Sustainable University Now vs Regents of the University of California et al

Case Number

24CV01119

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 09/19/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion to Compel

Tentative Ruling

For all reasons discussed herein, the motion of petitioner to compel respondent The Regents of the University of California’s further responses to requests for production of documents, set one, is granted as to request for production of documents no. 17, only. On or before October 3, 2025, respondent shall serve a code compliant, supplemental privilege log in accordance with this ruling. Further, the court awards sanctions in favor of respondent The Regents of the University of California and against petitioner Sustainable University Now, in the amount of $4,770, payable to respondent’s counsel. Payment of sanctions by respondent is due by October 19, 2025. Except as herein granted, the motion is otherwise denied.

Background:

On February 28, 2024, petitioner Sustainable University Now filed a verified petition for writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, directing respondents the Regents of the University of California (the Regents) and the University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) (collectively, respondents) to comply with Government Code section 7920.000 et seq. (the California Public Records Act or CPRA). As alleged in the petition:

On April 8, 2022, petitioner submitted a written request (the CPRA Request) to respondents pursuant to the CPRA, seeking nineteen categories of documents: (1) actual numbers of staff and faculty employed by UCSB for each quarter from April 2011 through April 2022; (2) projections for additional faculty to be hired and who are expected to conduct activities on campus between “now” and 2025; (3) when housing will be available for occupancy by UCSB faculty and staff employed by UCSB and for whom on campus housing has not been offered or provided; (4) the status of the “Ocean Road” project; (5) any contract with developers to build and manage the Ocean Road project; (6) UCSB’s planning process for new or remodeled faculty or staff housing projects; (7) UCSB’s action to “Initiate Planning” of a “New Campus Residential Facility” as referenced in the “SUN-UCSB settlement agreement”; (8) “Preliminary Project Proposals” submitted to the “Campus Planning Committee” as described in the SUN-UCSB settlement agreement; (9) on-campus enrollment numbers for each quarter from April 2011 through April 2022; (10) the “Official Count of Students” for each year between 2011 to April 2022; (11) occupancy numbers for UCSB on campus student housing for each quarter from April 2011 through April 2022; (12) when UCSB plans to offer occupancy in on campus housing for enrolled students who have requested but not been allotted a dormitory bed; (13) projections for additional students to be enrolled at UCSB between now and 2025 including when student enrollment will reach the 25,000 cap; (14) planning milestones for the “Munger Residence Hall”; (15) restrictions to the donation of funding offered by “Mr. Munger” to construct the “Munger Residence”; (16) funding required to complete the Munger Residence; (17) communications with the California Coastal Commission regarding the Munger Residence; (18) plans for other new on campus student housing projects; and (19) plans for on campus housing alternatives should the Munger Residence Hall not be approved. (Pet., ¶¶ 2, 29-31.) (Note: Though the petition asserts that the CPRA Request is attached as “Exhibit A”, that request, and other exhibits referenced and described in the petition, are not attached to the court’s copy.)

Respondents acknowledged receipt of the CPRA Request in an email on April 19, 2022, in which respondents stated, among other things, that there were no responsive or disclosable documents as to six of the categories contained in the CPRA Request, and that respondents anticipate a response to that request around June 13, 2022. (Pet., ¶¶ 32-33 & 36.)

On June 30 and August 24, 2022, petitioner corresponded with respondents by email reminding respondents that the anticipated response date had passed, asking that responsive records be sent as soon as possible, and detailing why respondent’s April 19, 2022, email was deficient, unresponsive, and failed to comply with the CPRA. (Pet., ¶¶ 34-37.) Respondents did not respond to petitioner’s correspondence. (Pet., ¶¶ 34 & 38.) On November 2, 2022, respondents produced some responsive documents though the production remained deficient. (Pet., ¶ 39.)

Respondents answered the petition on April 19, 2024.

On May 15, 2025, petitioner filed a motion for an order compelling the Regents to serve further verified responses, a privilege log, and an “actual” or revised production of documents without redactions, in response to petitioner’s set one request for production of documents (the RFP), and for sanctions against the Regents.

In support of the motion, petitioner submits a declaration of its counsel, Jeremy H. Herwitt (Herwitt), who states that petitioner served the RFP on the Regents on May 17, 2024. (Herwitt Decl., ¶ 3 & Exh. A.) The Regents served its responses to the RFP on July 12, 2024, and produced documents bearing the bates range of “Regents_SUN_0001-0138.” (Herwitt Decl., ¶ 7 & Exhs. B-C.) Between August 27, 2024, and January 10, 2025, the parties met and conferred regarding purported deficiencies in the Regents’ responses to the RFP and the status of any supplemental discovery responses. (Herwitt Decl., ¶¶ 8-14 & Exhs. D-H.)

On January 17, 2025, the Regents served supplemental responses to all but forty-two of the RFP identified in petitioner’s meet and confer correspondence. (Herwitt Decl., ¶ 15 & Exh. I.) On January 23, the Regents served a privilege log in connection with the Regents’ production of documents. (Herwitt Decl., ¶ 16 & Exh. J.)

Between March 19 and May 2, 2025, the parties further met and conferred regarding the purported deficiencies in the original and supplemental responses of the Regents to the RFP. (Herwitt Decl., ¶¶ 18-19 & Exhs. K-L.)

On May 8, 2025, the Regents served a second supplemental response to the RFP which did not include supplemental responses to any of the requests at issue in the present motion. (Herwitt Decl., ¶ 20.) As of the making of the Herwitt declaration, the Regents has confirmed its intention not to further supplement its responses to RFP nos. 1, 2, 5, 7 through 9, 12, 14, 19 through 24, 31 through 57, and 59. (Herwitt Decl., ¶ 22.)

The above summary of information and evidence contained in the Herwitt declaration is not intended to be exhaustive.

The motion is opposed by the Regents.

Analysis:

As a threshold issue, there exist deficiencies in the supporting separate statement submitted by petitioner, warranting a denial of the motion on procedural grounds.

California Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(a)(3), requires that the present motion be accompanied by a separate statement, which must “be full and complete so that no person is required to review any other document in order to determine the full request and the full response.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule, 3.1345(c).) The separate statement must include “[t]he text of each response, answer, or objection, and any further responses or answers...” and “[i]f necessary, the text of all definitions, instructions, and other matters required to understand each discovery request and the responses to it[.]” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(c)(2).) The motion must also “identify the … demands … by set and number.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(d).)

Wholly absent from the notice of and the memorandum submitted in support of the motion is any information identifying the number of the RFP to which petitioners seek an order compelling a further response.

To the extent petitioner relies on the separate statement to identify the requests, information appearing in the Herwitt declaration and described above indicates that the requests at issue are RFP nos. 1, 2, 5, 7 through 9, 12, 14, 19 through 24, 31 through 57, to which petitioner contends the Regents have refused to provide supplemental responses. The separate statement submitted by petitioner in support of the motion does not include the text of or the Regents’ responses to RFP nos. 1, 2, 5, 7 through 9, or 14. (See Sep. Stmt. at p. 3 [commencing with RFP no. 17].) Moreover, the separate statement includes RFP which are not identified in the Herwitt declaration. (See, e.g., Sep. Stmt. at pp. 3 [setting forth the text of and the Regents’ responses to RFP no. 17].) The failure of petitioner to clearly identify the specific RFP at issue creates confusion and prevents the court and Regents from determining the specific nature of the order sought by petitioner.

In addition, the text of each RFP identified in the separate statement shows that each request includes capitalized terms. For example, RFP no. 17 includes the capitalized term “APRIL 19, 2022 RESPONSE”. (Sep. Stmt. at p. 3.) RFP nos. 19 through 24 and 31 through 37 include the capitalized term “MUNGER”. (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 5-17.) RFP nos. 38 through 43 contain the capitalized terms “COASTAL COMMISSION” and “OCEAN ROAD PROJECT”. (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 18-24.) These examples are not intended to be exhaustive as to the use of capitalized terms in the RFP identified in the separate statement.

The separate statement submitted by petitioner does not include the definition of any capitalized term. For this additional reason, the separate statement is not full and complete and fails to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1345.

Further, “[m]aterial must not be incorporated into the separate statement by reference.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(c).) In the separate statement, petitioner incorporates its arguments for compelling a further response to RFP no. 19 into, among other things, its arguments for compelling a further response to RFP nos. 31 through 37. (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 5-7 & 12-16.) The category of documents described in RFP no. 19 is not identical to and is qualitatively different from the categories of documents described in RFP nos. 31 through 37. For example, RFP no. 19 requests the production of documents produced by the Regents to “MUNGER”. (Sep. Stmt. at p. 5.) RFP nos. 31 through 37 requests the production of documents exchanged between the Regents or UCSB, and any federal, state, or local agency regarding “MUNGER”. (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 12-17.)

Petitioner similarly incorporates arguments for compelling a further response to RFP no. 38, which requests documents produced by the Regents to the “COASTAL COMMISSION REGARDING or RELATED TO the OCEAN ROAD PROJECT” into its arguments for compelling a further response to RFP no. 46, which requests documents produced by any federal, state, or local agency to the Regents regarding the “OCEAN ROAD PROJECT”. (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 18 & 27.)

The incorporation of material by reference appears throughout the separate statement. By incorporating its arguments in the manner described above, petitioner has effectively failed to provide an adequate statement of the “factual and legal” reasons for compelling further responses or production “as to each matter in dispute[.]” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(c)(3).) In the absence of specific facts relating to the specific documents sought in each RFP, the incorporated justifications or statements for compelling further responses offered by petitioner are no more than “mere generalities” wholly insufficient to demonstrate good cause for each of the requests stated in the RFP. (Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 224.)

The examples provided above are intended to be illustrative but not exhaustive as to the deficiencies appearing in the separate statement submitted by petitioner. These deficiencies justify a denial of the motion. (Mills v. U.S. Bank (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 871, 893.)

Notwithstanding the procedural deficiencies described above, the court will, for all reasons further discussed below, grant the motion, in part as to RFP no. 17 only, and otherwise deny the motion.

“CPRA establishes a basic rule requiring disclosure of public records upon request. [Citation.] In general, it creates ‘a presumptive right of access to any record created or maintained by a public agency that relates in any way to the business of the public agency.’ [Citation.] Every such record ‘must be disclosed unless a statutory exception is shown.’ [Citation.]” (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (2017) 2 Cal.5th 608, 616, original italics, fn. omitted; see also Becerra v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 897, 913 [noting that the CPRA “does not confer an absolute right of access....”].)

The CPRA provides that “[a]ny person may institute a proceeding for injunctive or declarative relief, or for a writ of mandate, in any court of competent jurisdiction, to enforce that person’s right under this division to inspect or receive a copy of any public record or class of public records.” (Gov. Code, § 7923.000.) “Whenever it is made to appear, by verified petition to the superior court of the county where the records or some part thereof are situated, that certain public records are being improperly withheld from a member of the public, the court shall order the officer or other person charged with withholding the records to disclose those records or show cause why that person should not do so.” (Gov. Code, § 7923.100.)

“The judicial remedy set forth in the CPRA is available only to a person or entity who is seeking disclosure of public records and only where the public entity is allegedly improperly withholding those records.” (County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 119, 127, original italics.) In an action brought by a member of the public under the CPRA, “[t]he trial court’s role is to review the agency’s objections to the CPRA requests in light of the relevant exemptions.” (Wilder v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 77, 84.) “The court shall decide the case after the court does all of the following:

“(a) Examine the record in camera, if permitted by subdivision (b) of Section 915 of the Evidence Code.

“(b) Examine any papers filed by the parties.

“(c) Consider any oral argument and additional evidence as the court may allow.” (Gov. Code, § 7923.105.)

“ ‘[T]he core purposes of the CPRA are to prevent secrecy in government and to contribute significantly to the public understanding of government activities.’ [Citations.] Where appropriate, discovery will further these core purposes by allowing the public to seek evidence that tests an agency's asserted reasons for declining to disclose a requested document.” (City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 272, 287 (City of Los Angeles).) Though “the discovery act applies to CPRA proceedings, the right to discovery nonetheless ‘remains subject to the trial court’s authority to manage and limit discovery as required. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 288.)

“CPRA is intended to ‘permit the expeditious determination’ of a narrow issue: whether a public agency has an obligation to disclose the records that the petitioner has requested. [Citations.] Although many CPRA cases are likely to involve questions of law based on undisputed facts (including, for example, whether a particular type of record is subject to a disclosure exemption), other cases will require the court to make factual findings based on conflicting evidence. In some such cases, discovery may be necessary to test the agency’s assertion that it does not have an obligation to disclose the records at issue. [Citation.] When a party does seek to compel discovery (or seeks a protective order from a discovery request), the trial court must determine whether the discovery sought is necessary to resolve whether the agency has a duty to disclose, and to additionally consider whether the request is justified given the need for an expeditious resolution.

“In assessing the permissible scope of discovery in a CPRA proceeding, trial courts may also look to federal case law addressing the use of discovery in cases arising under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA; 5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq.). It is well-established that because the CPRA ‘was modeled on [the FOIA],’ the ‘judicial construction of the FOIA ... “serve[s] to illuminate the interpretation of its California counterpart.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.] Federal courts have consistently held that while discovery is permissible in FOIA cases, its use is more ‘limited’ than in other types of civil actions. [Citation.] Federal courts have not adopted a uniform test to assess the propriety of discovery in FOIA matters. They have generally found, however, that when the government has provided a detailed factual basis in support of its decision to withhold documents (generally through affidavits), discovery is warranted only if the plaintiff ‘make[s] a [sufficient] showing of bad faith,’ or is able to provide ‘tangible evidence’ that the records have been improperly withheld. [Citation.] Stated more simply, while discovery ‘may be appropriate when the plaintiff can raise sufficient question as to the agency’s good faith in processing or in its search’ [citation], it is improper when ‘sought for the “bare hope of falling upon something that might impugn the [agency’s evidence].” ’ [Citations.]”

“Given the ‘clear legislative intent that the determination of the obligation to disclose records requested from a public agency be made expeditiously’ [citation], we adopt the general proposition set forth in these federal authorities. When assessing motions to compel discovery (or motions seeking a protective order) in CPRA proceedings, the trial court has discretion to consider whether the petitioner has made an adequate showing that the discovery is likely to aid in the resolution of the particular issues presented in the proceeding.” (City of Los Angeles, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at pp. 289-290.)

The first request identified in the separate statement is RFP no. 17, which seeks the production by the Regents of documents “referring to, reflecting, demonstrating, and/or REGARDING all efforts made by REGENTS to investigate, prepare, and/or provide the APRIL 19, 2022 RESPONSE to PETITIONER.” (Sep. Stmt. at p. 3.) Though the definition of the term “APRIL 19, 2022 RESPONSE” is not provided in the separate statement, absent a dispute by respondents, the court understands this term to refer to the response of respondents to the CPRA Request alleged in the petition. (See Pet., ¶ 33.)

In the arguments in favor of compelling a further response to RFP no. 17 advanced in the separate statement, petitioner does not contend that the written response of the Regents to RFP no. 17 is itself deficient. Instead, petitioner contends that “despite [petitioner’s] repeated requests and the extensive meet and confer efforts undertaken by [petitioner’s] counsel, [the Regents] has failed to produce any privilege logs or similar documents describing the documents responsive to [RFP] No. 17 ... that are purported to be privileged and that the Regents withheld on that basis.” (Sep. Stmt. at p. 4.) Petitioner further contends that the Regents’ “failure to provide details or a log of the allegedly privileged/confidential documents that have been withheld” prevents petitioner “from assessing the merits” of the Regents’ claim. (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 4-5.) For this reason, petitioner argues, the court should order the Regents “to produce a code-compliant privilege log that sets forth all documents withheld by [the Regents] on the basis of privilege in response to [RFP no. 17]....” (Sep. Stmt. at p. 5.)

In its opposition to the motion, the Regents does not appear to contend that RFP no. 17 is outside the scope of permissible discovery in a CPRA proceeding. Moreover, to the extent petitioner raises in this proceeding a question or issue as to the Regent’s good faith in processing the CPRA Request or in searching for documents responsive to that request, the request stated in RFP no. 17 appears to fall within the permissible scope of discovery.

In support of its opposition to the motion, the Regents submits a declaration of its counsel, Corrie J. Buck (Buck), who states that the Regents produced a privilege log on January 25, 2025. (Buck Decl., ¶ 7.) A copy of that privilege log is attached to the Buck declaration. (Buck Decl., Exh. C.) The privilege log attached to the Buck declaration appears to be identical to the privilege or “redaction” log referenced in and attached to the Herwitt declaration. (See Herwitt Decl., 16 & Exh. J [describing the Regents’ “January 23, 2025, redaction log”].)

“A privilege log must identify with particularity each document the responding party claims is protected from disclosure by a privilege and provide sufficient factual information for the propounding party and court to evaluate whether the claim has merit. [Citations.] The precise information required for an adequate privilege log will vary from case to case based on the privileges asserted and the underlying circumstances. In general, however, a privilege log typically should provide the identity and capacity of all individuals who authored, sent, or received each allegedly privileged document, the document’s date, a brief description of the document and its contents or subject matter sufficient to determine whether the privilege applies, and the precise privilege or protection asserted.” (Catalina Island Yacht Club v. Superior Court (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1130 (Catalina Island).)

Though the privilege log referenced in and attached to the Herwitt and Buck declarations identifies the sender, recipient, the date of each allegedly privileged document, and the privilege claimed by the Regents as to each document, the privilege log fails to provide any description of each document, including its content or subject matter. For this reason, the privilege log is insufficient to permit petitioner or the court to determine whether the privilege claimed by the Regents as to each document identified in that log applies.

“If the response and any privilege log fail to provide sufficient information to allow the trial court to rule on the merits, the court may order the responding party to provide a further response by serving a privilege log or, if one already has been served, a supplemental privilege log that adequately identifies each document the responding party claims is privileged and the factual basis for the privilege claim.” (Catalina Island, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 1127.) For all reasons described above, the court will grant the motion as to RFP no. 17, and order the Regents to produce a code-compliant supplemental privilege log which includes all factual information necessary for the court and petitioner to evaluate whether the Regents’ claim has merit, as further discussed above.

In the remaining thirty-three RFP identified in the separate statement, petitioner requests that the Regents produce categories of documents which appear similar or nearly identical to the categories of documents described in the CPRA Request. For example, these RFP describe categories of documents relating to “MUNGER”, the “MUNGER PROJECT”, the “COASTAL COMMISSION”, and the “OCEAN ROAD PROJECT” as further detailed above. By way of further example, RFP nos. 51 through 57 describe categories of documents regarding any “ON-CAMPUS HOUSING PROJECT(S)” (a term which is also not defined in the separate statement). (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 30-38.)

Considering the nature and categories of documents requested by Petitioner in the CPRA Request and in the remaining RFP set forth in the separate statement as further described above, petitioner fails to explain why these RFP will aid in resolving any question or issue of whether respondents did or did not have a duty to disclose the categories of documents identified in the CPRA Request, acted in good faith in searching for the documents described in the CPRA Request, or improperly withheld any documents. Instead, the categories of documents described in the remaining RFP, apart from RFP no. 17, are similar or relate to, and effectively restate or expand upon, the categories of documents described in the CPRA Request as alleged in the petition and described above.

“[A] party seeking judicial enforcement of the [CPRA] may not reframe its public records request as a discovery request unconstrained by the narrow issue of whether the [CPRA] requires the public agency to disclose the records the petitioner has requested.” (County of San Benito v. Superior Court (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 243, 263.) For all reasons described above, petitioner has failed to make an adequate showing why, apart from RFP no. 17, the discovery sought in the remaining RFP set forth in the separate statement is likely to aid in resolving the narrow issue presented in this proceeding. For this reason, the court will deny the motion as to these remaining RFP.

Sanctions:

In their respective moving and opposing papers, petitioner and the Regents each request an award of sanctions against the other. The sanctions requested by petitioner total $18,560, based on the time expended or expected to be expended by petitioner’s counsel to meet and confer, prepare the present motion, review the Regents’ opposition to the motion, and to attend the hearing, among other things. (Herwitt Decl., ¶¶ 23-26.) The sanctions requested by the Regents total $18,420, based on the time expended by the Regents’ counsel to meet and confer and draft the opposition to the motion. (Buck Decl., ¶ 8.)

Subject to exceptions which do not appear to apply here, “the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (h).)

As further discussed above, petitioner’s motion was unsuccessful as to all the RFP at issue apart from RFP no. 17, which total more than 30 requests. As to RFP no. 17, the record reflects that the Regents, notwithstanding petitioner’s assertions, provided a privilege log in connection with its response to RFP no. 17. Petitioner’s meet and confer efforts do not appear to address the sufficiency of the privilege log served by the Regents and instead dispute that the Regents provided a privilege log (instead referring to that document as a “redaction” log), and whether the documents identified on that log are privileged. (see, e.g., Herwitt Decl., Exh. D at pp. 5-6 [addressing response to RFP no. 17 and absence of privilege log]), Exh. F at pdf p. 289 [addressing purported absence of privilege log and elimination of redactions]; Exh. L at pdf p. 354 [addressing “redaction log” and withholding of documents on basis of privilege].)

Under the totality of the circumstances present here, the court finds that the motion was substantially justified as to RFP no. 17 only, and without substantial justification as to all remaining RFP identified in the separate statement and further discussed above, which comprise the majority of the RFP at issue in the motion. Further, though the Regents was not substantially justified in opposing the motion as to RFP no. 17, the court finds that the Regents was substantially justified in opposing the motion as to all remaining RFP at issue. For all reasons discussed above, the court will grant the Regents’ request for an award of sanctions, in part.

The principles which govern an award of discovery sanctions include “the principle of reasonableness...” which “means a trial court has discretion to reduce the amount of fees and costs requested as a discovery sanction in order to reach a reasonable award.” (Cornerstone Realty Advisors, LLC v. Summit Healthcare Reit, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 771, 777, 791.)

It appears to the court that the amount of attorney fees claimed by the Regents is excessive under the circumstances here. The amount of the sanctions needs to reflect the reasonable expenses incurred. While the court agrees that some of the time expended by the Regent’s counsel was necessitated by the conduct of petitioner, information appearing in the Buck declaration shows that the sanctions requested by the Regents includes two hours expended by a partner whose hourly rate is $1,500, three hours expended by a senior associate whose hourly rate is $900, and 16 hours expended by Buck whose hourly rate is $795. (Buck Decl., ¶ 8.)

Absent from the Buck declaration and the Regents’ opposition to the motion is any information sufficient to show the nature of the efforts expended by each attorney in connection with the present motion. The absence of this information prevents the court from determining whether the fees requested by the Regents are reasonable. Further, the general information appearing in the Buck declaration gives rise to some question of whether the sanctions requested by the Regents reflect time expended on matters which are not subject to compensation, inefficient or duplicative efforts by counsel, or that this matter was overstaffed. (Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 271; see also Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1326 [describing circumstances sufficient to “support[] the trial court’s conclusion the matter was overstaffed....”].)

Moreover, the issues presented in the motion are not complex. There is also no information or evidence to suggest that petitioner engaged in bad faith during the parties’ efforts to meet and confer.

Under the circumstances present here including the court’s experience with addressing attorney fee issues, the court finds that 6 hours of Buck’s time at the reasonable hourly rate of $795, for a total of $4,770, constitutes the reasonable amount of attorney fees incurred as a result of the filing of the present motion and reasonable efforts expended by counsel for the Regents, for which monetary sanctions are appropriately awardable.

As to petitioner’s request for an award of sanctions, “[i]n ordering a further response, the court also may impose monetary sanctions on the responding party if that party lacked substantial justification for providing its deficient ... privilege log.” (Catalina Island, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 1127.) The amount of sanctions awarded to the Regents herein is discounted to reflect the amount of sanctions appropriately awardable to petitioner to the extent the motion is directed to RFP no. 17 and the privilege log produced by the Regents.

Petitioner’s objections:

Petitioner submits in support of its reply, objections to material appearing in the Buck declaration and the declaration of Monica Dussert submitted by the Regents in support of its opposition to the motion. The court considers only that evidence which is admissible and relevant to the issues presented.