Estate of Svetlana Leonidova Dayal vs Logix Federal Credit Union et al

Case Number

24CV01984

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 04/07/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion: Compel Discovery Responses; Motion: Protective Order

Tentative Ruling

Estate of Svetlana Leonidovna Dayal v. Logix Federal Credit Union, et al. 

Case No. 24CV01984

           

Hearing Date: April 7, 2025                                                    

HEARING:              (1)       Motion of Plaintiff to Compel Further Responses to Discovery

                             (2)       Motion of Defendants for Protective Order

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiff Estate of Svetlana Leonidovna Dayal: Self-represented

                                    For Defendants Logix Federal Credit Union, Ana Fonseca, Timothy Jensen, and Wendy Vannoy: Mark K. Worthge, Elizabeth M. Sanguinetti, Litchfield Cavo LLP  

                                   

TENTATIVE RULING:

Hearing on the motion of plaintiff to compel further responses to discovery and the motion of defendants for a protective order are continued to June 2, 2025, at 10:00 a.m.

Background:

On April 9, 2024, plaintiff “Estate of Svetlana Leonidovna Dayal” filed the original complaint in this action against defendants Logix Federal Credit Union, Ana Fonseca, Timothy Jensen, and Wendy Vannoy. The complaint asserted six causes of action: (1) conversion; (2) breach of contract; (3) recoupment; (4) defamation; (5) punitive damages; and (6) unjust enrichment. Plaintiff appears in this action self-represented.

On May 17, 2024, defendants filed their motion to compel arbitration. On September 9, 2024, the court denied the motion to compel arbitration.

On October 9, 2024, defendants filed their demurrer to the original complaint and concurrently filed a motion to strike portions of the complaint. The demurrer was noticed for hearing on January 6, 2025.

On November 15, 2024, defendants filed their motion to preclude Svetlana Leonidovna Dayal from acting as counsel for plaintiff in this matter. Defendants argued that a legal estate must be represented by counsel and may not be self-represented. Defendants concurrently filed a motion for protective order to stay discovery until the issue of self-representation is resolved. These motions were originally noticed for hearing on February 24, 2025, and were and are opposed by plaintiff.

On December 5, 2024, without first obtaining leave of court, plaintiff filed the first amended complaint (FAC). The FAC continues to identify the plaintiff as “Estate of Svetlana Leonidovna Dayal.” The FAC asserts six causes of action: (1) conversion; (2) breach of contract; (3) recoupment; (4) defamation; (5) fraudulent concealment; and (6) unjust enrichment. The difference from the original complaint is the fifth cause of action for fraudulent concealment. The filing of the FAC mooted the demurrer and motion to strike as to the original complaint. In ordering these motions off calendar, the court further ordered that any response to the FAC was due March 1, 2025.

On December 19, 2024, plaintiff filed a motion to compel further responses to the discovery that is also the subject of the defendants’ motion for protective order. This motion is opposed by defendants on the grounds asserted in the motion for protective order.

On February 24, 2025, the court held a hearing on: (1) the defendants’ motion to preclude self-representation; (2) the defendants’ motion for protective order; and (3) the plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to discovery. At the hearing, the court continued the hearing on the discovery motions to this date with the following analysis and order:

“Underlying all of these is what amounts a mistaken identification. Plaintiff’s original and first amended complaint (FAC, the operative pleading) identifies the plaintiff as ‘Estate of Svetlana Leonidovna Dayal’ and the person appearing for the plaintiff is Svetlana Leonidovna Dayal, ‘Executor for the Estate of Svetlana Leonidovna Dayal.’ Defendants’ point is that an executor of an estate may not be self- represented and may only appear by counsel. (City of Downey v. Johnson (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 775, 780.) This is because an executor is a person appearing in a representative capacity on behalf of a decedent’s estate and not on their own behalf. (Id. at pp. 779-780.)

“In opposition to defendants’ motion to preclude the plaintiff from appearing self-represented, the plaintiff states that she is ‘acting in her capacity as the executor and principal party in interest of her own “living estate.” ’ (Opposition, at p. 2.) A review of the FAC demonstrates that the transactions at issue are all transactions with the plaintiff in her personal capacity. Plaintiff appears, albeit not clearly, to indicate that she has some form of revocable trust which is incorrectly named in the FAC as an ‘estate.’ (E.g., FAC, ¶¶ 1, 16-18 & exhibits A, B.) ‘[A] sole trustee of a revocable living trust who is also the sole settlor and beneficiary of the trust assets he or she is charged to protect does not appear in court proceedings concerning the trust in a representative capacity. Instead, he or she properly acts in propria persona and does not violate the bar against practicing law without a license. ([Bus. & Prof. Code,]§ 6125.)’ (Aulisio v. Bancroft (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1516, 1519–1520.)

“The problem presented by these motions thus is an apparent misuse of legal terminology by the plaintiff. (The court notes that there is nothing before the court other than this apparent misuse of terminology to suggest that any legal ‘estate’ is involved or that the plaintiff occupies the status of “executor” based upon any probate proceeding.) The motion to preclude the plaintiff from appearing self-represented will therefore be denied. It may be necessary for the plaintiff to amend the FAC to correctly reflect her status so as to avoid this confusion in the future.

“Insofar as the motion for a protective order and the motion to compel depend upon resolving the issue of counsel, the parties are ordered to further meet and confer regarding this discovery dispute, in person, by telephone, or by video conference, on or before March 10, 2025. Each party shall file and serve a report to the court identifying all remaining outstanding issues, if any, on or before March 24, 2025. The motion to compel and the motion for a protective order will be continued to April 7, 2025.” (Minute Order, filed Feb. 24, 2025, at pp. 1-2.)

On March 10, 2025, plaintiff filed a “Notice of Meet and Confer Report and Estoppel.” This report states that defendants sent a proposed stipulation to file a second amended complaint. (Plaintiff’s Report, exhibit A.) The proposed stipulation grants leave for plaintiff to file a second amended complaint consistent with the court’s February 24 order, and set a schedule for responding to the soon-to-be-filed second amended complaint. Plaintiff responded by conditionally accepting the proposed stipulation, but on various conditions including that “Defendants must first provide the evidence they are relying upon to claim that I am acting in a representative capacity for a third party, or that I am otherwise not the real party in interest. If such evidence exists, 1 request that you provide it in full, along with any supporting documentation, no later than five (5) business days from your receipt of this letter.” (Plaintiff’s Report, exhibit B, p. 11.) According to plaintiff, because defendants failed to provide the evidence demanded by plaintiff, the stipulation is rejected and there is no need to amend the complaint. (Plaintiff’s Report, at p. 2.)

On March 20, 2025, defendants filed a demurrer and a motion to strike as to the FAC. The demurrer and motion to strike are noticed for hearing on June 2, 2025.

On March 25, 2025, defendants filed their report on outstanding issues. According to defendants, plaintiff initially stated that she was willing to amend the complaint to proceed in her individual capacity but ultimately refused to execute the stipulation unless the defendants agreed to multiple substantive conditions. (Worthge decl., ¶¶ 1, 2 & exhibits 1, 2.)

Analysis:

There are four issues that appear to be conflated in the discussions between the parties: (1) plaintiff’s ability to appear self-represented; (2) the sufficiency of the FAC as to the self-representation issue; (3) what a second amended complaint must, should, or may include; and (4) proceeding with discovery. These are interrelated but separate issues.

As to the first issue (plaintiff’s ability to appear self-represented), the court noted in ruling on defendants’ motion to preclude self-representation that plaintiff may appear self-represented (and hence without an attorney) if, and solely to the extent, that plaintiff makes the claims set forth in the FAC in her individual capacity. By contrast, to the extent that plaintiff asserts claims in the FAC in a representative capacity, that is, on behalf of a legal “estate” rather than on her own behalf, the legal estate may not be self-represented, and plaintiff may not appear on behalf of that legal estate. Because it appeared to the court from the pleadings that plaintiff intends to assert claims in her individual capacity in the FAC, the plaintiff is permitted to appear self-represented to assert those individual claims. For that reason, the court denied defendants’ motion to preclude self-representation.

As to the second issue (the sufficiency of the FAC as to the self-representation issue), the court previously stated, “It may be necessary for the plaintiff to amend the FAC to correctly reflect her status so as to avoid this confusion in the future.” In making this statement, the court was simply noting that, because the confusion in the pleading as to whether some or all of the claims asserted in the FAC were brought on an individual basis, it would be appropriate for the plaintiff to consider filing an amended complaint to clarify this issue so that further pleading challenges may be avoided. Because the motion to preclude self-representation was not a challenge to the pleading (and the discovery motions likewise are not pleading challenges), the court did not rule on the sufficiency of the FAC as to the self-representation issue.

To be clear, the denial of the motion to preclude self-representation was based solely upon the appearance in the pleadings that the plaintiff intends to assert individual claims that the plaintiff may assert self-represented. It is a different issue, and one not yet addressed by the court, whether the FAC is sufficient to assert those individual claims. Whether the FAC is sufficient as a matter of pleading is an issue presented in defendants’ pending demurrer and motion to strike the FAC.

As to the third issue (what a second amended complaint must, should, or may include), because the court has not ruled on the demurrer and motion to strike, the court is not in a position to determine whether or not, or to what extent, the FAC is sufficient. Correspondingly, the court is not in a position to address what, if anything, may be necessary for a second amended complaint. It is important, however, to point out that the purpose of the pleadings is to frame the issues for adjudication by appropriate motion or at trial. It is the plaintiff’s responsibility to ensure that the plaintiff’s complaint fully and sufficiently pleads the causes of action for which plaintiff seeks adjudication and judicial remedies. At the pleading stage, the defendant has no burden other than to respond to the pleading within the appropriate time.

As to the fourth issue (proceeding with discovery), the court had hoped that by identifying the apparent confusion in the FAC at the February 24 hearing, the parties would have been able to clarify pleading matters so that the discovery matters would be likewise resolved. Given the unsettled state of the pleadings, and the remaining textual confusion, resolution of the discovery matters will have to await resolution of the pleading matters. The discovery matters will therefore be continued to be heard with the pending demurrer and motion to strike.