses pursuant to Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d). (Baker Dec., ¶ 11.) If relief is not granted, Plaintiffs will be unable to seek recovery of attorney’s fees or costs reasonably incurred in prosecuting this action. (Ibid.) Attorney Baker further contends that Ford will not be prejudiced by the court’s consideration of the motion because, pursuant to a signed statutory offer to compromise under Code of Civil Procedure section 998, Ford expressly agreed that Plaintiffs retained the right to petition the court for an award of reasonably incurred attorney’s fees pursuant to Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d). (Ibid.)

“While an attorney fee motion should be timely filed, the rule provisions are mandatory but not jurisdictional, and on a proper showing under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 473, the trial court may grant relief for such mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” (Community Youth Athletic Center v. City of National City (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1444 (Community Youth).) “For good cause, the trial judge may extend the time for filing a motion for attorney’s fees in the absence of a stipulation or for a longer period than allowed by stipulation.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1702(d).) “In granting relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473 and rule 3.1702(d), the trial court [is] empowered to relieve a party from the failure to meet a procedural time limit, upon a proper showing, and that the applications were timely and accompanied by the proposed pleading.” (Community Youth, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 1445.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 473 “provides for both discretionary and mandatory relief.” (Pagnini v. Union Bank, N.A. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 298, 302.) Under the discretionary provision, “[t]he court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party ... from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against the party through the party’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b); Lorenz v. Commercial Acceptance Ins. Co. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 981, 989, original italics.) The party moving for relief under the discretionary provision of section 473 bears the “burden to demonstrate ‘that due to some mistake, either of fact or of law, of himself ..., or through some inadvertence, surprise or neglect which may properly be considered excusable, the judgment or order from which he seeks relief should be reversed.’ [Citation.]” (Hopkins & Carley v. Gens (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1410, original italics.)

Under the mandatory provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 473, the court “shall” grant relief “whenever an application ... is made no more than six months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by an attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, ... unless the court finds that the default or dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).)

“ ‘The range of attorney conduct for which relief can be granted in the mandatory provision is broader than that in the discretionary provision, and includes inexcusable neglect.’ [Citation.] The purposes of the mandatory relief provision is to promote the determination of actions on their merits, to relieve innocent clients of the burden of the attorneys’ fault, to impose the burden on the erring attorney, and to avoid the precipitation of additional litigation in the form of malpractice suits.” (Gee v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 477, 492.) “[I]f the prerequisites for the application of the mandatory provision of section 473, subdivision (b) exist, the trial court does not have discretion to refuse relief.” (Leader v. Health Industries of America, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 603, 612.)

The purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), “are advanced as long as mandatory relief is confined to situations in which the attorney, rather than the client, is the cause of the default,” (Martin Potts & Associates, Inc. v. Corsair, LLC (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 432, 439.) There is no evidence or information which suggests that Plaintiffs, and not their counsel, caused the late filing of the motion. (Dollase v. Wanu Water, Inc. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1315, 1327.) There is also no evidence or information showing “any prejudice [Ford] might suffer” if the court were to permit the late filing of the motion. (Shapell Socal Rental Properties, LLC v. Chico’s FAS, Inc. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 198, 217 (Shapell).)

The filing of the motion the day after attorney Baker discovered the calendaring error as further discussed above also demonstrates “the relative speed with which” attorney Baker acted. (Shapell, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 217.) As the declaration of attorney Baker was filed with the motion, the court finds that Plaintiffs have substantially complied with Code of Civil Procedure section 473. (Los Angeles County v. Lewis (1918) 179 Cal. 398, 400 [general discussion].)

“When the moving party promptly seeks relief and there is no prejudice to the opposing party, very slight evidence is required to justify relief.” (Mink v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1343.) Further, “ ‘any doubts in applying section 473 must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief [citations] ....’ [Citations.]” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 980.) Further, it does not appear to the court, based on the present record, that the conduct of attorney Baker fell below the professional standard of care. (Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 249, 258.)

For all reasons discussed above, the court will permit the late filing of the motion on September 16, and continue the hearing on the motion to November 18, 2026. Further, the court will order Ford to file and serve any opposition to the motion on or before October 26, 2026; and Plaintiffs to file and serve any reply on or before November 10, 2026. Plaintiffs shall not file any further papers in support of the motion apart from the reply described herein. The court will also order Plaintiffs to serve, and file proof of service of, notice of the court’s ruling herein.