Kamron Bateni et al vs Sierra Property Group Inc et al

Case Number

24CV02162

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 11/07/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

CMC; Demurrer and Motion to Strike

Tentative Ruling

(1) For all reasons discussed herein, the demurrer of defendant Sierra Property Group, Inc., to plaintiffs’ second amended complaint is overruled.

(2) For all reasons discussed herein, the motion of defendant Sierra Property Group, Inc., to strike portions of plaintiffs’ second amended complaint is denied.

(3) Sierra Property Group, Inc. shall file and serve its answer to the second amended complaint no later than November 21, 2025.

Background:

This action commenced on April 17, 2024, by the filing of the original complaint by plaintiffs Kamron Bateni (Bateni), Mackenzie Bennetts (Bennetts), Aidan Delong (Delong), Justin Hill-Kocak (Hill-Kocak), and Emma Welch (Welch) (collectively, plaintiffs) against defendants Sierra Property Group, Inc. (Sierra), Manning Holdings, LLC (Manning), John Nastro (John), and Barbara Nastro (Nastro) (collectively, defendants) (Note: Due to common surnames, the Court will refer to Mr. and Ms. Nastro by their first names to avoid confusion. No disrespect is intended).

The case relates to a residential property that plaintiffs allege contained toxic mold that caused them physical illness and emotional distress.

Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint (FAC) on August 6, 2024, alleging seven causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment; (4) tortious breach of the warranty of habitability; (5) negligence; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (7) negligent infliction of emotional distress.

On October 9, 2024, Sierra filed a demurrer to the sixth and seventh causes of action alleged in the FAC on the grounds that plaintiffs failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

Also on October 9, 2024, Sierra filed a motion to strike prayer paragraphs 4 and 5, and all references in the FAC to plaintiffs’ entitlement to punitive damages and attorney’s fees.

On February 14, 2025, the court sustained the demurrer to the sixth cause of action, with leave to amend, and overruled the demurrer to the seventh cause of action. The motion to strike portions of the FAC was only granted with respect to plaintiffs’ prayer for relief for punitive damages.

On February 28, 2025, plaintiffs filed the operative second amended complaint (SAC) setting forth the same causes of action as the FAC. However, plaintiffs include much more by way of detail and particularity. (Note: On August 22, 2025, plaintiffs filed a notice of errata regarding the second amended complaint and provided the two exhibits that were inadvertently omitted from the FAC.)

Sierra again demurs to the sixth cause of action, for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e), on the grounds that the SAC fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for IIED. Sierra also seeks an order striking multiple portions of the SAC that it argues are all a part of plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages related to the IIED claim.

The demurrer and motion to strike of Sierra are each opposed by plaintiffs.

Analysis:

(1) Demurrer

“The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds:

“(a) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading.

“(b) The person who filed the pleading does not have the legal capacity to sue.

“(c) There is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action.

“(d) There is a defect or misjoinder of parties.

“(e) The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

“(f) The pleading is uncertain. As used in this subdivision, “uncertain” includes ambiguous and unintelligible.

“(g) In an action founded upon a contract, it cannot be ascertained from the pleading whether the contract is written, is oral, or is implied by conduct.

“(h) No certificate was filed as required by Section 411.35.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.)

“When any ground for objection to a complaint, cross-complaint, or answer appears on the face thereof, or from any matter of which the court is required to or may take judicial notice, the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer to the pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).)

“[A] court must treat a demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, it does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.” (Travelers Indem. Co. of Connecticut v. Navigators Specialty Ins. Co. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 341, 358, citing Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)

“If the complaint states a cause of action under any theory, regardless of the title under which the factual basis for relief is stated, that aspect of the complaint is good against a demurrer. “ ‘[W]e are not limited to plaintiffs’ theory of recovery in testing the sufficiency of their complaint against a demurrer, but instead must determine if the factual allegations of the complaint are adequate to state a cause of action under any legal theory. The courts of this state have . . . long since departed from holding a plaintiff strictly to the ‘form of action’ he has pleaded and instead have adopted the more flexible approach of examining the facts alleged to determine if a demurrer should be sustained.’ ” [Citations.]” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38-39.)

“To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)

A demurrer searches for defects in the allegations of the pleading. “A demurrer is simply not the appropriate procedure for determining the truth of disputed facts.” (Ramsden v. Western Union (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 873, 879.)

“A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is ‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.’ [Citations.] A defendant’s conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so ‘extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’ [Citation.] And the defendant’s conduct must be ‘intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.’ [Citation.]” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051, internal quotation marks omitted.)

As relevant here, by way of the SAC plaintiffs allege:

Plaintiffs are college students who rented units within a duplex owned and operated by defendants, located at 6650 Trigo Ave., Unit 3, Isla Vista (the “property”). (SAC, ¶ 1.)

On June 20, 2023, Welch, Bennetts, and Hill-Kocak moved into the property and Delong and Bateni moved in shortly thereafter. (SAC, ¶ 6.) Although defendants represented that there was no mold present within the property at the time plaintiffs moved in, the tenants who resided at the property immediately before plaintiffs had informed defendants of severe water damage as well as significant health problems while living at the property. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Evidence of potential mold issues was present when plaintiffs moved into the property, but defendants “knowingly and falsely represented that no mold was present, even though they knew that the toxic mold levels at the property were 150 times the threshold scientifically recognized as dangerous to occupant health.” (Ibid.)

“Defendants are in the business of renting, managing, maintaining, and repairing residential units, including those affected by water intrusion and mold, meaning that they at all times had the specialized knowledge to recognize that the unit at issue had or was almost certain to have significant toxic mold. They also knew, were charged with the knowledge, of what constitutes dangerous levels of mold based on past testing and remediation work at rental units they had owned, and were aware of the significant dangers that such mold had caused to their tenants in the past. Defendants chose to do nothing to address the water damage or existing mold on the premises and instead actively concealed the presence of falsely represented within Plaintiffs’ lease that they inspected the premises, and intentionally or recklessly falsely represented that it was free from mold . . .” (SAC, ¶ 8.)

“Defendants made these false representations with full knowledge of the condition of the premises and the health problems the conditions caused prior tenants-blatantly disregarding the health and safety of Plaintiffs or did so recklessly, because they wanted Plaintiffs to move in and pay a security deposit and rent. The truth was that Defendants knew that the mold levels were and remained at approximately 150 times the toxic mold threshold and the worst that its testing companies had ever seen. Defendants also knew that the prior tenants had become seriously ill due to the mold and that the sheer volume of toxic mold as tested would make any tenant, no matter how healthy, seriously ill and was potentially even more dangerous and/or deadly to tenants with allergies, lung/breathing conditions, and/or other vulnerabilities. Defendants did nothing, or next to nothing, to remediate the mold and instead concealed its existence and falsely lulled Plaintiffs into believing that the toxic mold was not present at all.” (SAC, ¶ 9; bold omitted.) Plaintiffs relied on defendants’ false representations to move in. (Id. at ¶ 10.)

“Beginning in the winter of 2023, and continuing through February 2024, each of the Plaintiffs began experiencing health issues. The health issues notably would improve when the Plaintiffs temporarily left the Subject Property, for example during a holiday break.” (SAC, ¶ 12.)

“On February 13, 2024, Plaintiff Hill-Kocak observed large amounts of mold growth on the walls, window frame, curtains, and even the box spring of his bed. Furthermore, the bathroom wall, which had previously been opened up, had partially caved in due to the presence of moisture within the wall itself. When Plaintiff Hill-Kocak contacted Defendant Sierra about the presence of mold on February 14, 2024, Defendant Sierra knowingly falsely explained it was simply a “ ‘cleanliness issue’ ”, did not acknowledge the serious nature of the problem despite visibly observing the presence of mold in Plaintiff Hill-Kocak’s bedroom, and failed to take immediate action to remediate the health hazard. Defendants knew that this was untrue, and that the toxic mold levels were 150 times the dangerous threshold, but delayed Plaintiff’s evacuation from the unit at issue because they wanted to continue making money from Plaintiffs even if it came at the expense of their health. This was not an isolated occurrence but a pattern of lies and deceit to put their monetary interest above the health of their tenant[s] who were being exposed to outrageous toxic mold levels (the worst that the testing professionals had seen). This wrongful, malicious and intentional conduct occurred with the prior tenants, Plaintiffs, and other past and present tenants at the building, and the wrongful conduct occurred with full knowledge, approval, and/or ratification, of the officers, directors, and/or owners of Defendants.” (SAC, ¶ 13.)

Following mold testing: “On February 19, 2024, Plaintiffs’ mold inspection company notified Plaintiffs that the results were “ ‘the worst they have ever seen’ ” and advised Plaintiffs to vacate the Subject Property as soon as possible. Plaintiffs then notified Defendant Sierra of the results. Defendant Sierra falsely claimed that Plaintiffs could remain at the Subject Property safely, and without further issue, and that only remediation involved removing the wet drywall.” (SAC, ¶ 18.)

“Despite knowledge of the dangerous, toxic mold, Defendant Sierra induced Plaintiff Delong to move back into the property on the false promise that the property was safe to live in. Within 3-4 days, Plaintiff Delong was sick again from toxic mold exposure. Defendants knew that Plaintiff Delong had already experienced significant symptoms in reaction to the extremely high levels of mold and was thus even more susceptible to this repeat toxic mold exposure at such high levels.” (SAC, ¶ 21.)

“All Defendants engaged in outrageous, malicious, unprivileged conduct, described in detail in this Complaint. All Defendants intended to cause Plaintiffs physical harm, emotional distress, and/or the Defendants engaged in the conduct complained of with reckless disregard of the safety of Plaintiffs with the high probability of causing Plaintiffs physical injuries and severe emotional distress. Plaintiffs’ emotional distress includes but is not limited to constant worry over their health condition, worry about where to live, sleep difficulties and severe anxiety caused by physical and emotional illness. Plaintiffs were present at the time the outrageous conduct occurred; and all Defendants knew that Plaintiffs were present. Plaintiffs suffered physical injuries and severe emotional distress and this outrageous conduct of the defendants was a cause of the physical injuries and emotional distress suffered by Plaintiffs.” (SAC, ¶ 69.)

“All Defendants acted willfully, maliciously, knowingly, with reckless disregard and callous indifference to the known consequences of their acts and omissions, and purposefully with intent to harm Plaintiffs, thereby warranting punitive and exemplary damages against all Defendants, in an amount to be proven at trial of this matter.” (SAC, ¶ 71.)

By way of the demurrer, Sierra frames its argument as a pleading issue but is in effect asking this court to determine that the alleged conduct is not extreme or outrageous enough for plaintiffs to recovery punitive damages.

Several of the cases cited, both in support of and in opposition to the demurrer, pertain to motions for judgment on the pleadings rather than demurrers. However, they are still instructive.

“[A] motion for a judgment on the pleadings and a general demurrer are in effect substantially similar and the same rules apply to ruling on such a motion as applied to ruling on a demurrer [citation], and an appeal from a judgment on the pleadings is reviewed in the same way as a judgment of dismissal following the sustaining of a demurrer. [Citation.]” (Peters v. State of California (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1421, 1424.)

In Burnett v. Chimney Sweep (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1057 (Burnett), plaintiffs sued Chimney Sweep for premises liability and other causes of action in connection with toxic mold on premises. Plaintiffs sought, among other damages, damages for IIED. In that case, the complaint alleged that plaintiffs observed excessive moisture and the growth of mildew and mold on the premises, that they notified defendants of the condition, that defendants refused to repair the condition, and that as a result defendants inhaled toxic spores causing them to sustain severe physical and emotional damages. The allegations are not significantly different from the allegations of the present SAC. If anything, the SAC contains more factual detail than the complaint in Burnett. Like the present case, in Burnett defendant Chimney Sweep made the argument that the allegations of the complaint do not describe extreme and outrageous conduct. “Chimney Sweep contends that the complaint’s allegations do not meet the standard of extreme and outrageous conduct required to state a claim. The contention is without merit. In Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 921, the appellate court concluded that the plaintiff tenant had stated a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress by alleging that she had suffered “ ‘ “extreme emotional distress” ’ as a result of the [landlord’s and property manager’s] ‘ “knowing, intentional, and willful” ’ failure to correct defective conditions of the premises.’ ” The Stoiber court observed that whether the failure to act was extreme and outrageous “ ‘under the present allegations, presents a factual question - it cannot be said as a matter of law that [plaintiff] has not stated a cause of action.’ ” (Id., at p. 922.)” (Burnett, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 1069.)

Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1298-1299 reiterated the Burnett holding, and also citing Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, ultimately holding that whether particular circumstances constitute extreme and outrageous conduct, in the context of a habitability action, “presents a factual question.”

The court finds that plaintiffs have pled the sixth cause of action with the requisite particularity and have alleged facts that a reasonable trier of fact could determine are extreme and outrageous. As such, plaintiffs have pled sufficient facts supporting their IIED claim to overcome demurrer. As such, the demurrer will be overruled.

(2) Motion to Strike

Sierra’s motion to strike allegations supporting punitive damages is based on the same arguments as the demurrer. The motion will be denied for the same reasons the demurrer will be overruled.