ESTATE OF SAMANTHA JEAN CURNOW, ET AL. V. SANTA BARBARA COTTAGE HOSPITAL, ET AL
ESTATE OF SAMANTHA JEAN CURNOW, ET AL. V. SANTA BARBARA COTTAGE HOSPITAL, ET AL
Case Number
24CV01539
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Wed, 02/05/2025 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
Motion by Defendants William Hahn, M.D. and Rohit Sharma, M.D. for summary judgment
Tentative Ruling
Nora Hovsepian for Plaintiffs.
Louise M. Douville / Matthew A. Yarvis of Fraser Watson & Croutch, LLP for Defendants Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital, William Hahn, M.D., and Rohit Sharma, M.D.
RULING
The motion is GRANTED. Judgment will be entered in favor of the moving Defendants and there is a waiver and judicial estoppel of all costs and potential claims for malicious prosecution.
Background
This is a medical negligence case arising out of the death of Samantha Jean Curnow at Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital on April 10, 2023, after having given birth to Plaintiff Collette Marie Chapman the previous day. According to the complaint, Ms. Curnow had presented to the hospital on April 7, 2023, at 38 weeks and 2 days gestation, with complaints of leaking and irregular contractions. She had a spontaneous vaginal delivery early on April 9, 2023, during which she sustained a laceration which was repaired. Shortly after the delivery, Ms. Curnow was found to be suffering from lower uterine segment atony, a complication that can cause life-threatening blood loss. Her lab results revealed signs of infection, and she began to experience significant bleeding, weakness, and pain. Her lab results from early on April 10 showed worsening signs of infection and impending sepsis, and three hours later showed severe metabolic acidosis and septic shock. Her condition worsened, requiring resuscitation efforts, after which she was taken to have a CT scan, during which she suffered cardiopulmonary arrest. She was intubated and transferred to the Medical Intensive Care Unit, but never regained consciousness. Over the next hours, she suffered multiple cardiac arrests, and multiple organ failures, among other serious conditions, receiving multiple blood transfusions and intravenous antibiotics, but her sepsis was overwhelming, and her septic shock had progressed too far without appropriate treatment. She died at 4:12 p.m., leaving her newborn baby, and a then-9-year-old daughter. An autopsy revealed the cause of death as streptococcal toxic shock syndrome due to post-partum streptococcus pyogenes endometritis, with disseminated intravascular coagulopathy, multi-organ failures and streptococcus pyogenes bacetermia.
Plaintiffs are the estate of Ms. Curnow, and her two children. The complaint names as Defendants various medical professionals involved in Ms. Curnow’s care, as well as Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital.
Defendants William Hahn, M.D., and Rohit Sharma, M.D., have both moved for summary judgment of Plaintiffs’ claims against them, contending that the care they provided to decedent was always within the applicable standard of care, and that their actions did not cause or contribute to Ms. Curnow’s death.
The declaration of Andrew Wachtel, M.D., is submitted in support of the motion as it relates to Dr. Hahn. Dr. Wachtel is an expert in critical care medicine. His declaration sets forth his educational background and experience. He is familiar with the standard of care in the relevant timeframe with respect to the medical critical care provided to a critically ill patient such as Ms. Curnow. He declares that he has reviewed decedent’s Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital medical chart. The declaration noted aspects of the medical history of the events leading to her death. Dr. Hahn, identified by the records as a second year resident, was not involved with decedent’s care until her transfer into the MICU. He conferred with a first year resident and signed a Critical Care History and Physical authored by the first year resident and authored the eventual death summary. The History and Physical was also signed by the critical care attending physician, Eric Suess, M.D. Dr. Hahn entered various orders into the chart on behalf of the critical care team. Dr. Suess’s attestation note reflected that he had independently performed a history and physical examination, discussed the case and management with the resident physicians, and agreed with their notes. He co-signed except as reflected in the records, and notes that the critical care was either performed by him or performed under his supervision. Dr. Wachtel opined that the care and treatment rendered by Dr. Hahn and the entire critical care team was consistent with the applicable standard of care and was completely reasonable. All necessary critical care interventions were utilized in decedent’s case, and everything required to be done for her was accomplished by the critical care team once she was transferred to the MICU. He further concluded that Dr. Hahn was not independently directing the decedent’s care secondary to his status as a medical resident, and that to a degree of reasonable medical probability, no acts or omissions by Dr. Hahn were a substantial cause or contributing factor to decedent’s passing.
The declaration of Megan Brenner, M.D., is submitted in support of the motion as it relates to Dr. Sharma. Dr. Brenner is an expert in trauma and surgical critical care. She is familiar with the standard of care in the relative timeframe with respect to the surgical critical care provided to a critically ill patient such as Ms. Curnow. She has reviewed decedent’s medical chart maintained by Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital. After reciting the preliminary facts of decedent’s condition on April 9 and the morning of April 10, 2023, Dr. Brenner notes that Dr. Sharma, a surgical critical care specialist, first consulted on Ms. Curnow’s case in the afternoon of April 10, 2023, authoring a note that he had arrived in the MICU to aid in resuscitation of a woman in cardiac arrest, and that given the cardiac arrest and other conditions, it was not clear if she was having ongoing uterine hemorrhage. He outlined what he did, given the dire situation, and what the thoughts were regarding what was occurring, following a conference with the MICU and OB teams, after an ultrasound was performed. His note proceeded to say that she unfortunately would go on to code again, and what they did to allow for better resuscitation and because she was bleeding more now not just from the uterus “but also from all over in DIC type picture.” It further articulated Dr. Sharma’s note regarding the ensuing events and treatments, including the placement of an intrauterine Bakri balloon and the manner of its utilization, up until decedent was pronounced. Dr. Brenner opined that Dr. Shama’s care and treatment of Ms. Curnow was at all times consistent with the applicable standard of care. It is typical for a surgeon to be called upon in an emergent situation without time to fully explore the potential causes of the issue facing a patient, and the labs available to Dr. Sharma and Curnow’s clinical presentation demonstrated a picture of hemorrhage, which is an expected and reasonable conclusion in the post-partum period. It is her further opinion that any reasonable critical care surgeon would have opted under the circumstances to place and employ an aortic balloon in an effort to control bleeding peripherally, and Dr. Sharma’s technique in placing the aortic balloon was reasonable and compliant with the standard of care. Everything that he was required to do from a surgical critical care perspective was done. She concludes that it is also her opinion, to a degree of reasonable medical probability, that no acts or omissions by Dr. Sharma were a substantial cause or contributing factor to Ms. Curnow’s passing.
The motion was also supported by the declaration of attorney Yarvis, which stated that a copy of the authenticated medical records maintained by Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital pertaining to Ms. Curnow were attached. However, the declaration contained no attachments whatsoever, and the motion failed to properly place before the Court any of the medical records upon which the expert witnesses had allegedly relied in reaching their opinions.
Plaintiffs filed a notice that, having received the motion, they do not oppose it. Their notice states further that they would have no objection to judgment being entered in favor of the moving Defendants, in exchange for a waiver of all costs and potential claims for malicious prosecution.
ANALYSIS
For the reasons more fully articulated below, the motion will be GRANTED.
1. Relevant summary judgment standards, generally
A Defendant’s motion for summary judgment asks the court to determine that the entire action has no merit, and to terminate the action without the necessity of a trial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(a).) The procedure enables the court to look behind the pleadings to determine whether the party against whom the motion is directed has evidence to back up the claims. The court must determine from the evidence presented that there is no triable issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(c).)
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must consider all of the evidence and all of the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c)), and must view the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the opposing party. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at 843.) In examining the sufficiency of the affidavits filed in connection with a summary judgment motion, those filed by the moving party are strictly construed, and those of the opposing party are liberally construed. (D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 20-21.)
In resolving the motion, the court may not weigh the evidence. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) Rather, the role of the trial court in resolving a summary judgment motion is to determine whether issues of fact exist, not to decide the merits of the issues. (Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1107; see also Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group) § 10:270.) A triable issue of material fact exists only if the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 850.) Any doubts as to the propriety of granting the motion should be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion. (Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn., supra.)
2. Medical negligence
The elements of a cause of action for medical malpractice are: (1) a duty to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of the profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of the duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the injury; and (4) resulting loss or damage. Hanson v. Grode (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 601, 606. Because the standard of care in a medical malpractice case is a matter “peculiarly within the knowledge of experts” (Sinz v. Owens (1949) 33 Cal.2d 749, 753), expert testimony is required to “prove or disprove that the Defendant performed in accordance with the standard prevailing of care” unless the negligence is obvious to a layperson. (Kelley v. Trunk (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 519, 523.) When a medical malpractice Defendant’s expert witness testimony regarding compliance with the applicable standard of care is uncontradicted, no triable issue of fact remains for the jury to consider, and the Defendant must prevail as a matter of law. (Willard v. Hagemeister (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 406, 412.)
Hospital/medical records can be used as a basis for an expert medical opinion. (Garibay v. Hemmat (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 735, 743.) Although experts may properly rely on hearsay in forming their opinions, they may not relate the out-of-court statements of another as independent proof of the fact. (Ibid.) Certainly, hospital and medical records can be admitted under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, so long as they are properly authenticated. (Id. at p. 742; Evid. Code, § 1271.) Where the hospital or medical records are not before the court, however, an expert medical opinion has no evidentiary basis, and therefore no evidentiary value. (Garibay v. Hemmat, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 742.)
3. Application.
In this case, the Court is faced with the unfortunate circumstance that while the motion was clearly intended to attach the medical records which had been provided to the expert witnesses, upon which they relied in reaching their expert opinions, the records were apparently inadvertently omitted. The Court has no information with respect to whether the version of the motion which was served upon Plaintiffs included the underlying records. Whether or not it did, Plaintiffs filed a notice expressly stating that they have determined not to oppose the motion. Further, they have indicated their willingness to have judgment entered against them and in favor of the moving parties, in exchange for a waiver of costs and any potential claims for malicious prosecution. Of course, the latter assertion by Plaintiffs is beyond the power of this Court and could only be accomplished by the agreement of the moving Defendants, in settlement of the claims asserted against them.
However, Plaintiff’s express statement that they are not opposing the motion can be deemed by the Court to be a waiver of any objections which could be made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(d), which provides:
Supporting and opposing affidavits or declarations shall be made by a person on personal knowledge, shall set forth admissible evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated in the affidavits or declarations. An objection based on the failure to comply with the requirements of this subdivision, if not made at the hearing, shall be deemed waived.
As a result, the Court must assess the interplay between this provision, and the general rule in medical malpractice cases that where the underlying hospital or medical records relied on by an expert are not before the court, the expert medical opinion has no evidentiary basis, and therefore no evidentiary value (see Garibay v. Hemmat, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 742), as well as the general rule of summary judgment practice that the moving party’s burden of making a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 235 Cal.4th 826, 850), is not affected by the opposing party’s failure to oppose the motion or controvert the facts set forth in the motion, since there is no obligation by the opposing party to establish anything unless and until the moving party has by affidavit stated facts establishing every element necessary to sustain a judgment in his favor. (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.)
If the medical opinion declarations have no evidentiary basis and no evidentiary value because of the failure of the motion papers to include the underlying medical records upon which the opinions are based, can that fundamental evidentiary failure possibly be rectified by the mere lack or waiver of an objection to the expert witness opinion declaration?
The Court has concluded that it can do that based upon all the information submitted.