Maria Hernandez vs. County of Santa Barbara

Case Number

24CV02573

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 05/28/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

City Of Santa Barbara’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiff Maria Hernandez: Jesse L. Halpern, The Halpern Law Firm

For Defendant City of Santa Barbara: Sarah J. Knecht, Tom R. Shapiro, Office of

the City Attorney

Emails: tshapiro@santabarbaraca.gov; jlh@halpernlawcorp.com;

berta@halpemlawcorp.com;

RULING

For all reasons discussed herein, the motion of defendant City of Santa Barbara for summary judgment is granted. Defendant shall serve and submit for the court’s approval and in accordance with this ruling, a proposed order that conforms to the court’s ruling herein.

Background

On May 9, 2024, plaintiff Maria Hernandez filed a complaint against defendant County of Santa Barbara (the County), alleging one cause of action for premises liability - dangerous condition of public property. In the complaint, plaintiff alleges that on November 9, 2023, she was walking on a public sidewalk owned by the County, when plaintiff tripped over a raised portion of the sidewalk cement which was created by employees of the County and of which the County had actual and constructive notice. (Compl., ¶¶ Prem.L-1 & Prem.L-4(a)-(b).)

On June 18, 2024, plaintiff filed an amendment to the complaint substituting the City of Goleta for the defendant designated by the fictitious name of Doe 1.

On June 28, 2024, plaintiff filed an amendment to the complaint substituting the City of Santa Barbara for the defendant designated by the fictitious name of Doe 2.

On July 15, 2024, the court entered an order pursuant to a stipulation by the parties to dismiss the County from the action, without prejudice.

On July 26, 2024, the City of Goleta filed an answer to the complaint, generally denying its allegations and asserting seventeen affirmative defenses.

On August 1, 2024, the City of Santa Barbara filed an answer to the complaint, generally denying its allegations and asserting fifteen affirmative defenses.

On March 7, 2025, plaintiff dismissed the complaint as to the City of Goleta, with prejudice.

City of Santa Barbara’s motion for summary judgment:

On February 13, 2025, City of Santa Barbara (the City) filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the complaint is without merit, and there exists no triable controversy. (Notice at p. 2, ll. 3-6.)

Plaintiff opposes the motion.

It is undisputed that at approximately 1:20 p.m. on November 9, 2023, plaintiff was walking on the sidewalk in the 6300 block of Hollister Avenue in Goleta, California, when she tripped and fell. (Plaintiff’s Responses to City’s Sep. Stmt. [Pl. Resp. Sep. Stmt.] at UMF Nos. 1, 3 & evidence cited therein). The sidewalk where the accident occurred is controlled and maintained by the City. (Pl. Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 2 & evidence cited therein.) At the time of the incident, plaintiff was walking on the right with a work companion who was walking on the left, and the weather was “pretty.” (Pl. Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF Nos. 4-5 & evidence cited therein.) Plaintiff recalled tripping and falling forward to the right side of the pavement. (Pl. Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 6 & evidence cited therein.)

Plaintiff identified the cause of her trip and fall as the sidewalk uplift depicted in “Deposition Exhibit 6A.” (Pl. Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 7 & evidence cited therein; see also Declaration of Maria Hernandez, ¶ 4.)

On August 29, 2024, City Risk Analyst Marisa Kahn (Kahn) performed a site inspection and measured the sidewalk uplift at the accident location. (Pl. Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 8 & evidence cited therein.) The highest differential between the two sidewalk portions was approximately one inch. (Ibid.) At the approximate location of the accident, the sidewalk differential was approximately one inch. (Pl. Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 9 & evidence cited therein.) There were no visual obstructions to the defect, and no jagged edges of concrete at the site of the accident. (Pl. Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 10 & evidence cited therein.) There are no prior complaints about the sidewalk. (Pl. Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 11 & evidence cited therein.)

The above summary is not intended to be exhaustive, and the court has considered all admissible evidence submitted in support of and in opposition to the present motion of the City.

Analysis

“From commencement to conclusion,” a party moving for summary judgment “bears the burden of persuasion that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 845, 850 (Aguilar); Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (c).)

Relevant here, a defendant moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that “one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, supra, 235 Cal.4th at p. 850, 853.) The defendant must produce evidence which, when “viewed in the light most favorable to” the plaintiff, is sufficient to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 845, 850-851; see also Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 610, 618.)

If a moving defendant carries its burden of production, this “causes a shift, and the [plaintiff] is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) The plaintiff must “set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o).)

The pleadings frame the issues to be considered on a motion for summary judgment. (Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1253.) To meet its burden, the City must produce evidence showing that plaintiff “has not established, and cannot reasonably expect to establish” the elements of the sole cause of action for premises liability based on the existence of a dangerous condition of public property alleged in the complaint. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768.)

The City contends that the one inch sidewalk differential at the location where plaintiff fell, which was measured by Kahn during a site inspection of the sidewalk at issue, together with the absence of any jagged edges or other visual obstructions blocking the sidewalk differential at the subject location, and the absence of any reported injuries, incidents, or accidents at or near the location of plaintiff’s fall, support a prima facie evidentiary showing that the sidewalk defect or uneven walking surface at issue in this action is trivial or minor, created at most an insignificant risk of injury when exercising due care, did not present a substantial risk of injury, and did not constitute a dangerous condition as a matter of law.

The parties do not dispute that the sidewalk on which plaintiff tripped and fell is owned or controlled by the City, which is a public entity. (Gov. Code, §§ 811.2 & 830, subd. (c).) (Note: Undesignated statutory references shall be to the Government Code.)

Section 810 et seq. (the Government Claims Act or Act) “is a comprehensive statutory scheme governing the liabilities and immunities of public entities and public employees for torts.” (Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Protection Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 798, 803.) The purpose of the Act is “to confine potential governmental liability rigidly delineated circumstances….” (Williams v. Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834, 838.) Relevant here, section 835 “sets out the exclusive conditions under which a public entity is liable for injuries caused by a dangerous condition of public property.” (Brown v. Poway Unified School Dist. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 820, 829 (Brown).)

Subject to exceptions which do not appear to apply here, section 835 provides that “a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either: [¶] (a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or [¶] (b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.” (Gov. Code, § 835.)

The Act defines a “dangerous condition” as “a condition of property that creates a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.” (Gov. Code, § 830, subd. (a).) “A condition is not a dangerous condition … if the trial … court, viewing the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff, determines as a matter of law that the risk created by the condition was of such a minor, trivial or insignificant nature in view of the surrounding circumstances that no reasonable person would conclude that the condition created a substantial risk of injury when such property or adjacent property was used with due care in a manner in which it was reasonably foreseeable that it would be used.” (Gov. Code, § 830.2.)

“ ‘The trivial defect doctrine originated to shield public entities from liability where conditions on public property create a risk “of such a minor, trivial or insignificant nature in view of the surrounding circumstances ... no reasonable person would conclude that the condition created a substantial risk of injury when such property or adjacent property was used with due care in a manner in which it was reasonably foreseeable that it would be used.” ’ [Citation.] The trivial defect doctrine is not an affirmative defense. It is an aspect of duty that a plaintiff must plead and prove. [Citation.]

“In appropriate cases, the trial court may determine, and the appellate court may determine de novo, whether a given walkway defect was trivial as a matter of law. [Citations.] ‘Where reasonable minds can reach only one conclusion—that there was no substantial risk of injury—the issue is a question of law, properly resolved by way of summary judgment.’ [Citation]. If, however, the court determines that sufficient evidence has been presented so that reasonable minds may differ as to whether the defect presents a substantial risk of injury, the court may not conclude that the defect is trivial as a matter of law. [Citation.]

“In determining whether a given walkway defect is trivial as a matter of law, the court should not rely solely upon the size of the defect—in this case, on the depth or height of the walkway depression or elevation—although the defect’s size ‘may be one of the most relevant factors’ to the court’s decision. [Citation.] The court should consider other circumstances which might have rendered the defect a dangerous condition at the time of the accident. [Citation.]

“These other circumstances or factors include whether there were any broken pieces or jagged edges in the area of the defect, whether any dirt, debris or other material obscured a pedestrian’s view of the defect, the plaintiff's knowledge of the area, whether the accident occurred at night or in an unlighted area, the weather at the time of the accident, and whether the defect has caused any other accidents. [Citations.] In sum, ‘[a] court should decide whether a defect may be dangerous only after considering all of the circumstances surrounding the accident that might make the defect more dangerous than its size alone would suggest.’ [Citation.]

“The court’s analysis of whether a walkway defect is trivial involves, as a matter of law, two essential steps. ‘First, the court reviews evidence regarding type and size of the defect. If that preliminary analysis reveals a trivial defect, the court considers evidence of any additional factors [bearing on whether the defect presented a substantial risk of injury]. If these additional factors do not indicate the defect was sufficiently dangerous to a reasonably careful person, the court should deem the defect trivial as a matter of law ....’ [Citation.]” (Huckey v. City of Temecula (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1104-1105 (Huckey), original italics and footnotes omitted.)

The evidence submitted by the City in support of the motion and described above, which is not disputed by plaintiff, shows that the sidewalk differential at the location of the incident measured one inch at its highest point, including at the location where plaintiff fell. “Sidewalk elevations ranging from three-quarters of an inch to one and one-half inches have generally been held trivial as a matter of law.” (Huckey, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 1107.) For this reason, the evidence presented by the City is sufficient to show that the elevation or differential at issue is trivial as a matter of law under the Act.

Though the City’s prima facie showing of the sidewalk elevation or differential at the location of plaintiff’s fall is sufficient to shift the burden to plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact (Huckey, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 1107), the undisputed evidence also shows an absence of jagged edges, broken pieces, and visual obstructions at the subject location, and that no injuries, incidents, or accidents at the location where plaintiff tripped and fell were reported to the City. These additional material facts are also sufficient to show that there did not exist any “circumstances surrounding the accident that might make the defect more dangerous than its size alone would suggest.” (Caloroso v. Hathaway (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 922, 927.)

For all reasons discussed above, the City has made a prima facie evidentiary showing that the sidewalk differential at the location where plaintiff fell was, as a matter of law, a trivial defect, and that plaintiff cannot establish that the City maintained, or that there existed, a dangerous condition of public property at the time and location of plaintiff’s fall. The burden now shifts to plaintiff “to raise a triable issue of material fact concerning whether the height differential was trivial as a matter of law under the circumstances.” (Huckey, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 1107.)

In her opposition to the motion, plaintiff contends that the size of the defect, the lighting of the sidewalk, the existence of a prior similar accident involving another individual, and the City’s acknowledgment that the differential was repaired due to the potential risk of injury, are sufficient to show that the defect is not trivial, and that there exist factual issues that must be determined by a jury.

In support of her opposition, plaintiff submits a separate statement setting forth additional facts which plaintiff contends are material, and which are not disputed by the City. (See City Reply to Pl. Opp. Sep. Stmt. at pp. 4-5.)

The additional material facts offered by plaintiff are supported by the declaration of Ana Rodriguez (Rodriguez), a resident of Lompoc, California, who is 50 years of age. (Rodriguez Decl., ¶ 1.) Rodriguez states that she became aware of plaintiff’s trip and fall on the sidewalk near plaintiff’s and Rodriguez’s place of work in November of 2023. (Plaintiff’s Additional Material Fact [AMF] No. 1; Rodriguez Decl., ¶ 2.) Rodriguez further states that, within several months prior to plaintiff’s accident, Rodriguez was walking in the same location on the sidewalk while on a break. (AMF No. 2; Rodriguez Decl., ¶ & Exh. A.) Rodriguez’s foot struck the uplifted portion of the sidewalk, which is the same condition as that which caused plaintiff to fall, causing Rodriguez to fall forward. (AMF Nos. 3 & 5; Rodriguez Decl., ¶¶ 4-5.) Rodriguez was not injured and did not make a claim against the City. (AMF No. 4; Rodriguez Decl., ¶ 4.)

Assuming without deciding that the undisputed information offered in the Rodriguez declaration is sufficient to show that the sidewalk differential caused another person to trip, plaintiff presents no evidence to show that the City had actual or constructive knowledge of this incident, or of the existence of the sidewalk differential which purportedly caused Rodriguez’s fall, sufficiently prior to plaintiff’s injury to permit the City to take protective measures. (Gov. Code, §§ 835, subd. (b), & 835.2; Brown, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 829 [public entity could not be liable under section 835 absent evidence of notice of the allegedly dangerous condition].)

Plaintiff’s separate statement of additional material facts is also supported by Kahn’s deposition testimony, which appears in a transcript attached as exhibit D to the declaration of plaintiff’s counsel, Jesse L. Halpern (Halpern). Plaintiff contends that this testimony shows that Kahn acknowledged that a one inch sidewalk uplift would regularly be reported for repairs, that Kahn acknowledged the potential risk of a tripping injury associated with a one-inch sidewalk uplift, and that Kahn reported the condition at issue for repairs. (AMF Nos. 6-11.)

Kahn’s testimony shows that, upon the City receiving a report about a condition that requires repair, Kahn will make a repair request, that the City will generally fix a condition that is reported, that Kahn would typically report a one inch uplift for repair, and that Kahn input the condition at issue in this lawsuit into the City’s maintenance system and requested that it be repaired. (Halpern Decl., Exh. D at p. 16, ll. 14-25; p. 17, ll. 22-p. 18, l. 7; p. 20, ll. 2-7.) This testimony does not change the court’s analysis.

For example, to the extent Kahn’s testimony gives rise to an inference that the sidewalk differential posed some risk of injury prompting Kahn to request its repair once that condition was reported, plaintiff fails to explain why this demonstrates that the sidewalk differential “posed ‘a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury’ when ‘used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.’ [Citations.]” (Huckey, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 1110.)

Further, even if Kahn’s testimony was sufficient to show the existence of a dangerous condition of the sidewalk at the time plaintiff fell and was injured, plaintiff provides no evidence that Kahn, or the City, had actual or constructive notice of this condition at any time prior to plaintiff’s injury. Instead, Kahn’s testimony suggests that the City did not have a record of any requests for repair or complaints about the sidewalk, or notice of any hazards or dangers present at the sidewalk location where plaintiff fell. (See, e.g., Halpern Decl., Exh. D [Kahn Transcript] at pp. 8-17.)

Plaintiff also submits copies of photographs which, according to plaintiff, depict the sidewalk differential or uplift at the location of plaintiff’s fall. These photographs were marked as exhibits during plaintiff’s deposition, and, according to plaintiff, show the existence of shadows which affect the lighting and visibility of the portion of the sidewalk where plaintiff fell. (Memorandum at pp. 5-6; Pl. Decl., ¶¶ 3-4.)

Wholly absent from plaintiff’s separate statement of additional material facts is any reference to these photographs, or facts relating to the existence of shadows at the subject location. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(3) [opposing separate statement must set forth any purportedly disputed facts with reference to supporting evidence].) “ ‘ “This is the Golden Rule of Summary Adjudication: if it is not set forth in the separate statement, it does not exist.” ’ [Citation.]” (City of Pasadena v. Superior Court (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238, fn. 4, original italics.)

Even if the court were to consider the factual and legal arguments advanced by plaintiff regarding the shadows depicted in the photographs submitted by plaintiff, plaintiff provides no information to show that these photographs “were taken at any time near the dates or the times of day plaintiff claimed [s]he fell or that these photographs showed the conditions on the sidewalk at the time plaintiff fell.” (Huckey, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 1109.) To the extent this information could be found among the documents submitted by plaintiff, these facts are “of no value, because this would have imposed on the trial court the impossible burden of determining both the existence and significance of facts unmentioned by the parties.” (Artiglio v. General Electric Co. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 830, 842; accord San Diego Watercrafts, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 308, 314.)

Notwithstanding the issues noted above, the court’s review of the photographs submitted by plaintiff shows that the shadows depicted in these photographs do not obscure or conceal the sidewalk differential at issue. (Stathoulis v. City of Montebello (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 559, 567, 569 [discussion of whether the pedestrian’s view of or ability to see the defect was obstructed].) For this and all further reasons discussed above, any inferences that may arise from the photographs submitted by plaintiff are insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the sidewalk differential was minor or trivial, or presented a substantial risk of injury to persons using the sidewalk with due care and in a reasonably foreseeable manner.

“The city is not an insurer of the public ways against all defects. If a defect will generally cause no harm when one uses the sidewalk with ordinary care, then the city is not to be held liable if, in fact, injury does arise from the defect.” (Fielder v. City of Glendale (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 719, 726.) For all reasons described above, the City has met its burden to show that, as a matter of law, the sidewalk differential or defect at issue was minor, trivial, or insignificant in nature, and that no reasonable person would conclude that the condition of the sidewalk at issue created a substantial risk of injury when used with due care in a reasonably foreseeable manner. Plaintiff has failed to present evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of material fact concerning whether the sidewalk differential was minor, trivial, or insignificant. Moreover, to the extent plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient to show the existence of a triable issue of fact as to whether the sidewalk differential is trivial or constitutes a dangerous condition under section 835, plaintiff has failed to present any evidence showing that the City had actual or constructive notice that the sidewalk was in a dangerous condition at the time of plaintiff’s injury. For these and all reasons further discussed above, the court will grant the motion.

The court’s records reflect that the City has not submitted a proposed order for the court’s approval. The City shall, in compliance with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312, serve and submit for the court’s approval, a proposed order that conforms to the court’s ruling herein.