Estate of Svetlana Leonidova Dayal vs Logix Federal Credit Union et al

Case Number

24CV01984

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 08/04/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion: Reconsideration

Tentative Ruling

Estate of Svetlana Leonidovna Dayal v. Logix Federal Credit Union, et al.

Case No. 24CV01984    

Hearing Date: August 4, 2025                                                

HEARING:              Motion of Plaintiff for Reconsideration of Orders of June 2, 2025

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiff Estate of Svetlana Leonidovna Dayal: Self-represented

                                    For Defendants Logix Federal Credit Union, Ana Fonseca, Timothy Jensen, and Wendy Vannoy: Elizabeth M. Sanguinetti, Litchfield Cavo LLP; Mark K. Worthge, Kaufman Dolowich

                                 

TENTATIVE RULING:

The motion of plaintiff Estate of Svetlana Leonidovna Dayal for reconsideration is denied. The court extends and clarifies that plaintiff shall file and serve her second amended complaint, under leave of court granted in the sustaining of the demurrer to the first amended complaint, on or before August 19, 2025.

Background:

(1)       Allegations of First Amended Complaint

On November 23, 2021, plaintiff “Estate of Svetlana Leonidovna Dayal” (Dayal) purchased a 2020 BMW X6 (the Vehicle) from a dealership, Autobakers. (First Amended Complaint [FAC], ¶ 15.) The price of the Vehicle was $22,498.00 of which $22,444.45 was to be paid by a loan from defendant Logix Federal Credit Union (Logix). (FAC, ¶¶ 16, 17 & exhibit A.) The registration for the Vehicle lists Logix as a lienholder. (FAC, exhibit A.) Dayal issued a promissory note and executed a security agreement (collectively, the Note). (FAC, ¶ 18 & exhibit B.) (Note: The pages of the FAC following page 17 are not consecutively numbered as required by Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.109. Citations to pages of exhibits, in the FAC and in other documents, are to the pdf page of the document as electronically filed with the court.)

Dayal transferred the Note to Logix, but Logix did not deliver money to Dayal in exchange for the Note. (FAC, ¶ 19.) Dayal has no evidence that Logix delivered money to the seller on behalf of Dayal and not merely a book-entry credit or some other form of credit issuance to the seller. (FAC, ¶ 20.) In conjunction with the Note, Logix assigned an account number and made a book-entry credit to the designated account after taking the Note for face value. (FAC, ¶ 21.)

By letter dated December 18, 2023, to defendant Timothy Jensen, the chief financial officer of Logix, Dayal broadly demanded that Logix close the account as paid in full. (FAC, ¶¶ 4, 23-28 & exhibit C.) Counsel for Logix responded that Dayal did not send anything along with the letter constituting payment and otherwise rejected Dayal’s demand. (FAC, ¶ 31 & exhibit D.)

On March 13, 2024, Dayal tendered a negotiable instrument payable to Logix in the amount of $14,275.22, which was the amount that a representative of Logix orally requested for payment in full during a telephone call with Dayal. (FAC, ¶ 34.) The “negotiable instrument” was in the form of a demand note identified as “payment in full.” (FAC, ¶ 34 & exhibit E.)

Logix did not raise any objection to the March 13 instrument nor did Logix contact Dayal regarding the letter. (FAC, ¶ 38.)

On March 20, 2024, the Vehicle was taken. (FAC, ¶ 39.) On March 23, Dayal received certified mail from Logix stating that Logix had taken the Vehicle at the direction of defendant Wendy Vannoy, a Senior Repossession Specialist. (FAC, ¶¶ 40 & exhibit F.)

(2)       Procedural History

On April 9, 2024, plaintiff “Estate of Svetlana Leonidovna Dayal” filed the original complaint in this action against defendants Logix Federal Credit Union, Ana Fonseca, Timothy Jensen, and Wendy Vannoy. The complaint asserted six causes of action: (1) conversion; (2) breach of contract; (3) recoupment; (4) defamation; (5) punitive damages; and (6) unjust enrichment. Plaintiff appears in this action self-represented.

On May 17, 2024, defendants filed their motion to compel arbitration. On September 9, 2024, the court denied the motion to compel arbitration.

On October 9, 2024, defendants filed their demurrer to the original complaint and concurrently filed a motion to strike portions of the complaint. The demurrer was noticed for hearing on January 6, 2025.

On November 15, 2024, defendants filed their motion to preclude Svetlana Leonidovna Dayal from acting as counsel for plaintiff in this matter. Defendants argued that a legal estate must be represented by counsel and may not be self-represented. Defendants concurrently filed a motion for protective order to stay discovery until the issue of self-representation is resolved. These motions were originally noticed for hearing on February 24, 2025, and were opposed by plaintiff.

On December 5, 2024, without first obtaining leave of court, plaintiff filed the FAC. The FAC continues to identify the plaintiff as “Estate of Svetlana Leonidovna Dayal.” The FAC asserts six causes of action: (1) conversion; (2) breach of contract; (3) recoupment; (4) defamation; (5) fraudulent concealment; and (6) unjust enrichment. The difference from the original complaint is the fifth cause of action for fraudulent concealment. The filing of the FAC mooted the demurrer and motion to strike as to the original complaint. In ordering these motions off calendar, the court further ordered that any response to the FAC was due March 1, 2025.

On December 19, 2024, plaintiff filed a motion to compel further responses to discovery that was also the subject of the defendants’ motion for protective order. This motion was opposed by defendants on the grounds including those asserted in their motion for protective order.

On February 24, 2025, the court held a hearing on: (1) the defendants’ motion to preclude self-representation; (2) the defendants’ motion for protective order; and (3) the plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to discovery. At the hearing, the court continued the hearing on the discovery motions with the following analysis and order:

“Underlying all of these is what amounts a mistaken identification. Plaintiff’s original and first amended complaint (FAC, the operative pleading) identifies the plaintiff as ‘Estate of Svetlana Leonidovna Dayal’ and the person appearing for the plaintiff is Svetlana Leonidovna Dayal, ‘Executor for the Estate of Svetlana Leonidovna Dayal.’ Defendants’ point is that an executor of an estate may not be self- represented and may only appear by counsel. (City of Downey v. Johnson (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 775, 780.) This is because an executor is a person appearing in a representative capacity on behalf of a decedent’s estate and not on their own behalf. (Id. at pp. 779-780.)

“In opposition to defendants’ motion to preclude the plaintiff from appearing self-represented, the plaintiff states that she is ‘acting in her capacity as the executor and principal party in interest of her own “living estate.” ’ (Opposition, at p. 2.) A review of the FAC demonstrates that the transactions at issue are all transactions with the plaintiff in her personal capacity. Plaintiff appears, albeit not clearly, to indicate that she has some form of revocable trust which is incorrectly named in the FAC as an ‘estate.’ (E.g., FAC, ¶¶ 1, 16-18 & exhibits A, B.) ‘[A] sole trustee of a revocable living trust who is also the sole settlor and beneficiary of the trust assets he or she is charged to protect does not appear in court proceedings concerning the trust in a representative capacity. Instead, he or she properly acts in propria persona and does not violate the bar against practicing law without a license. ([Bus. & Prof. Code,]§ 6125.)’ (Aulisio v. Bancroft (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1516, 1519–1520.)

“The problem presented by these motions thus is an apparent misuse of legal terminology by the plaintiff. (The court notes that there is nothing before the court other than this apparent misuse of terminology to suggest that any legal ‘estate’ is involved or that the plaintiff occupies the status of “executor” based upon any probate proceeding.) The motion to preclude the plaintiff from appearing self-represented will therefore be denied. It may be necessary for the plaintiff to amend the FAC to correctly reflect her status so as to avoid this confusion in the future.

“Insofar as the motion for a protective order and the motion to compel depend upon resolving the issue of counsel, the parties are ordered to further meet and confer regarding this discovery dispute, in person, by telephone, or by video conference, on or before March 10, 2025. Each party shall file and serve a report to the court identifying all remaining outstanding issues, if any, on or before March 24, 2025. The motion to compel and the motion for a protective order will be continued to April 7, 2025.” (Minute Order, filed Feb. 24, 2025, at pp. 1-2.)

On March 10, 2025, plaintiff filed a “Notice of Meet and Confer Report and Estoppel.” This report stated that defendants sent a proposed stipulation to file a second amended complaint. (Plaintiff’s Report, exhibit A.) The proposed stipulation grants leave for plaintiff to file a second amended complaint consistent with the court’s February 24 order, and set a schedule for responding to the soon-to-be-filed second amended complaint. Plaintiff responded by conditionally accepting the proposed stipulation, but on various conditions including that “Defendants must first provide the evidence they are relying upon to claim that I am acting in a representative capacity for a third party, or that I am otherwise not the real party in interest. If such evidence exists, I request that you provide it in full, along with any supporting documentation, no later than five (5) business days from your receipt of this letter.” (Plaintiff’s Report, exhibit B, p. 11.) According to plaintiff, because defendants failed to provide the evidence demanded by plaintiff, the stipulation was rejected and there was no need to amend the complaint. (Plaintiff’s Report, at p. 2.)

On March 20, 2025, defendants filed a demurrer and a motion to strike as to the FAC. The demurrer and motion to strike were noticed for hearing on June 2, 2025.

On March 25, 2025, defendants filed their report on outstanding issues. According to defendants, plaintiff initially stated that she was willing to amend the complaint to proceed in her individual capacity but ultimately refused to execute the stipulation unless the defendants agreed to multiple substantive conditions. (Worthge decl., ¶¶ 1, 2 & exhibits 1, 2.)

On April 7, 2025, the court noted that resolution of the discovery motions depended in part on the resolution of the demurrer and motion to strike as to the FAC. The court continued the discovery motions to June 2 to be heard with the demurrer and motion to strike.

On June 2, 2025, the court sustained the general and special demurrers of defendants to the FAC, with leave to amend on or before June 17. The court denied the defendants’ motion to strike as moot. In ruling on the demurrer and motion to strike, the court denied plaintiff’s requests for judicial notice. The court also granted defendants’ motion for a protective order in part and denied plaintiff’s motions to compel.

On June 11, 2025, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s June 2, 2025, ruling accompanied by an “affidavit” in support. Plaintiff has not filed a second amended complaint. The motion for reconsideration is now before the court.

On July 22, 2025, defendants filed opposition to the motion for reconsideration.

On July 30, 2025, plaintiff filed and served an untimely reply. The reply was due five court days prior to the hearing, i.e., on July 28. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).) Notwithstanding the untimeliness, the court has considered the reply.

Analysis:

In the motion for reconsideration, plaintiff asserts that (i) the court improperly resolved disputed facts and ignored a presumption of validity, (ii) the defendants introduced no admissible evidence, (iii) the denial of discovery violates due process, (iv) the court must proceed according to the common law as demanded by plaintiff and as guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, (v) the rejection of judicial notice was improper, (vi) the court improperly advocated for defendants, and (vii) the court erred in its interpretation of Uniform Commercial Code section 9207, subdivision (c)(2), and overlooked Logix’s duty to apply proceeds to reduce principal.

(1)       Procedural Issues

“When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (a).)

“This section specifies the court’s jurisdiction with regard to applications for reconsideration of its orders and renewals of previous motions, and applies to all applications to reconsider any order of a judge or court, or for the renewal of a previous motion, whether the order deciding the previous matter or motion is interim or final. No application to reconsider any order or for the renewal of a previous motion may be considered by any judge or court unless made according to this section.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (e).)

“ ‘A party seeking reconsideration ... must provide a satisfactory explanation for the failure to produce the evidence at an earlier time.’ [Citations.] ‘The burden under section 1008 is comparable to that of a party seeking a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence: the information must be such that the moving party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered or produced it’ at the original hearing. [Citation.]” (Dickson v. Mann (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 935, 951.)

Plaintiff’s motion fails to meet the procedural burdens under section 1008. Plaintiff’s arguments are all variations on the theme that the court erred in its prior ruling because it did not agree with plaintiff’s arguments. Plaintiff fails to present any evidence or argument that plaintiff did not, and with reasonable diligence could not, have produced or argued in its motions or oppositions for the June 2 hearing.

This problem is compounded in a technical way by failing to present an affidavit in support of the motion. The document presented with the title “affidavit” fails to comply with the procedural requirements of an affidavit.

“An affidavit is ‘ “a written declaration under oath” [citation], taken before “any officer authorized to administer oaths.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Because ‘the oath-and-affidavit procedure was both cumbersome and widely ignored,’ the Legislature in 1957 enacted section 2015.5, which ‘allows use of “unsworn” declarations made under penalty of perjury’ in place of an affidavit. [Citation.] ‘To qualify as an alternative to an affidavit, a declaration must be signed and recite that the person making it certifies it to be true under penalty of perjury. The document must reflect the date and place of execution, if signed in California, or recite that it is executed “under the laws of the State of California.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Sanchez v. Bezos (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 750, 763, fn. 3.)

The “affidavit” of Svetlana-Leonidovna Dayal neither states that it was signed in California nor recites that it was executed under the laws of the State of California. Stating that it was executed under the penalty of perjury laws of the United States is different and generally insufficient.

Because Dayal has failed to meet the procedural requirements of a motion for reconsideration, the motion will be denied.

(2)       Substantive Issues

Notwithstanding plaintiff’s failure to comply with the procedural requirements of a motion for reconsideration, the court may, on its own motion, determine to reconsider its interim orders. (See Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1108.)

In reviewing plaintiff’s motion, it appears that plaintiff has misconstrued certain aspects of the court’s ruling. Some comment is warranted about these issues.

A fundamental issue exists by plaintiff pleading her cause of actions on behalf of the “Estate of SVETLANA LEONIDOVNA DAYAL (‘Dayal’), by and through its Executor, Svetana-Leonidovna: Dayal.” (FAC, p. 1, ll. 2-3.) Following defendants’ motion on this issue, the court has repeatedly explained that Dayal may represent herself in this action if, and only if, she alleges claims asserted by her individually in her individual capacity or individually as the sole settlor and beneficiary of a revocable living trust. If, as plaintiff now actually alleges, the claims are asserted by plaintiff as an “executor” of an “estate,” then plaintiff must be represented by an attorney. As the court has explained, plaintiff may cure this problem either by amending the complaint to allege the claims in an individual capacity or by retaining counsel to allege the claims in a representative capacity. The plaintiff, who is not an attorney, cannot represent herself in a representative capacity.

The court’s ruling on defendants’ motion for a protective order directly addresses this problem of plaintiff failing to allege a claim where plaintiff may legally represent herself. The court has not, contrary to plaintiff’s suggestion in the motion for reconsideration, precluded plaintiff from conducting discovery. The court has only stayed discovery until the plaintiff is either represented by an attorney in these proceedings or amends her complaint to assert claims that she may assert while self-represented. Once the pleadings are settled, the parties may proceed with discovery.

With respect to the demurrer, the court explained the standards the court applied:

“ ‘The rules by which the sufficiency of a complaint is tested against a general demurrer are well settled. We not only treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but also ‘give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.’ ” (Zhang v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364, 370, internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)

“Additionally, to the extent the factual allegations conflict with the content of the exhibits to the complaint, we rely on and accept as true the contents of the exhibits and treat as surplusage the pleader’s allegations as to the legal effect of the exhibits.” (Barnett v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 500, 505.)

Under these standards, the court does not consider evidence of either party, only the allegations of the FAC, including exhibits attached to FAC. The court does not find any basis to revisit its reasoning for sustaining the demurrer to each of the causes of action of the FAC. The demurrer order grants plaintiff leave to amend so that plaintiff may supply any allegations of fact plaintiff believes would resolve the current deficiencies identified by the court.

As the court noted with respect to plaintiff’s requests for judicial notice, judicial notice is a substitute for evidence. The court does not take judicial notice of legal matter except in particular circumstances that are not present here. Instead, the court considered plaintiff’s legal material, including legal maxims, as support for plaintiff’s legal arguments.

Finally, plaintiff’s citation and argument based upon the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution reflect a misunderstanding of the Seventh Amendment. “The aim of the amendment … is to preserve the substance of the common-law right of trial by jury, as distinguished from mere matters of form or procedure, and particularly to retain the common-law distinction between the province of the court and that of the jury, whereby, in the absence of express or implied consent to the contrary, issues of law are to be resolved by the court and issues of fact are to be determined by the jury under appropriate instructions by the court.” (Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman (1935) 295 U.S. 654, 657 [55 S.Ct. 890, 79 L.Ed. 1636].) “The federal civil jury trial provision of the Seventh Amendment applies only to civil trials in federal court; federal decisions explicitly hold that the civil jury trial provision of the Seventh Amendment does not apply to state court proceedings.” (Nationwide Biweekly Administration, Inc. v. Superior Court (2020) 9 Cal.5th 279, 330; accord, Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc. (1996) 518 U.S. 415, 432 [116 S.Ct. 2211, 135 L.Ed.2d 659]; Minneapolis & St. L.R. Co. v. Bombolis (1916) 241 U.S. 211, 217 [36 S.Ct. 595, 60 L.Ed. 961] [“the 7th Amendment applies only to proceedings in courts of the United States, and does not in any manner whatever govern or regulate trials by jury in state courts, or the standards which must be applied concerning the same”].) Here, the right to trial by jury, whether or not the Seventh Amendment has any application, is not at issue in a demurrer, the purpose of which is “to test the sufficiency of the pleadings to state a cause of action as a matter of law.” (Mendoza v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 802, 809.)

In making its ruling, the court considered the arguments made by the parties in support of and in opposition to the respective motions and ruled accordingly. The court finds no basis to reconsider the June 2, 2025, rulings on the court’s own motion.

Insofar as the filing of the motion for reconsideration has left ambiguous the deadline for plaintiff to file a second amended complaint, the court will extend the deadline to provide a date certain.