Estate of Samantha Jean Curnow, et al. vs. Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital, et al

Case Number

24CV01539

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 05/21/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Defendant Bradley D. Brown, M.D.’s, Motion for Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiffs Estate of Samantha Jean Curnow, Sadie Victoria Khashoggi, by and through her guardians ad litem Kathleen Huff-Valencia and Layla Shashoggi, and Colette Marie Chapman, by and through her guardian ad litem Colin Chapman: Nora Hovsepian, Law Offices of Nora Hovsepian

For Defendants Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital, William Hahn, M.D., and Rohit Sharma, M.D.: Louise M. Douville, Matthew A. Yarvis, Fraser Watson & Croutch, LLP

                            

For Defendants Heather L. Terbell, M.D., Serene Alexander, D.O., Carin L. Craig, M.D., and Wanda Westerman, C.N.M.: James C. Schaeffer, Zachary S. Rosen, Schaeffer Cota Rosen LLP                                  

For Defendants Elizabeth T. Patberg, M.D., and Alejandro R. Soffici, M.D.: Yuk K. Law, Greg R. Bunch, Law Brandmeyer, LLP                                    

For Defendant Bradley D. Brown, M.D.: Deborah S. Taggart, Jennifer K. Villebro, David J. Masutani, Schmid & Voiles

RULING

For all reasons discussed herein, the motion of defendant Bradley D. Brown, M.D., for summary judgment is granted.

Background

On March 18, 2024, plaintiffs the Estate of Samantha Jean Curnow (Curnow), Sadie Victoria Khashoggi (Khashoggi), by and through her guardians ad litem Kathleen Huff-Valencia and Layla Shashoggi (Shashoggi), and Colette Marie Chapman (Chapman), by and through her guardian ad litem Colin Chapman (collectively, plaintiffs) filed a complaint against defendants Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital (the Hospital), Serene Alexander, D.O. (Dr. Alexander), Heather I. Trebell, M.D., William Hahn, M.D. (Dr. Hahn), Wanda Westerman, C.N.M. (Westerman), Rohit Sharma, M.D. (Dr. Sharma), Alejandro R. Soffici, M.D. (Dr. Soffici), Elizabeth T. Patberg, M.D. (Dr. Patberg), Bradley Brown, M.D. (Dr. Brown), and Carin L. Craig, M.D. (Dr. Craig) (collectively, defendants), alleging one cause of action for medical malpractice resulting in wrongful death.

The complaint arises out of the death of Curnow at the Hospital on April 10, 2023, after giving birth to plaintiff Chapman the previous day. As alleged in the complaint, Curnow presented to the Hospital on April 7, 2023, at 38 weeks and 2 days gestation, after a premature rupture of membranes that occurred that day. (Compl., ¶¶ 27-28.) Curnow had a spontaneous vaginal delivery early in the day on April 9, 2023, during which she sustained a laceration that was repaired. (Compl., ¶¶ 30 & 32.)

Shortly after the delivery, Curnow was found to be suffering from lower uterine segment atony, a complication which can cause life-threatening blood loss. (Compl., ¶ 33.) Her lab results revealed signs of infection, and she began to experience significant bleeding, weakness, and pain. (Compl., ¶ 34.) Lab results from early in the day April 10 also showed worsening signs of infection and impending sepsis, and three hours later showed severe metabolic acidosis and septic shock. (Compl., ¶¶ 35-37.) Curnow’s condition worsened, requiring resuscitation efforts, after which Curnow was given a CT scan during which she suffered cardiopulmonary arrest. (Compl., ¶¶ 37-39.) Curnow was intubated and transferred to the Medical Intensive Care Unit, but never regained consciousness. (Compl., ¶ 39.)

Over the next hours, Curnow suffered multiple cardiac arrests and organ failures, among other conditions, and received multiple blood transfusions and intravenous antibiotics, but her sepsis was overwhelming and her septic shock had progressed too far. (Compl., ¶ 40.) Curnow died on April 10, 2023, at 34 years of age, leaving behind her daughters Chapman and Khashoggi, who was 9 years of age at the time. (Compl., ¶ 41.) An autopsy revealed Curnow’s cause of death as streptococcal toxic shock syndrome due to post-partum streptococcus pyogenes endometritis, with disseminated intravascular coagulopathy, multi-organ failure, and streptococcus pyogenes bacetermia. (Compl., ¶ 42.)

On May 17, 2024, the Hospital, Dr. Hahn, and Dr. Sharma filed an answer to the complaint, generally denying its allegations and asserting nine affirmative defenses.

On May 21, 2024, Dr. Brown answered the complaint, generally denying its allegations and asserting twenty-two affirmative defenses.

On June 7, 2024, defendants Heather L. Terbell, M.D., who asserts that she was erroneous sued as Heather I. Trebell, Dr. Alexander, and Westerman separately filed answers to the complaint, generally denying its allegations and asserting affirmative defenses.

On July 5, 2024, Dr. Patberg answered the complaint, generally denying its allegations and asserting twelve affirmative defenses.

On July 18, 2024, Dr. Soffici answered the complaint, generally denying its allegations and asserting twelve affirmative defenses.

On February 11, 2024, the court entered an order granting the unopposed motion of Dr. Hahn and Dr. Sharma for summary judgment of plaintiffs’ claims against them, which was entered on March 19, 2025.

On February 21, 2025, the court separately granted the unopposed and separately filed motions of Dr. Patberg and Dr. Soffici for summary judgment. Judgment on Dr. Patberg’s motion was entered on the same day. Judgment on Dr. Soffici’s motion was entered on March 13, 2025.

On February 28, 2025, Dr. Brown filed a motion for summary judgment against plaintiffs, which is made on the grounds that Dr. Brown complied with the required standard of care in treating Curnow, and that there is an absence of legal causation between any negligent act or omission by Dr. Brown and Curnow’s injuries or death.  

The motion of Dr. Brown is supported by a separate statement setting forth the material facts that Dr. Brown contends are undisputed. The supporting evidence includes the declaration of Erick H. Cheung, M.D., relative to the care and treatment provided to Curnow by Brown.

Dr. Cheung is licensed physician who is board certified by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology, and who has practiced psychiatry in Southern California since 2009. Dr. Cheung’s declaration sets forth his educational background and experience. Dr. Cheung states that he is familiar with the standard of care applicable to psychiatrists such as Dr. Brown when treating patients such as Curnow, and issues of medical causation and resulting damages.

Dr. Cheung declares that he has reviewed Curnow’s medical records from the Hospital, among other things. Dr. Cheung notes that Dr. Brown received what Dr. Cheung characterizes as a common call for a psychiatric consultation after Curnow had become verbally agitated following an argument with the father of the baby, and threatened to leave the Hospital against medical advice. Dr. Cheung states that Dr. Brown was not called to perform a medical consultation or evaluate Curnow for sepsis.

According to Dr. Cheung, Dr. Brown performed a psychiatric history which included a complete mental status evaluation, and that Dr. Brown had no reason to clinically suspect an underlying acute medical condition based on Dr. Brown’s psychiatric evaluation of Curnow. Dr. Cheung also notes that there were no vital signs, lab results, or physical signs or complaints during Dr. Brown’s encounter with Curnow that were abnormal so as to require Dr. Brown to immediately intervene or contact Curnow’s primary care team.

Dr. Cheung opines that Dr. Brown’s psychiatric evaluation and assessment of Curnow met the standard of care for a consulting psychiatrist, and that there was no reasonable indication based on the information available at the time of Dr. Brown’s evaluation of Curnow, to either suspect or initiate an urgent medical intervention or that would have suggested a diagnosis of infection or sepsis to the primary attending physician or team.

Dr. Cheung also opines, to a reasonable medical probability and based on the timing of events in terms of Dr. Brown’s consultation, that there was nothing Dr. Brown  did or failed to do in violation of the standard of care that caused any injury to or contributed to the death of Curnow. Further, Dr. Cheung opines that, even if Dr. Brown had formed an opinion that an acute or emergent medical intervention was necessary, the standard of care would have required Dr. Brown to either trigger a rapid response or contact Curnow’s attending physician, which would not have changed Curnow’s outcome.

The motion is also supported by the declaration of Dr. Brown’s counsel, David J. Masutani (Masutani), who states that certified copies of various deposition transcripts and discovery responses are attached to a notice of lodgment of exhibits submitted concurrently with the motion. Masutani also states that Curnow’s medical records are attached as exhibit A to the notice of lodgment, and that these records were produced by the Hospital during discovery.   

On March 11, 2025, plaintiffs filed a notice stating that they “have no objection to judgment being entered in favor of defendant [Brown] in exchange for a waiver of any and all costs and potential claims for malicious prosecution incurred by said defendant.” (Mar. 11, 2025, Pl. Notice of Non-Opposition at p. 2, ll. 10-18.)

Analysis

A motion for summary judgment “shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (c).) “From commencement to conclusion, the moving party bears the burden of persuasion that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 845, 850 (Aguilar).)

A defendant moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that “one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, supra, 235 Cal.4th at p. 850, 853.) A moving defendant also bears an initial burden of production to make a sufficient prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 845, 850-851.)

If a moving defendant carries its burden of production, this “causes a shift, and the [plaintiff] is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) The plaintiff must set forth specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o).) If the plaintiff cannot meet its burden of proof regarding an essential element of plaintiff’s case, defendant will be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 35 Cal.4th 763, 780-781.)

The pleadings frame the issues to be considered on a motion for summary judgment. (Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1253.) To meet his burden on summary judgment, Dr. Brown must produce evidence negating the theory of liability alleged in the complaint and further described above. (Hedayati v. Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 833, 846.)

The undisputed evidence, including the opinion testimony of Dr. Cheung, shows that the care and treatment provided to Curnow by Dr. Brown met the applicable standard of care, and did not cause or contribute to Curnow’s injuries or death. (Borrayo v. Avery (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 304, 310 [setting forth elements of proof in a medical malpractice action]; Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467 [“the standard of care and defendants’ breach must normally be established by expert testimony in a medical malpractice case”].) For these reasons, Dr. Brown has met his initial burden to show that the conduct at issue in this action met the applicable standard of care, and that there does not exist a proximate causal connection between that conduct and Curnow’s injuries or death.

The burden now shifts to plaintiffs to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact and to rebut the expert testimony offered by Dr. Brown. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.)

Noted above, plaintiffs have indicated their willingness to have judgment entered against them and in favor of Dr. Brown, in exchange for a waiver of costs and any potential claims for malicious prosecution. The latter assertion by plaintiffs is beyond the power of this court, and can only be accomplished by the agreement of Dr. Brown in settlement of the claims asserted against him.

Apart from the above, plaintiffs otherwise expressly do not oppose the motion, have failed to file a separate statement, and have not produced conflicting expert or other evidence to show the existence of a triable issue of fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(2)-(3); Mandell-Brown v. Novo Nordisk, Inc. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 478, 508 [“if a plaintiff opposing summary judgment fails to file a separate statement, and the trial court reviews the moving papers and concludes the motion is not deficient on its face, it has discretion under subdivision (b)(3) to grant the motion”].)

For all reasons discussed above, Dr. Brown has met his burden to produce evidence showing that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that Dr. Brown is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to the cause of action alleged in the complaint. Plaintiffs have not shown that there exist any triable issues as to any material fact asserted by Dr. Brown. Further, the motion is not deficient on its face. Therefore, and for all reasons discussed above, the court will grant the motion.