Lynne Oldham et al vs Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital et al
Lynne Oldham et al vs Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital et al
Case Number
24CV01998
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Mon, 05/19/2025 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
Motion: Summary Judgment
Tentative Ruling
Lynne Oldham, et al. vs. Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital, et al.
Case No. 24CV01998
Hearing Date: May 19, 2025
HEARING: Defendants Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital And Cottage Health’s Motion For Summary Judgment
ATTORNEYS: For Plaintiffs Lynne Oldham and Henry F. Lucas: Benjamin Fogel, Benjamin Fogel, Inc., William I. Goldsmith, Law Offices of Goldsmith & Hull, Markus B. Willoughby, Willoughby Law Firm, Inc.
For Defendants Covenant Living West and Todd A. Fearer, M.D.: Jeffery W. Grass, David, Grass, Goldstein & Finlay
For Defendants Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital and Cottage Health: Louise M. Douville, Matthew A. Yarvis, Fraser Watson & Croutch, LLP
For Defendant Michele A. Armet, M.D.: Mark B. Connely, Jennifer J. Henderson, Hall Hieatt Connely & Bowen LLP
TENTATIVE RULING:
The motion of defendants Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital and Cottage Health for summary judgment is granted.
Background:
On April 9, 2024, plaintiffs Lynne Oldham (Oldham), individually and as the successor in interest to Katherine Lucas (Katherine), and Henry F. Lucas (Henry) (collectively, plaintiffs) filed a complaint against defendants Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital (the Hospital), Cottage Health (Cottage), Covenant Living At The Samarkand dba The Samarkand SNF (Covenant Living), Michelle A. Armet, M.D. (Armet), Camille M. Hunter, M.D. (Hunter), and Todd A. Fearer, M.D. (Fearer) (collectively, defendants), alleging two causes of action: (1) professional negligence (survival action) (by Oldham against all defendants); and (2) wrongful death (by Henry against all defendants). (Note: The court refers to parties by their first names to avoid confusion due to common surnames. No disrespect is intended.) As alleged in the complaint:
Oldham is the niece of Katherine, and Henry is Katherine’s brother. (Compl., ¶¶ 2-3.) From July 22 through September 14, 2023, Katherine employed defendants to examine, care for, treat, diagnose, and perform surgery on, Katherine with respect to Katherine’s multiple physical conditions and complaints which included fractures, limb ischemia, and vascular damages. (Compl., ¶¶ 10 & 13.) Defendants failed to use due or reasonable care or skill in endeavoring to examine, care for, diagnose, treat, provide medications to, perform surgery on, and treat Katherine, which caused Katherine to suffer injuries, pain, hospitalizations, and surgeries, and which resulted in Katherine’s death on September 22, 2023. (Compl., ¶¶ 13-14.)
Covenant Living and Fearer filed an answer to the complaint on May 20, 2024, generally denying its allegations and asserting fourteen affirmative defenses.
On May 24, 2024, the Hospital and Cottage answered the complaint, generally denying its allegations and asserting nine affirmative defenses.
Hunter filed an answer to the complaint on May 28, 2024, generally denying its allegations and asserting twenty-two affirmative defenses.
On June 3, 2024, Armet filed an answer to the complaint, generally denying its allegations and asserting seventeen affirmative defenses.
On July 31, 2024, plaintiffs filed a request for dismissal of the complaint as to Hunter.
On January 27, 2025, the Hospital and Cottage (collectively, the Hospital Defendants) filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that no negligent or intentional acts or omissions by any party or non-party may be imputed onto the Hospital Defendants based on the absence of of an agency or ostensible agency relationship, that the care and treatment provided to Katherine by non-physician staff complied with the applicable standard of care, and that no act or omission by a non-physician provider caused or contributed to the injuries claimed by plaintiffs.
The motion is supported by a separate statement setting forth the material facts that the Hospital Defendants contend are undisputed. The Hospital Defendants submit in support of the motion and the facts set forth in the separate statement, a declaration of their counsel, Matthew A. Yarvis, to which are attached Katherine’s medical records and a “Conditions of Service” form executed by Katherine, which Yarvis (Yarvis) asserts are each maintained by the Hospital. (Yarvis Decl., ¶¶ 2-3 & Exhs. A-B.) The Hospital Defendants also submit a declaration of Kathryn Biasotti, BSN, MBS, CPHRM, LNCC, (Biasotti) who is a registered nurse retained by the Hospital Defendants to provide opinions regarding the Hospital’s non-physical staff’s compliance with the applicable standard of care. (Biasotti Decl., ¶¶ 1 & 4-19.)
On April 29, 2025, plaintiffs filed a notice stating that “they do not oppose the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by” the Hospital Defendants. (Apr. 29, 2025, Pl. Notice of Non-Opposition at p. 2, ll. 1-3.)
Analysis:
A motion for summary judgment “shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (c).) “From commencement to conclusion, the moving party bears the burden of persuasion that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 845, 850 (Aguilar).)
A defendant moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that “one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, supra, 235 Cal.4th at p. 850, 853.) A moving defendant also bears an initial burden of production to make a sufficient prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 845, 850-851.)
If a moving defendant carries its burden of production, this “causes a shift, and the [plaintiff] is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) The plaintiff must set forth specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o).) If the plaintiff cannot meet its burden of proof regarding an essential element of plaintiff’s case, defendant will be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 35 Cal.4th 763, 780-781.)
The pleadings frame the issues to be considered on a motion for summary judgment. (Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1253.) Therefore, to meet their burden, defendants must produce evidence negating the theories of liability alleged in the complaint and further described above. (Hedayati v. Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 833, 846.)
The undisputed evidence submitted by the Hospital Defendants shows that the physicians who provided care and treatment to Katherine at the Hospital did so as independent contractors, that Katherine signed a “Conditions of Service” form prior to her admission to the Hospital which provided written notice that the physicians providing services to Katherine at the Hospital were not employees or agents of the Hospital, and that the Hospital Defendants did not cause Katherine to conclude that the physicians who provided care and treatment at the Hospital were agents of the Hospital. (Sep. Stmt., UMF Nos. 1-2 & evidence cited therein.) For these reasons, the Hospital Defendants have met their initial burden to show that the physicians who provided care to Katherine at the Hospital were not the agents or ostensible agents of the Hospital Defendants. (See Mejia v. Community Hospital of San Bernardino (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1448, 1456-1458 [general discussion].)
The undisputed evidence, including the opinion testimony of Kathryn Biasotti, also shows that the care provided to Katherine by non-physician staff met the applicable standard of care, and was not a substantial factor in causing Katherine’s injuries or death. (Sep. Stmt. at UMF Nos. 3-13 & evidence cited therein; Borrayo v. Avery (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 304, 310 [setting forth elements of proof in a medical malpractice action]; Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467 [“the standard of care and defendants’ breach must normally be established by expert testimony in a medical malpractice case”].) For these reasons, the Hospital Defendants have also met their burden to show that the purportedly negligent conduct at issue in this action met the applicable standard of care, and that there does not exist a causal connection between that conduct and Katherine’s injuries or death.
The burden now shifts to plaintiffs to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact and to rebut the expert testimony offered by the Hospital Defendants. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) As plaintiffs expressly do not oppose the motion, have not submitted an opposing separate statement, and do not present conflicting expert or other evidence, plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to show the existence of a triable issue of fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(2)-(3); Mandell-Brown v. Novo Nordisk, Inc. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 478, 508.)
For all reasons further discussed above, the Hospital Defendants have met their burden to show that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to each of the causes of action alleged in the complaint. (See also Musgrove v. Silver (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 694, 705 [elements of wrongful death claim].) Therefore, and for all reasons discussed above, the court will grant the motion.
The court has reviewed the proposed order submitted on January 27, 2025, by the Hospital Defendants, and intends to sign it.